LT Income, LLC v. Purnell

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
August 28, 2025

2025COA74

No. 24CA1399, LT Income, LLC v. Purnell — Taxation —
Property Tax — Redemption of Real Property of Person Under
Disability

Section 39-12-104(1), C.R.S. 2025, provides that an owner of a

property who was under a legal disability when a treasurer’s deed

was executed and delivered has a right to redeem the property

within nine years of the recording of the deed. In this appeal of a

district court’s order concluding that a property owner had a

statutory right of redemption, a division of the court of appeals

holds, as a matter of first impression, that a person “under legal

disability” for purposes of section 39-12-104(1) includes an

individual who, because of a mental impairment, lacks the capacity

to manage their affairs and adequately protect their interests in the

underlying tax sale proceeding. The division also holds that the

redemption statute doesn’t impose a requirement that a property
owner, at the time of the execution and delivery of a treasurer’s

deed, must be subject to a protective proceeding under the Colorado

Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act,

§§ 15-14-101 to -434, C.R.S. 2025, or have a legal disability

imposed on them as contemplated by section 27-65-127, C.R.S.

2025. And because the division further concludes that the district

court here properly determined that the plaintiff was under a legal

disability when a treasurer’s deed to his property was executed and

delivered, the division affirms the court’s judgment.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2025COA74

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1399
Fremont County District Court No. 22CV30030
Honorable Lynette M. Wenner, Judge

LT Income, LLC, a Colorado limited liability company,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

David J. Purnell,

Defendant-Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE KUHN
J. Jones and Moultrie, JJ., concur

Announced August 28, 2025

Daniel B. Slater, Cañon City, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Frascona, Joiner, Goodman and Greenstein, P.C., Britney Beall-Eder, Jordan
C. May, Caroline W. Young, Boulder, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee
¶1 Section 39-12-104(1), C.R.S. 2025, provides that a property

owner who was “under legal disability at the time of execution and

delivery of a tax deed . . . shall have the right to make redemption of

such property at any time within nine years from the date of the

recording of such tax deed.” In this appeal of a district court’s

order granting a property owner’s request for relief under the

redemption statute, we interpret the meaning of the statutory

phrase “under legal disability.”

¶2 We hold that this phrase encompasses an individual who,

because of a mental impairment, lacks the capacity to manage their

affairs and adequately protect their interests in the underlying tax

sale proceeding. We also hold that section 39-12-104(1) doesn’t

impose a requirement that a property owner, at the time of the

execution and delivery of a treasurer’s deed, must be subject to a

protective proceeding under the Colorado Uniform Guardianship

and Protective Proceedings Act (Colorado UGPPA), §§ 15-14-101 to

-434, C.R.S. 2025, or under a legal disability within the meaning of

section 27-65-127, C.R.S. 2025. Accordingly, we affirm the district

court’s judgment concluding that defendant, David J. Purnell, has a

1
statutory right of redemption to the property for which plaintiff, LT

Income, LLC, holds a treasurer’s deed.

I. Background

¶3 Purnell is an Air Force veteran who suffered a severe

traumatic brain injury while serving as a military police officer. In

1985, while responding to a domestic violence report, Purnell was

shot in the head with a large caliber handgun. He spent the next

six months in a coma but ultimately survived his injuries. As a

result of this incident, the Air Force placed Purnell on medical

retirement, and he “has a 100% service connection disability

rating.”

¶4 Less than two years later, in the spring of 1988, Purnell

purchased a property in Fremont County. He financed this

purchase with a mortgage, which he had repaid in full by early

2018. However, Purnell failed to pay property taxes for 2017 after

his loan servicer stopped collecting them as part of the mortgage

payment, and a tax lien attached to the property. In November

2018, the Fremont County Treasurer sold the tax lien to LT Income

at a public auction. Purnell failed to exercise the generally

applicable three-year statutory right to redeem the tax lien, and on

2
January 27, 2022, the treasurer issued a treasurer’s deed to the

property to LT Income. That same day, LT Income recorded the

deed.

¶5 In March 2022, LT Income brought an action seeking to quiet

title to the property. Purnell filed an answer and counterclaim

approximately three and a half months after he was served with LT

Income’s complaint. He alleged that he was under a legal disability

when the treasurer’s deed was executed and delivered because he

had been suffering from “cognitive deficiencies” resulting from his

traumatic brain injury. Based on this disability, Purnell asserted

that he had the right to redeem his property within nine years of

the date the deed was recorded, as provided in section

39-12-104(1).

¶6 LT Income successfully moved to strike Purnell’s answer and

counterclaim as untimely. See C.R.C.P. 12(a)(1) (“A defendant shall

file his answer or other response within [twenty-one] days after the

service of the summons and complaint . . . .”). Soon after the court

struck Purnell’s pleadings, LT Income filed a motion for a default

judgment. Purnell contested that motion and filed a separate

motion for an enlargement of time in which to file his answer and

3
counterclaim. In those filings, Purnell again claimed that he was

under a legal disability when the treasurer’s deed was executed and

delivered. He explained that he suffers (and had suffered) from

various physical and mental impairments, including problems with

short-term memory, attention, and understanding the proceedings

against him. Purnell argued that, based on these impairments, the

court should excuse the untimely answer and counterclaim, deny

entry of a default judgment, and ultimately set aside the treasurer’s

deed by allowing him to redeem the property in accordance with

section 39-12-104. See C.R.C.P. 6(b)(2) (giving district courts

discretion to accept filings past the deadline when “the failure to act

was the result of excusable neglect”); C.R.C.P. 55(b)(1) (“[N]o

judgment by default shall be entered against an . . . incompetent

person unless represented in the action by a general guardian,

guardian ad litem, conservator, or such other representative who

has appeared in the action.”).

¶7 The district court noted that its ruling on the motions turned

on the meaning of the undefined phrase “under legal disability” in

section 39-12-104(1). The court addressed that issue in a written

order, concluding that (1) an individual may be under a legal

4
disability by operation of various statutory criteria; and (2) the

statute didn’t appear to require an adjudication of incapacity prior

to, or effective at, the time of the execution and delivery of a

treasurer’s deed.

¶8 Then, after holding an evidentiary hearing to determine

whether Purnell has a right of redemption under the statute, the

court issued a second order in August 2023. The court observed

that in assessing whether Purnell was under a legal disability

within the meaning of the redemption statute, it had to determine

whether “(1) Mr. Purnell has shown by clear and convincing

evidence, that (2) at the time the tax deed issued, (3) he lacked

capability to act for himself in managing or administering his

financial affairs, (4) because of a mental impairment, and (5) he did

not have a legal representative.” And because Purnell carried his

burden of proof, the court concluded that he was entitled to redeem

the property within nine years of the date the treasurer’s deed was

recorded.

II. Analysis

¶9 LT Income contends that the district court erred by concluding

that Purnell has a right of redemption under section 39-12-104.

5
Specifically, LT Income contends that the district court

misinterpreted and misapplied section 39-12-104 because while

Purnell perhaps has some disabilities, the phrase “under legal

disability” in the redemption statute only encompasses property

owners who, at the time the treasurer’s deed was executed and

delivered, (1) were minors under the age of eighteen or mentally

incompetent; or (2) had been adjudicated incapacitated in a

protective proceeding under the Colorado UGPPA, or were under a

legal disability within the meaning of section 27-65-127. We

disagree with both contentions.

¶ 10 Before we turn to the merits of these arguments, we first set

forth the applicable standard of review and governing law.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 11 We review de novo questions of statutory interpretation.

Roane v. Elizabeth Sch. Dist., 2024 COA 59, ¶ 23. Likewise, we

review de novo whether a district court applied the correct legal

standard. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Crossgrove, 2012 CO 31, ¶ 7. To

the extent LT Income’s appeal requires us to review the district

court’s findings of fact, we will disturb those findings only if they

6
are clearly erroneous with no support in the record. See Frisco Lot

3 LLC v. Giberson Ltd. P’ship, LLLP, 2024 COA 125, ¶ 66.

¶ 12 When interpreting a statute, our task is to ascertain and give

effect to the legislature’s intent. Roane, ¶ 24. We begin this inquiry

by considering the plain language of the statute, giving its words

and phrases their plain and ordinary meanings. Id. In doing so,

“[w]e look to the entire statutory scheme to give consistent,

harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts, and we avoid

constructions that would render any words or phrases superfluous

or that would lead to illogical or absurd results.” Id. “Because

words often have several meanings or nuanced meanings, ‘the

precise meaning actually intended by an undefined term often must

be determined by reference to other considerations, like the context

in which it is used.’” T.D. v. Wiseman, 2017 COA 111, ¶ 36 (quoting

People v. Opana, 2017 CO 56, ¶ 12). If we conclude that the statute

is unambiguous, then we apply it as written and need not resort to

other rules of statutory construction. Roane, ¶ 24.

B. Tax Liens, Treasurer’s Deeds, and Redemption Rights

¶ 13 A property owner is required to pay property taxes. Arnold v.

Brent, 2024 COA 104, ¶ 16. When property taxes go unpaid, “a tax

7
lien attaches against the property for the amount of taxes levied

against the property together with any delinquent interest, costs,

and fees.” Dove Valley Bus. Park Assocs., Ltd. v. Bd. of Cnty.

Comm’rs, 945 P.2d 395, 399 (Colo. 1997); § 39-1-107(2), C.R.S.

2025. The county treasurer is authorized to sell the tax lien at a

public auction to a third party who pays the delinquent taxes,

interest, and any fees that are due. § 39-11-115(1), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 14 After the tax lien is sold, the property owner has a three-year

statutory right to redeem the tax lien by paying the outstanding

taxes, interest, and costs. Actarus, LLC v. Johnson, 2019 COA 122,

¶ 12; see § 39-11-120(1), C.R.S. 2025; § 39-12-103(1), (3), C.R.S.

2025. But if the owner fails to timely exercise this right of

redemption, the holder of the unredeemed tax lien may apply for a

treasurer’s deed to the property. § 39-11-120(1); Red Flower, Inc. v.

McKown, 2016 COA 160, ¶ 1. The county treasurer shall issue a

treasurer’s deed to the lienholder after providing notice to the

property owner, any occupant, and all interested persons of record.

Wells Fargo Fin. Colo., Inc. v. Olivas, 2017 COA 158, ¶ 2;

§ 39-11-128(1), C.R.S. 2025.

8
¶ 15 Once issued, a treasurer’s deed “terminate[s] the [original

property owner’s] entire ownership interest in the subject property

by conveying the totality of the land on which the taxes are

delinquent” to the lienholder. Bolser v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 100 P.3d

51, 54 (Colo. App. 2004). But even a validly issued treasurer’s deed

can be set aside in some circumstances. As relevant to this appeal,

a property owner who was “under legal disability at the time of

execution and delivery of a tax deed . . . shall have the right to

make redemption of such property at any time within nine years

from the date of the recording of such tax deed.” § 39-12-104(1).

Put differently, a property owner’s legal disability will not prevent

the attachment of a tax lien, the sale of that lien, or the subsequent

issuance of a treasurer’s deed. But recording that deed doesn’t

extinguish a qualifying property owner’s ability to void the deed by

redeeming the property through the procedure set out in the

redemption statute. Actarus, ¶ 15.

C. Disability Statutes

¶ 16 The phrase “under legal disability” is not defined in the

statutes addressing the right of redemption or in other provisions

that apply to treasurers’ sales of property tax liens. However,

9
numerous other statutes address situations in which people are

under a disability. As relevant to LT Income’s arguments, one of

those statutes modifies the way that statutes of limitation apply in

actions involving litigants “under disability.” See §§ 13-81-101 to

-107, C.R.S. 2025. The modifying statute defines a “[p]erson under

disability” as “any person who is a minor under eighteen years of

age, a mental incompetent, or a person under other legal disability

and who does not have a legal guardian.” § 13-81-101(3).

¶ 17 The term “mental incompetent” refers to a person who is

“insane,” as defined in section 16-8-101(1), C.R.S. 2025, or to “a

person with an intellectual and developmental disability as defined

in section 25.5-10-202,” C.R.S. 2025. § 25.5-10-237(1), C.R.S.

2025; see Southard v. Miles, 714 P.2d 891, 898-99 (Colo. 1986)

(applying section 27-10.5-135(1), C.R.S. 1985, now codified as

section 25.5-10-237(1)). An individual is “insane” if the individual

“is so diseased or defective in mind at the time of the commission of

[an] act as to be incapable of distinguishing right from wrong with

respect to that act.” § 16-8-101(1). And a “[p]erson with an

intellectual and developmental disability” is “a person determined

by a community-centered board to have an intellectual and

10
developmental disability,” § 25.5-10-202(26)(b),1 C.R.S. 2023, which

is a disability

that manifests before the person reaches
twenty-two years of age, that constitutes a
substantial disability to the affected person,
and that is attributable to an intellectual and
developmental disability or related conditions,
including Prader-Willi syndrome, cerebral
palsy, epilepsy, autism, or other neurological
conditions when the condition or conditions
result in impairment of general intellectual
functioning or adaptive behavior similar to that
of a person with an intellectual and
developmental disability.

§ 25.5-10-202(26)(a).

D. Purnell’s Claimed Disabilities Rendered Him “Under Legal
Disability” for the Purposes of the Redemption Statute

¶ 18 Relying on the above statutory provisions, LT Income argues

that a person is only “under a legal disability” if that person falls

within the sweep of the statute modifying the statutes of limitation.

LT Income asserts that it “should be safe to assume that the class

of persons who are under a legal disability include[s] minors under

1 We refer to the definition of a “[p]erson with an intellectual and

developmental disability” under section 25.5-10-202(26)(b), C.R.S.
2023, in effect at the time of the district court’s ruling, because the
relevant subsection has since been amended. See Ch. 83, sec. 38,
§ 25.5-10-202(26)(b), 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 338.

11
the age of eighteen and those determined to be mentally

incompetent,” meaning individuals who are either insane or

determined by a community-centered board to have an intellectual

and developmental disability.

¶ 19 That portion of the argument is true as far as it goes. But LT

Income then broadly argues that those are the only circumstances

in which an individual can be deemed “under legal disability” as

contemplated in the redemption statute. This argument reads the

statute too narrowly.

¶ 20 For starters, the statute of limitations provision that LT

Income urges us to apply in interpreting section 39-12-104(1)

doesn’t exclusively equate a legal disability with minority and

mental incompetency. Instead, section 13-81-101(3) provides that

a “[p]erson under disability” includes “a person under other legal

disability and who does not have a legal guardian.” (Emphasis

added.) In doing so, the plain language of this provision

acknowledges that other circumstances may qualify as a legal

disability. LT Income’s argument fails because it would require us

to read these words out of the statute. See Huffman v. City &

County of Denver, 2020 COA 59, ¶ 17 (“We may not read language

12
out of a statute . . . .”). And had the drafters of section

39-12-104(1) intended for a legal disability to only mean minority

and mental incompetency, they would have used specific language

to do so or, at least, would have referenced section 13-81-101(3).

See Dep’t of Transp. v. Stapleton, 97 P.3d 938, 943 (Colo. 2004)

(“[W]e presume that the General Assembly understands the legal

import of the words it uses and does not use language idly, but

rather intends that meaning should be given to each word.”);

Arapahoe Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Velarde, 2022 CO 18, ¶ 23

(noting that if the legislature intended to include in one statute a

term that another statute set forth, the legislature would have

referenced that other statute). We see no such indication in the

redemption statute.

¶ 21 LT Income’s view is also inconsistent with the only published

Colorado appellate court decision interpreting the phrase “under

legal disability” in the redemption statute. In Actarus, the county

issued a treasurer’s deed for property owned by an individual who

had been under guardianship as a result of her severe mental

illness. Actarus, ¶ 2. While the owner’s husband had served as her

court-appointed guardian until his death, a successor guardian

13
hadn’t been appointed for the owner when Actarus, LLC, obtained

the treasurer’s deed. Id. at ¶ 29. A division of this court upheld the

district court’s ruling that the owner was under a legal disability

and therefore entitled to redeem her interest in the property as

provided in section 39-12-104. Actarus, ¶¶ 9, 40. The division

concluded that “an ‘owner of real property’ who ‘is under legal

disability’ includes an individual who a court has determined is

incapacitated and who does not have a legal guardian who can

advocate on her behalf.” Id. at ¶ 19 (emphasis added). Thus, the

division held that the statute applies to incapacitated property

owners proceeding without the assistance of a legal guardian.

¶ 22 It’s true that Actarus is factually distinguishable from the case

before us because, unlike the property owner in that case, Purnell

wasn’t under guardianship or other protective order when the

treasurer’s deed was executed and delivered. Still, Actarus weighs

against LT Income’s narrow interpretation of “under legal

disability.” Contrary to LT Income’s view, the division concluded

that the phrase encompasses an incapacitated property owner, id.,

because that owner is “an individual other than a minor, who is

unable to effectively receive or evaluate information or both or make

14
or communicate decisions to such an extent that the individual

lacks the ability to satisfy essential requirements for physical

health, safety, or self-care,” § 15-14-102(5), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 23 Additionally, LT Income’s interpretation of section 39-12-104

is at odds with the dictionary definition of “legal disability,” the

Colorado Rules of Probate Procedure, and statutes allowing courts

to impose a legal disability. Specifically, Black’s Law Dictionary

defines “legal disability” as “[a] court-determined lack of capability

to act for oneself in managing or administering financial affairs,

usu[ally] because the person is a minor or has a mental

impairment.” Black’s Law Dictionary 579 (12th ed. 2024).

Similarly, the probate rules provide that a person under a legal

disability includes, but is not limited to, a person who is (1) under

eighteen years of age or (2) incompetent or incapacitated to such an

extent that the individual is incapable of adequately representing

their own interests. C.R.P.P. 12(b). And under the statutory

scheme governing mental health care and treatment, a district

court may grant a petition to impose a legal disability upon an

individual if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that

the individual (1) has a mental health disorder and is either a

15
danger to the individual’s self or others, is gravely disabled, or is

insane; and (2) the requested imposition of disability is both

necessary and desirable. § 27-65-127(1)-(2), (5)(d).

¶ 24 Thus, we conclude that an individual may have a legal

disability even if the individual is not a minor, insane, or suffering

from an intellectual and developmental disability within the

meaning of section 25.5-10-202(26)(a). See, e.g., Wiseman, ¶¶ 2, 47

(“[F]or purposes of section 13-80-103.7(3.5)(a), C.R.S. 2016,” the

general limitations statute for child victims of sexual assault, a legal

disability “means an inability to bring a lawsuit based on some

policy of the law.”). Considering the phrase “under legal disability”

in the context of section 39-12-104 where it appears, see Wiseman,

¶ 36, we hold that this phrase includes an individual who, because

of a mental impairment, lacks the capacity to manage their affairs

and adequately protect their interests in the underlying tax sale

proceeding. Accordingly, we perceive no error in the district court’s

conclusion that whether Purnell was legally disabled within the

meaning of the redemption statute turned, in part, on whether “he

lacked capability to act for himself in managing or administering his

financial affairs . . . because of a mental impairment.”

16
¶ 25 During the evidentiary hearing, Purnell presented evidence

that he was incapacitated at the time of the execution and delivery

of the treasurer’s deed. Dr. Kimberly Leib — who was qualified as

an expert in clinical neuropsychology — determined that Purnell

meets the diagnostic criteria for major neurocognitive disorder. She

opined that Purnell’s disorder had “multiple etiologies”: the

traumatic brain injury, his alcohol abuse, and possibly an

unspecified neurodegenerative condition. Dr. Leib reported that

Purnell exhibits “severe deficits in attention, visual and verbal

memory, visuospatial functioning, aspects of language (verbal

fluency), and aspects of executive functioning.” She testified that

Purnell’s cognitive and mental deficits are sufficiently severe to

negatively affect his ability to live alone safely and independently

manage his finances. Dr. Leib opined that Purnell needs assistance

because of his profound memory impairment and the concomitant

risk of financial exploitation by others.

¶ 26 Similarly, Maria Mora, a licensed clinical social worker and a

mental health therapist with the Department of Veterans Affairs,

conducted a mental health evaluation of Purnell and concluded that

he is cognitively impaired. Mora reached that conclusion because

17
Purnell has problems with short-term memory, is easily confused

when asked certain questions, and is unable to understand the

consequences of his actions. To illustrate the extent of Purnell’s

cognitive deficits, Mora recounted how he was unsure why he was

meeting with her, “even though [they] had discussed [the upcoming

evaluation] just two days prior.” She testified that “because of the

traumatic brain injury, . . . [Purnell’s] judgment was impaired and

continues to be impaired. That’s not going to change.”

¶ 27 And Purnell’s friend, Iris Donley, likewise testified that

Purnell’s memory problems are “pretty obvious.” Donley said that

Purnell doesn’t know how to budget or pay his bills and that he has

“no concept of money.” She testified that he has difficulty carrying

out basic daily functions, such as maintaining personal hygiene,

dressing himself properly, and “just really communicating to people

what his needs [a]re.”

¶ 28 True, some of the above testimony was grounded on Purnell

exhibiting these conditions after the tax sale. However, the record

supports the district court’s inference that those conditions also

existed at the time of the execution and delivery of the treasurer’s

deed. See Owners Ins. Co. v. Dakota Station II Condo. Ass’n, 2021

18
COA 114, ¶ 50 (noting that, as the fact finder, it’s for the district

court “to resolve factual issues, determine witness credibility, weigh

evidence, and make reasonable inferences from that evidence”). For

example, Purnell told Mora that after he sustained the traumatic

brain injury in 1985, he had headaches for several years, “[h]e had

to have another brain surgery in 1991 and his memory became

worse,” and he generally “ha[d] been having problems with

thinking” after the shooting. Moreover, Purnell testified that people

had previously taken advantage of him financially, saying, “They

would represent themselves as my friends and ask me if they could

have money, and me being the person I am, I acquiesced.” And as

noted above, he had to be placed on medical retirement due to his

traumatic brain injury and “has a 100% service connection

disability rating.”

¶ 29 Under these circumstances, then, we perceive no error in the

district court’s determination that Purnell’s mental impairments

19
qualified as a legal disability within the meaning of the redemption

statute.2

E. LT Income’s Specific Adjudication Argument Fails

¶ 30 LT Income doesn’t challenge the evidence that Purnell

presented in the district court or the findings of fact that the court

made based on that evidence. Still, citing James v. Brookhart

Lumber Co., 727 P.2d 1119, 1120-21 (Colo. App. 1986), LT Income

contends that Purnell’s claimed disabilities are insufficient as a

matter of law because when the treasurer’s deed was executed and

delivered, there was no court proceeding to appoint a guardian or

conservator or to impose a legal disability on him under section

27-65-127. Put another way, LT Income argues that for a property

owner to be under a legal disability as provided in section

39-12-104(1), a court proceeding under one of two available

statutory processes must already be underway to reach that

2 In making that determination, the district court held Purnell to a

higher burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence. We note
that the proper standard was proof by a preponderance of the
evidence. See § 13-25-127(1), C.R.S. 2025 (noting that, with
exceptions not relevant here, “the burden of proof in any civil action
shall be by a preponderance of the evidence”). However, we would
affirm the court’s determination under either standard.

20
determination. Moreover, LT Income argues that the determination

of disability must occur before the treasurer’s deed is executed and

delivered. We’re not persuaded, for several reasons.

¶ 31 First, LT Income’s reliance on James is misplaced. In that

case — involving the statute of limitations for reopening workers’

compensation claims — a division of this court concluded that an

agency hearing was not the proper forum to raise and decide the

issue of whether the petitioner was legally disabled for the purposes

of tolling the limitations period under sections 13-81-101(3) and

13-81-103. James, 727 P.2d at 1120-21. The division reasoned

that the proceedings under the Colorado UGPPA and 27-65-127

offered “a statutory scheme for the determination of a legal

disability,” and those statutes required “an interested person [to]

petition the court for a specific finding as to the existence of a legal

disability.” James, 727 P.2d at 1121. But while the James court

correctly observed that a disability determination made in those

proceedings would suffice to show that an individual was under a

legal disability for the relevant tolling provisions, James doesn’t

stand for the proposition that those are the only proceedings in

which a legal disability could be established, much less that the

21
determination must occur at a particular time. To the contrary, the

division indicated that the petitioner could still establish that he

was legally disabled at the time his claims accrued by obtaining a

subsequent adjudication on that issue. Id.

¶ 32 Second, as the district court observed, the redemption statute

doesn’t impose a prior adjudication requirement, let alone require

that the adjudication must originate from a specific proceeding. If

the General Assembly wanted to limit the application of the

nine-year disability exception to the general redemption period only

to those property owners who were already under a protective order

or had a legal disability imposed on them when a treasurer’s deed

was executed and delivered, it would have employed language to

that effect. See Stapleton, 97 P.3d at 943; see also Nieto v. Clark’s

Mkt., Inc., 2021 CO 48, ¶ 12 (noting that we do not add to, or

subtract from, the words that the General Assembly has chosen).

For example, the General Assembly included such limiting language

in the statute addressing the disposition of a disabled person’s

small estate, providing that “a verified petition for the distribution

without administration of the estate of a person under disability”

must include “[t]he date upon which and the court by which the

22
person under disability was adjudged as having a behavioral or

mental health disorder, an intellectual and developmental disability,

or other incapacitating disability.” § 15-14-118(1), (2)(c), C.R.S.

2025. The absence of similar language in section 39-12-104

suggests that the General Assembly didn’t intend to impose a

similar requirement there. See Deutsch v. Kalcevic, 140 P.3d 340,

342 (Colo. App. 2006) (“[W]hen the legislature includes a provision

in one statute, but omits that provision from another similar

statute, the omission is evidence of its intent.”).

¶ 33 Third, it would be contrary to the rest of the redemption

statute to engraft a requirement that a prior adjudication of a

disability in certain specific proceedings is a prerequisite to show

that a property owner was under a legal disability. The statute

provides that, if the property owner’s legal disability is removed or

ceases within the nine-year period, the right of redemption must be

asserted and take place within a period of not more than two years

after the removal or cessation of the disability.3 § 39-12-104(1).

3 However, the right of redemption must be exercised within nine

years of the recording of the tax deed, even if the legal disability is
not removed or never ceases. § 39-12-104(1), C.R.S. 2025.

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¶ 34 This structure is consistent with the purpose of such tolling

provisions. A legal disability that affects an individual’s ability to

assert a right on their own terminates with the appointment of a

legal guardian to advocate on his behalf. See Elgin v. Bartlett, 994

P.2d 411, 414 (Colo. 1999) (recognizing this principle in considering

whether a litigant was a “person under disability” as contemplated

by section 13-81-101(3)), overruled in part on other grounds by,

Rudnicki v. Bianco, 2021 CO 80, ¶ 44. Given that such an

appointment typically occurs in a protective proceeding, a property

owner who was already under guardianship or conservatorship

when the treasurer’s deed was executed and delivered would not fall

under the exception and would be subject to the general three-year

period to redeem the property. See § 15-14-311(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025

(appointment of a guardian); § 15-14-401(1)(b), C.R.S. 2025

(appointment of a conservator). Thus, specifically as to these

property owners, reading the phrase “under legal disability” as

requiring a prior adjudication in a protective proceeding would read

out the statute’s provision allowing owners under a disability to

exercise the right of redemption within nine years because their

disability would have been imposed and removed before the deed

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was executed and delivered. We must avoid such constructions.

See Huffman, ¶ 17; see also Goodman v. Heritage Builders, Inc.,

2017 CO 13, ¶ 7 (noting that courts should reject statutory

interpretations that render words or phrases superfluous).

¶ 35 Fourth, LT Income’s argument fails to account for the fact that

adjudication of legal disabilities is almost always a process that

retrospectively recognizes an impairment that already exists. In

other words, adjudication is the court’s determination of the cause

of an existing situation. Consequently, interpreting the redemption

statute as covering only those property owners who had already

been adjudicated with disabilities in proceedings under the

Colorado UGPPA or section 27-65-127 would mean that the statute

wouldn’t apply to any previous situations in which the disability

had already affected the individual’s rights. Moreover, as happened

in this case, there are numerous other situations in which a district

court may make a determination of legal disability. LT Income

points us to no compelling authority limiting such a determination

to proceedings under the Colorado UGPPA or section 27-65-127.

¶ 36 In sum, we conclude that the district court didn’t err by

determining that because Purnell was under a legal disability when

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the treasurer’s deed was executed and delivered to LT Income,

Purnell could redeem his property within nine years of January 27,

2022, when the deed was recorded, as permitted by section

39-12-104(1).

III. Disposition

¶ 37 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.

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