Peo v. March

23CA1650 Peo v March 09-04-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1650
El Paso County District Court No. 22CR2599
Honorable Monica Jo Gomez, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Lamar March,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN
Tow and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced September 4, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Josiah Beamish, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Kimberly Alderman Penix, Alternate Defense Counsel, Fort Collins, Colorado,
for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Lamar March, appeals the judgment of conviction

entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of attempted first degree

murder, first degree burglary, first degree assault, violation of a

protection order, and three crime of violence sentence enhancers.

We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In June 2021, before the events giving rise to this case, March

severely injured the victim, his girlfriend, and ultimately pleaded

guilty to second degree assault. The district court in that case

entered a mandatory protection order against March, listing the

victim as the protected party and requiring, among other things,

that March vacate the victim’s home.

¶3 In May 2022, law enforcement responded to a disturbance at

the victim’s apartment complex and found her “crying hysterically.”

Officers observed that the victim appeared injured, her hair had

been “sheared off,” and she had tried to use stools to prevent

someone from entering her apartment. The victim told law

enforcement that March had threatened to kill her.

¶4 After being transported to the hospital, the victim told the

treating forensic nurse examiner that March had punched, kicked,

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and choked her, causing her to lose consciousness and urinate on

herself. The victim also reported that March had forced her to cut

off her own hair to cause her embarrassment.

¶5 The prosecution asserted that March subjected the victim to

intense and repeated domestic violence, in part, because he feared

the victim was cheating on him. Before trial, the prosecution gave

notice under CRE 404(b)(3) that it intended to introduce evidence of

other acts related to March’s 2021 assault of the victim. Over

March’s objection, the trial court ruled that most of the

prosecution’s proposed other acts evidence related to the 2021

incident was admissible to show March’s state of mind, motive, and

common scheme or plan.

¶6 The jury found March guilty of attempted first degree murder,

first degree burglary, first degree assault, and violation of a

protection order. It further found that March caused serious bodily

injury when committing attempted murder, burglary, and assault,

rendering those offenses crimes of violence. See § 18-1.3-

406(2)(a)(I)(B), C.R.S. 2025.

¶7 The trial court sentenced March to forty-eight years in the

Department of Corrections’ custody. As relevant to this appeal, the

2
court’s sentence encompassed (1) thirty-two years for attempted

first degree murder and (2) sixteen years for first degree burglary,

running consecutively to the sentence for attempted murder.

¶8 On appeal, March contends that (1) the trial court erred by

admitting other acts evidence under CRE 404(b); (2) insufficient

evidence supported his convictions for first degree assault, first

degree burglary, and attempted first degree murder; and (3) his

sentence violates his right to due process. We address each

contention in turn.

II. CRE 404(b)

¶9 March argues that the trial court abused its discretion under

CRE 404(b) by admitting extensive other acts evidence. We

disagree.

A. Additional Background

¶ 10 Based on the court’s pretrial order under CRE 404(b), the

prosecution introduced significant other acts evidence related to the

2021 incident. The following is illustrative:

• The victim’s sister testified that she checked on the

victim at March’s apartment after she had been

unusually noncommunicative in the days leading up to

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the 2021 incident; receiving no response at the

apartment, the victim’s sister contacted the police for a

welfare check. Officers later forced open the apartment

door, found the victim inside, and took her out on a

stretcher due to her injuries.

• The victim’s sister testified that the victim was

“unrecognizable” at the hospital — her face was “three

times” bigger than normal, her eyes were swollen shut,

she had a cigarette burn on her leg, she suffered bruises

“from head to toe,” and blood was everywhere. The

victim relayed to her sister that March had threatened to

kill her and had tortured her “for a few days.”

• Four additional family members testified for the

prosecution regarding the 2021 incident, including the

victim’s brother-in-law, who said the victim appeared

“[b]eat up” after the assault; March’s sister, who testified

that March felt he could “hurt” the victim and was “losing

control of himself”; and March’s mother and stepfather,

who expressed concern for the victim after not hearing

from her.

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• The detective who investigated the 2021 incident testified

that the victim initially couldn’t communicate at the

hospital due to the severity of her injuries. The detective

also testified that he (1) found blood on walls, window

blinds, and clothes in March’s apartment; and (2)

interviewed March’s sister, who said that March had

admitted to choking and threatening to kill the victim.

• The forensic nurse examiner, who had reviewed the

victim’s medical history, testified that the victim suffered

a subdural hematoma following the 2021 incident.

• The prosecution introduced several photographs of the

victim’s injuries, March’s apartment, and other evidence

related to the 2021 incident.

¶ 11 The court issued several limiting instructions regarding the

other acts evidence, informing the jurors that evidence regarding

the 2021 incident was being admitted for a limited purpose of

showing motive, intent, common scheme or plan, and preparation.

B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 12 We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

discretion. People v. Vanderpauye, 2023 CO 42, ¶ 23. A court

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abuses its discretion when it misapplies the law or when its ruling

is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Id.

¶ 13 Because March preserved his challenge through a timely

objection, we review any error in the court’s evidentiary ruling for

nonconstitutional harmless error. Pernell v. People, 2018 CO 13,

¶ 22. Under this standard, we will reverse only if a reasonable

probability exists that the court’s error contributed to the

defendant’s conviction. People v. Roman, 2017 CO 70, ¶ 13.

¶ 14 CRE 404(b) governs the admissibility of other acts evidence.

The rule prohibits the use of “[e]vidence of any other crime, wrong,

or act . . . to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a

particular occasion the person acted in conformity with the

character.” CRE 404(b)(1). But such evidence “may be admissible

for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack

of accident.” CRE 404(b)(2). And as with all evidence, other acts

evidence is admissible only if relevant and if its probative value isn’t

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. CRE

401-403.

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¶ 15 Under CRE 404(b), the court must first determine, by a

preponderance of the evidence, whether the defendant committed

the prior acts. See People v. Vasquez, 2022 COA 100, ¶ 74. After

making this threshold finding, the court next analyzes the prior act

evidence under our supreme court’s four-part Spoto framework.

People v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Colo. 1990). Under Spoto,

evidence of extrinsic acts that suggest bad character is admissible

only if (1) the evidence relates to a material fact; (2) the evidence is

logically relevant; (3) the logical relevance is independent of the

prohibited inference that the defendant acted in conformity with his

bad character; and (4) the evidence’s probative value isn’t

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See

Rojas v. People, 2022 CO 8, ¶ 27 (citing Spoto, 795 P.2d at 1318-

19).

¶ 16 In cases involving domestic violence, other acts of violence

may be admitted “to show a common plan, scheme, design, identity,

modus operandi, motive, or guilty knowledge or for some other

purpose.” § 18-6-801.5(3), C.R.S. 2025. In such cases, the General

Assembly has declared that “evidence of similar transactions”

involving domestic violence “can be helpful” and sometimes

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“necessary” because domestic violence is “frequently cyclical in

nature, involves patterns of abuse, and can consist of harm with

escalating levels of seriousness.” § 18-6-801.5(1); see also People v.

Cross, 2023 COA 24, ¶ 22 (By enacting section 18-6-801.5, the

legislature intended to “place[] its finger on the scale in favor of

admitting evidence of prior acts of domestic violence in prosecutions

involving domestic violence.”).

C. Analysis

¶ 17 At the outset, we note that March doesn’t dispute the trial

court’s threshold finding that the prosecution proved, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that March committed the prior acts

involving the 2021 incident.

¶ 18 Turning to the first Spoto prong, the court properly found that

the evidence regarding the 2021 incident related to March’s intent,

motive, and plan. These were material facts because (1) March’s

intent to harm or kill the victim was an essential element for

multiple charges that he faced, see §§ 18-3-102(1)(a), 18-3-

202(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025; and (2) March claimed that the victim

assaulted him first and that he merely defended himself.

See People v. McBride, 228 P.3d 216, 227 (Colo. App. 2009)

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(evidence of the defendant’s prior violent acts was admissible to

prove intent); People v. Torres, 141 P.3d 931, 934 (Colo. App. 2006)

(“Evidence of a prior act of domestic violence is relevant to show the

defendant’s intent to harm the victim, rather than merely to

frighten her.”).

¶ 19 As to the second prong, the court acted within its discretion by

finding the evidence logically relevant. Evidence that March had

previously threatened the victim and beaten her tended to make it

more likely that March intended to harm or kill the victim rather

than merely defend himself. See Torres, 141 P.3d at 934 (“[T]he

evidence [of a prior act of domestic violence] had a tendency to show

that it was more probable that [the defendant] intended to commit

the acts of domestic violence.”); see also Yusem v. People, 210 P.3d

458, 465 (Colo. 2009) (“Because the prior act evidence is logically

relevant to demonstrate [the defendant’s] mental state, it

necessarily is relevant to rebut his claim of self-defense.”).

¶ 20 As to the third prong, the court appropriately found that the

evidence of the 2021 incident bore logical relevance independent of

the impermissible inference that March acted in conformity with his

bad character. Recall, both the 2021 incident and the crimes in

9
this case involved March making threats and inflicting bodily injury

against the same victim, his girlfriend. See Cross, ¶ 22 (“[U]nder

the third prong of Spoto, acts of [a] ‘defendant’s violent behavior

toward the same victim in an ongoing relationship’ are admissible

in domestic violence cases.” (citation omitted)). And in both

incidents, the evidence showed that March choked the victim and

marred her physical appearance — first by burning her leg with a

cigarette in 2021 and then by shearing off her hair in this case.

The prosecution therefore tied the prior act evidence “with sufficient

specificity to the charged offenses,” allowing the jury to properly

consider it independent of any prohibited propensity inference.

McBride, 228 P.3d at 227.

¶ 21 While evidence of the 2021 incident no doubt injected some

bad character evidence into the trial, Spoto’s third prong doesn’t

demand the complete absence of a bad character inference; it

merely requires that the proffered evidence be logically relevant

independent of that inference. People v. Lancaster, 2022 COA 82,

¶ 47.

¶ 22 For two reasons, we aren’t persuaded otherwise by March’s

reliance on Yusem, 210 P.3d at 466-67. First, Yusem didn’t involve

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a defendant’s acts of domestic violence, let alone multiple acts

against the same victim. Under March’s view, other acts evidence

involving domestic violence could never be admitted in a later

domestic violence case because it would necessarily suggest that

the defendant acted in conformity with that bad character. But

that view “cannot be squared with the General Assembly’s directive

in section 18-6-801.5(3).” Cross, ¶ 23. Second, unlike in Yusem,

where the other act and the charged offense lacked similarity, 210

P.3d at 467, we have already concluded that the prosecution tied

the evidence of the 2021 incident with sufficient specificity to

March’s charged offenses. And, in any event, CRE 404(b) doesn’t

require similarity for the other acts evidence to be admissible.

Yusem, 210 P.3d at 467.

¶ 23 As to the fourth prong, we perceive no abuse of discretion in

the court’s finding that the probative value of the other acts wasn’t

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The

probative value of the 2021 evidence was high because March’s

intent and motive were central disputed issues at trial. See People

v. Herron, 251 P.3d 1190, 1198 (Colo. App. 2010) (under Spoto’s

fourth prong, the court considers the importance of the material

11
fact for which the evidence is offered and whether the fact is

disputed). And although the court admitted a large quantum of

other acts evidence regarding the 2021 incident, we can’t say that

decision amounted to an abuse of discretion given that the main

witness to the incident — the victim — testified she didn’t

remember anything prior to waking up in the hospital. See id.

(considering “the availability of alternative means of proof” under

Spoto’s fourth prong).

¶ 24 We also conclude that the court mitigated any danger of unfair

prejudice by giving several limiting instructions informing the jury

that evidence of the 2021 incident could be considered only for

limited purposes. Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that

the jury followed the court’s limiting instruction. People v. Rowe,

2012 COA 90, ¶ 46.

¶ 25 Affording the other acts evidence its maximum probative value

attributable by a reasonable fact finder and the minimum unfair

prejudice to be reasonably expected, Bondsteel v. People, 2019 CO

26, ¶ 50, and mindful of the General Assembly’s guidance in section

18-6-801.5, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the court’s ruling

under Spoto’s fourth prong.

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¶ 26 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court didn’t abuse its

discretion by admitting the evidence of the 2021 incident under

CRE 404(b).

III. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 27 March next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting his convictions for first degree assault, first degree

burglary, and attempted first degree murder. Specifically, he

argues that insufficient evidence allowed the jury to find beyond a

reasonable doubt that he (1) caused serious bodily injury by

strangling the victim; (2) entered the victim’s residence unlawfully

or with the intent to commit a crime; and (3) acted with the specific

intent to kill the victim. We aren’t persuaded.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 28 We review the record de novo to determine whether the

evidence before the jury was sufficient both in quantity and quality

to sustain the defendant’s conviction. Clark v. People, 232 P.3d

1287, 1291 (Colo. 2010). Applying a “substantial evidence test,” we

consider whether the relevant evidence, viewed as a whole and in

the light most favorable to the prosecution, is substantial and

sufficient to support a conclusion by a reasonable mind that the

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defendant is guilty of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

Johnson v. People, 2023 CO 7, ¶ 13. Under this test, relevant

evidence includes both direct and circumstantial evidence. McCoy

v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 63.

B. First Degree Assault by Strangulation

¶ 29 As relevant here, a person commits assault in the first degree

by strangulation if, “[w]ith the intent to cause serious bodily injury,

he or she applies sufficient pressure to impede or restrict the

breathing or circulation of the blood of another person by applying

such pressure to the neck . . . of the other person and thereby

causes serious bodily injury.” § 18-3-202(1)(g), C.R.S. 2025.

Serious bodily injury is any bodily injury that, “either at the time of

the actual injury or at a later time, involves a substantial risk of

death.” § 18-1-901(3)(p), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 30 At trial, the forensic nurse examiner testified as an expert in

strangulation and concluded that the victim suffered serious bodily

injury. She supported her conclusion by testifying to the following:

• The victim relayed at the hospital that March had

strangled her three times and that she had lost

consciousness and urinated on herself.

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• Any loss of consciousness during strangulation poses

substantial risk of death.

• The victim showed signs of strangulation, such as trouble

breathing, painful and difficult swallowing, blurry vision,

tingling all over her body, neck pain, and a sore throat.

• The victim displayed abrasions and bruising to her upper

lip, which aren’t “uncommon” with strangulation.

¶ 31 The jury also heard from one of the responding police officers

who first spoke with the victim. The officer testified that the victim

had “dark markings” around her neck, a “larger red area” on her

chest, and “slightly swollen” cheeks. The prosecution introduced

multiple pictures of the victim, taken by the officer, that generally

confirmed the officer’s observations.

¶ 32 Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, the jury could reasonably find beyond a reasonable

doubt that March inflicted serious bodily injury on the victim by

strangulation. § 18-3-202(1)(g).

¶ 33 March urges us to consider the conflict between the victim’s

reports to police and the physical evidence introduced at trial. As

examples, he points to the lack of urine on her clothing and the

15
absence of trauma to her neck during the medical examination.

But the task of resolving conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence

fell to the jury. See People v. Plancarte, 232 P.3d 186, 192 (Colo.

App. 2009). In addition, March’s argument ignores the forensic

nurse examiner’s testimony that (1) the dark and red markings

initially observed by the officer may have “dissipated” before she

examined the victim and (2) strangulation doesn’t always result in

observable external or internal injuries.

C. First Degree Burglary

¶ 34 “A person commits first degree burglary if the person

knowingly enters unlawfully . . . in a building or occupied structure

with intent to commit therein a crime . . . and if in effecting entry or

while in the building or occupied structure . . . the person . . .

assaults or menaces any person . . . .” § 18-4-202(1), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 35 The mandatory protection order entered after March’s 2021

assault prohibited March from, among other things, harassing,

molesting, intimidating, retaliating against, or tampering with the

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victim.1 See § 18-1-1001(1), C.R.S. 2025. The prosecution alleged

that March intended to commit the crime of violating a protection

order when he unlawfully entered the victim’s apartment.

¶ 36 According to one of the responding officers, the victim said

that she didn’t know how March gained entry into her apartment.

She suspected March might have made a copy of her key. The

victim had also placed stools in front of her apartment door to block

access. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, the jury could reasonably infer that March entered the

victim’s apartment unlawfully. See People v. Bondurant, 2012 COA

50, ¶ 63 (concluding sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s

first degree burglary conviction where the defendant entered the

residence “unexpectedly” and “without prior arrangements” or

invitation). While March testified that he entered the apartment

with the victim’s permission, the jury was free to reject his

testimony. See Plancarte, 232 P.3d at 192.

1 The trial court took judicial notice that the protection order was

modified in April 2022, shortly before March’s crimes in this case,
so that March could contact the victim and visit her home
(presumably because he and the victim share two children). The
protection order’s other provisions, however, remained in place.

17
¶ 37 We also conclude that sufficient evidence allowed the jury to

find beyond a reasonable doubt that March entered the apartment

with the intent to commit a crime therein — specifically, violating a

protection order. See § 18-6-803.5(1), C.R.S. 2025. Based on the

evidence that March choked the victim three times and sheared off

her hair, the jury could reasonably infer that March entered the

apartment intending to harass, molest, intimidate, retaliate against,

or tamper with the victim. See People v. Phillips, 219 P.3d 798, 800

(Colo. App. 2009) (“An actor’s state of mind is normally not subject

to direct proof and must be inferred from his or her actions and the

circumstances surrounding the occurrence.”).

D. Attempted First Degree Murder

¶ 38 A person commits murder in the first degree if, “[a]fter

deliberation and with the intent to cause the death of a person

other than himself, he causes the death of that person or of another

person.” § 18-3-102(1)(a). “A person commits criminal attempt if,

acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for

commission of an offense, he engages in conduct constituting a

substantial step toward the commission of the offense.” § 18-2-

101(1), C.R.S. 2025.

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¶ 39 We conclude sufficient evidence permitted the jury to find

beyond a reasonable doubt that March acted after deliberation and

with the intent to kill the victim. In addition to the evidence that

March choked the victim three times, one of the responding officers

testified that the victim, while at the hospital, reported that March

threatened her by saying, “I’m going to kill you, you’re not going to

make it out alive and no one is going to save you this time.”

March’s mother and the victim’s sister also testified that March had

previously threatened to kill the victim. And, as discussed, the jury

heard evidence about the 2021 incident in which March severely

beat the victim and left her unresponsive. See People v. Jensen, 55

P.3d 135, 140 (Colo. App. 2001) (the prosecution may prove the

defendant’s culpable mental state in a homicide trial through

“evidence of prior threats, mistreatment, or malice by the defendant

toward the victim”).

¶ 40 Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the jury

could reasonably infer from this evidence that March acted after

deliberation and with the intent to kill the victim. See People v.

Harmon, 2025 COA 38M, ¶¶ 31-32; People v. Bogle, 743 P.2d 56, 58

(Colo. App. 1987).

19
¶ 41 Accordingly, sufficient evidence supported March’s convictions

for first degree assault, first degree burglary, and attempted first

degree murder.

IV. Sentencing

¶ 42 March contends that the trial court committed several errors

that affected his forty-eight-year prison sentence. We perceive no

basis to reverse.

A. Advisement on Sentence Enhancements

¶ 43 March first argues that, contrary to Crim. P. 10, the trial court

never advised him at his arraignment about the crime of violence

sentence enhancement charges that he faced.

¶ 44 But March didn’t designate the arraignment transcripts in his

designation of record, thus foreclosing our review. See C.A.R.

10(d)(3); People v. Shifrin, 2014 COA 14, ¶ 39. Even after March

supplemented the record (after the People pointed out the

arraignment transcripts were omitted), no transcript of the

arraignment appears in our record. Without the arraignment

transcripts, we must presume that the trial court properly advised

March of the sentence enhancement charges or that such

advisement wasn’t necessary under the circumstances. See LePage

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v. People, 2014 CO 13, ¶¶ 15-16 (describing presumption of

regularity, including the appellant’s duty to present a record that

discloses the alleged error). Indeed, a minute order dated June 2,

2022, reflects both that March waived reading and advisement of

the charges and that he appeared with counsel. See Crim. P. 10(e)

(“If the defendant appears with counsel, the information or

indictment need not be read and no waiver of said reading is

necessary.”).

B. Consecutive Sentencing

¶ 45 Next, March asserts that the trial court erred by imposing

consecutive sentences for his attempted first degree murder and

first degree burglary convictions. According to March, the

prosecution contended at trial that all charges arose from a single

event.

¶ 46 “When a defendant is convicted of more than one offense, the

decision to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences is within

the sound discretion of the trial court.” People v. Rodriguez-Ortiz,

2025 COA 61, ¶ 84. But the court’s discretion is restricted in

certain circumstances. For example, under section 18-1.3-

406(1)(a), C.R.S. 2021, which applied to March’s offenses, the court

21
must “sentence a person convicted of two or more separate crimes

of violence arising out of the same incident so that his or her

sentences are served consecutively rather than concurrently.”2

Because March’s attempted first degree murder and first degree

burglary convictions both qualified as crimes of violence, see § 18-

1.3-406(2)(a)(I)(B), (2)(a)(II)(B), (H), C.R.S. 2021, the court had no

choice but to impose consecutive sentences.

¶ 47 Moreover, even putting aside section 18-1.3-406(1), a trial

court is generally required to impose concurrent sentences only

when the defendant is convicted of multiple crimes based on

identical evidence. § 18-1-408(3), C.R.S. 2025. In this case,

March’s attempted murder and burglary convictions weren’t

necessarily based on identical evidence. Evidence regarding March

copying the victim’s key, the stools blocking her apartment door,

and March’s protection order, for example, was generally relevant

only to the burglary charge. By contrast, evidence regarding

March’s deliberation and intent to kill the victim, while necessary

for the jury to convict March of attempted first degree murder,

2 This provision is now codified at section 18-1.3-406(1)(b), C.R.S.

2025, and applies to offenses committed on or after July 1, 2023.

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wasn’t essential to the burglary charge. See People v. Muckle, 107

P.3d 380, 383 (Colo. 2005) (“[T]he mere possibility that the jury may

have relied on identical evidence in returning more than one

conviction is not sufficient to trigger the mandatory concurrent

sentencing provision.”).

C. Proportionality

¶ 48 March also argues that his forty-eight-year sentence is

excessive and disproportionate. March requested that the trial

court conduct a proportionality review but filed his notice of appeal

before the court could rule, thereby divesting it of jurisdiction. See

People v. Hampton, 696 P.2d 765, 771 (Colo. 1985).

¶ 49 We are a court of review, not first view. People v. Spomer,

2025 COA 39M, ¶ 43. Given the case’s current posture and

because inquiry into the specific facts and circumstances of

March’s crimes may be necessary, see Wells-Yates v. People, 2019

CO 90M, ¶ 69, we decline to address March’s proportionality

arguments in the first instance and conclude they are better

addressed during the postconviction stage. See People v. Session,

2020 COA 158, ¶ 51; see also People v. Crawley, 2024 COA 49, ¶ 7

23
(“A proportionality challenge implicates the constitutionality of a

sentence and is thus cognizable under Crim. P. 35(c).”).

D. Victim’s Request for Leniency

¶ 50 Finally, March argues that the trial court failed to give the

victim’s request for leniency at sentencing “appropriate weight.” In

requesting leniency, the victim told the court that the events

described at trial were “taken out of proportion” and that March

was a “great father” and a “good man.”

¶ 51 Although victims have the right to be heard at sentencing,

§ 24-4.1-302.5(1)(d)(IV), C.R.S. 2025, a defendant’s ultimate

sentence rests with the trial court’s “wide discretion,” subject to

constitutional and statutory restraints. People v. Walters, 632 P.2d

566, 567 (Colo. 1981).

¶ 52 We discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s sentence.

Because his attempted first degree murder and first degree burglary

convictions qualified as crimes of violence, the court’s sentences of

thirty-two years for the former (a class 2 felony) and sixteen years

for the latter (a class 3 felony) both fell within the permissible

statutory range. See § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V.5)(A), (8)(a)(I), C.R.S.

2025. Moreover, the trial court heard the prosecution’s domestic

24
violence expert testify that victims of domestic violence often recant

or minimize their abuser’s crimes. Given this, we can’t say that the

trial court abused its discretion by declining to give the victim’s

statement more weight.

¶ 53 Accordingly, we perceive no error in the trial court’s sentence

that requires reversal.

V. Disposition

¶ 54 We affirm the judgment.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE YUN concur.

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