Marriage of Barron

24CA0930 Marriage of Barron 11-06-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0930
Boulder County District Court No. 22DR30321
Honorable Bruce Langer, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Samantha Weston,

Appellant,

and

Ira Barron,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE FOX
Brown and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced November 6, 2025

Jonathan S. Willett, Boulder, Colorado, for Appellant

Aitken Law, LLC, Sharlene J. Aitken, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee
¶1 In this case between Samantha Weston (wife) and Ira Barron

(husband), wife appeals several of the district court’s decisions from

the dissolution proceedings and in its permanent orders. She also

appeals the court’s order finding her in contempt and imposing

sanctions. We affirm and remand to the district court for the

determination of appellate attorney fees and costs.

I. Background

¶2 The parties married in 2004. In August 2022, wife petitioned

for legal separation from husband, which he later converted to a

petition for dissolution of marriage. A permanent orders hearing

was set for April 2023.

¶3 Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 16.2(e)(3) and (g)(5), the parties’

disclosures and witness lists were due on February 6, 2023, and

their expert reports were due on February 13, 2023. Each party

filed timely witness disclosures. The parties endorsed Glenn

Fleckenstein as a joint expert retained to appraise four properties,

including the marital home (Mapleton). Husband also listed an

“unknown rebuttal real estate appraiser” and an “unknown

financial expert.” Wife listed an “unknown personal property

valuator.”

1
¶4 On February 14, husband moved to extend the deadline for

expert reports, arguing that the large marital estate and his

separate property interests required an expert “to assist with

valuing the pre-marital and/or inherited value of the numerous

sizable accounts.” Wife objected, arguing that he did not identify

the type of expert or a reason for the delay. The district court

denied husband’s motion. Husband then endorsed William Kamin

as a rebuttal real estate expert and timely filed a rebuttal expert

report. See C.R.C.P. 16.2(g)(5).

¶5 Because the parties took little action in the case, the court

rescheduled the April 2023 permanent orders hearing for October

23. In late July, wife’s attorney filed a motion to withdraw, which

the court granted in early August. More than a month later, the

same attorney filed a limited entry of appearance to request a

continuance of the October 23 permanent orders hearing. The

motion requested a continuance because the parties had not

undertaken “formal discovery,” and husband’s documentation was

insufficient to trace or value his separate property. The court

denied the motion, finding no good cause. Wife then filed a pro se

motion to continue, which the court also denied.

2
¶6 On October 10, four days after the court denied wife’s second

motion to continue, a new attorney entered a limited appearance for

wife and asked the court to reconsider her motion to continue the

permanent orders hearing. The court granted the motion,

reasoning that the marital estate was complex, neither party had

updated their financial disclosures, and husband’s separate

property would require tracing.

¶7 At an October 20 status conference, wife expressed concerns

about her ability to retain counsel given her ongoing mental health

challenges. She also expressed concerns about her original

attorney’s diligence and effort in the case, requesting more time to

secure experts. The court was sympathetic but explained that the

case had been pending for “a very long time, and . . . the deadline

for experts [wa]s long past.” As discussed in more detail in Part

II.B, the court noted that it would entertain arguments about

whether to extend deadlines but would not rule until it heard such

arguments. The court then set the permanent orders hearing for

February 2024.

¶8 On October 26, a third new attorney entered his appearance

for wife and, on November 15, moved to extend the discovery and

3
expert deadlines. The motion did not identify a proposed expert or

include an expert report but indicated that counsel had

“contemplated contacting an accounting expert to competently trace

[husband’s] assets.” Beyond stressing that counsel lacked

necessary information about husband’s assets and the marital

estate, the motion failed to make any specific discovery requests.

¶9 At a later status conference, the district court denied wife’s

motion to extend the deadlines. It explained that the case had been

pending “for well over a year. . . . [Wife] was represented . . . for

almost a year . . . , and a large amount of discovery and

endorsement of expert witnesses and expert reports . . . ha[d] been

done ad nause[a]m.” The court was also unsure as to what

necessary information wife sought, given that the parties had “over

a year to try to unravel th[e] [financials] and gather the

information.”

¶ 10 The permanent orders hearing occurred on February 27, 2024,

and the court issued the dissolution decree that day. Then, in

March 2024, as discussed further below, the court granted

husband’s motion to hold wife in contempt and imposed remedial

4
sanctions, including attorney fees. Finally, the court issued written

permanent orders in April 2024.

¶ 11 Wife now appeals. She contends that the district court erred

by refusing to extend the expert and discovery deadlines. She also

argues that the court made several errors in its property

distribution. Finally, she challenges the court’s contempt sanction

awarding husband attorney fees. The court did not err with respect

to the deadlines or property distribution, and we affirm its contempt

finding. However, we first address and reject husband’s motion to

dismiss this appeal.

II. Analysis

A. Finality

¶ 12 After the parties filed appellate opening and answer briefs,

husband moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of finality. We

conclude that the issues on appeal arise from final, appealable

judgments and deny the motion to dismiss.

¶ 13 At the permanent orders hearing, wife’s counsel explained the

parties’ agreement that, within forty-five days of the court’s entry of

permanent orders, they would “mediate/arbitrate the division of

[their] personal property so the [c]ourt doesn’t have to deal with it.”

5
Husband’s attorney responded, “I believe [wife’s counsel] captured

it, Your Honor.” The court’s permanent orders divided all the

parties’ property except their personal property, noting that the

parties “agreed to submit the division of personal property to

mediation/arbitration . . . [and that] [t]he Court w[ould] enter no

additional orders regarding division of personal property.”

¶ 14 Husband later moved to compel arbitration concerning the

personal property division, explaining that the parties’ mediation

attempts were unsuccessful. A magistrate ruled on the motion,

ordering further mediation. Husband then asked the district court

to review the magistrate’s order, requesting the court to order the

parties to agree on an arbitrator.

¶ 15 Although the written permanent orders, permanent orders

hearing, and subsequent motions clearly evinced the parties’

agreement to arbitrate, the district court believed it lacked their

consent and therefore could not compel arbitration. But the court

concluded that the magistrate erred by ordering further mediation,

so it ordered an evidentiary hearing before the magistrate to resolve

the personal property division. Husband now argues that the

6
appeal is not final because the personal property division remains

pending.

¶ 16 Our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing final judgments. L.H.M.

Corp., TCD v. Martinez, 2021 CO 78, ¶ 14; see § 13-4-102(1), C.R.S.

2025; C.A.R. 1(a)(1). A final judgment “ends the particular action in

which it is entered, leaving nothing further for the court

pronouncing it to do in order to completely determine the rights of

the parties.” In re Marriage of Wiggs, 2025 COA 10, ¶ 7 (quoting

Schaden v. DIA Brewing Co., 2021 CO 4M, ¶ 46). “In dissolution

proceedings, an order generally is not final and appealable until the

district court has issued permanent orders resolving all outstanding

issues between the parties, including . . . maintenance, disposition

of property, and attorney fees.” Id. at ¶ 9; see In re Marriage of Hill,

166 P.3d 269, 272 (Colo. App. 2007) (Dissolution cases often

involve “intertwined issues” that are “part and parcel of dissolving

the marriage.”).

¶ 17 But there are “exceptions to the rule that a final order must

dispose of the entire litigation.” Wiggs, ¶ 10. For example, a

judgment is final as to a claim when it “completely resolves the

rights of the parties . . . with respect to [that] claim and no factual

7
or legal issues remain for judicial resolution.” Brody v. Bock, 897

P.2d 769, 777 (Colo. 1995). And an outstanding issue does not

“prevent finality when its resolution will not change or moot the

determinations contained in the order.” Hill, 166 P.3d at 271.

¶ 18 Here, the district court entered the decree of dissolution,

entered permanent orders, and explicitly stated that it would “enter

no additional orders regarding division of personal property,”

referring the matter to “mediation/arbitration.” Therefore, the

permanent orders left “nothing further for the court pronouncing

[the order] to do.” Wiggs, ¶ 7 (quoting Schaden, ¶ 46). And the

parties agreed to handle the personal property division separately,

such that it could “not change or moot the determinations

contained in the” court’s permanent orders. Hill, 166 P.3d at 271.

Accordingly, “no factual or legal issues remain[ed] for judicial

resolution” with respect to the permanent orders. Brody, 897 P.2d

at 777 (emphasis added).

¶ 19 Furthermore, when parties agree to arbitrate a particular

issue, “a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider that

issue.” In re Marriage of Roth, 2017 COA 45, ¶ 16 (citation omitted).

Here, the parties agreed to “mediation/arbitration,” which they

8
never disputed in the motion to dismiss or the response.1 After

their mediation attempts failed, arbitration was the next logical step

towards resolving the personal property dispute.2 Because the

court explicitly declined to enter further orders concerning personal

property, and the parties agreed to arbitrate that issue — leaving

nothing more for the district court to do — the court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction to consider the merits of the personal property

disposition. See id.; Wiggs, ¶ 7. Thus, the court’s permanent

orders are a final, appealable judgment.

1 Because the parties do not raise or challenge the validity of their

agreement to arbitrate, we do not address it. See § 13-22-206,
C.R.S. 2025 (validity of arbitration agreements).
2 To the extent that the district court’s review of the magistrate’s

order suggests otherwise, that order is not before us for review
because neither party appealed the various arbitration-related
orders. See Compos v. People, 2021 CO 19, ¶ 35 (noting that, under
the party presentation principle, parties “are responsible for
advancing the facts and arguments entitling them to relief” (quoting
Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243-44 (2008))).

9
B. Discovery and Expert Deadlines

¶ 20 Wife first contends that the district court erred by denying her

November 2023 motion to extend discovery and expert witness

deadlines.3 We perceive no error.

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 21 A district court “has discretion to impose a reasonable

discovery deadline in managing its docket.” Frisco Lot 3 LLC v.

Giberson Ltd. P’ship, 2024 COA 125, ¶ 99 (citation omitted); see

also C.R.C.P. 16.2(f)(5) (courts may extend discovery deadlines for

good cause). District courts also have “broad discretion to

determine whether a party should be permitted to endorse

witnesses after the” deadline. Brown v. Hollywood Bar & Cafe, 942

P.2d 1363, 1365 (Colo. App. 1997); see In re Marriage of Antuna, 8

P.3d 589, 593 (Colo. App. 2000). We review discovery orders for an

3 Throughout her brief, wife does not state whether any issues were

preserved and cites only to the “Location of the Ruling in the
Record” without textual context. Our appellate rules require a
statement (not a mere citation) of “whether the issue was preserved,
and if preserved, the precise location in the record where the issue
was raised and where the court ruled.” C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(A) (emphasis
added). Wife’s record citations also do not follow the format detailed
in our policy on record citations. See C.A.R. 28(e). We admonish
counsel to review our appellate rules, which “are not mere
technicalities.” Cikraji v. Snowberger, 2015 COA 66, ¶ 10.

10
abuse of discretion. Gateway Logistics, Inc. v. Smay, 2013 CO 25,

¶ 13. A court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair or when it misapplies the law. In

re Marriage of Sheehan, 2022 COA 29, ¶ 23.

2. Analysis

¶ 22 Wife makes various arguments as to why the court erred by

not extending the discovery and expert deadlines.4 First, she

appears to contend that her first attorney’s alleged negligence

excused her noncompliance with the deadlines and constituted

good cause for extending them. But the district court noted that

this attorney represented wife for nearly a year, giving the parties

ample time to conduct discovery. And “none of [wife’s] complaints

about [her] former counsel demonstrate an abuse of discretion by

the trial court.” Frisco Lot 3 LLC, ¶¶ 96, 101-02 (granting a

continuance but prohibiting further discovery or expert disclosures

was not an abuse of discretion).

4 Although the court continued the permanent orders hearing, this

continuance did not alter the original discovery and expert
deadlines. See Todd v. Bear Valley Vill. Apartments, 980 P.2d 973,
977 (Colo. 1999) (When a trial is continued for reasons unrelated to
discovery issues, “the discovery deadlines associated with the
original trial date remain in effect.”).

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¶ 23 Wife also contends that the court erred by not considering the

factors in C.R.C.P. 26(b)(2)(F). C.R.C.P. 16.2, which governs

domestic relations cases, instructs courts to “grant all reasonable

requests for additional discovery for good cause as defined in

C.R.C.P. 26(b)(2)(F).” C.R.C.P. 16.2(f)(4). But Rule 26(b)(2) governs

the scope, not the timing, of discovery; it limits the number of

depositions, interrogatories, examinations, and requests for

production and admission. And Rule 26(b)(2)(F) provides factors for

courts to consider before modifying those limits; it does not apply to

discovery deadlines. See DCP Midstream, LP v. Anadarko Petroleum

Corp., 2013 CO 36, ¶ 9 (instructing courts to consider Rule

26(b)(2)(F)’s factors “to resolve a dispute regarding the proper scope

of discovery”).

¶ 24 Despite making several requests to continue the permanent

orders hearing, wife did not move to extend discovery or expert

deadlines until November 2023, over six months after the original

hearing date. Beyond citing a general lack of information, she did

not articulate in detail what additional discovery she intended to

seek. See Ammons v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 897 P.2d 860, 864

(Colo. App. 1995) (denying additional discovery was proper when

12
the party did not identify the additional discovery it sought);

Makeen v. Hailey, 2015 COA 181, ¶¶ 30, 33 (denying a discovery

extension was proper when the party “had nearly eleven months to

conduct discovery” and failed to identify any prejudice).

¶ 25 Even on appeal, wife fails to articulate what discovery she

would have sought, arguing only that she was forced to take

husband’s evidence “at face value . . . because [she] had no other

information and was denied discovery.” Yet it is not clear what

“other information” she wanted. Moreover, the court “never

prevented [wife] from obtaining discovery. . . . Rather, [it] declined

[her] request to reopen discovery, a decision well within the court’s

discretion.” Silva v. Wilcox, 223 P.3d 127, 134 (Colo. App. 2009).

And wife “had nearly eleven months to conduct discovery.” Makeen,

¶ 30. Her attorney’s failure to do so is not an error attributable to

the court. See Frisco Lot 3 LLC, ¶ 96.

¶ 26 Finally, even if the record does not support the court’s finding

that the parties conducted discovery and endorsed experts “ad

nause[a]m,” the court did not abuse its discretion by not reopening

discovery. The case had been pending for over a year, wife sought

multiple continuances without asking to reopen or extend discovery

13
deadlines, her motion did not articulate what specific information

she sought, and her third attorney filed the motion nearly three

weeks after entering his appearance.

¶ 27 Wife also argues that the district court abused its discretion

when it denied her request to extend the deadline for endorsing

expert witnesses. But her motion did not name a specific expert,

provide an expert report, or give any details about the expert

beyond stating that her counsel had “contemplated contacting an

accounting expert to competently trace the assets.” And her

original witness list only included a potential rebuttal personal

property valuator, not an accounting expert.

¶ 28 Moreover, wife objected to husband’s motion seeking an

extension of the expert report deadline so an expert could “assist

with valuing the pre-marital and/or inherited . . . accounts.” Not

only did wife later seek an extension for nearly identical reasons,

but her motion also did not identify an expert despite her objection

to husband’s motion on those same grounds. In these

circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion by

denying wife’s belated request. See Brown, 942 P.2d at 1365.

14
C. Property Division and Maintenance

¶ 29 Wife next argues that, in awarding Mapleton to her, the court

misapplied the law and accepted erroneous valuations. She also

contends that the court erred by declining to award her

maintenance. We affirm.

1. Additional Facts

¶ 30 Before the marriage, husband purchased Mapleton, which

remained titled solely in his name. Both parties asked to be

awarded Mapleton, and the court considered appraisals from two

experts: (1) Fleckenstein, the joint expert; and (2) Kamin, husband’s

rebuttal expert. In its permanent orders, the district court accepted

Kamin’s 2023 valuation of $2.95 million but subtracted the

$420,274 mortgage, leaving equity of $2,529,726. It also accepted

Kamin’s valuation of $1,025,000 at the time of marriage, which it

found was the value of husband’s separate property interest. It

then awarded Mapleton to wife (ordering her to refinance the

mortgage to her name only) but noted that it accounted for

husband’s separate property interest in Mapleton in its overall

division. Finally, the court rejected wife’s request for spousal

maintenance.

15
2. Standard of Review

¶ 31 District courts have “great latitude to equitably divide the

marital estate,” and we will not disturb that division absent an

abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Medeiros, 2023 COA 42M,

¶ 28. A court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair or a misapplication of the law.

Id. We review de novo whether the district court applied the correct

legal standard. In re Marriage of Capparelli, 2024 COA 103M, ¶ 9.

¶ 32 We also review a district court’s maintenance award (or lack

thereof) for an abuse of discretion. See Medieros, ¶ 58.

3. Property Division

¶ 33 “When dividing the marital estate, the district court

determines whether an asset is marital and subject to division or

separate and shielded from division.” Medeiros, ¶ 49; see § 14-10-

113(1), C.R.S. 2025. Once the court distinguishes separate from

marital property, it must divide the marital property to “ensur[e] an

equitable, but not necessarily equal, division.” Capparelli, ¶ 9.

¶ 34 Subject to certain exceptions, there is a statutory presumption

that property acquired during the marriage is marital. Medeiros,

¶ 49 (citing § 14-10-113(3)); Capparelli, ¶ 10. Property acquired

16
before marriage is generally not marital, In re Marriage of Corak,

2014 COA 147, ¶ 11, except to the extent that its value has

appreciated during the marriage, In re Marriage of Krejci, 2013 COA

6, ¶ 13; § 14-10-113(4). Additionally, transferring separate property

to joint ownership during the marriage creates a presumption that

the donor spouse intended to gift the property to the marriage such

that it “is marital property absent clear and convincing evidence to

the contrary.” Capparelli, ¶ 11.

¶ 35 Wife first contends that the district court was required, but

failed, to consider her contributions to Mapleton’s value. Under

section 14-10-113(1)(a), courts must consider contributions to

marital property. The court acknowledged wife’s argument that her

contributions rendered Mapleton’s total value marital. But it

explained that the parties’ “conduct and/or contributions” during

the marriage “d[id] not control the issue of a premarital separate

property interest,” finding that husband had a separate property

interest in Mapleton of $1,025,000. Because husband bought the

home before the marriage and never transferred it into joint

ownership, the court held that he did not intend to gift his

premarital interest to the marriage. See Corak, ¶ 11; Capparelli,

17
¶¶ 10-11. We conclude that the court did not err by determining

the value of husband’s separate property interest in Mapleton.

wife’s contributions had no bearing on his separate property

interest. See § 14-10-113(1)(a).

¶ 36 We also reject wife’s argument that the court did not apply the

correct burden of proof “to rebut a presumption that property

acquired during the marriage [wa]s marital.” Mapleton was

acquired before the marriage, and it was never transferred into joint

ownership. See § 14-10-113(2), (3); Capparelli, ¶ 11. So any

burden to overcome a marital presumption does not apply. And

whether the parties paid the mortgage during the marriage with

joint or separate funds had no apparent impact on the court’s

award; it awarded the house to wife and awarded husband only his

18
separate property interest in it, which was unaffected by the parties’

conduct during the marriage.5

¶ 37 Wife next argues that the record does not support the court’s

acceptance of Kamin’s expert rebuttal evidence because the court

“neglected to address [the] unlikely contention that [Mapleton]

increased in value from [$546,800] when purchased [in 2000] to

[$]1.25 million” when the parties married in 2004. First, Kamin’s

2004 valuation was $1,025,000, not $1,250,000. Second, “[w]hen

dividing marital assets, the court may select the valuation of one

party over that of the other party or make its own valuation, and its

decision will be affirmed if the value is reasonable in light of the

5 Because husband did not cross-appeal, we do not address

whether the court committed legal error in awarding the marital
home to wife. See Koinis v. Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 97 P.3d 193,
197 (Colo. App. 2003) (recognizing that an appellee “must file a
cross-appeal in order to raise a contention that, if successful, would
increase its rights under the judgment or order being reviewed”). In
no way, however, do we endorse what the court did here —
specifically, awarding husband’s separate property to wife. See In
re Marriage of Mitchell, 55 P.3d 183, 185 (Colo. App. 2002) (holding
that husband’s separate real property “could not be awarded to
wife,” but the court “correctly classified the increase in value of th[e]
property during the marriage as marital property, equitably divided
that increase, and entered a monetary award to wife”); In re
Marriage of Sarvis, 695 P.2d 772, 773 (Colo. App. 1984) (ordering
husband to convey his separate real property to wife was error).

19
evidence as a whole.” Medeiros, ¶ 41. And wife never attempted to

impeach Kamin’s 2004 estimate or argue that it was unreasonable.

¶ 38 Considering the evidence as a whole, we conclude that the

court’s valuation was reasonable. See id. Kamin’s 2004 valuation

was $1,025,000, while Fleckenstein’s was $920,000. But

Fleckenstein’s report included a valuation range “from $841,360 up

to $1,113,840.” Therefore, Kamin’s $1,025,000 valuation fell within

the (higher) range of Fleckenstein’s valuation. The court was free to

accept Kamin’s valuation over Fleckenstein’s, and nothing in the

record suggests that Kamin’s valuation was unreasonable for a

Boulder home. See id. Accordingly, notwithstanding supra footnote

5, the court did not abuse its discretion by accepting Kamin’s

valuation of Mapleton when awarding Mapleton to wife.

4. Maintenance

¶ 39 After considering various factors, a district court may award

maintenance only if the requesting party “lacks sufficient property,

including marital property . . . , to provide for his or her reasonable

needs and is unable to support himself or herself through

appropriate employment.” § 14-10-114(3)(d), C.R.S. 2025. Because

maintenance depends on the court’s property division, “the court

20
must first divide the marital property before deciding whether

maintenance is necessary to provide for the requesting party’s

reasonable needs.” In re Marriage of Morton, 2016 COA 1, ¶ 31.

¶ 40 Wife next contends that the court erred by awarding her “an

overvalued non-liquid asset while saddling her with the . . .

mortgage” without awarding maintenance.6 She also suggests that

the court erred by not awarding maintenance because it overvalued

the property awarded to her. She points to the court’s conclusion

that it awarded her over $5 million in assets, which included

$3,943,817 in specified assets, “plus an unknown amount of assets

that w[ould] be divided equally . . . because they could not be

valued.” She contends that the court erred by assigning value to

unvalued assets. We conclude that any error was harmless. See

C.R.C.P. 61.

¶ 41 Courts should generally provide for a spouse’s financial needs

through property disposition instead of maintenance. In re

6 Although wife apparently disputes Kamin’s 2023 valuation of

$2.95 million, Fleckenstein’s valuation was $2.85 million (less than
a 5% difference). See In re Marriage of Zappanti, 80 P.3d 889, 893
(Colo. App. 2003) (“An error affecting only a small percentage of the
overall marital estate is harmless . . . .”).

21
Marriage of Huff, 834 P.2d 244, 252 (Colo. 1992). And the court

may award maintenance only when the requesting spouse cannot

meet their “reasonable needs.” § 14-10-114(3)(d). Here the court

noted that, although the parties were retired, wife’s award included

Mapleton, a separate rental property with no mortgage that would

produce income, and “investment accounts of more than $600,000,”

which would also generate income. It concluded that wife could

meet her reasonable needs without maintenance. We agree.

¶ 42 Even if there was no support for the court’s finding that wife’s

award exceeded $5 million, nothing in the record suggests that she

could not support herself or pay Mapleton’s mortgage with a $3.9

million award. Although she argues that she may need to “sell[]

assets or tap[] into her retirement accounts,” that does not mean

she cannot meet her reasonable needs. She was sixty-three at the

time of dissolution, so it would be reasonable for her to “tap[] into

her retirement accounts” in the near future. And while she

suggests that the court should have allocated Mapleton’s mortgage

to husband, she agreed during the permanent orders hearing “that

whoever gets awarded Mapleton should also be awarded the

mortgage on that property.” See Horton v. Suthers, 43 P.3d 611,

22
619 (Colo. 2002) (invited error applies when a party asks the court

to take a certain action — or acquiesces to an action — of which

she later complains). Finally, although wife argues that husband

received $2,661,394.90 in “liquid” assets, while she claims to have

only received $451,583.90 in liquid assets, much of husband’s

award included his separate property.7 See Medeiros, ¶ 49

(separate property is not divisible). And the court was not required

to equally distribute assets. See Capparelli, ¶ 9 (The court must

“ensur[e] an equitable, but not necessarily equal, division.”).

¶ 43 Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion by awarding

Mapleton’s mortgage to wife without also awarding maintenance.8

7 The court’s conclusion that wife received over $600,000 in

investment accounts differs from wife’s calculation of the “liquid”
assets awarded to her because she excluded business investments
and retirement accounts from her calculation.
8 We also reject wife’s arguments that the court failed to consider

husband’s social security and potential dividend income; the court’s
maintenance decision was based on wife’s ability to meet her needs,
not husband’s ability to pay. See In re Marriage of Antuna, 8 P.3d
589, 595 (Colo. App. 2000) (“For purposes of maintenance, . . . the
payor’s income is relevant to the extent that it is indicative of that
spouse’s ability to meet his or her own needs while meeting those of
the payee spouse.”).

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D. Contempt

¶ 44 Wife argues that the district court erred by ordering her to pay

husband’s attorney fees because it did not impose a proper

remedial sanction after finding her in contempt. Specifically, she

argues that, because the court’s order did not include a “purge

clause,” it could not award attorney fees. We disagree.

1. Additional Facts

¶ 45 The petition for legal separation included a clause restraining

the parties “from transferring, encumbering, concealing, or in any

way disposing of, without the consent of the other party or an order

of the court, any marital property, except in the usual course of

business or for the necessities of life.” § 14-10-107(4)(b)(I)(A),

C.R.S. 2025 (imposing an automatic statutory injunction in

dissolution cases).

¶ 46 In November 2023, husband asked the court to hold wife in

contempt for violating this provision. He alleged that wife

unilaterally received and retained money from one of the parties’

rental properties, which she deposited into a new bank account in

her name. In total, husband alleged that wife improperly retained

24
$19,626.85, which he argued should have been deposited into the

parties’ joint account.

¶ 47 The court held a contempt hearing in March 2024. After the

hearing, the court made oral and written findings, holding wife in

contempt. The court ordered wife to transfer $6,200 to the joint

account and deposit all future rent payments there. It also noted

that it would equitably distribute the funds in wife’s new account

when it issued the permanent orders. Its remedial contempt

sanction included an award to husband of $5,300 in attorney fees

and costs.

2. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 48 Contempt findings are within the district court’s discretion

“and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.” In re

Estate of Elliott, 993 P.2d 474, 478 (Colo. 2000). A court abuses its

discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable,

or unfair or when it misapplies the law. Sheehan, ¶ 23.

¶ 49 C.R.C.P. 107 governs contempt citations and sanctions, which

may be remedial or punitive. Remedial sanctions are “imposed to

force compliance with a lawful order or to compel performance of an

act within the person’s power or present ability to perform.”

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C.R.C.P. 107(a)(5). If a district court finds a party in contempt and

orders remedial sanctions, its order must “describ[e] the means by

which the person may purge the contempt and the sanctions that

will be in effect until the contempt is purged.” C.R.C.P. 107(d)(2).

The court may also, in its discretion, impose “[c]osts and reasonable

attorney[] fees in connection with the contempt proceeding.” Id.

3. Application

¶ 50 Wife argues that the court’s order improperly omitted a purge

clause. In support, she contends that the court said in its oral

findings, “I’m not sure that . . . I can actually remedy anything by

having her move the money from one account to another. The

money exists. The money will be taken into consideration when I

do the final division of property.” And in its written order, the court

explained that it would distribute the funds from wife’s individual

account in its permanent orders. But the written order clearly

instructed wife to deposit $6,200 into the shared account and “to

deposit all future rent payments into the [shared] account.”

Therefore, the court properly described the means by which wife

could purge the contempt. See id. Because the court imposed a

proper remedial sanction that included a purge clause, it was

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authorized to award attorney fees. See In re Marriage of Webb, 284

P.3d 107, 110 (Colo. App. 2011). Accordingly, we affirm the district

court’s award of husband’s attorney fees as a remedial contempt

sanction.

III. Appellate Attorney Fees and Costs

¶ 51 Husband requests appellate attorney fees and costs. First, he

argues that wife’s appeal is frivolous under section 13-17-102(2),

C.R.S. 2025, because (1) she failed to properly cite the record;

(2) the court’s property division and maintenance conclusion are

plainly correct; and (3) wife’s contentions regarding the discovery

and expert deadlines are issues “for the Attorney Regulation Office

against Wife’s prior counsel.” But appeals are not frivolous except

in “clear and unequivocal cases when the appellant presents no

rational argument, or when the appeal is prosecuted for the sole

purpose of harassment or delay.” Good Life Colo., LLC v. WLCO,

LLC, 2025 COA 8M, ¶ 106 (citation omitted). And while we rejected

most of wife’s arguments on appeal, “we cannot say that [they] were

so lacking in legal support that they were not rational” or that her

appeal sought harassment or delay. Id. at ¶ 107.

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¶ 52 Husband also seeks his appellate fees and costs under

C.R.C.P. 107(d)(2). We agree that costs and fees incurred in

connection with an appeal of a contempt order are costs and fees

incurred “in connection with the contempt proceeding.” Madison

Cap. Co. v. Star Acquisition VIII, 214 P.3d 557, 562 (Colo. App.

2009) (quoting C.R.C.P. 107(d)(2)); see In re Marriage of Dean, 2017

COA 51, ¶ 33. However, husband is entitled only to his attorney

fees and costs incurred with respect to the contempt portion of the

appeal. See Madison Cap. Co., 214 P.3d at 562. We therefore

exercise our discretion under C.A.R. 39.1 and remand for the

district court to determine an award of husband’s reasonable

appellate attorney fees and costs incurred for defending the

contempt portion of the appeal.

IV. Disposition

¶ 53 The judgment is affirmed. We remand the case so the district

court may determine an appropriate award of reasonable appellate

attorney fees and costs in accordance with this opinion.

JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.

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