Peo in Interest of LJ

25CA0732 People in Interest of LJ 10-09-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0732
Arapahoe County District Court No. 24JV5
Honorable Shay K. Whitaker, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of L.J. and J.D.J., Children,

and Concerning L.S.,

Appellant,

and

J.M.J.,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE YUN
Freyre and Pawar, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 9, 2025

Ron Carl, County Attorney, Erinn E. Walz, Assistant County Attorney, Aurora,
Colorado, for Appellee the People of the State of Colorado

Angela M. Compton, Guardian Ad Litem

Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant
The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for
Appellee J.M.J.
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, L.S. (mother)

appeals the judgment allocating parental responsibilities for L.J.

and J.D.J. (the children) to J.M.J. (father). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Arapahoe County Department of Human Services filed a

petition in dependency or neglect based, in part, on allegations that

mother was using substances in the presence of the children. The

children — then two and three years old — were placed with father.

¶3 Mother entered an admission to the petition, and the juvenile

court adjudicated the children dependent and neglected. The court

then adopted a treatment plan for mother requiring her to (1) stay

in contact with the Department; (2) attend family time; (3) obtain

employment or other legal income; (4) provide random weekly

urinalysis tests and complete a substance evaluation and

recommended treatment; (5) participate in a parent education

program; and (6) provide a safe and stable residence for the

children.

¶4 Father moved for an allocation of parental responsibilities

(APR), a request supported by the Department and the children’s

guardian ad litem. After an evidentiary hearing, the court granted

1
an APR to father and ordered a step-up plan beginning with

supervised family time for mother.

II. Discussion

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶5 When allocating parental responsibilities in a dependency and

neglect proceeding, the court must consider the legislative purposes

of the Children’s Code. People in Interest of J.G., 2021 COA 47,

¶ 18. The overriding purpose of the Children’s Code is to protect

children’s welfare and safety by providing procedures through

which the children’s best interests can be served. Id. at ¶ 19.

Thus, any allocation of parental responsibilities must prioritize the

children’s best interests. People in Interest of L.B., 254 P.3d 1203,

1208 (Colo. App. 2011); see § 19-3-507(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025. While

the court may consider the factors listed in the Uniform Dissolution

of Marriage Act, section 14-10-124(1.5)(a), C.R.S. 2025, the focus

remains on the protection and safety of the children, rather than

the parents’ custodial interests. People in Interest of H.K.W., 2017

COA 70, ¶ 13.

¶6 Although a juvenile court must find that a parent is unfit and

cannot become fit within a reasonable time before it may terminate

2
parental rights, no such finding is required before a court may

allocate parental responsibilities. See People in Interest of M.D.,

2014 COA 121, ¶ 44; L.B., 254 P.3d at 1208. Nonetheless, a

parent’s unfitness may still be a compelling reason not to return a

child to that parent. See M.D., ¶ 43.

¶7 The allocation of parental responsibilities is a matter within

the juvenile court’s discretion. See In re Parental Responsibilities

Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15. A court abuses its

discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or

unfair, or when it misapplies or misconstrues the law. People in

Interest of E.B., 2022 CO 55, ¶ 14.

¶8 The credibility of witnesses, the sufficiency, probative effect,

and weight of the evidence, as well as the inferences and

conclusions to be drawn from it, are within the juvenile court’s

discretion. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 249-50 (Colo.

2010). And when the juvenile court’s findings have record support,

its resolution of conflicting evidence is binding on review. B.R.D.,

¶ 15. But whether the court applied the correct legal standard in

making its findings is a question of law that we review de novo.

People in Interest of N.G.G., 2020 COA 6, ¶ 10.

3
B. Troxel Presumption

¶9 As a preliminary matter, mother asks us to apply the Troxel

presumption that a fit parent acts in the children’s best interests.

See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000). However, even

setting aside the question of whether mother was fit, Colorado cases

have thus far limited the Troxel presumption to situations where

child custody and decision-making are awarded to a nonparent over

the objection of a parent. See J.G., ¶ 21 (citing Troxel for the

proposition that “in proceedings between a parent and nonparent,

the parent is entitled to a constitutional presumption that the

parent acts in the child’s best interests”); see also In re B.J.,

242 P.3d 1128, 1133-34 (Colo. 2010) (same); N.G.G., ¶ 15 (same).

¶ 10 Here, the decision-making, parenting time, and custody

determinations were only between the parents. Mother does not

direct us to any authority that requires a court to apply Troxel in an

APR between two parents, and we are not aware of any such

authority.

C. Fitness and Endangerment

¶ 11 Mother argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by

awarding custody and decision-making authority to father because

4
there was no evidence that mother was unfit or that the children’s

health and safety were at risk.

¶ 12 Initially, we reject mother’s misplaced reliance on section

14-10-129(1)(b)(I). That section addresses the court’s authority to

modify an existing parenting time schedule; it does not apply to an

initial parenting time order. In an APR proceeding under title 19,

the court is not required to find that a parent is unfit or that the

children’s health and safety are at risk; rather, the focus is on the

best interests of the children. See L.B., 254 P.3d at 1208 (the

adjudication of children as dependent and neglected provides the

predicate for a disposition to enter; no finding concerning either

unfitness or endangerment is necessary); see also M.D., ¶ 44 (“[T]he

court may award visitation to nonparents, notwithstanding the

opposition of a parent, without demonstrating parental unfitness or

significant harm to the child.”).

¶ 13 The juvenile court nonetheless found that “significant

concerns” remained for the children’s safety because of mother’s

substance use and her “continued escalation” in the presence of the

children. And, although we acknowledge the court did not

specifically find that mother was unfit, it did so implicitly, stating it

5
hoped that she could “become a fit parent.” The record supports

the court’s findings.

¶ 14 The caseworker testified that the petition was filed because

mother was using substances, including methamphetamine and

fentanyl, in the presence of one of the children; left drug

paraphernalia, such as pipes and needles, scattered throughout the

home; and left the child unattended in a highchair for several

hours. The juvenile court took judicial notice of a criminal case in

which mother was originally charged with possession of

methamphetamine and fentanyl but ultimately pled guilty to a

lesser count of possession of drug paraphernalia. And mother

admitted to the caseworker that she was using alcohol and that the

child “got ahold of [an] alcohol shooter” while in her care.

¶ 15 Mother agreed to a treatment plan but did not successfully

complete any treatment plan objectives. The caseworker testified

that mother was given nine months to work on the plan, but

mother, among other things,

• provided no documentation that she completed a

substance abuse evaluation or treatment;

• completed no urinalysis tests;

6
• did not consistently display protective parenting skills;

• did not follow the recommendations of the parenting time

program;

• failed to meet with the caseworker consistently and, at

times, “had problem[s] with communication”;

• provided no documentation of income; and

• was struggling with housing.

¶ 16 In addition to safety concerns raised by mother’s

noncompliance with the treatment plan, the family time coach was

concerned about mother’s inability to manage her emotions around

the children. The coach testified that mother raised her voice at the

children when frustrated or angry, made inappropriate remarks

about father to the children, and yelled at or insulted the coach, the

coach’s supervisor, and father in the children’s presence. When the

coach attempted to intervene and redirect mother, her escalation

intensified.

¶ 17 The coach also testified that the children exhibited “a lot of

dysregulated behaviors” and mother struggled to manage both

children simultaneously. The coach had to intervene during family

7
time to protect the children’s “overall safety and wellbeing” because

the children fought a lot and got “physical with each other.”

¶ 18 Ultimately, the coach opined that mother’s contact with the

children should remain supervised. And the caseworker opined

that the proposed APR served the children’s best interests because

it adequately addressed the safety concerns.

¶ 19 On this record, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the

juvenile court’s conclusion that granting an APR primarily to father

was in the children’s best interests. See E.B., ¶ 14.

D. Delegation

¶ 20 Next, mother argues that the juvenile court improperly

delegated discretion over mother’s family time to father and third-

party supervisors. We disagree.

¶ 21 It is well settled that “[o]nly the court has the authority to

allocate parenting time.” B.J., 242 P.3d at 1133. A juvenile court

may not delegate decisions regarding the exercise of parenting time

to third parties or to one parent when the issue of parenting time is

contested. In re Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 334 (Colo. App.

2007); see also People in Interest of B.C., 122 P.3d 1067, 1070-71

8
(Colo. App. 2005) (noting that a court must make decisions about

parenting time and may not delegate this function to others).

¶ 22 The APR judgment states that:

(a) [Mother’s] family time must be supervised
by a third party agreed upon by herself and
[father]. If a third party is not available, or
cannot be agreed upon, [mother’s] parenting
time must be professionally supervised by a
professional visitation agency at her sole
expense. Any professional visitation agency
utilized must be approximately equidistant
between each parent’s residence.

(b) [Mother] will be entitled to a minimum of
ten hours of family time per week, if the
agreed-upon third party or professional
visitation agency is willing to provide her with
a total of ten hours each week.

¶ 23 Mother argues that this language effectively gives father veto

power over the manner of her contact with the children. But

mother’s argument overlooks the provision that ensures she will

receive family time even if father vetoes her choice of third-party

supervisor by providing that “if a third party . . . cannot be agreed

upon,” mother’s family time “must be supervised by a professional

visitation agency.” The APR does not give father discretion to

withhold consent for the professional visitation agency. And mother

9
is “entitled to a minimum of ten hours of family time per week” if

the “professional visitation agency is willing to provide” ten hours.

¶ 24 Mother also argues that the APR improperly conditions her

family time on the approval of professional supervisors. Though

inartfully worded, these APR provisions allow mother to select a

professional visitation agency that is “approximately equidistant”

from each parent and to have a minimum of ten hours of parenting

time at that agency each week. As with any other parenting time

order, if the selected agency cannot accommodate the minimum

hours, mother is free to seek an alternative agency that can.

¶ 25 Thus, we do not read these provisions as improperly

delegating the juvenile court’s responsibility to make decisions

about parenting time. See B.C., 122 P.3d at 1070-71.

E. Mother’s Remaining Contention

¶ 26 Finally, mother contends throughout the opening brief that

father engaged in “tactical gamesmanship” to withhold her family

time and, for that reason, should not have been granted an APR.

This argument essentially asks us to reweigh the evidence, a role

beyond our authority. See People in Interest of K.L.W., 2021 COA

56, ¶ 62 (we cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute our

10
judgment for that of the juvenile court); A.J.L., 243 P.3d at 250 (“[I]t

is important to defer to the [juvenile] court . . . when it hears

contradictory testimony on material issues.”).

¶ 27 The juvenile court acknowledged mother’s “frustration with the

domestic case” and that the case had been “contentious throughout

the years.” Nevertheless, the court found it necessary to “step back

from that” history and consider it only for “context about the

family.” And the family time coach testified that she saw no

evidence to support mother’s allegation that father was trying to

limit her visitation with the children.

¶ 28 Because the court’s findings are supported by the record, its

resolution of the evidence is binding on review. See B.R.D., ¶ 15.

F. Conclusion

¶ 29 In sum, the record supports the juvenile court’s findings, and

its APR based on those findings was neither a misapplication of the

law nor manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Accordingly,

the court did not abuse its discretion. See E.B., ¶ 14; B.R.D., ¶ 15.

III. Disposition

¶ 30 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE PAWAR concur.

11