Marriage of Clark

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published
opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but
have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the
reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they
are not the official language of the division. Any discrepancy
between the language in the summary and in the opinion should
be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY
August 28, 2025

2025COA75

No. 24CA1713, Marriage of Clark — Family Law — Dissolution
— Modification and Termination of Provisions for Maintenance,
Support, and Property Disposition — Remarriage

In this dissolution of marriage case, a division of the court of

appeals considers the contractual language necessary to “otherwise

agree[] in writing” that the obligation to make future maintenance

payments will not automatically terminate upon a recipient

spouse’s remarriage under section 14-10-122(2)(a)(III), C.R.S. 2025.

The majority holds that all that is required is an agreement

that expressly or by clear implication indicates the parties’ intent

that the payments continue. In reaching this conclusion, the

majority declines to follow In re Marriage of Cerrone, 2021 COA 116,

¶ 20, to the extent that Cerrone could be read to require specific use

of the term “remarriage” to define the circumstances under which

maintenance obligations will not terminate.
Because the separation agreement here indicates, by clear

implication, the parties’ intent that maintenance payments will

continue even if the recipient remarries, the majority concludes that

the parties have “otherwise agreed in writing” under section

14-10-122(2)(a)(III) that the automatic termination on remarriage

provision does not apply. Accordingly, the majority affirms the

district court’s order denying the motion to terminate maintenance

payments.

The special concurrence, while agreeing with the majority

opinion, highlights the inconsistency in this court’s precedent

concerning the contractual language necessary to prevent the

automatic termination of maintenance payments under section 14-

10-122(2)(a)(III) and urges the supreme court to resolve the conflict.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2025COA75

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1713
Mesa County District Court No. 22DR355
Honorable Craig P. Henderson, Judge
Honorable Daniel M. Garcia, Magistrate

In re the Marriage of

Jessica Kay Clark,

Appellee,

and

Christopher Clay Clark,

Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE YUN
Tow, J., concurs
Sullivan, J., specially concurs

Announced August 28, 2025

Polidori, Franklin, Monahan & Beattie, L.L.C., Robin Lutz Beattie, Lakewood,
Colorado, for Appellee

Epstein Patierno, LLP, Wendy J. Smock, Robert W. Voorhees, Denver,
Colorado, for Appellant
¶1 In this dissolution of marriage case, Christopher Clay Clark

(husband) appeals the district court’s adoption of the magistrate’s

order denying his motion to terminate his maintenance obligation to

Jessica Kay Clark (wife) following her remarriage.

¶2 Section 14-10-122(2)(a)(III), C.R.S. 2025, provides, in relevant

part, that “[u]nless otherwise agreed in writing . . . , the obligation

to pay future maintenance is terminated upon . . . [t]he remarriage

of . . . the party receiving maintenance.” The parties’ separation

agreement provides that husband will pay wife “the set amount” of

$108,000 in monthly installments over “72 months (6 years)” and

specifies that this “[a]greement is set and may not be modified or

terminated.”

¶3 We hold that, by including this provision in the separation

agreement, the parties “otherwise agreed in writing” to prevent

maintenance from terminating upon wife’s remarriage during this

six-year period. Id. In so holding, we decline to read In re Marriage

of Cerrone, 2021 COA 116, ¶ 20 (citation omitted), so strictly as to

always require an “‘express provision’ that maintenance will

continue even if the recipient spouse remarries.” Instead, all the

1
statute requires is an agreement that expressly or by clear

implication indicates the parties’ intent that the payments continue.

¶4 We therefore affirm the district court’s order and remand the

case for further proceedings concerning wife’s request for appellate

attorney fees.

I. Background

¶5 In 2022, wife petitioned to dissolve the parties’ marriage of

approximately twenty-two years. The parties, who were both pro se,

managed to settle all matters related to the dissolution of their

marriage by executing a separation agreement using a standard

form promulgated by the Judicial Department. See JDF 1115,

Separation Agreement (Marriage) (revised Feb. 2018),

https://perma.cc/UG47-R8BF.

¶6 Section four of the separation agreement, titled “Maintenance

(Spousal/Partner Support),” provides that husband will pay wife

$1,500 per month starting on June 20, 2022, and ending on June

20, 2028. It then states: “In order for the Court to modify this

provision in the future [pursuant to section 14-10-122], you must

select 4(b) . . . .” The parties instead selected “4(a),” designating

2
that “[t]he terms of this Maintenance Agreement are contractual in

nature and shall not be modified in the future.”

¶7 The parties also completed section five of the separation

agreement, “Other Terms,” which provided blank space for the

parties to fill in additional terms. In that space, the parties

handwrote: “[Husband] agrees to pay [wife] the set amount of

$108,000, payable to wife the 21st of every month for 72 months (6

years). Agreement is set and may not be modified or terminated.” A

magistrate entered a decree that dissolved the parties’ marriage and

incorporated by reference the terms of the separation agreement.

¶8 In October 2023, wife sought to have husband held in

contempt for failure to pay maintenance. Husband, in turn, moved

to terminate his maintenance obligation under section

14-10-122(2)(a)(III) because wife had remarried in June 2023. In

response, wife acknowledged her remarriage but asserted that the

language in the separation agreement was sufficient to prevent the

termination of maintenance.

¶9 A magistrate agreed with wife and denied husband’s motion to

terminate maintenance. After husband petitioned for review, the

3
district court upheld and adopted the magistrate’s order, reasoning

that

[t]he Section 5 language and the introductory
paragraphs of the Agreement read together
with the Section 4 language states in clear and
express terms that [husband] agrees to pay
[wife] maintenance in “the set amount” . . . of
$108,000 in monthly payments of $1500 over
six years. Even more importantly, Section 5
states unequivocally that the “[a]greement is
set and may not be modified or terminated. . . .
It is this language of the maintenance
agreement being set and that it may not be
terminated that convinces the Court that the
agreement contains an express condition in
unmistakably clear terms that the
maintenance was not to be changed or
terminated for any reason including by
operation of law.

¶ 10 Husband now appeals.

II. Termination of Maintenance Upon Wife’s Remarriage

¶ 11 Husband contends that both the magistrate and the district

court erred by ruling that his maintenance obligation continued

after wife’s remarriage rather than automatically terminating under

section 14-10-122(2)(a)(III). He asserts that under Cerrone,

¶¶ 18-24, maintenance terminated because the separation

agreement does not explicitly state that maintenance would

continue after wife’s remarriage. We disagree because we conclude

4
that the parties’ intent for maintenance to continue is otherwise

apparent from the separation agreement.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 12 Our review of a district court’s order adopting a magistrate’s

decision is effectively a second layer of appellate review. In re

Marriage of Sheehan, 2022 COA 29, ¶ 22. We must accept the

magistrate’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. In

re Marriage of Young, 2021 COA 96, ¶ 8. However, we review de

novo questions of law, including questions of statutory and contract

interpretation. Sheehan, ¶ 22.

B. Section 14-10-122(2)(a)(III) and Law Governing Separation
Agreements

¶ 13 Section 14-10-122(2)(a)(III) states, in relevant part, that

“[u]nless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the

decree, the obligation to pay future maintenance is terminated

upon . . . [t]he remarriage of . . . the party receiving maintenance.”

Accordingly, we must resolve whether the parties “otherwise agreed

in writing” through their separation agreement that maintenance

would continue even if wife remarried. Id.; cf. In re Marriage of

Williams, 2017 COA 120M, ¶ 10 (determining de novo, based on the

5
separation agreement, whether maintenance survived the obligor

spouse’s death as a continuing obligation of his estate or was

terminated under section 14-10-122(2)(a)(I)).

¶ 14 A separation agreement is a contract between the parties. In

re Marriage of Deines, 608 P.2d 375, 377 (Colo. App. 1980). Our

primary goal when interpreting an agreement is to determine and

give effect to the parties’ intent based primarily on the language of

the agreement. Ad Two, Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 9 P.3d 373,

376 (Colo. 2000); In re Marriage of Crowder, 77 P.3d 858, 860-61

(Colo. App. 2003). We construe the agreement’s terms in

accordance with their plain and generally accepted meanings. Ad

Two, 9 P.3d at 376. And we evaluate the contract as a whole and

seek to “give effect to all provisions so that none will be rendered

meaningless.” Gagne v. Gagne, 2014 COA 127, ¶ 53 (quoting Pepcol

Mfg. Co. v. Denv. Union Corp., 687 P.2d 1310, 1313 (Colo. 1984)).

C. In re Marriage of Cerrone

¶ 15 In Cerrone, ¶¶ 7-25, another division of this court analyzed the

contractual language required to waive section 14-10-122(2)(a)(III)’s

automatic termination of maintenance upon a receiving party’s

remarriage. There, the parties had executed a separation

6
agreement awarding the wife “maintenance in the amount of

$2,489.00 per month for a period of 138 months.” Cerrone, ¶ 3.

The agreement further provided that “[m]aintenance shall terminate

at the end of the contractual period of 11 1/2 years” and that “[a]ll

maintenance outlined herein is contractual in nature and shall be

non-modifiable for any reason whatsoever by the Court.” Id.

¶ 16 The division concluded that the contractual language was not

sufficient to continue the husband’s maintenance obligation after

the wife’s remarriage. Id. at ¶ 8. The division held that “to avoid

termination of maintenance by operation of law under section

14-10-122(2)(a)(III), a separation agreement or decree must include

an ‘express provision’ that maintenance will continue even if the

recipient spouse remarries.” Id. at ¶ 20 (quoting In re Marriage of

Hahn, 628 P.2d 175, 176 (Colo. App. 1981)).

¶ 17 The Cerrone division reasoned that, to overcome the statutory

presumption that maintenance ends on the recipient spouse’s

remarriage, the plain language of section 14-10-122(2)(a)(III)

requires the parties to “make it unmistakably clear . . . that they

have ‘otherwise agreed’ under the statute, meaning that they agree

the automatic termination on remarriage provision will not apply to

7
their maintenance award.” Id. at ¶¶ 18, 20. Accordingly, the

division declined to follow In re Marriage of Parsons, 30 P.3d 868,

869 (Colo. App. 2001), “to the extent [Parsons] holds that a

nonmodification clause in a separation agreement is alone sufficient

to evince the parties’ agreement that the maintenance obligation

will survive the recipient spouse’s remarriage.” Cerrone, ¶ 20.

¶ 18 Instead, the Cerrone division was persuaded by Spratlen v.

Spratlen, 491 P.2d 608, 609-10 (Colo. App. 1971), and Hahn,

628 P.2d at 176, both of which interpreted previous, but similar,

versions of section 14-10-122(2)(a)(III) and held that there must be

an express provision that maintenance would continue after the

recipient’s remarriage in order to overcome the statutory

termination of maintenance. See Cerrone, ¶¶ 11-14, 18-20.

¶ 19 Thus, the Cerrone division did “not view as talismanic the

terms ‘contractual’ and ‘nonmodifiable’” and instead held that “the

language of the separation agreement must be read as a whole, and

in context, to determine the meaning of those terms or any others.”

Id. at ¶ 19. And the division concluded that the separation

agreement before it was “insufficiently clear . . . to require husband

8
to continue paying wife maintenance after her remarriage.” Id. at

¶ 21.

D. Section 14-10-122(2)(a)(III) Does Not Require Talismanic
Language

¶ 20 To the extent that Cerrone can be read to require express

mention of the term “remarriage” to prevent maintenance from

terminating when the recipient remarries, we decline to follow that

holding. See Chavez v. Chavez, 2020 COA 70, ¶ 13 (noting that

divisions of the court of appeals function independently and thus

“are not bound by the decisions of other divisions”). Instead,

relying on Williams, ¶ 16, and Hahn, 628 P.2d at 176, we hold that

a separation agreement need not use any talismanic language to

preclude maintenance from terminating upon remarriage; all that is

required is a writing that “expressly or by clear implication provide[s]

that the payments will continue after” the recipient spouse

remarries. Williams, ¶ 16 (emphasis added).

¶ 21 In Williams, a division of this court addressed the type of

contractual language necessary to prevent the automatic

termination of maintenance under an earlier version of section

9
14-10-122(2)(a).1 Williams, ¶¶ 9-24. Before the enactment of

section 14-10-122(2)’s predecessor, the common law provided that

the obligation to make maintenance payments would end upon the

death of the obligor unless the obligor contractually agreed that the

payments would continue. In re Estate of Kettering, 376 P.2d 983,

986 (Colo. 1962). “Such an agreement [was] enforceable if it

expressly or by clear implication provide[d] that the payments shall

continue after the death of the husband.” Id. (emphasis added); see

Williams, ¶ 14. The Williams division found “the holdings of the

pre-statute cases instructive in delineating what type of writing

would be required under [section 14-10-122(2)] to continue the

payment of maintenance after the death of the obligor” and held

that “the writing must expressly or by clear implication provide that

the payments will continue after the death of the obligor.” Williams,

¶ 16 (emphasis added).

1 That version of the statute provided, “Unless otherwise agreed in

writing or expressly provided in the decree, the obligation to pay
future maintenance is terminated upon the death of either party or
the remarriage of the party receiving maintenance.” § 14-10-122(2),
C.R.S. 1988; see In re Marriage of Williams, 2017 COA 120M, ¶ 9.

10
¶ 22 Although Colorado cases have not explicitly addressed the

common law’s “by clear implication” language when determining

whether maintenance payments terminate upon a recipient’s

remarriage under section 14-10-122(2)(a)(III), they have

nevertheless applied the principle. See Hahn, 628 P.2d at 176;

Parsons, 30 P.3d at 869 (“While express language concerning

termination is preferable, the absence of that language is not fatal if

the intent is evident from the agreement or decree as a whole.”

(emphasis added)); see also Spratlen, 491 P.2d at 610 (relying on

Kettering to hold that the predecessor to section 14-10-122(2)

“require[d] an express statement that alimony [would] continue after

remarriage”).

¶ 23 In Hahn, for example, a division of this court held that a

provision providing that maintenance was “not . . . subject to

modification for any reason except the death of the wife” constituted

“an express provision” continuing maintenance after remarriage.

628 P.2d at 176. The Hahn division reasoned that although the

provision in question did “not explicitly provide for continuation or

termination of maintenance in the event of remarriage,

nevertheless, it indicate[d] that it was the contemplation of the

11
parties that only the wife’s death would absolve the husband of

liability for payment of maintenance.” Id. In other words, the

provision in Hahn expressed “by clear implication” the parties’

intent that maintenance payments would continue even if the

recipient remarried.

¶ 24 In contrast, requiring a writing to specifically mention

remarriage to stop maintenance payments from automatically

terminating would be contrary to the plain language of the statute,

as the General Assembly has not evinced an intent to require any

particular language to satisfy the “otherwise agreed in writing”

requirement. § 14-10-122(2)(a). Doing so would also be contrary to

the bedrock principle that “[t]he primary goal of contract

interpretation is to determine and give effect to the intent of the

parties,” and, therefore, courts “should not allow a hyper-technical

reading of the language in a contract to defeat the intentions of the

parties.” Ad Two, 9 P.3d at 376-77.

¶ 25 Accordingly, we hold that section 14-10-122(2)(a)(III) does not

require any particular language for parties to agree that

maintenance will continue upon remarriage; all that is required is a

writing that “expressly or by clear implication provide[s] that the

12
payments will continue after” the recipient spouse remarries.

Williams, ¶ 16.

E. Application

¶ 26 For the reasons explained above, we reject husband’s

contention that the separation agreement in this case needed to

specifically include the term “remarriage” to define the

circumstances under which maintenance “may not be . . .

terminated.” In our view, the agreement clearly demonstrates that

the parties “otherwise agreed” that section 14-10-122(2)(a)(III)’s

remarriage provision would not automatically terminate husband’s

maintenance obligations.

¶ 27 Even if we were to agree with husband that the language in

section four specifying that maintenance is “contractual in nature

and shall not be modified in the future” is, by itself, insufficient to

overcome the termination of maintenance under section

14-10-122(2)(a)(III), see Cerrone, ¶¶ 18-20, we must read the

separation agreement “as a whole, and in context, to determine the

meaning of [its] terms,” id. at ¶ 19. Thus, section four does not end

our analysis.

13
¶ 28 We, like the district court, view the parties’ handwritten

addition in section five as dispositive. Husband’s agreement to pay

wife “the set amount” of $108,000 over seventy-two months, when

combined with the next sentence providing that their agreement

“may not be . . . terminated,” is a clear acknowledgment that

husband will pay wife a total of $108,000 in maintenance

regardless of any later events that could trigger termination,

including wife’s remarriage.

¶ 29 In this respect, the language in this separation agreement is

distinguishable from the language in Cerrone that failed to

overcome the statutory termination of maintenance upon

remarriage. See id. at ¶¶ 3, 21-23. Specifically, the maintenance

provision in Cerrone, ¶ 3, did not explicitly prohibit “termination”

and instead only stated that maintenance was “non-modifiable,”

whereas the agreement here, in addition to prohibiting modification,

expressly provides for a “set amount” of maintenance that “may not

be . . . terminated.” Put differently, unlike the agreement in

Cerrone, the separation agreement here provides “by clear

implication . . . that the [maintenance] payments will continue

14
after” wife remarries, despite its failure to specifically mention

remarriage. Williams, ¶ 16.

¶ 30 To hold otherwise, as husband asks us to do, would largely

render the language in section five meaningless. See Gagne, ¶ 53;

see also Pepcol, 687 P.2d at 1313 (holding that a contract “is to be

interpreted in its entirety with the end in view of seeking to

harmonize and to give effect to all provisions”).

¶ 31 Accordingly, we conclude that the parties “otherwise agreed in

writing” under section 14-10-122(2)(a)(III) that the automatic

termination on remarriage provision does not apply.

III. Appellate Attorney Fees and Costs

¶ 32 Wife requests her appellate attorney fees under section

14-10-119, C.R.S. 2025, due to the alleged financial disparities

between the parties. Because the district court is better equipped

to determine the factual issues regarding the parties’ current

financial resources, we remand for the district court to determine

whether an award of appellate attorney fees is appropriate. See In

re Marriage of Alvis, 2019 COA 97, ¶ 30.

¶ 33 However, wife is entitled to an award of her appellate costs.

See C.A.R. 39(a)(2) (costs are taxed against the appellant if a

15
judgment is affirmed). Accordingly, she may pursue those costs in

the district court by following the procedure set forth in C.A.R.

39(c)(2).

IV. Disposition

¶ 34 We affirm the order and remand the case to the district court

for further proceedings concerning wife’s request for appellate

attorney fees and costs.

JUDGE TOW concurs.

JUDGE SULLIVAN specially concurs.

16
JUDGE SULLIVAN, specially concurring.

¶ 35 I agree with the majority that the parties’ separation

agreement requiring husband to pay wife a “set amount” of

maintenance — and specifying that it could “not be modified or

terminated” — constituted an agreement in writing under section

14-10-122(2)(a)(III), C.R.S. 2025, that overcame the statutory

presumption against continuing maintenance after a recipient

spouse remarries. I write separately, however, to underscore the

unusually muddy state of our court’s precedent on this issue and to

urge the supreme court to provide much-needed clarity.

¶ 36 Section 14-10-122(2)(a)(III) states that, “[u]nless otherwise

agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree, the obligation

to pay future maintenance is terminated upon . . . [t]he remarriage

of or the establishment of a civil union by the party receiving

maintenance.”1 For more than fifty years, divisions of this court

have ping-ponged back and forth between different, and often

conflicting, answers to a deceptively simple question: Does the

1 Like the majority, I refer only to the recipient spouse’s remarriage

because those are the facts presented by this case. But the statute
applies equally when the maintenance recipient establishes a civil
union.

17
statute demand an express reference to “remarriage” in the parties’

separation agreement for the payor spouse’s maintenance obligation

to continue after the recipient spouse remarries?

¶ 37 In Spratlen v. Spratlen, 491 P.2d 608, 610 (Colo. App. 1971),

for example, the division interpreted section 14-10-122(2)’s

predecessor to require “an express statement that [maintenance]

continue after remarriage.” The division in In re Marriage of Hahn,

628 P.2d 175, 176 (Colo. App. 1981), however, backtracked from

Spratlen’s narrow reading, concluding that an explicit reference to

“remarriage” in the separation agreement wasn’t necessary for the

husband’s maintenance payments to continue. Rather, the

agreement’s provision that only the wife’s death would terminate

the husband’s maintenance obligation was sufficient to overcome

the statutory presumption. Id. Twenty years later, the division in

In re Marriage of Parsons, 30 P.3d 868, 869 (Colo. App. 2001),

pulled back from Spratlen even further, holding that a

nonmodification clause alone “is sufficient to overcome the

statutory presumption that maintenance terminates upon the

recipient’s remarriage.” The division explained that although

“express language” regarding terminating maintenance is

18
“preferable,” the omission of such language “is not fatal if the intent

is evident from the agreement . . . as a whole.” Id.

¶ 38 Then came In re Marriage of Cerrone, 2021 COA 116, ¶ 20.

The division in Cerrone hurled the pendulum back toward Spratlen,

concluding that a separation agreement “must include an ‘express

provision’ that maintenance will continue even if the recipient

spouse remarries.” Id. (quoting Hahn, 628 P.2d at 176). Such

provision, the division explained, must be “unmistakably clear” that

the parties have “otherwise agreed” under section

14-10-122(2)(a)(III) that the “automatic termination on remarriage

provision will not apply to their maintenance award.” Cerrone,

¶ 20. The Cerrone division thus declined to follow Parsons’ holding

that a nonmodification clause alone is sufficient to demonstrate the

parties’ agreement that maintenance will survive the recipient

spouse’s remarriage. Id.

¶ 39 Today, the majority again does an about-face, tacking closer to

where things stood under Hahn. The majority concludes, correctly

in my view, that section 14-10-122(2)(a)(III) doesn’t demand any

particular magic words for maintenance to continue after the

recipient spouse remarries. Instead, the separation agreement need

19
only expressly or by clear implication provide that maintenance will

continue after the recipient spouse remarries. Supra ¶ 20. In so

holding, the majority declines to follow Cerrone to the extent it

requires specific mention of the recipient spouse’s remarriage in the

separation agreement.

¶ 40 Given this whipsawing by divisions of this court, I worry that

parties, attorneys, and trial courts will remain without settled

guidance regarding section 14-10-122(2)(a)(III)’s requirements

absent supreme court intervention. As this case illustrates, the

divisions’ divergent interpretations will inevitably lead to

inconsistent outcomes in similar cases, contrary to the General

Assembly’s stated intent. See § 14-10-104(1), C.R.S. 2025 (the

legislature’s “general purpose” in enacting the Uniform Dissolution

of Marriage Act is to promote uniformity of the law). And without

clarity on the statute’s requirements, parties in domestic relations

cases will continue to face drawn out litigation, added legal

expenses, and unpredictable results. Absent legislative action, only

the supreme court can remedy these concerns and resolve the

conflict in this court’s precedent. See Digit. Landscape Inc. v. Media

20
Kings LLC, 2018 COA 142, ¶ 68 (one division of the court of appeals

isn’t bound by another division’s decision).

¶ 41 Counsel, of course, can mitigate the uncertainty presented by

this court’s clashing decisions by including an explicit provision in

their client’s separation agreement detailing what occurs if the

spouse receiving maintenance remarries. See Parsons, 30 P.3d at

869 (“[E]xpress language” regarding terminating maintenance “is

preferable.”). But that provides little solace for parties who have

already signed their separation agreements. Nor does it solve the

problem for parties who, as here, are navigating the legal system

without the benefit of counsel when finalizing their dissolution. See

Colo. Jud. Branch, Cases and Parties without Attorney

Representation in Civil Cases: Fiscal Year 2025, at 4 (July 8, 2025),

https://perma.cc/G6V3-RD95 (estimating that seventy-six percent

of parties in domestic relations cases didn’t have attorney

representation in fiscal year 2025).

¶ 42 Accordingly, I urge the supreme court to grant review in an

appropriate case to resolve the conflict in this court’s precedent over

section 14-10-122(2)(a)(III)’s requirements.

21