Marriage of Pittman

24CA2072 Marriage of Pittman 10-30-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA2072
Douglas County District Court No. 23DR30656
Honorable Andrew C. Baum, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Taylor J. Pittman,

Appellee,

and

Christina D. Pittman n/k/a Christina L. DeMichelis,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE FOX
Meirink and Hawthorne*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 30, 2025

The W Law, Emily Warren, Jon Eric Stuebner, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee

Christina D. Pittman n/k/a Christina L. DeMichelis, Pro Se

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 The district court dissolved the marriage of Taylor J. Pittman

(father) and Christina D. Pittman n/k/a Christina L. DeMichelis

(mother), and it entered permanent orders (1) allocating parenting

time and decision-making; (2) dividing the marital property;

(3) ordering father to pay future maintenance and child support

(but denying retroactive awards); (4) allowing the parties to file an

amended joint tax return; and (5) declining to award mother’s

unpaid attorney fees. Mother appeals various aspects of the court’s

permanent orders. We affirm except as to the portion of the court’s

order allowing father to offset his child support obligations against

various debts mother owed him.

I. Background

¶2 The parties were married in 2019 and had two daughters, G.P.

(born in 2020) and L.P. (born in 2022). Father petitioned for

dissolution of marriage in August 2023. Mother was represented by

counsel from August 2023 until June 2024, at which point she

proceeded pro se. A permanent orders hearing occurred on

September 23 and 24, 2024. The district court issued the

dissolution decree after the hearing. It then issued written

permanent orders on October 18, 2024, and amended written

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permanent orders on January 16, 2025. We address mother’s

challenges to the permanent orders below.

II. Educational Decision-Making

¶3 Mother first contends that the district court erred by depriving

her of the right to make appropriate educational decisions for the

children and contends that the district court violated her due

process rights by restricting her ability to object and present

evidence. We discern no error.

A. Relevant Facts

¶4 The parties’ children were both under five years old when the

court issued permanent orders. G.P. was diagnosed with autism

spectrum disorder (ASD), and her condition requires specialized

behavioral care, occupational therapy, and speech therapy. During

the dissolution proceeding, mother assumed much of G.P.’s and

L.P.’s care in the marital home(s).

¶5 At the permanent orders hearing, the district court made

findings concerning decision-making and parenting time.1 It

1 Consistent with the recommendations of the child and family

investigator, the court allocated parenting time in phases, and
father’s parenting time increased with each phase. The court also
detailed a process and timelines for the parents’ communication.

2
acknowledged that G.P.’s ASD required her to have additional

support services. It also recognized that both parents fully

supported all aspects of G.P.’s therapy and that the parents and

G.P.’s therapy providers jointly agreed to focus on that therapy,

rather than placing G.P. in school for the 2024-2025 school year.

¶6 Guided by section 14-10-124(1.5)(a) and (b), C.R.S. 2025, the

district court addressed the applicable factors before allocating joint

decision-making to both parents for “all major issues including

health and medical care, orthodontics, mental health, education,

religion, and extracurricular activities.” However, when the

children were in the care of a particular parent, that parent could

make day-to-day or routine decisions about the children.

¶7 As relevant to mother’s appeal, the court’s January 16, 2025,

amended permanent orders acknowledged mother’s request that the

children attend private school. It also noted father’s concerns

about the financial burdens associated with a private school

setting. While the court did not prohibit a private school option

indefinitely, it concluded that until both parties had paid the

marital and separate debt allocated to them, a private school option

was not feasible. The court also set a target date of twenty-four

3
months to pay off the debt (excluding mother’s student loan debt)

so that the parents could then revisit a private school option.

B. Legal Principles

¶8 The district court has broad discretion over the allocation of

parental decision-making responsibilities. In re Marriage of Morgan,

2018 COA 116M, ¶ 23. We will not disturb the court’s decision

absent a showing that the court acted in a manner that was

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or that misapplied the

law. In re Marriage of Pawelec, 2024 COA 107, ¶ 45. And we will

uphold the court’s decision when the evidence supports it. In re

Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 330 (Colo. App. 2007); see Van

Gundy v. Van Gundy, 2012 COA 194, ¶ 12 (reviewing factual

findings for clear error).

¶9 Section 14-10-130(1), C.R.S. 2025, provides that “the person

or persons with responsibility for decision-making may determine the

child’s upbringing, including his or her education.” (Emphasis

added.) Where joint decision-making is allocated, both parents are

“persons with responsibility for decision-making [who] may

determine the child’s . . . education.” Id. But when those parents

cannot responsibly discharge their duty to make a particular

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decision, a court is sometimes left with no alternative but to do so.

In re Marriage of Thomas, 2021 COA 123, ¶¶ 36-38.

C. Discussion

¶ 10 Mother argues that the district court erred by tying the

children’s educational options to the parents’ debt repayment. She

disagrees with the court’s decision about where the children will be

educated. But the court’s findings enjoy record support, so we

cannot disturb them. See Hatton, 160 P.3d at 330; see also In re

Parental Responsibilities Concerning S.Z.S., 2022 COA 105, ¶ 28

(recognizing that we may not reweigh the court’s resolution of

conflicting evidence).

¶ 11 Mother testified that she wanted both children to attend

private school. She elaborated on the resources available at

Compositive Primary, a private school. Father countered that his

main objection to private school was that he and mother lack the

funds to pay $20,000 annually per child — or $40,000 for both

children — to attend private school. He also relied on the fact that,

in anticipation of the 2025-2026 school year, G.P. had an

individualized education plan to address her specific needs, which a

public school had to abide by, while the private school could choose

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to send G.P. home for behavioral issues. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.137(a)

(2024) (“No parentally-placed private school child with a disability

has an individual right to receive some or all of the special

education and related services that the child would receive if

enrolled in a public school.”). Moreover, father testified about the

family’s debt, including their unsuccessful attempts to manage that

debt. Even with the generous tuition assistance mother now

invokes, citing the child and family investigator’s report, this family

was simply in no position to incur the added expense of private

school tuition for either child. Mother’s own brief acknowledges

that the parties’ debt exceeds $177,000. The debt included credit

card debt, tax liability, and mother’s student loan balance (and

excluded loans from family members and attorney fee debt for both

parties).

¶ 12 Thomas is instructive here. There, a division of this court

recognized that when the parents “reach[] an impasse in making a

major decision they [are] obligated to make together,” the district

court has the authority to break “a parental deadlock between joint

decision-makers.” Thomas, ¶¶ 36, 38; see also In re Marriage of

Dauwe, 148 P.3d 282, 285 (Colo. App. 2006) (upholding an order

6
granting the mother the authority to obtain therapy for the children

because it resolved a longstanding dispute).

¶ 13 Seeing no reason to depart from the holding in Thomas, we

reject mother’s contention that the district court erred by not

allowing her to dictate where the children attend school when both

parents could not agree. Notably, the court did not foreclose the

parents’ ability to revisit the private school issue after they paid

their considerable debt (marital and separate but excluding

mother’s student loan debt). The prospective component of the

court’s order is not challenged here, so we need not address it. See

Compos v. People, 2021 CO 19, ¶ 35 (noting that under the party

presentation principle, parties “are responsible for advancing the

facts and arguments entitling them to relief” (quoting Greenlaw v.

United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243-44 (2008))).

¶ 14 To the extent mother raises other challenges to the court’s

decision regarding the children’s education, she does not show how

the federal education laws she references conflict with or displace

Colorado law concerning families and children. See, e.g., § 14-10-

104.5, C.R.S. 2025; see also Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, Minneapolis

Pub. Schs. v. R.M.M., 861 F.3d 769, 775 (8th Cir. 2017) (federal law

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“limits the obligations a state owes to disabled children enrolled in

private schools”). On appeal she now offers other options the

district court should have considered, but she did not present all

those options to the district court. See Bertoia v. Galaxy Mgmt. Co.,

2025 COA 55, ¶ 40 (new arguments may not be raised for the first

time on appeal).

¶ 15 Regarding her claim that she was not afforded due process,

regrettably many Colorado families do not have the benefit of two

days’ worth of the court’s time. The court generously afforded this

family a two-day permanent orders hearing, perhaps in part to

accommodate mother’s pro se status.2 Under the circumstances —

and absent an offer of proof during the hearing about what evidence

mother proffered and was not allowed to present — we cannot

conclude that she was deprived of due process in any way. See

Galiant Homes, LLC v. Herlik, 2025 COA 3, ¶¶ 50-66.

¶ 16 Each side had equal time, and in the time that remained, the

court invited mother to present anything else she wished the court

2 While the court gave mother leeway, it was ultimately her

responsibility to follow the court’s rules at the district level and on
appeal. See Yadon v. Southward, 64 P.3d 909, 912 (Colo. App.
2002) (pro se parties must adhere to the court rules).

8
to consider. She chose to use her remaining time to argue that she

should have been awarded funds to hire counsel and that father

should be ordered to pay her unpaid attorney fees (the balance due

before her attorney withdrew). She offered no other exhibits or

testimony. See id. at ¶¶ 65-66.

¶ 17 All told, mother and father reached an impasse in making a

major decision they were obligated to make together — how to

educate their children. Because they could not resolve the dispute,

the district court appropriately exercised its authority to do so. See

Thomas, ¶¶ 36-38. We therefore discern no error.

III. Child Support and Maintenance

¶ 18 Mother next contends that the court erred in its child support

and maintenance determinations because it (1) failed to impute to

father all income he earned; (2) improperly imputed income to her;

(3) omitted child care expenses; (4) granted father a $583 monthly

credit for extraordinary expenses; (5) offset various debts against

father’s child support and maintenance obligations; (6) denied her

retroactive maintenance and child support; and (7) ordered the

parties to file joint tax returns. We largely disagree with her

9
contentions but conclude that the court erred by allowing father to

offset his child support obligation against debts mother owed him.

A. Relevant Facts

¶ 19 Following a two-hour temporary orders hearing, the district

court ordered father, on a temporary basis, to pay mother $3,530

monthly in child support and $3,625 monthly in maintenance for a

total of $7,155 each month (paid in weekly installments). Later,

based on the evidence presented at the two-day permanent orders

hearing, the court observed that mother and father lived well

beyond their means during the marriage and now face a “crushing

mountain of debt.”

¶ 20 To meet his temporary obligation, father added two jobs to his

regular job. At the permanent orders hearing, father testified that

he did not plan to continue working three jobs. Father’s primary

full-time job grossed $13,212 per month. Mother disclosed that she

earned $1,222 per month from part-time work (twelve to sixteen

hours per week). Both parties referenced their monthly expenses

and debt.

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B. Standard of Review

¶ 21 We review maintenance and child support orders for an abuse

of discretion because “the issue of the [parties’] financial resources

is factual in nature,” but we review de novo whether the trial court

applied the correct legal standard to its factual findings. In re

Marriage of Davis, 252 P.3d 530, 533 (Colo. App. 2011); see also In

re Marriage of Wells, 252 P.3d 1212, 1213 (Colo. App. 2011) (child

support); In re Marriage of Medeiros, 2023 COA 42M, ¶ 28

(maintenance).

¶ 22 Whether a party is “voluntarily underemployed” presents a

mixed legal and factual question under section 14-10-114(8)(c)(IV),

C.R.S. 2025. People in Interest of J.R.T. v. Martinez, 70 P.3d 474,

476-77 (Colo. 2003). We defer to the district court’s factual findings

if they are supported by the record and review its legal conclusions

de novo. In re Marriage of Garrett, 2018 COA 154, ¶ 9.

C. Legal Principles

1. Calculating Maintenance and Child Support

¶ 23 The court addresses maintenance after dividing the marital

assets and debt. See In re Marriage of Morton, 2016 COA 1, ¶ 31;

see also § 14-10-113(1), C.R.S. 2025. Section 14-10-114(3) details

11
the process a trial court must follow when considering a

maintenance request. In re Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 13.

The court must first make findings concerning (1) the amount of

each party’s gross income; (2) the marital property distributed to

each party; (3) each party’s financial resources; (4) the reasonable

financial need established during the marriage; and (5) whether the

maintenance award would be deductible for federal income tax

purposes. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I); see Wright, ¶ 14.

¶ 24 After making these initial findings, the court must determine

“the amount and term of the maintenance award, if any, that is fair

and equitable to both parties.” § 14-10-114(3)(a)(II); Wright, ¶ 15.

The court need not make explicit factual findings about each factor

in section 14-10-114(3)(c), which governs the amount and duration

of maintenance, as long as the record shows that it meaningfully

considered the factors and it provides us with a clear

understanding of the basis for its decision. Wright, ¶ 20.

¶ 25 “After calculating the maintenance award, the court may

determine child support obligations.” In re Marriage of de Koning,

2016 CO 2, ¶ 22. To determine the amount of a child support

award, the court must consider several factors, including — as

12
relevant here — both parents’ financial resources. § 14-10-

115(2)(b), C.R.S. 2025.

2. Determination of Parties’ Income

¶ 26 The district court generally determines child support and

maintenance based on the parties’ gross incomes. § 14-10-

114(3)(a)(I)(A), (8)(c) (maintenance); § 14-10-115(5)(a)(I) (child

support). “Gross income” means income from any source and

includes potential income for a party who the court finds is

voluntarily underemployed. § 14-10-114(8)(c)(I), (IV); § 14-10-

115(3)(c), (5)(a)(I), (5)(b)(I). However, gross income does not include

“[i]ncome from additional jobs that result in . . . employment of . . .

more than forty hours per week or more than what would otherwise

be considered to be full-time employment.” § 14-10-114(8)(c)(II)(C);

§ 14-10-115(5)(a)(II)(C).

¶ 27 If a parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, the

court must calculate child support and maintenance based on the

parent’s potential, not actual, income.3 § 14-10-114(8)(c)(IV); § 14-

3 “Potential income” is “the amount a party could earn from a full-

time job commensurate with the party’s demonstrated earning
ability.” In re Marriage of Tooker, 2019 COA 83, ¶ 26

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10-115(5)(b)(I). A party is voluntarily underemployed if the court

finds they are “unreasonably for[]going higher paying employment

that [they] could obtain.” Martinez, 70 P.3d at 476.

D. Analysis

1. Parties’ Income

¶ 28 The court awarded the marital home (Cedar Circle) and an

Infinity vehicle to mother. The home had $65,000 in net equity,

and the car was valued at $15,000. The court also allocated

$28,900 in credit card debt to mother. The court awarded father

his retirement accounts, a Volvo vehicle, and significant debt. It

valued the retirement accounts at $52,000, the Volvo at $4,000,

and the debt at approximately $75,500.

¶ 29 After explaining that it was applying the operative statute and

cases, the court made the following factual findings:

• Father’s gross monthly income for maintenance purposes

was $13,212 based on his full-time employment at TJX.

The court acknowledged that it could not factor

additional jobs into the calculation.

• Mother’s monthly income was $1,222 based on part-time

work of twelve to sixteen hours per week. The court

14
declined to find that mother was voluntarily

underemployed, noting that she was enrolled in an

Executive Masters program in Health Administration. It

also refused to impute the $68,000 per year she earned

before the children were born.

• Recognizing that it could only credit father for uninsured

extraordinary medical expenses of over $250 per child

per year, the court accepted that father’s out-of-pocket

medical insurance expenses were $7,000 annually or

$583 monthly ($7,500 in actual expenses less $250 per

child).

• Based on its calculations, the court concluded that father

owed mother $896 per month in child support. Starting

November 1, 2024, it ordered father to make two equal

monthly payments into the Family Support Registry.

¶ 30 Applying the statutory maintenance factors, the court also

awarded mother $3,414 per month in maintenance for fourteen

months. In making this award, the court acknowledged that father

would need to work more than forty hours per week for the duration

15
of maintenance to meet the obligation.4 The court also recognized

that, with a graduate degree, mother should be able to increase her

earning potential (beyond what she had earned in the past).

¶ 31 Mother argues that the district court improperly imputed

$1,222 of monthly income to her, despite her enrollment in a

graduate program and her caretaking responsibilities, which

included caring for a child with a disability. But she does not

appear to fault the court’s finding that she was not voluntarily

underemployed. Because she was not underemployed, the court

was required to consider her actual gross income, not her potential

income. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(A), (8)(a)(II), (8)(c)(IV); § 14-10-115(3)(c),

(5)(a), (5)(b)(I). And because mother’s actual monthly income was

$1,222, this was the proper calculation. Accordingly, we reject her

contention that the court improperly imputed income to her.

¶ 32 Mother also contends that the district court erred by failing to

consider father’s multiple jobs, mistakenly limiting its calculation of

4 Father has not cross-appealed the district court’s orders, so we do

not address this component of the order. See Koinis v. Colo. Dep’t of
Pub. Safety, 97 P.3d 193, 197 (Colo. App. 2003) (recognizing that an
appellee “must file a cross-appeal in order to raise a contention
that, if successful, would increase its rights under the judgment or
order being reviewed”).

16
his income to one full-time job. She contends that this affected the

maintenance award. But the maintenance statute explicitly

instructs courts, when determining a party’s gross income, not to

consider “[i]ncome from additional jobs that result in” work beyond

forty hours per week or that is greater than full-time employment.

§ 14-10-114(8)(c)(II)(C). Therefore, the district court could not

consider father’s additional income in its maintenance calculations.

See § 14-10-115(5)(a)(II)(C) (same for child support).

2. Child Care Expenses

¶ 33 Mother contends that the district court erred by failing to

include child care expenses in its child support calculations. As

relevant to mother’s challenge on appeal, she testified that the

parties hired a nanny for the children. While the child support

mother received following temporary orders included the nanny

expenses, mother did not testify or produce evidence at the

permanent orders hearing about the amount of those expenses.

Father contends that this issue is unpreserved because mother

failed to present evidence of child care expenses at the permanent

orders hearing, but she requested child care expenses in the

parties’ joint trial management certificate and in a proposed child

17
support worksheet. While she may not have proved her entitlement

to those expenses, she directed the court’s attention to the matter

such that it had an opportunity to rule on the issue. Dill v.

Rembrandt Grp., Inc., 2020 COA 69, ¶ 24.

¶ 34 Father testified that until June 2023, he worked remotely full

time and mostly watched the children during the day with

occasional help from the nanny.5 Mother, who was afflicted with

postpartum depression, would mostly be in her bedroom. At some

point, the maternal grandparents provided child care, so father

could be more attentive to work.

¶ 35 While it would not have been unreasonable for the court to

include some amount of child care expenses in a child support

award, it was mother’s burden to prove the amount she historically

paid and anticipated needing. See In re Marriage of Connerton, 260

P.3d 62, 67 (Colo. App. 2010) (District courts “may only consider

child care expenses that were actually incurred.”); see § 14-10-

5 Father also challenged the reasonableness of any claimed child

care expenses. According to him (1) mother only claimed she was
working eight hours per week; (2) her parents provided a significant
amount of free child care; and (3) mother’s educational program
only required her to be at the school one weekend per semester with
all other instruction provided online.

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115(9)(a) (“Net child care costs incurred on behalf of the children

. . . shall be added to the basic obligation . . . .”). There was

evidence that mother was enrolled in online classes and presumably

could not attend to the children then. But mother also testified

that her parents provided child care during her classes, and she did

not testify that she paid her parents for that child care. See W.

Denv. Feed Co. v. Ireland, 551 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Colo. App. 1976)

(even if no direct evidence contradicts a witness’s testimony, the

trier of fact need not accept the testimony as establishing the truth

of facts to which it is directed).

¶ 36 To the extent mother’s brief relies on the worksheets she

supplied, she does not point to exhibits or testimony substantiating

the expenses she claimed. Given the evidence presented at the

permanent orders hearing, we cannot conclude that the district

court abused its wide discretion by not including child care

expenses as part of the child support award to mother. See

Connerton, 260 P.3d at 67 (concluding that the district court did not

err by declining to include “child care expenses . . . that were

speculative and not actually incurred”).

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3. Extraordinary Medical Expenses

¶ 37 In addition, mother avers that the court erred in crediting

father $583 for the children’s monthly extraordinary medical

expenses in its child support order. See § 14-10-115(10)(h)(II),

C.R.S. 2024 (authorizing child support credits for annual uninsured

medical expenses above $250 per child).6 Father’s testimony

addressed his request for these expenses, and mother did not cross-

examine him regarding this request. Indeed she testified that she

wanted father to “take on” the children’s health insurance and

made a similar request in the trial management certificate. And the

court’s medical expenses credit was directly tied to the children’s

health insurance costs.

¶ 38 Because mother did not indicate to the court that she objected

to father’s receiving the monthly credit, we will not review this

contention of error. Credit Serv. Co. v. Skivington, 2020 COA 60M,

¶ 22 (“[W]e don’t consider issues raised for the first time on

appeal.”). We also decline mother’s invitation to review the issue for

plain error. Unlike in criminal cases, no rule requires plain error

6 The statute no longer includes a $250 limit. § 14-10-
115(10)(h)(II), C.R.S. 2025.

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review in civil cases. In re E.R.S., 2019 COA 40, ¶ 35. We review

unpreserved arguments for plain error “only in the rare civil case,

involving unusual or special circumstances — and even then, only

when necessary to avert unequivocal and manifest injustice.” Id.

(citation modified). Because this is not one of those rare cases, we

do not review mother’s unpreserved argument.

4. Offsets Against Child Support and Maintenance

¶ 39 Mother next argues that the district court erred by allowing

father to offset certain expenses against his child support and

maintenance obligations. We agree in part. The court included the

following in the written permanent orders:

• It awarded a vehicle to father and ordered mother to pay

father $8,453 for insurance payments she received

related to the vehicle. If she did not transfer that amount

by a specific date, the court allowed father to offset his

child support and maintenance payments against the

amount mother owed.

• It ordered father to pay a joint tax debt in full and offset

mother’s half ($2,671) against father’s maintenance

payments. If that offset was insufficient to cover

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mother’s half after her fourteen-month maintenance

terminated, father could then offset any remaining

balance from his child support obligation.

• It awarded Cedar Circle to mother, ordered her to

refinance all encumbrances to her name only within six

months, and ordered father to continue paying the

various encumbrances on the house until mother

refinanced or sold the home, which he could offset

against his maintenance obligation.

• It categorized certain litigation costs as “non-marital

debt” but allocated the costs equally between the parties,

ordering father to offset mother’s half of the costs

($7,997.50) against his child support and maintenance

obligations.

¶ 40 In post-trial motions, mother argued that father could not

offset his maintenance obligation against the tax liability and that it

22
was generally improper to offset this obligation against other debts.7

We conclude that the court erred by allowing father to offset debt

against his child support obligation. However, any claimed error

with respect to the offsets against his maintenance obligation was

harmless. See C.R.C.P. 61.

¶ 41 The court could not properly offset father’s child support

obligation against other debts because child support is “for the care

of the child” and is a right belonging exclusively to the child. In

Interest of Baby A, 2015 CO 72, ¶ 40. “Therefore, the support must

go to the children’s daily care and cannot be used for expenditures

made for the parent.” Id.; see also Hall v. Hall-Stradley, 776 P.2d

1166, 1167 (Colo. App. 1989) (“[A] parent who owes a duty of child

support may not offset that obligation against a personal judgment

that parent may have against the custodial parent.”). And although

“a setoff against arrearages may be appropriate if . . . no harm will

result to the interests of the children,” In re Marriage of Wisdom,

7 The parties agree that this issue is preserved, but mother did not

supplement the record with her post-trial filings raising the issue.
See McLellan v. Colo. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2022 COA 7, ¶ 27
(appellants must designate the appellate record). However, we may
take judicial notice of records in related proceedings. Harriman v.
Cabela’s Inc., 2016 COA 43, ¶ 64; CRE 201.

23
833 P.2d 884, 887 (Colo. App. 1992), an order regarding arrearages

is not the same as an initial support order, see In re Marriage of

Drexler, 2013 COA 43, ¶ 23 (distinguishing a principle applicable to

an initial obligation from principles applicable when a party

defaults on their support obligations). We therefore reverse the

portion of the court’s order allowing father to offset the above costs

against his child support obligation.

¶ 42 However, even if the court improperly offset costs against

father’s maintenance obligation, any error was harmless. See

C.R.C.P. 61. First, with respect to Cedar Circle, the court

determined that father could only offset costs for Cedar Circle’s

encumbrances until mother transferred the home and

encumbrances to her name, and it acknowledged that father’s

payments would reduce mother’s monthly need. Therefore, the

offset aligned with the maintenance statute’s purpose of ensuring a

fair and equitable award, “based upon the totality of the

circumstances” by applying “all relevant factors, including . . . the

recipient spouse[’s] [ability] to meet . . . her needs.” § 14-10-

114(3)(c)(I), (3)(e). Additionally, because father conveyed Cedar

Circle to mother in November 2024, which he was only required to

24
do after she refinanced, the record suggests that this offset applied

for (at most) one month.

¶ 43 Next, with respect to the $8,453 in insurance proceeds, any

offset against maintenance was similarly harmless. The court gave

mother thirty-five days from the date of its initial permanent orders

to transfer the money to father. Therefore, the offset was not

automatic but was conditional upon mother meeting the court’s

deadline. On appeal, mother does not contend that she failed to

meet this deadline such that any offset actually applied. So she

fails to allege that she suffered any harm from this portion of the

court’s order. See C.R.C.P. 61.

¶ 44 Finally, as to the offsets applicable to mother’s half of the

litigation and tax expenses, these are costs that mother would have

owed father regardless of any offset. Had the court not applied the

offset, mother would have presumably used father’s maintenance

payments to reimburse him for those costs. Therefore, the court’s

award simply eliminated the inefficiency of requiring father to pay

mother, only for her to repay him with the same money. And,

contrary to mother’s assertion, the offsets did not reduce her award

to $0. Excluding the time value of a monthly payment, the court’s

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total maintenance award was $47,796 ($3,414 times fourteen

months). The highest potential offset amount was approximately

$22,622 (assuming a one-month mortgage offset of $3,500).

¶ 45 Our decision is guided by the different rationales underlying

the maintenance and child support statutes. See In re Marriage of

Kann, 2017 COA 94, ¶ 23 (explaining that, unlike child support,

“maintenance is not awarded as a matter of right”). Accordingly, we

affirm the maintenance offsets but remand to the district court to

correct its order by removing any offsets for child support. If the

court finds that father offset any amount of his child support

obligation, he must reimburse mother only for those amounts.8

5. Retroactive Child Support and Maintenance

¶ 46 Mother claims she is entitled to retroactive child support and

maintenance. She alleges that she requested $50,085 in retroactive

support from August 8, 2023 (when father filed for dissolution)

through February 1, 2024 (when the court issued temporary

8 Because father was required to make child support payments into

the Family Support Registry, it is unclear from our record whether
he ever took offsets against child support. On remand, the court
can hear argument and/or evidence on this issue. See § 26-13-
114(10), C.R.S. 2025 (copies of payment records maintained by the
Family Support Registry are admissible as proof of payment).

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orders). She primarily cites policy reasons to support her request.

She also references father’s extended absence following a suicide

attempt and her asserted need to resort to public assistance. We

also reject father’s contention that this issue was unpreserved;

mother requested retroactive child support and maintenance, which

the court’s permanent orders addressed and denied.

¶ 47 Soon after filing for dissolution, father provided notice,

through counsel, of the temporary orders hearing set for January

31, 2024. That the hearing could not occur sooner was beyond his

control. Nonetheless, he told mother, who remained in the marital

home, to ask him if she needed funds. Mother did not directly

respond to his request, but she requested child support and

maintenance through counsel.

¶ 48 Her early efforts in the case were largely directed toward

restricting father’s access to their children, but the parties later

agreed that father would have a phased parenting time structure.

At the January 2024 temporary orders hearing, the court ordered

father to pay child support ($3,530 per month) and maintenance

($3,625 per month). Father continued paying the temporary

maintenance and child support until the court issued its permanent

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orders, setting child support at $896 monthly and maintenance at

$3,414 monthly for fourteen months.

¶ 49 Until the court issued temporary orders, both parents were

responsible for supporting their children. See In re Marriage of

Alvis, 2019 COA 97, ¶ 10. The court exercised its wide discretion in

declining to make a retroactive award. See Wells, 252 P.3d at 1213

(reviewing child support orders for an abuse of discretion). In its

permanent orders, the court also noted that, as to retroactive child

support and maintenance, mother “did not develop her argument

with any evidence . . . other than some general questions about

[father] allegedly not giving her money before temporary orders.”

Because the evidence supports the court’s decision, we reject

mother’s argument.

¶ 50 Finally, while mother argues that the child support award is

incongruent with the parties’ pre-dissolution lifestyle, this “is only

one factor for the court to consider, which does not lock the child

into a single standard of living until emancipation.” In re Marriage

of Nimmo, 891 P.2d 1002, 1007 (Colo. 1995). The court considered

the parties’ pre-dissolution standard of living under section 14-10-

115(2)(b)(III), but it noted that they lived well beyond their means

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and incurred significant debt. Because the record supports the

court’s findings, we will not disturb them. Garrett, ¶ 9.

6. Joint Tax Return

¶ 51 For the 2023 tax year, mother filed a tax return separately

from father. Because she claimed the children as her dependents,

she realized a $10,780 tax refund. Father incurred a $26,000 tax

liability because he could not file as married filing jointly. He asked

mother to work with him to amend the tax return to married filing

jointly to minimize the tax liability.

¶ 52 Mother argues on appeal that the district court could not

require her to file jointly with father. While that may be so, it does

not mean that the court could not consider the impact of her filing a

separate tax return on the marital estate in its property division.

See Cohan v. Cohan, 372 P.2d 149, 151 (Colo. 1962) (a court may

consider the effect of state and federal income taxes); In re Marriage

of Lafaye, 89 P.3d 455, 461 (Colo. App. 2003) (same).

¶ 53 The court included the tax liability in calculating the parties’

debt. It also characterized the liability as marital debt that could

have been avoided. Mother then had the option of (1) working with

father to amend the return to reduce their marital tax debt or (2)

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forgoing receipt of child tax credits for both children for all future

tax filings. If she opted to amend, the court allowed the parties to

each claim one child on their respective future tax returns.

¶ 54 So although mother asserts that she was compelled to file an

amended tax return, it was one of two options the court offered.

That she chose to amend the tax return rather than to forgo

splitting the child tax credits does not undermine the court’s order.

IV. Mother’s Attorney Fees

¶ 55 Mother moved for attorney fees, requesting amounts she owed

before her attorney withdrew. The court denied her motion but

allowed her to renew her request at the permanent orders hearing.

At the hearing, mother asked for $34,000 in attorney fees, and the

court denied her request in its permanent orders. It reasoned that

mother “receive[d] overall net positive property, while [father]

receive[d] net debt,” and father had been paying $3,625 in

temporary maintenance, a portion of which mother could have used

to pay her fees. It also noted that mother’s earning potential would

increase significantly after she completed her graduate program.

Mother now argues that the court abused its discretion by denying

her request. We perceive no error.

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¶ 56 In domestic relations cases, district courts have discretion to

order a party to pay the other party’s reasonable attorney fees “after

considering the financial resources of both parties.” § 14-10-119,

C.R.S. 2025. We review a court’s decision under this section for an

abuse of discretion. See Davis, 252 P.3d at 538.

¶ 57 “Courts must consider a request for fees ‘in light of [section

119’s] equitable purpose,’” which includes ensuring that “neither

party suffers ‘undue economic hardship’ as a result of the

dissolution.” de Koning, ¶ 23 (citation omitted). Under the statute,

courts may “equitably apportion costs and fees between parties

based on relative ability to pay, and courts have great latitude . . .

to craft attorney fee orders appropriate to the circumstances in a

given case.” Davis, 252 P.3d at 538. The focus is on overall

economic circumstances, not just the parties’ incomes. Id.

¶ 58 The court considered father’s substantial debt and ongoing

maintenance and child support obligations, and it also considered

mother’s impending increase in earning potential. Importantly, the

court had to consider “undue economic hardship” with respect to

both parties, not just mother. de Koning, ¶ 23 (citation omitted).

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Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its

discretion by denying mother’s request for attorney fees.

V. Judicial Bias

¶ 59 Mother raises several arguments alleging judicial bias and

punitive orders but concedes that she did not object or file post-trial

motions concerning these alleged errors. For the same reasons

explained in Part III.D.3, we decline to consider her unpreserved

arguments. See E.R.S., ¶ 35.

VI. Father’s Appellate Attorney Fees

¶ 60 Father requests appellate attorney fees, arguing that mother’s

appeal is substantially frivolous, groundless, and vexatious. We do

not assess attorney fees against pro se parties unless “the party

clearly knew or reasonably should have known that [her] action or

defense, or any part of the action or defense, was substantially

frivolous, substantially groundless, or substantially vexatious.”

§ 13-17-102(6), C.R.S. 2025. An appeal is frivolous only in “clear

and unequivocal cases when the appellant presents no rational

argument, or when the appeal is prosecuted for the sole purpose of

harassment or delay.” Good Life Colo., LLC v. WLCO, LLC, 2025

COA 8M, ¶ 106 (citation omitted); see also Black v. Black, 2020

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COA 64M, ¶ 133 (“A claim is groundless if there is no credible

evidence to support” it and vexatious if “brought or maintained in

bad faith.” (citation omitted)).

¶ 61 Although we reject most of mother’s contentions on appeal, we

cannot say that she presented no rational argument or appealed in

bad faith. See Black, ¶ 133. Her appeal appears to arise from a

concern for her own financial well-being and that of the parties’

children, not bad faith or harassment. And she primarily cites

relevant legal authority, supporting her contentions with record

citations. While most of her arguments were unsuccessful, there is

no evidence that she knew or should have known that her appeal

was frivolous, groundless, or vexatious. § 13-17-102(6). We

therefore deny father’s request.

VII. Disposition

¶ 62 The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the

case is remanded to the district court to correct the portion of its

permanent orders allowing offsets against father’s child support

obligation.

JUDGE MEIRINK and JUDGE HAWTHORNE concur.

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