Peo in Interest of DR

25CA0515 Peo in Interest of DR 10-30-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0515
El Paso County District Court No. 24JV30415
Honorable Robin Chittum, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of D.R., a Child,

and Concerning A.G. and C.R.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES
Kuhn and Moultrie, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 30, 2025

Kenneth R. Hodges, County Attorney, Amy C. Fitch, Assistant County Attorney,
Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee

Josie L. Burt, Guardian Ad Litem

Andrew A. Gargano, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado,
for Appellant A.G.

Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Chelsea A. Carr,
Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant C.R.
¶1 C.R. (father) and A.G. (mother) appeal the judgment

adjudicating D.R. (the child) dependent or neglected. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In April 2024, the El Paso County Department of Human

Services received a report that mother had given birth at home and

hadn’t received any prenatal or postnatal care. The parents had

two previous dependency or neglect cases involving children who

were born exposed to substances, one of which was still ongoing

when the child was born. The Department believed that the parents

were living with paternal grandmother when the child was born,

and a caseworker from the Department visited grandmother’s home

but didn’t locate the parents or the child.

¶3 The Department continued its efforts to locate the parents and

child, but the parents were “actively avoiding” contact. In May

2024, the caseworker located father in the county jail, but when the

caseworker spoke with him, he claimed that there “was no baby.”

The Department finally located the parents and child in June 2024,

removed the child from the parents’ care, and filed a petition in

dependency or neglect. The parents denied the allegations and

asked for a jury trial.

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¶4 The juvenile court held a jury trial over four days in October

and November 2024. At the trial, the Department presented

evidence from several witnesses who were involved in the parents’

previous cases, including mother’s and father’s treatment providers,

an intake caseworker, and an ongoing caseworker. The intake

caseworker also testified about her involvement with the intake in

this case.

¶5 After hearing the evidence, the jury found that the Department

had proved that the child was dependent or neglected under section

19-3-102(1)(b)-(e), C.R.S. 2025. Based on the jury’s verdicts, the

court sustained the petition, entered an adjudication, and adopted

treatment plans for both parents.

II. Admissibility of Facts Related to Previous Cases

¶6 The parents contend that the juvenile court erred by admitting

evidence of their previous dependency or neglect cases. We

disagree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶7 Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the

existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of

the action more probable or less probable than it would be without

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the evidence.” CRE 401. But even relevant evidence should be

excluded under CRE 403 “if its probative value is substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”

¶8 Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible “to

prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular

occasion the person acted in conformity with the character.” CRE

404(b)(1). Generally, when a party presents evidence of other acts

under Rule 404(b), the trial court should apply the four-part test set

forth in People v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Colo. 1990).

¶9 In People in Interest of A.W., 2015 COA 144M, ¶¶ 19-23, a

division of this court determined that Rule 404(b) and Spoto didn’t

apply to evidence of a parent’s past treatment of her older children

when offered to establish “prospective harm.” Prospective harm

analysis requires a fact finder to predict whether the child will be

dependent or neglected if returned to the parents. People in Interest

of S.N., 2014 COA 116, ¶¶ 16-17. In assessing prospective harm,

the fact finder may consider the parent’s (1) past treatment of other

children; (2) condition, such as mental illness, physical disability,

or incarceration; and (3) conduct, such as drug use, physical abuse,

or violence. Id. at ¶ 18; see also People v. D.A.K., 596 P.2d 747,

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749-50 (Colo. 1979) ( “[T]he child’s situation on the day of the

hearing cannot be viewed in a vacuum” and the evidence must be

“considered in the context of the child’s history as well as the

respondent parent’s prior behavior.”).

¶ 10 We review the juvenile court’s decision to admit evidence for

an abuse of discretion. People in Interest of M.H-K., 2018 COA 178,

¶ 60. A court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it misapplies the law.

People in Interest of A.N-B., 2019 COA 46, ¶ 9.

B. Analysis

¶ 11 Father’s attorney moved to preclude evidence of the two

previous dependency or neglect cases, asserting that the evidence

was inadmissible under Rule 404(b). Relying on A.W., the juvenile

court denied that motion, determining that neither Rule 404(b) nor

Spoto applied. The court also determined, however, that it still

needed to analyze the evidence under Rule 403, and it found that

the probative value of the evidence wasn’t substantially outweighed

by the danger of unfair prejudice, considering that (1) the evidence

was “really recent” and had “similar allegations” and (2) any

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prejudice could be “mitigated” by giving the jury a limiting

instruction.

¶ 12 Father’s attorney proposed a limiting instruction, which the

juvenile court edited and presented to the jury as follows:

You have heard evidence related to prior
[dependency or neglect] cases involving [the
parents] and children other than [the child].
This evidence is being offered for the limited
purpose of showing prospective harm. This
evidence may only be considered for that
limited purpose. You cannot use this evidence
to show bad character or propensity.

The court read the instruction to the jury before the testimony of

the parents’ treatment providers, the ongoing caseworker, and the

intake caseworker, and it also provided a written version before

deliberations.

¶ 13 At the trial, the Department presented evidence that the

parents had substance abuse and mental health problems that had

not been addressed during the previous cases. For example, the

record shows that the parents completed dual diagnosis evaluations

during the first case, and the evaluators diagnosed both parents

with substance abuse disorders and mother with bipolar disorder.

The evaluators recommended outpatient treatment and sobriety

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monitoring, but the parents didn’t participate in either. The

Department filed the second case after the child at issue in that

case tested positive for methamphetamine at birth. The ongoing

caseworker in the second case testified that neither parent

participated in treatment during that case, and the parents

indicated that they weren’t participating because they “did not need

treatment.”

¶ 14 We conclude that the juvenile court didn’t abuse its discretion

by deciding that Rule 404(b) and Spoto didn’t apply to evidence

related to the parents’ previous cases. In this case, the Department

presented evidence that the parents had a history of substance use

and mental health problems and had not complied with mandated

treatment in the recent past. The jury could use this evidence to

predict whether it was likely or expected that the parents could

provide proper parental care if the child was returned to their care.

See S.N., ¶ 17; § 19-3-102(1)(b). This is precisely the type of

evidence that is admissible to establish prospective harm, see S.N.,

¶ 18, and, according to A.W., when a party offers evidence of

prospective harm, Rule 404(b) and Spoto don’t apply, see A.W.,

¶ 23.

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¶ 15 The parents assert that the Department couldn’t offer evidence

of their previous cases for purposes of prospective harm analysis

because the child wasn’t removed at birth. In support, the parents

note that the published cases focusing on prospective harm,

including A.W., involve children who were removed at birth. See

People in Interest of D.L.R., 638 P.2d 39, 40 (Colo. 1981); A.W., ¶ 4;

S.N., ¶ 2. To be sure, in such cases, because a child isn’t in the

parent’s care, the fact finder is generally required to use prospective

harm analysis. See A.W., ¶ 22. But nothing in our case law

prohibits the application of prospective harm analysis in

circumstances, such as those in this case, when a child isn’t

removed from a parent at birth. Cf. People in Interest of C.M., 2024

COA 90, ¶ 29 (recognizing the applicability of prospective harm

analysis in a case involving a child who wasn’t removed until thirty-

six days after birth). Indeed, we read A.W. to hold that Rule 404(b)

doesn’t apply to evidence of prospective harm because this type of

evidence isn’t offered to show that the parent acted in conformity

with a character trait on a “particular occasion.” Rather, this

evidence allows the fact finder to predict the home environment and

potential parental care to which a child might be exposed if

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returned to the parent. See A.W., ¶¶ 21-22. We therefore reject the

parents’ assertion.

¶ 16 Because we conclude that the juvenile court didn’t err by

deciding that Rule 404(b) and Spoto didn’t apply, we don’t address

the parents’ contention that the evidence didn’t pass muster under

Spoto.

¶ 17 Finally, we reject the parents’ assertion that the evidence was

inadmissible under Rule 403. The evidence of the parents’

substance abuse and mental health problems was highly probative

of whether the child would lack proper parental care if returned to

the parents. And, because the court gave the jury a limiting

instruction, we must presume that the jury didn’t use the evidence

for an improper purpose. See A.W., ¶ 27. To the extent the parents

assert that the limiting instruction was insufficient to cure any

prejudice, we reject that argument in Part IV, below. We therefore

conclude that the parents weren’t unfairly prejudiced by the court’s

decision to admit the evidence relating to the previous cases. See

id. (presuming that the jury did not use the evidence for an

improper purpose because the parent failed to “indicate[] how the

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jury did not abide by the limiting instruction” and the evidence was

“not so prejudicial that the jury could not follow th[e] instruction”).

III. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 18 Mother contends that the evidence was insufficient to support

the jury’s verdicts. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law and Analysis

¶ 19 As now relevant, a child is dependent or neglected if (1) the

child “lacks proper parental care through the actions or omissions”

of a parent; (2) the child’s “environment is injurious to his or her

welfare”; (3) the parent “fails or refuses to provide the child with

proper or necessary subsistence, education, medical care, or any

other care necessary for his or her health, guidance, or well-being”;

or (4) the child is “homeless, without proper care, or not domiciled

with his or her parent . . . through no fault of [the] parent.” § 19-3-

102(1)(b)-(e).

¶ 20 An adjudication of dependency or neglect must be based on

existing circumstances and related to the child’s status at the time

of adjudication. People in Interest of A.E.L., 181 P.3d 1186, 1192

(Colo. App. 2008). But that doesn’t mean that a fact finder must

determine that the child is receiving improper care at the time of

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the hearing. People in Interest of S.X.M., 271 P.3d 1124, 1130 (Colo.

App. 2011). Rather, an adjudication may be based on past,

current, or prospective harm. See People in Interest of G.E.S., 2016

COA 183, ¶ 15.

¶ 21 “Whether a child is dependent [or] neglected presents a mixed

question of fact and law because it requires application of

evidentiary facts to the statutory grounds.” People in Interest of

M.M., 2017 COA 144, ¶ 17. To establish that a child is dependent

or neglected, a department must prove the allegations in the

petition by a preponderance of the evidence. See § 19-3-505(1),

(7)(a), C.R.S. 2025; People in Interest of S.G.L., 214 P.3d 580, 583

(Colo. App. 2009).

¶ 22 When determining whether the evidence is sufficient to

sustain an adjudication, we consider the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prevailing party and draw every inference fairly

deducible from the evidence in favor of the jury’s verdicts. S.G.L.,

214 P.3d at 583. We won’t disturb the jury’s verdicts if the evidence

supports them, even though reasonable people might arrive at

different conclusions based on the same facts. Id.; People in Interest

of T.T., 128 P.3d 328, 331 (Colo. App. 2005); see also Thomas v.

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People, 2021 CO 84, ¶ 10 (an appellate court may not “invade the

jury’s province by second-guessing any findings that are supported

by the evidence”).

B. Analysis

¶ 23 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

Department and drawing every fairly deducible inference in favor of

the jury’s verdicts, we conclude that the record contains sufficient

evidence to support the jury’s determination that the child was

dependent or neglected under section 19-3-102(1)(b), (c), and (d).

See S.G.L., 214 P.3d at 583.

¶ 24 First, the Department presented sufficient evidence to

establish that, based on mother’s substance use and mental health

problems, the child would lack proper parental care if she was

returned to mother. § 19-3-102(1)(b). As already discussed in Part

II, above, the Department presented evidence that mother was

diagnosed with a substance use disorder and bipolar disorder and

that she hadn’t completed any treatment. Mother’s treatment

provider, who was qualified as an expert in addictions and mental

health evaluations, opined that a person is very unlikely to

successfully address these problems without treatment. The

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treatment provider also described the ways in which these disorders

can impact a person’s ability to parent a child, such as impairing

judgment and decision-making, delaying reactions, and

suppressing or elevating emotions.

¶ 25 Mother asserts that the child wasn’t dependent or neglected

because there was no evidence that she used substances during her

pregnancy or that substance use affected the child’s care while she

had custody of the child. Nothing in section 19-3-102(1)(b) required

the Department to establish that mother used substances during

her pregnancy. Cf. § 19-3-102(1)(g) (a child is dependent or

neglected when, among other things, the child “is born affected by

alcohol or substance exposure”). And because the Department

presented evidence of mother’s history of substance abuse to

establish prospective harm, it didn’t need to show that she was

using substances during her pregnancy or for the two months that

she was caring for the child. Although the jury could consider the

lack of evidence as to these two points, we disagree with mother

that, as a matter of law, the jury couldn’t find the child dependent

or neglected based on evidence of mother’s past substance use

under a prospective harm theory. See S.N., ¶ 18; T.T., 128 P.3d at

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330 (the child was dependent or neglected under section 19-3-

102(1)(b) based on the mother’s past substance use because

“returning the child to mother was likely to be detrimental to him”).

¶ 26 Second, the evidence also showed that the child was in an

injurious environment based on the parents’ living situation. § 19-

3-102(1)(c). The intake caseworker testified about the home in

which the parents were living when the child was born and

indicated that it wasn’t appropriate for a child. The Department

also presented photographs of the home, which showed its

condition around the time that the child was born. And the jury

heard evidence that the parents had been evicted from that home

before the child was born and that they were either living in a

camper outside a friend’s home or inside that home with ten other

people. According to mother’s testimony, the people living in the

home were all recovering drug or alcohol users and didn’t have

stable employment. Thus, whether the child was living in the first

home, the camper, or the second home, there was sufficient

evidence for the jury to find that the child was in an injurious

environment. See People in Interest of J.G., 2016 CO 39, ¶ 26 (an

13
injurious environment is a situation that is “likely harmful” to the

child).

¶ 27 Third, the Department submitted sufficient evidence to prove

that the child was dependent or neglected because mother failed or

refused to provide the child with proper medical care. § 19-3-

102(1)(d). The evidence was undisputed that the child was born at

home and mother didn’t take the child to the hospital or to a

doctor’s office after she was born. To be sure, the jury heard

testimony that the child’s birth was attended by a friend who was a

nurse and that the child was healthy despite the lack of medical

care. The jury also heard evidence that father delivered the baby

and that mother refused to call an ambulance and go to the

hospital because she knew that the Department would be notified

and would remove the child from her care. The caseworker also

testified that the Department had information that there had been

no prenatal or postnatal care, the newborn infant needed to be

medically evaluated, and concerns had been raised that the child

possibly had breathing problems.

¶ 28 Citing to section 19-3-103(1), C.R.S. 2025, mother maintains

that the child wasn’t dependent or neglected when mother failed to

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“immediately” bring the child to a doctor because she had “valid

spiritual and personal beliefs that shaped her care of the child.”

Section 19-3-103(1) provides that “[n]o child who in lieu of medical

treatment is under treatment solely by spiritual means through

prayer in accordance with a recognized method of religious healing

shall, for that reason alone, be considered to have been neglected or

dependent within the purview of this article.” At most, mother

testified that she hadn’t taken the child to a doctor because she

wanted a doctor with “my beliefs and that coincides with . . . my

family heritage and [father’s] family heritage.” She didn’t testify

that the child was “under treatment solely by spiritual means

through prayer” or that she was doing so under a “recognized

method of religious healing.” Id. Section 19-3-103(1) therefore

doesn’t apply. What’s more, as noted above, the jury heard

testimony that mother failed to provide the child with medical care,

not because of her religious beliefs, but simply because she didn’t

want the Department to find out about the child. We therefore

reject mother’s argument.

¶ 29 In sum, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to

support the jury’s verdicts under section 19-3-102(1)(b), (c), and (d).

15
Based on this conclusion, we don’t need to consider whether the

child was also dependent or neglected under section 19-3-102(1)(e).

See People in Interest of S.M-L., 2016 COA 173, ¶ 29 (“[S]ection 19-

3-102 requires proof of only one condition for an adjudication.”),

aff’d on other grounds sub nom. People in Interest of R.S. v. G.S.,

2018 CO 31.

¶ 30 Finally, mother argues that the Department didn’t make

reasonable efforts, which “caused this case to reach the

adjudication stage.” In support, she cites section 19-1-115(6)(b)(I),

C.R.S. 2025, which requires, among other things, that a juvenile

court find that “reasonable efforts have been made to prevent or

eliminate the need for removal of the child from the home” before

awarding legal custody to a department. However, the Department

isn’t required to make reasonable efforts if “an emergency situation

exists which requires the immediate temporary removal of the child

from the home.” § 19-1-115(6)(b)(II).

¶ 31 Mother maintains that the magistrate erred by finding that an

“emergency situation” existed under section 19-1-115(6)(b)(II) and

therefore the Department needed to make reasonable efforts under

section 19-1-115(6)(b)(I). But mother’s argument isn’t properly

16
before us because (1) orders entered at the temporary protective

custody stage are interim orders not subject to appeal, see People in

Interest of M.W., 140 P.3d 231, 233 (Colo. App. 2006); and (2) even

if she could appeal the temporary order, she still needed to file a

petition for juvenile court review of the magistrate’s order before she

could appeal, see People in Interest of K.L-P., 148 P.3d 402, 403

(Colo. App. 2006). As a result, mother’s reasonable efforts

argument necessarily fails. And mother hasn’t otherwise directed

us to any statute or case law that requires the juvenile court to

consider whether the Department made reasonable efforts before

the court can enter an adjudication order.

IV. Jury Instructions

¶ 32 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by failing to

provide the jury with definitions for “propensity” and “injurious

environment.” We disagree.

¶ 33 “When a term, word, or phrase in a jury instruction is one

with which reasonable persons of common intelligence would be

familiar, and its meaning is not so technical or mysterious as to

create confusion in jurors’ minds as to its meaning, an instruction

defining it is not required.” People v. Thoro Prods. Co., 45 P.3d 737,

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745 (Colo. App. 2001), aff'd, 70 P.3d 1188 (Colo. 2003). “When

definitions are not provided in a jury instruction, the jury is

presumed to employ the common meaning of the words used.”

People v. Walden, 224 P.3d 369, 379 (Colo. App. 2009).

¶ 34 A juvenile court must correctly instruct the jury on the law

applicable to the case. J.G., ¶ 33. We review de novo whether a

particular jury instruction correctly states the law. Day v. Johnson,

255 P.3d 1064, 1067 (Colo. 2011). However, we review the court’s

decision to give — or not to give — a particular instruction for an

abuse of discretion. J.G., ¶ 33.

¶ 35 Father’s attorney submitted a proposed limiting instruction for

the prospective harm evidence, which included the following

statement:

The evidence may not be used to argue that
because one or both parents acted, or failed to
act, in a particular way involving that other
child, that he or she will likely act, or fail to
act, in the same way toward [the child]. That
would be an impermissible “propensity”
argument.

The juvenile court removed these two sentences from the final

instruction and replaced them with the following: “You cannot use

this evidence to show bad character or propensity.” (CF, p 401.)

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Father’s counsel objected to the change because “the jury may not

understand what propensity is[,] which is what the sentence before

is defining.” The court declined to define “propensity.”

¶ 36 We don’t see any abuse of discretion in the juvenile court’s

decision to decline to provide the jury with a definition for

“propensity.” Mother hasn’t directed us to a published case

addressing whether a court errs by declining to provide a jury

instruction defining “propensity.” But cases from other

jurisdictions have defined “propensity” by using a common, rather

than a technical, meaning. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 1060,

1067 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (applying the definition of “propensity”

found in Webster’s Dictionary). And in any event, there is little

relevant difference between the common meaning and legal

definition for “propensity.” Compare Merriam-Webster Dictionary,

https://perma.cc/5XR4-DVNN (“an often intense natural

inclination or preference”), with Black’s Law Dictionary 1472 (12th

ed. 2024) (defining “propensity” as “[a] natural tendency to behave

in a particular way; esp., the fact that a person is prone to a specific

type of bad behavior”).

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¶ 37 Father’s counsel also submitted a proposed jury instruction

that stated, in pertinent part, the following: “An injurious

environment exists when the children are in a situation that is

likely harmful. Injurious means adverse, bad or damaging.

Environment means the circumstances, objects, or conditions by

which one is surrounded.” Mother’s attorney joined father’s

counsel’s request to define injurious environment for the jury. The

juvenile court rejected the proposed instruction because (1) “we

don’t have a standard definition for injurious environment”; (2) “the

ordinary person off the street can come up with a definition”; and

(3) “if the jury [was] hung up on this issue, they can ask a

question.”

¶ 38 The juvenile court didn’t abuse its discretion by declining to

define “injurious environment.” The injurious environment

instruction provided by the court tracked the statutory language

and the model jury instructions. See § 19-3-102(1)(c); CJI-Civ.

41:20 (2025). A previous version of the model instructions included

a definition for injurious environment, which has since been deleted

and not replaced. See CJI-Civ. 41:10 n.1 (2025). Because the

phrase isn’t defined by statute or model instruction, the jury could

20
give the phrase its ordinary meaning, which, as the court pointed

out, was “not so technical or mysterious as to create confusion in

jurors’ minds as to its meaning.” Thoro Prods. Co., 45 P.3d at 745.

Finally, the jury didn’t express any confusion about what the

phrase meant, and mother hasn’t explained on appeal “how the jury

would have attributed an incorrect meaning to it.” People v.

Claycomb, 2025 COA 36, ¶ 32.

¶ 39 In sum, we conclude that the juvenile court didn’t abuse its

discretion by declining to provide the jury with additional

definitions for “propensity” and “injurious environment” because

the ordinary meanings of those terms, which we presume the jurors

knew, adequately informed the jurors about those concepts. See

Walden, 224 P.3d at 379.

V. Expert Qualification

¶ 40 Mother argues that the juvenile court erred when it qualified

the intake caseworker as an expert. Again, we disagree.

¶ 41 Under CRE 702, an expert witness may be qualified to offer

expert testimony based on any of the five factors in CRE 702: (1)

knowledge; (2) skill; (3) experience; (4) training; or (5) education.

Huntoon v. TCI Cablevision of Colo., Inc., 969 P.2d 681, 690 (Colo.

21
1998). The decision to qualify a caseworker as an expert is left to

the juvenile court’s sound discretion, and we won’t disturb its

decision absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. People in

Interest of L.G., 737 P.2d 431, 435 (Colo. App. 1987).

¶ 42 The record shows that the intake caseworker had (1) a

bachelor’s degree in psychology and was working towards a

master’s degree in forensic psychology; (2) worked for the

Department as a caseworker for three years; (3) previously worked

with children in an inpatient treatment facility for about a year; (4)

completed the training and certification process for caseworkers in

Colorado, along with continuing education courses since becoming

certified; (5) participated in more than 500 intake assessments; and

(6) previously been qualified as an expert in child welfare. Focusing

on the caseworker’s leadership role, her three years of experience at

the Department, and her 500 intake investigations, the juvenile

court qualified her as an expert in child welfare based on her

knowledge, experience, and training.

¶ 43 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by qualifying the

caseworker as an expert in child welfare because the caseworker

didn’t have any “specialized knowledge” in child welfare and any

22
knowledge she did have was “fully supplied by the Petitioner in this

case.” Her argument fails for two reasons. First, in addition to her

knowledge, the court qualified the caseworker as an expert based

on her experience and training; mother forwards no argument as to

how the caseworker lacked the requisite experience or training to be

an expert in child welfare. Second, mother provides no authority

for the proposition that an expert can’t gain relevant knowledge by

working for a party in the case.

¶ 44 We therefore conclude that the court didn’t abuse its

discretion. See People in Interest of A.E.L., 181 P.3d 1186, 1193

(Colo. App. 2008) (discerning no abuse of discretion in the court’s

decision to qualify caseworkers as experts in social work with an

emphasis in child protection).

VI. Scope of Cross-Examination

¶ 45 Mother maintains that the juvenile court erred by allowing the

county attorney to ask father questions on cross-examination that

were outside the scope of the direct examination. We disagree.

¶ 46 The juvenile court has discretion to “exercise reasonable

control over interrogation of witnesses and presentation of

evidence.” People v. Whitman, 205 P.3d 371, 378 (Colo. App. 2007).

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Under CRE 611(b), “[c]ross-examination should be limited to the

subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the

credibility of the witness.”

¶ 47 On direct examination, father’s attorney asked him about the

child’s home birth in April 2024, events connected to the child’s

removal in June 2024, and father’s employment situation. On

cross-examination, father’s attorney objected to questions about his

other children and previous cases as outside the scope of direct

examination. Counsel also objected to a juror question about his

conversations with the caseworker.

¶ 48 Mother’s attorney didn’t join in these objections or otherwise

raise any issue with these questions as beyond the scope of the

direct examination. Although we are skeptical that one parent can

assert on appeal an issue that was only raised by the other parent,

we will address most of father’s counsel’s objections. However, we

decline to address father’s attorney’s objection to a juror question

about the child’s birth certificate because father’s attorney objected

on a different ground from the one mother now raises. See People v.

Ujaama, 2012 COA 36, ¶ 37 (an issue is unpreserved if an objection

24
was made in the trial court but on grounds different from those

raised on appeal).

¶ 49 We reject mother’s argument for two reasons. First, because

CRE 611(b) allows the juvenile court discretion to permit a party to

ask about “additional matters as if on direct examination,” the

challenged questions were permissible even if they were outside the

scope of direct examination. Second, even assuming the court

erred, we discern no reversible error because the evidence was

either cumulative or played a minimal role in the Department’s

case. See People v. Casias, 2012 COA 117, ¶ 64. Mother provides

no explanation as to how this evidence prejudiced her.

VII. Disposition

¶ 50 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE KUHN and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.

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