Zlaten v. Longmont Lodge

25CA0036 Zlaten v Longmont Lodge 10-30-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0036
Boulder County District Court No. 23CV30875
Honorable J. Chris Larson, Judge

Patricia Zlaten and Douglas Zlaten,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

Longmont Lodge No. 1548, Loyal Order of Moose, Inc., a Colorado corporation,

Defendant-Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE YUN
Freyre and Pawar, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 30, 2025

Martinez Law Colorado, LLC, Anna N. Martinez, Denver, Colorado; Martinez
Law, LLC, Esteban A. Martinez, Longmont, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants

Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP, Robert J. Zavaglia, Jr., Sotheby S. Mancini,
Greenwood Village, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee
¶1 In this premises liability case, plaintiffs, Patricia and Douglas

Zlaten, appeal the district court’s denial of their motion for a

judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) after the jury

returned a verdict in favor of defendant, Longmont Lodge No. 1548,

Loyal Order of Moose, Inc. (the Lodge). We affirm the judgment.

I. Background

¶2 The Zlatens were dues-paying members of the Lodge, a

fraternal and service organization. For several years, the Lodge

allowed its members to bring their dogs onto its property and let

them run off-leash within a fenced picnic area (the enclosure).

¶3 One day, Patricia Zlaten1 went to find another member,

Dianne Romero, to give her a hug. Romero’s boyfriend told Patricia

that she was in the enclosure. Romero often brought her dogs to

the enclosure, typically at least once a week. To access the

enclosure, Romero would check out a key from a Lodge employee,

walk her leashed dogs to the enclosure, unlock the padlock on the

gate latch, and then latch the gate while the dogs were inside.

1 Because Patricia and Douglas Zlaten share a last name, we will

refer to Patricia by her first name. We mean no disrespect in doing
so.

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While Romero was inside the enclosure with her two unleashed

dogs, Patricia entered the enclosure through the latched, but

unlocked, gate. Once Patricia was inside, one of Romero’s dogs

approached her, jumped up, and bit her, knocking her to the

ground.

¶4 The Zlatens sued the Lodge and Romero, seeking damages for

personal injuries and loss of consortium. Before trial, the Zlatens

settled with Romero. As a result, the case proceeded to trial only

against the Lodge. After a two-day trial, the jury returned a verdict

in favor of the Lodge. Specifically, the jury answered the following

questions in the verdict form2:

1. Did the Plaintiff Patricia Zlaten have injuries
or damages? (Yes or No)

Answer: Yes

2. Did the Defendant, Moose Lodge # 1548,
know or should it have known about a danger
on the property? (Yes or No)

2 The Lodge asserts that the jury entered a general verdict. We
disagree. The jury returned a special verdict, not a general verdict.
See Morales v. Golston, 141 P.3d 901, 906 (Colo. App. 2005)
(explaining that a general verdict simply requires the jury to
announce the ultimate legal result for each claim — i.e., who
wins — while a special verdict presents the jury with specific
questions of fact).

2
Answer: No

3. Did the Defendant, Moose Lodge # 1548, fail
to use reasonable care to protect Plaintiff from
a danger on property? (Yes or No)

Answer: No

4. Did the Defendant, Moose Lodge # 1548’s
failure cause the Plaintiff’s injuries or
damages? (Yes or No)

Answer: No

¶5 The Zlatens then filed a motion for JNOV challenging the

jury’s finding that the Lodge neither knew nor should have known

about a dangerous condition on its property. The court denied the

motion, concluding that, viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the Lodge, a reasonable person could have reached the

same conclusion as the jury.

¶6 The Zlatens now appeal.

II. Analysis

¶7 The Zlatens contend that the district court erroneously denied

their JNOV motion because they presented unchallenged and

overwhelming evidence whereas the Lodge presented “no evidence”

and relied solely on legal theory. We disagree.

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A. Standard of Review and Governing Law

¶8 We review the denial of a motion for JNOV de novo, employing

the same standards used by the district court. M.G. Dyess, Inc. v.

MarkWest Liberty Midstream & Res., L.L.C., 2022 COA 108, ¶ 27.

When a motion for JNOV challenges the factual basis for the jury’s

verdict, the court must review the evidence and all reasonable

inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

Dream Finders Homes LLC v. Weyerhaeuser NR Co., 2021 COA 143,

¶ 111. Applying these standards, “a JNOV motion should be

granted only if the evidence . . . is such that no reasonable person

could reach the same conclusion as the jury.” Hall v. Frankel,

190 P.3d 852, 862 (Colo. App. 2008). “If the facts are sufficiently in

dispute such that reasonable people could reach different

conclusions, it is the function of the jury to resolve those disputes.”

M.G. Dyess, ¶ 27.

¶9 Under the Colorado Premises Liability Act, “an invitee may

recover for damages caused by the landowner’s unreasonable

failure to exercise reasonable care to protect against dangers the

landowner actually knew about or should have known about.”

§ 13-21-115(4)(c)(I), C.R.S. 2025. Thus, to prevail on a premises

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liability claim, the invitee must prove by a preponderance of the

evidence that: (1) the landowner “actually knew or should have

known” of the danger to the invitee and (2) the landowner

“unreasonably failed to exercise reasonable care” to protect the

invitee from that danger. Lombard v. Colo. Outdoor Educ. Ctr., Inc.,

187 P.3d 565, 570 (Colo. 2008). “Under the premises liability

statute, . . . liability and damages are questions of fact to be

determined by the finder of fact.” Vigil v. Franklin, 103 P.3d 322,

328 (Colo. 2004).

B. Discussion

¶ 10 The Zlatens contend they presented “uncontroverted and

unchallenged evidence establishing that the Lodge maintained a

dangerous condition by permitting unleashed dogs on its property

without warnings, rules, or controls.” Thus, the Zlatens insist that

a reasonable person would find that the Lodge knew or should have

known about a dangerous condition — either “the dangerous

condition of [the dog who bit Patricia]” or the dangerous condition of

“permitting dogs to run unleashed without adequate warnings,

rules, safety protocols[,] or signage.” In support, the Zlatens point

to the following evidence:

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• The Lodge allowed unleashed dogs in the enclosure.

• Despite having regulatory authority, the Lodge did not limit

the number of dogs in the enclosure, identify dogs, restrict

aggressive breeds, or verify whether dogs were vaccinated,

spayed, or neutered.

• The Lodge inconsistently posted signs with warnings or

rules regarding off-leash dogs.

• The Zlatens testified that they had never seen off-leash dogs

in the enclosure.

¶ 11 Contrary to the Zlatens’ contentions, other evidence in the

record supports the jury’s finding that the Lodge neither knew nor

should have known about a dangerous condition on its property.

Specifically, the following evidence supports this finding:

• The Lodge had allowed members to let their dogs run

off-leash in the enclosure for years.

• No evidence of previous dog bites in the enclosure was

introduced at trial.

• The dog that bit Patricia had never previously exhibited

aggressive behavior. Romero testified that the dog had

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never previously attacked any person or animal while she

owned him.

• Members had to check out a key from a Lodge employee to

access the enclosure.

• Romero testified that the Lodge required members to keep

dogs leashed until they reached the enclosure.

¶ 12 Viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom

in the light most favorable to the Lodge, we cannot say the evidence

was so one-sided that no reasonable person could have reached the

same conclusion as the jury. The jury could have reasonably

concluded that the Lodge neither knew nor should have known

about a dangerous condition on its property because (1) off-leash

dogs were permitted only in the enclosure, (2) access to the

enclosure was limited by requiring members to obtain a key from a

Lodge employee, (3) the dog in question had never previously

exhibited aggressive behavior or attacked anyone, and (4) no

evidence of prior dog bites in the enclosure was introduced.

Although the Zlatens point to contrary evidence, we cannot reweigh

the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. Durdin v.

Cheyenne Mountain Bank, 98 P.3d 899, 903 (Colo. App. 2004).

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When, as here, some evidence supports the jury’s verdict, it is

improper for a court to invade the province of the jury and

substitute its judgment for that of the jury. Wesley v. United Servs.

Auto. Ass’n, 694 P.2d 855, 857 (Colo. App. 1984).

¶ 13 Accordingly, the district court properly denied the Zlatens’

motion for JNOV. The evidence, when viewed in the light most

favorable to the Lodge, did not compel only one conclusion — that

the Lodge should have known about a danger on its premises. The

issue was properly left for the jury.

III. Disposition

¶ 14 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE PAWAR concur.

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