Peo in Interest of PA

25CA0731 Peo in Interest of PA 10-09-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0731
Weld County District Court No. 24JV60
Honorable W. Troy Hause, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of P.A., C.S., N.M., and M.A., Children,

and Concerning K.A.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR
Freyre and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 9, 2025

Bruce T. Barker, County Attorney, David S. Anderson, Assistant County
Attorney, Greeley, Colorado, for Appellee

Sandra K. Owens, Counsel for Youth, Greeley, Colorado, for P.A. and C.S.

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem, for N.M. and M.A.

Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant
¶1 K.A. (mother) appeals the juvenile court’s judgment

adjudicating P.A., M.A., N.M., and C.S. (the children) dependent or

neglected. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In August 2024, the Weld County Department of Human

Services (Department) filed a petition in dependency and neglect

regarding the children. The petition alleged, among other things,

alcohol abuse and domestic violence in the family home, physical

abuse of one of the children, and mother’s mental health affecting

her ability to care for the children.

¶3 Mother requested a jury trial. The court scheduled a four-day

jury trial. On the third day of trial, mother — who was represented

by counsel throughout the proceedings — admitted to paragraph

5(a) of the petition, which read that “[t]he children’s environment is

injurious to their welfare.” See § 19-3-102(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025. The

juvenile court accepted mother’s admission and entered the

adjudication.

¶4 Mother now appeals, claiming that (1) her admission to the

petition was not knowing and voluntary, (2) the juvenile court made

an evidentiary error regarding a child’s recorded statements, and (3)

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she received ineffective assistance of counsel. We conclude that

none of these arguments warrant relief.

II. Mother’s Admission Was Knowing and Voluntary

¶5 Mother contends her admission to the petition in dependency

or neglect was not knowing or voluntary. We perceive no error.

A. Relevant Law and Standard of Review

¶6 After a department of human services files a petition in

dependency and neglect, a parent may confess, stipulate, or elect

not to contest all or part of the petition, provided that the parent is

“fully advised” as to all their rights and “the possible consequences

of a finding that a child or youth is dependent or neglected.”

C.R.J.P. 4.15(c); People in Interest of N.G., 2012 COA 131, ¶ 19.

¶7 A parent may also waive their right to an adjudicatory hearing

and choose instead to admit to part of or all of the allegations in a

petition. C.R.J.P. 4.16(1) allows the court to accept a parent’s

admission after finding that (1) the parent understands their rights,

the allegations contained in the petition, and the effect of the

admission; and (2) the admission is voluntary. Although neither

the statute nor the rule indicates that a parent’s admission must be

“knowing,” such a requirement can be inferred from the language of

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the rule, which requires that a court conclude that the parent

“understands [their] rights.” C.R.J.P. 4.16(1); see § 19-3-202(1),

C.R.S. 2025.

¶8 We review the propriety of a parent’s waiver as a mixed

question of fact and law. See People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39,

¶ 50. We accept the court’s findings of historic fact if supported by

competent evidence in the record, but we review de novo the legal

significance of those facts. Id.

B. Analysis

¶9 Mother contends she was “not in a proper frame of mind to

make a knowing, voluntary and intelligent decision about whether

or not to enter an admission to the allegations in the petition.”

Mother further asserts that she “was confused” and “repeatedly

interjected and indicated confusion” about what her admission

entailed when the court discussed the admission with her.

¶ 10 Conversely, the record shows there was no concern about

mother’s mental state when she entered the admission, and the

juvenile court thoroughly advised mother of her rights and

repeatedly confirmed that she wanted to enter an admission to the

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petition before accepting her admission. The court’s advised

mother as follows:

THE COURT: So, [mother], what I understand
is that you are wanting to enter and in which
[sic] — are actually that you’re going to remain
silent, but an admission would be entered
against you as to injurious environment as to
all four children. Is that how you are wanting
to proceed?

[Mother]: Oh, yes, Your Honor.

¶ 11 The court, after adjusting the audio recording equipment,

confirmed:

THE COURT: So, do you want to say that
again? Is that how you want to proceed?

[Mother]: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And have you had ample
opportunity to speak with your attorney,
[mother’s counsel], about your decision today?

[Mother]: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: And has anyone pressured you,
promised you anything in return, or
threatened you in order for you to enter this
position today at this time?

[Mother]: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Are you under the influence of
any alcohol, drugs, medication that impacts
your ability to understand what is happening
today?

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[Mother]: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And you believe you do
understand what is happening today?

[Mother]: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you understand if I accept
your position, then we will not go forward on
this jury trial and I’ll release the jury. Do you
understand that?

[Mother]: Yes.

THE COURT: And we’ve been here for a couple
of days, and we’re probably two thirds of the
way through this jury trial, and you
understand you’re giving up your right to
argue to the jury that the allegations brought
against you by the Department are not true.
Do you understand you’re giving up that right?

[Mother]: Yes.

THE COURT: And you understand that if you
enter an admission — well, if you take the
position that [the court’s] going to enter a
default admission, and I’m gonna [sic] find
that [the] children were in an injurious
environment, then you understand that there
would be no appeal from this adjudication,
whereas you may be able to appeal the
adjudication from the jury trial. Do you
understand that?

[Mother]: Yes.

¶ 12 Afterward, the court again verified whether this was how

mother wanted to proceed and mother responded by requesting a

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few minutes with her counsel. The court told mother she could

“have a few minutes,” but if she needed more time, she would be

able to meet with her counsel over the lunch hour because the

court wanted to make sure that if the jury trial was moving forward,

there would be enough time to complete it. Mother instead asked

the court to repeat the question. The court responded as follows:

THE COURT: So, the question is I want you to
understand that if the jury enters a verdict
and it is contrary to what you want, you would
have a right to appeal to the Colorado Court of
Appeals. I’ll let [mother’s counsel] identify for
you if she believes it would be a good appeal,
or if there would be problems with that appeal,
that you would have a right to appeal that
verdict. Do you understand that?

[Mother]: Yes.

THE COURT: But if you entered the ― if you
take the position and have me enter a default
adjudication against you, there’s not an appeal
to that. You understand?

[Mother]: Yes.

¶ 13 Mother’s counsel clarified that mother would not lose the right

to all possible appeals, only the right “for this particular instance

regarding this jury trial.” The court further explained what the next

hearing would entail and how a treatment plan would be created

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and adopted. The court then again confirmed this was how mother

wanted to proceed:

THE COURT: Okay. So, I’ll ask one last time,
are you wanting me to enter an adjudication
with you remaining silent? And I understand
why because there’s a criminal case pending.
But I’m going to be making a finding, not the
jury, but I’ll be making a finding that the
children are dependent and neglected based
upon what was the facts filed in this case
outlined in [the exhibit to the petition that
describes the reason for Department
involvement, family history, and recommended
next steps], and that the children were in an
injurious environment? Is that how you want
me to proceed?

[Mother]: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And so, I’ll accept your
admission. I’ll find — well before I do,
[mother’s counsel], do you believe this
admission is freely, voluntarily and knowingly
made?

[Mother’s Counsel]: I do, Your Honor. Thank
you.

¶ 14 The court then fully advised mother of her rights, including

the possibility of termination of her parental rights and how the

case would proceed from the adjudication. Afterward, the court

inquired whether mother wanted to move forward with the

admission of the petition for a fourth time.

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THE COURT: So, do you have any questions
about your rights?

[Mother]: Not at this time.

THE COURT: Okay. Did my explanation of
your full rights in this case change your mind
as far as how you’re wanting to proceed?

[Mother]: No.

THE COURT: Okay. So, I will enter an
adjudication. I will allow you to remain silent.
I will enter an adjudication, which means that
I’m entering a decree finding that the children
are dependent or neglected, and that is based
upon the factual basis of [the exhibit to the
petition that describes the reason for
Department involvement, family history, and
recommended next steps], and allowing you to
remain silent. So, you’re not telling me
whether you believe it to be true or not, [I am]
not requiring that. But I am entering the
adjudication.

¶ 15 Thus, our review of the record reveals that the juvenile court

ensured that mother understood her rights, the allegations in the

petition, and the consequences of her admission. Therefore, we

conclude that the court did not err by concluding that mother’s

admission was knowing and voluntary. Because mother validly

waived her right to a jury trial, we see no basis for her contention

that the procedures afforded to her violated her right to due

process. See People in Interest of J.A.S., 160 P.3d 257, 262 (Colo.

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App. 2007) (explaining that due process requires, at a minimum,

notice and the opportunity to protect one’s rights).

III. Mother’s Child Hearsay Argument is Waived

¶ 16 The Department, the counsel for youth, and the guardian ad

litem argue that mother waived her challenge of improper child

hearsay evidence when she entered an admission to the petition

after receiving an advisement. We agree. Because we conclude that

mother’s challenge to the adjudication judgment is waived, we do

not address the merits of her child hearsay argument.

IV. Mother’s Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim Fails

¶ 17 Mother alleges that her counsel was ineffective during the jury

trial because counsel failed to (1) properly advise her of the

consequences of entering an admission before she did so; (2) share

the contents of P.A.’s forensic interview with her before the trial; (3)

inform her that the forensic interview could have been admitted

during trial; and (4) file a motion in limine concerning the

admission of the forensic interview. We disagree.

A. Relevant Law

¶ 18 A parent has a statutory right to appointed counsel in

dependency and neglect proceedings. §§ 19-1-105(2), 19-3-202(1),

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C.R.S. 2025. A parent’s statutory right to counsel includes the

right to effective assistance of counsel. A.R. v. D.R., 2020 CO 10,

¶ 47.

¶ 19 We employ the same Strickland test that is used in criminal

cases to evaluate ineffective assistance of counsel claims in

dependency and neglect proceedings. See id. at ¶¶ 48, 60 (citing

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). Under this test, to

establish a claim, the parent must show that (1) counsel’s

performance was outside the wide range of professionally competent

assistance, and (2) the parent was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient

performance — that is, there is a reasonable probability that but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome of the proceeding

would have been different. Id. at ¶ 60. “If the parent fails to

establish either prong of this test, the claim fails.” People in Interest

of C.B., 2019 COA 168, ¶ 26.

B. Analysis

¶ 20 Because mother does not meet the prejudice prong of the

Strickland test, her claim fails.

¶ 21 First, we note that even if we assume, without deciding, that

mother’s counsel did not properly advise her of the consequences of

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entering an admission, the record as described above in section

II.B. shows that the court properly advised mother about any such

consequences. Therefore, mother was not prejudiced by any alleged

deficiencies in her counsel’s advisement on entering an admission.

¶ 22 As to her second and third ineffective assistance allegations,

mother fails to explain how personally reviewing the contents or

receiving notice of the potential admission of the child P.A.’s

forensic interview would have impacted the ultimate outcome of the

case. Even if the forensic interview had not been admitted, P.A. was

listed as a witness and called to testify during the trial. As mother’s

counsel pointed out during the trial, P.A. could testify about all the

alleged incidents contained in the forensic interview.

¶ 23 Mother further alleges that, if she had been able to present her

case in chief and testify, she would have presented evidence that

she had resolved the child protection concerns that initiated the

case, and thus, there was a “good chance” that the jury would have

declined to adjudicate the children dependent or neglected.

¶ 24 However, this argument ignores the permanency caseworker’s

earlier testimony about mother’s progress. The caseworker testified

that mother had, to her knowledge, separated from her partner,

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obtained stable housing, completed parenting classes, begun

participating in therapy, and presented no ongoing concerns for

alcohol abuse — all of which mother asserts proves she had

resolved her child protection concerns. But the caseworker testified

that despite mother’s progress, she still had concerns for the

children’s safety in mother’s care and the caseworker did not

believe she had seen meaningful changes in mother’s behavior.

Mother describes no purported testimony that would have refuted

the caseworker’s concerns. Furthermore, mother’s admission came

before any of the parties finished presenting evidence. Thus, her

argument merely assumes there would have been no additional

evidence presented to refute her claims.

¶ 25 As to her fourth argument, even assuming mother’s counsel’s

failure to file a motion in limine was deficient, mother does not

establish that the forensic interview would have been definitively

excluded. And, as discussed above, given that the child was

available to testify, mother cannot establish prejudice resulting

from the forensic interview’s admission.

¶ 26 We conclude mother has not alleged sufficiently specific or

compelling allegations of prejudice to constitute a prima facie

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showing of ineffective assistance of counsel and we therefore reject

her claims.

V. Disposition

¶ 27 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE YUN concur.

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