Peo v. Morgan

22CA1580 Peo v Morgan 10-02-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 22CA1580
Weld County District Court No. 20CR496
Honorable Timothy Kerns, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Kaman Michael Morgan,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE
Pawar and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 2, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, William G. Kozeliski, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Casey J. Mulligan, Alternate Defense Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Kaman Michael Morgan, appeals his conviction for

first degree murder. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Morgan and B.B. dated on and off for three years and had a

child together.

¶3 On February 24, 2020, police responded to a report of a

shooting at Morgan’s house. Upon arrival, they found B.B. lying

face down in the driveway, with blood coming from her head. The

windshield of B.B.’s car had five bullet holes. B.B. had been shot

six times — five times from the front or side, and once in the back

of the head.

¶4 Multiple neighbors testified that they heard gunshots on the

night of the shooting. One neighbor testified that when she went

outside, she heard a man yell, “That’s what you get, you bitch.”

¶5 After the shooting, Morgan called his mother and confessed to

shooting B.B. A few hours later, he arrived at his mother’s house

and asked her to drive him to the police station. Morgan told his

mother that B.B. “said the wrong thing one last time,” so he

retrieved his gun from the house and shot B.B. through the front

windshield of her car.

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¶6 Earlier on the day of the shooting, Morgan and B.B. exchanged

text messages about B.B. picking up their infant son from Morgan’s

house. Morgan wrote, “I’m just so done with your fucking shit[,] it

gives me a headache even talking to you. Actions speak louder

than words! When you come my dad will [hand] him off to you[,] I

don’t even want to see you ever again. Or speak to you if I don’t

have to.” Morgan then called B.B. a “cunt.”

¶7 The trial evidence further showed that Morgan had threatened

to kill B.B. during a phone call in January 2020 and again the day

before the shooting.

¶8 Morgan testified at trial. Morgan admitted that he had

repeatedly threatened to kill B.B., though he claimed that they were

empty threats. Morgan said that B.B. arrived at his house around

8 p.m. to pick up their son. He said they argued and B.B. hit him

in the leg with the car seat. She then said, “Say good-bye to your

son. You’re never [going to] see him again[,] . . . at least alive.”

Morgan testified that he went inside to get his cell phone to call the

police and, while inside, also grabbed his gun. He returned outside

and claimed he saw B.B. shaking their son while putting him in the

car seat. Morgan then shot B.B. five times through the car’s

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windshield. When she fell out of the car, Morgan said he

accidentally shot her a sixth time.

¶9 Police recovered a .357 magnum revolver from the front lawn.

All six bullets had been fired. They also recovered a box of .357

magnum ammunition that was missing six bullets.

¶ 10 The jury convicted Morgan of first degree murder (after

deliberation) as an act of domestic violence, and the trial court

sentenced him to life without parole.

¶ 11 On appeal, Morgan contends that the trial court

(1) impermissibly permitted prosecutorial misconduct during voir

dire; (2) erroneously refused to give the jury a curative instruction

defense counsel requested after deliberations had begun; and

(3) erroneously precluded the defense from eliciting exculpatory

testimony from Morgan’s brother. He also asserts these errors

cumulatively deprived him of a fair trial. We address and reject

each of his contentions.

II. Prosecutorial Misconduct and Curative Instruction

¶ 12 Morgan contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct

when he used an analogy to explain the concept of “after

deliberation.” He further contends that the trial court erred when it

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denied his request for a curative instruction on “after deliberation”

after the jury began deliberating. We discern no error.

A. Additional Background Information

¶ 13 During voir dire, the prosecutor questioned the panel about

inferring intent from an individual’s action. He used the example of

someone using their turn signal, indicating their intent to turn. He

then asked two jurors about using their turn signals.

[PROSECUTOR]: On your way to court, did you
change lanes?

JUROR NO. 10: Yes.

[PROSECUTOR]: And can you describe for me
how you did it? And he’s not going to write you
a ticket if you —did you use your turn signal?

JUROR NO. 10: No, I just used my turn signal
and used my mirrors to make sure I can get
over.

[PROSECUTOR]: Okay. How long did that take
you?

JUROR NO. 10: A few seconds, I guess.

[PROSECUTOR]: Would you say it was a hasty
decision you made?

JUROR NO. 10: No.

[PROSECUTOR]: Okay. Was it — or it wasn’t
impulsive either, was it?

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JUROR NO. 10: No.

[PROSECUTOR]: Okay. It’s something you
thought about and did relatively quickly?

JUROR NO. 10: Yes.

[PROSECUTOR]: And you did it safely?

JUROR NO. 10: Yes.

....

[PROSECUTOR]: Juror Number 9, same
question.

JUROR NO. 9: Yeah, I just turn my turn signal
on and change lanes, and made it on time.

[PROSECUTOR]: Okay. And, again, it wasn’t
an impulsive decision —

JUROR NO. 9: No.

[PROSEUCTOR]: -- or hasty; is that fair?

JUROR NO. 9: Right.

[PROSECUTOR]: And it was a relatively quick
decision?

JUROR NO. 9: Yes.

¶ 14 In closing argument, the prosecutor referenced this analogy

without objection, saying the following regarding the element of

after deliberation:

After deliberation, you guys heard a lot of talk
about that when we were doing jury selection

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and things like that. The judge talked to you
about it, I talked to you about it, defense
counsel talked to you about it. But this
definition doesn’t mean you have to think for
days and days and weeks and weeks about a
plan, you know, like, in a movie plot or
something like that. That’s why I talked to you
guys in jury selection about changing lanes in
a car. It’s something that if you don’t do
safely, it can have huge ramifications. But you
do it quickly. You look in your mirror, you
signal and you go or don’t go because it’s not
safe yet. It can be a very quick decision.

We talked about it can’t be hasty or impulsive,
right? Just like changing a lane. Here, you
have him telling her the day before he’s going
to kill her. Him telling her to come to their
house and get [their child] that night right
then and there . . . . He’s not happy about her
moving in with her new boyfriend. His mom
tells her —tells you guys, or at least the cops
do, that he’s been saying he wanted to kill her
for weeks. . . . [He] threatens to murder her the
day before. The day of the murder he tells her
how much [he] hates her and doesn’t want her
moving in with [her boyfriend]. That shows
deliberation, ladies and gentlemen. That
shows that this was intentional.

¶ 15 Defense counsel then responded:

So first, let’s look at the element of after
deliberation. After deliberation has a specific
definition.

....

In jury selection, and then even in close, the
prosecution asked you about changing lanes.

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How many people changed lanes when they’re
driving to court today? Using their turn signal
when you’ve changed lanes. Changing lanes?
How many times have you changed lanes in
your life? It’s an automatic look, signal, move.
Where do you have to sit there thinking about
how do I change lanes? Where is my turn
signal? Am I supposed to look or just move?
No. Changing lanes is so ingrained that it’s a
habit.

That is not after deliberation. And [Morgan]
did not shoot [B.B.] after deliberation.
[Morgan] shot [B.B.] to stop the threat to his
son. He quickly reacted.

¶ 16 In rebuttal closing, the prosecutor responded:

We talked about the turn signal in jury
selection, about making decisions, and how
you can make decisions in a moment. Not
hastily, but you can make decisions in a
moment. Just like turning your turn signal on
like we do every day. Think about that and
[Morgan’s] actions. He deliberately got his
gun. He deliberately pulled the trigger six
different times. Hitting her all six times. He
could think between each time he pulled that
trigger, and he did it all six times.

¶ 17 The jury received the following definition of “after deliberation”:

The term “after deliberation” means not only
intentionally, but also that the decision to
commit the act has been made after the
exercise of reflection and judgment concerning
the act. An act after deliberation is never one
which has been committed in a hasty or
impulsive manner.

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¶ 18 The trial court also instructed the jury:

It is my job to decide what rules of law apply to
the case. While attorneys may comment on
some of these rules, you must follow the
instructions I give you. Even if you disagree
with or do not understand the reasons for
some of the rules of law, you must follow them.
No single instruction describes all the law
which must be applied; the instructions must
be considered together as a whole.

¶ 19 After deliberations began, defense counsel lodged a late

objection to the prosecutor’s argument, saying the following:

Just looking at . . . the closing arguments in
[People v. McBride, 228 P.3d 216 (Colo. App.
2009)] that reference back to voir dire, in
McBride this was the running a yellow light.
And I — I do realize that there is kind of a
difference of the facts in McBride and the facts
here . . . .

One of the issues was the prosecution in
McBride kept saying that it only takes a
second, that that decision only takes a second.
And they’re equating yellow light with after
deliberation. I think that the circumstances in
this case are very similar to what happened in
McBride, so I think it’s really important that we
do address this.

Just like in McBride where the [c]ourt found
that driving though a yellow light[,] it stated
it’s not illegal or even necessarily negligent, so
the analogy was in[a]pt.

[The court went] on to state that typically
driving through a yellow light is . . . an

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inconsequential decision made hastily or
impulsively rather than after true deliberation.
I think that the scenario of — that was brought
up in voir dire and then in closing and I think
— and definitely rebuttal as well, the changing
lanes and equating changing lanes, even if
hitting your turn signal only takes, like, a
quick action, it’s still, like, after deliberation. I
believe that’s what they were equating it to,
which I think would be improper.

¶ 20 Defense counsel then requested a curative instruction.

¶ 21 The trial court found as follows:

So the first question for the [c]ourt is whether
the analogy that was used in this case is
tantamount to the analogy used in the yellow
light scenario referenced in McBride. I think
there’s some distinguishing facts that need to
be acknowledged in terms of conducting that
analysis.

Number one, there was a discussion about
looking to see if there’s another car turning the
signal on and then moving the vehicle, so that
is more than a second or some sort of reflective
action by someone.

The reference in the rebuttal is, perhaps, more
problematic. Reality is that that reference —
let me find it here. . . . I like to make a
decision in a moment, not hastily, but you
ca[n] make them like turning on you[r] signal.
And then the following is a lengthy description
of the actions leading up to the — or advancing
the People’s argument about the step by step;
getting the gun, pulling the trigger six times,
hitting her all six times, he could think

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between each time he pulled the trigger, he did
it all six times, deliberately moved her car
down the street. That whole argument. So the
— the totality of the argument is that there is
considerable reflective — or thought process
that went into [Morgan’s] conduct.

And the People referenced twice that we’re not
talking about hasty or they — I don’t know if
they used impulsive, as well, but I think so.
They indicated that it is not hasty or impulsive
conduct, which is consistent with legal
principles.

So the — the context of the analogy — it’s
probably not wonderful, frankly, but I don’t
think it’s fatal in this case. I think that [it’s]
distinguished from the yellow light scenario.
And I think we just all understand that the
yellow light scenario, you have to decide right
now, am I pressing the gas or am I pressing
the [pedal]? And that happens in a second, in
a moment you have to make that decision.

The analogy used with respect to the turn
signal was not that — in fact, I think the
opposite was said at one point. Something
along the lines of you have to look in the other
lane, and then use the turn signal. So the —
the idea of — and so I don’t — I — I didn’t have
a contemporaneous objection and I’m not fall
— faulting anybody for that. You know, the
[c]ourt, I guess, is presumed to know all the
law as well. I try to highlight some of the
things before closing so we didn’t get into
trouble looking at some more recent issues.

I’m just not confident it’s — it’s the same
analogy.

10
¶ 22 Defense counsel then argued that while the analogy differed

slightly from the one in McBride, it was close, and a curative

instruction was necessary. The trial court disagreed, stating that

the prosecutor’s analogy did not convey to the jury that Morgan’s

actions were decided in a second but instead described the multiple

steps that he took. Further, the court found that the prosecutor

emphasized that “after deliberation” cannot be hasty or impulsive.

¶ 23 Ultimately, the trial court denied the request for the

supplemental instruction, stating as follows:

Yeah, the problem I have is that if pressed on
it, which, obviously, I am, I can’t find that —
that [the analogy] warrants readvising the jury.
And even if I elected to do that, then I do think
that I have to go through the exercise of
making a decision. Do I provide an
instruction? Do I provide an interrogatory?
Do I — do I have to get commitments from
them to commence deliberations again?

And if that was the right call, perhaps, that’s
what I would do. But I think the totality of the
record before me does not convey the message
that this could happen in a second. The
totality of the record, in my mind, says that
this was . . . well planned — and that’s —
that’s been the argument is that this was a
planned event. And it’s evidenced by him
going down to the bedroom, pulling the gun
out, walking up the stairs, all the things that
were highlighted.

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So I don’t think — I don’t think the right
decision is to provide an instruction to the
jury.

B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 24 Whether a prosecutor’s statement constitutes misconduct is

left to the trial court’s discretion. Domingo-Gomez v. People, 125

P.3d 1043, 1049 (Colo. 2005). We will not disturb the court’s

rulings regarding such statements absent a showing of an abuse of

that discretion. People v. Strock, 252 P.3d 1148, 1152 (Colo. App.

2010). A trial court abuses its discretion only when its ruling is

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or it misapplies the

law. People v. Ambrose, 2021 COA 62, ¶ 53.

¶ 25 We conduct a two-step analysis when reviewing a claim of

prosecutorial misconduct. Wend v. People, 235 P.3d 1089, 1096

(Colo. 2010). First, we determine whether the prosecutor’s

challenged conduct was improper under the totality of the

circumstances. Id. Second, if the prosecutor’s comments were

improper, we evaluate whether they warrant reversal according to

the proper standard of reversal. See id.

¶ 26 A prosecutor, while free to strike hard blows, is not at liberty

to strike foul ones. Id. Thus, a prosecutor may not misstate or

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misinterpret the law. People v. Grant, 174 P.3d 798, 810-11 (Colo.

App. 2007). Moreover, “[u]sing an analogy to explain the concept of

deliberation can be problematic, especially where it might trivialize

the reflection and judgment necessary to commit first degree

murder.” People v. Dominguez-Castor, 2020 COA 1, ¶ 88.

¶ 27 “We evaluate claims of improper argument ‘in the context of

the argument as a whole and in light of the evidence before the

jury.’” People v. Van Meter, 2018 COA 13, ¶ 24 (quoting People v.

Geisendorfer, 991 P.2d 308, 312 (Colo. App. 1999)). Because

arguments at trial are seldom perfectly scripted, we give

prosecutors the benefit of the doubt when their remarks are

ambiguous or inartful. People v. McMinn, 2013 COA 94, ¶ 60.

¶ 28 Trial courts are required to properly instruct the jury on all

matters of law. Key v. People, 715 P.2d 319, 323 (Colo. 1986).

Generally, a curative instruction will remedy any prejudice caused

by improper comments or argument. See People v. Meils, 2019 COA

180, ¶ 24. We review a trial court’s decision to give a supplemental

jury instruction for an abuse of discretion. People v. Griffin, 224

P.3d 292, 298 (Colo. App. 2009). A trial court abuses its discretion

13
when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or it

misapplies the law. People v. Abdulla, 2020 COA 109M, ¶ 61.

¶ 29 A person commits murder in the first degree if, after

deliberation and with the intent to cause the death of a person

other than himself, he causes the death of that person.

§ 18-3-102(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025. As stated previously, “[t]he term

‘after deliberation’ means not only intentionally but also that the

decision to commit the act has been made after the exercise of

reflection and judgment concerning the act.” § 18-3-101(3). “An

act committed after deliberation is never one which has been

committed in a hasty or impulsive manner.” Id.

¶ 30 When a defendant fails to object at trial, we review for plain

error. Van Meter, ¶ 26. “Reversal is required under this standard

only if the error was obvious and ‘so undermined the fundamental

fairness of the trial itself so as to cast serious doubt on the

reliability of the judgment of conviction.’” Id. (quoting Hagos v.

People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 14).

C. Prosecutorial Misconduct

¶ 31 While we generally discourage the use of analogies to explain

legal concepts, we discern no reversible misconduct in the

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prosecutor’s remarks. Like the trial court, we are not persuaded

that McBride requires a different result. See McBride, 228 P.3d at

221-26.

¶ 32 In McBride, the prosecutor referenced a yellow-light analogy

during voir dire and, in rebuttal closing, argued, “How long does it

take [to decide to go through a yellow light]? A second. That fast.

[The defendant] exercised reflection and judgment.” Id. at 224-25.

The division held that the prosecutor’s “analogy was inapt” because

driving “through a yellow light is not illegal or even necessarily

negligent and typically is an inconsequential decision made hastily

or impulsively rather than after true ‘deliberation.’” Id. at 225

(citations omitted). And it noted that not “every possible

permutation of a yellow-light argument” is plain error. Id.

However, the division explained that “[w]hat made this argument

plainly wrong was the prosecutor’s insistence that yellow-light

deliberation could occur as ‘fast’ as ‘[a] second.’” Id.

¶ 33 Here, in contrast, while the prosecutor stated that the decision

to change lanes could be “very quick,” he never attributed a specific

time frame to the decision. Instead, he used the jurors’

step-by-step decision process to emphasize that the decision was

15
neither hasty nor impulsive. He then connected the analogy to the

trial evidence supporting the after deliberation element, including

Morgan repeatedly threatening B.B., going inside the house to

retrieve the gun, and shooting B.B. six times, including once in the

back after B.B. fell out of the car. Therefore, we conclude that while

perhaps inartful, the prosecutor’s lane-change analogy does not

constitute misconduct.

¶ 34 But even if such comments were improper, they did not

amount to plain error for three reasons. First, the trial court

provided the jury with the correct definition of “after deliberation”

and instructed the jury that while the attorneys could argue the

instructions, it was the court’s job to decide what rules of law

applied. Absent contrary evidence, we presume the jury understood

and followed these instructions. Bondsteel v. People, 2019 CO 26,

¶ 62.

¶ 35 Second, defense counsel did not object contemporaneously.

The lack of an objection “may demonstrate [a] belief that the live

argument, despite its appearance in a cold record, was not overly

damaging.” People v. Knapp, 2020 COA 107, ¶ 61 (quoting

Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1054).

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¶ 36 Third, the evidence against Morgan was overwhelming.

Morgan admitted to repeatedly threatening to kill B.B., going into

the house after their argument, retrieving his gun, and shooting

B.B. six times. These admissions were further corroborated by

physical evidence.

¶ 37 Accordingly, we discern no reversible error.

D. Curative Instruction

¶ 38 Similarly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s

refusal to provide a curative instruction, for two reasons. First, the

record shows, and Morgan does not dispute, that the court correctly

instructed the jury on the meaning of “after deliberation.”

Moreover, the jury never asked a question about the meaning of

this term. Thus, we presume the jury understood and followed this

definition. Bondsteel, ¶ 62; cf. Leonardo v. People, 728 P.2d 1252,

1256 (Colo. 1986) (appropriate to give a supplemental instruction

when jury expresses confusion about an issue in the instructions).

¶ 39 Second, the record shows that the trial court thoroughly

considered the McBride case and determined that a curative

instruction was unnecessary. For the reasons described above, we

agree and conclude this decision was reasonable. See People v.

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Palacios, 2018 COA 6M, ¶ 18 (when assessing for abuse of

discretion, “we look to whether the trial court’s decision fell within a

range of reasonable options”).

¶ 40 Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial

court’s denial of Morgan’s curative instruction.

III. Self-Serving Hearsay

¶ 41 Morgan next contends that the trial court erred by excluding

his brother Konner1 Morgan’s testimony under the self-serving

hearsay rationale. While we agree that the court erroneously

excluded the statement as self-serving hearsay, we affirm its ruling

on alternate grounds, concluding that the court properly excluded

the statement because it was irrelevant under CRE 401 and 402.

See People v. Dyer, 2019 COA 161, ¶ 39 (we may affirm a lower

court’s decision on any grounds supported by the record, regardless

of whether it was relied upon or considered by the lower court).

1 Konner shares the same last name as the defendant. Accordingly,
we refer to him by his first name. We mean no disrespect in doing
so.

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A. Additional Facts

¶ 42 Konner testified that Morgan was living at his house at the

time of the shooting. Defense counsel asked, “[F]or the time . . .

that you [were] living with [Morgan], . . . [Morgan] never said

anything to you about planning to kill [B.B.], right?” The

prosecution objected on hearsay grounds. Defense counsel argued

that he was not trying to elicit hearsay because he knew the answer

to the question was no.

¶ 43 The trial court sustained the objection, finding as follows:

Here’s the foundation of that argument: If you
wish to elicit [w]hat the two of them had
communication about without getting into any
substance, you can say, Did you have a
conversation about X or Y? Yes.

Any inference about the substance of that
becoming the truth of the matter asserted,
then, is a hearsay question that calls for a
hearsay response. Now, I understand the
argument is [Morgan] did not make a
statement and, therefore, there’s no hearsay
involved.

The question’s improper because it calls for
the truth of the matter asserted to be inferred
by the absence of a response. And so that is
self-serving and it’s improper. So I’ll — I’ll flip
the scale a bit. If you believe there’s case law
that says that someone can go on the stand
and you can ask them all of the omissions that

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they have made in terms of their statements,
then I’ll have to reconsider. But I’ve had this
happen before. I’m fairly confident — I am
confident that this is improper, because the
question itself calls for a substantive response.

¶ 44 The prosecutor then clarified:

I think this situation is distinct where Defense
is attempting to elicit a statement or opening a
door, but if Defense phrases a question as, you
know, [y]ou never heard someone say this?
You never heard this from this person?
Obviously, if the answer from the witness is
yes, that’s different. But the answer is no
here.

¶ 45 The trial court responded:

Let me frame it a little bit to make sure that
we’re clear, because if we have a context of
either the declarant being subject to
cross-examination or a statement that’s
already in evidence, and then to clarify it by
saying, you did not say X or Y, I understand
that argument.

In this case we have [Morgan], who has not
taken the stand yet, and it is a . . . statement
that advances his state of mind without being
subject to cross-examination. So I think it’s
different than a context where you have a
declarant who’s already been subject to
cross-examination and you’re clarifying what
they did not say. So that’s the distinction I’m
making to start with.

....

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[T]he import of this question is it’s conveying
[Morgan’s] thought processes through a
question of omission without any context. And
in that scenario, that is an improper question.
I don’t have any other context within which to
decide whether it’s rebutting something from
the People or not that may or may not come up
that I’m aware.

B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 46 We review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

discretion under the standards set forth previously. See People v.

Gonzales-Quevedo, 203 P.3d 609, 612 (Colo. App. 2008).

¶ 47 Hearsay is “a statement other than one made by the declarant

while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove

the truth of the matter asserted.” CRE 801(c). Unless it falls within

an exception under the Colorado Rules of Evidence or is permitted

by statute or procedural rules, hearsay is inadmissible. CRE 802.

¶ 48 “Colorado law has no per se rule excluding a defendant’s self-

serving hearsay statement.” People v. Vanderpauye, 2023 CO 42, ¶

28. Rather, “a defendant’s self-serving hearsay statement may be

admissible if it satisfies a hearsay-rule exception in the Colorado

Rules of Evidence.” Id.

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¶ 49 Only relevant evidence is admissible. CRE 402. Relevant

evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of

any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action

more probable or less probable than it would be without the

evidence.” CRE 401. Evidence is probative if it has “a tendency to

prove the proposition for which it is offered.” Fletcher v. People, 179

P.3d 969, 974 (Colo. 2007).

C. Analysis

¶ 50 To the extent that the trial court relied on the self-serving

nature of the statement to exclude it, the trial court erred.

However, the record shows that the court did not solely rely on the

self-serving rationale. It also addressed the statement’s relevance.

The court noted that defense counsel’s question sought to convey

Morgan’s thought process through an omission, but without any

meaningful context. We agree. The fact that Morgan did not tell

Konner that he planned to kill B.B. does not have any tendency to

make the existence of any fact that was of consequence to the

determination of the action more or less probable. See CRE 401.

While Konner testified that he knew Morgan and B.B. had a

contentious relationship in general, no evidence was presented that

22
Morgan spoke to Konner about B.B. leading up to the shooting. On

the contrary, Konner testified that he spent little time at the home

with Morgan and instead lived primarily at his girlfriend’s house.

Without additional context, the fact that Morgan did not tell Konner

about a plan carries no probative value and is therefore irrelevant.

¶ 51 Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s

decision not to admit this evidence.

IV. Cumulative Error

¶ 52 When reviewing for cumulative error, we ask whether

“numerous formal irregularities, each of which in itself might be

deemed harmless, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair

trial.” Howard-Walker v. People, 2019 CO 69, ¶ 18 (quoting Oaks v.

People, 371 P.2d 443, 446 (Colo. 1962)). Because we have identified

no errors, we necessarily find no cumulative error.

V. Disposition

¶ 53 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE YUN concur.

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