Peo in Interest of Feyintola

25CA0927 Peo in Interest of Feyintola 08-07-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0927
Pueblo County District Court No. 25MH30043
Honorable Amiel Markenson, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Petitioner-Appellee,

In the Interest of Gbenga Dipo Feyintola,

Respondent-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE
J. Jones and Kuhn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced August 7, 2025

Cynthia Mitchell, County Attorney, Kate H. Shafer, Special Assistant County
Attorney, Pueblo, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee

Tezak Law, P.C., Mary E. Tezak, Florence, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant
¶1 Gbenga Dipo Feyintola appeals the district court’s order

authorizing staff at the Colorado Mental Health Hospital in Pueblo

(the hospital) to involuntarily medicate him. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Feyintola was admitted to the hospital after being found

incompetent to stand trial in a criminal case. A staff psychiatrist

diagnosed him with an unspecified mood disorder. Although he

was initially restored to competency and discharged without

medication treatment, he was readmitted to the hospital in

December 2024, where he has remained since. Since being

readmitted to the hospital, Feyintola has exhibited a pattern of

refusing oral medications and solid foods, acting aggressively

toward others, and being placed on assault precautions.

¶3 In May 2025, the People filed a petition seeking authorization

to involuntarily medicate Feyintola with olanzapine (Zyprexa) and

lithium. Consistent with People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961 (Colo.

1985), the petition asserted that (1) Feyintola is incapable of

effectively participating in decisions affecting his treatment; (2) the

requested treatment is necessary to prevent a significant and likely

long-term deterioration in his mental health condition and to

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prevent the likelihood of him causing serious harm to others in the

institution; (3) a less intrusive treatment alternative is not available;

and (4) Feyintola’s need for treatment is sufficiently compelling to

override any bona fide and legitimate interest he has in refusing

treatment.

¶4 The district court held a hearing, at which both Feyintola and

the psychiatrist supervising his treatment testified.

¶5 The psychiatrist testified that the acute symptoms of

Feyintola’s mood disorder include pressured speech,

disorganization, paranoia, delusions, and agitation. Feyintola was

prescribed olanzapine and lithium on an emergency basis after

threatening another hospital patient.

¶6 The psychiatrist explained that olanzapine is an antipsychotic

medication used to treat delusions, paranoia, and acute agitation,

and lithium is a mood stabilizing medication that can improve

symptoms like pressured speech and thought disorganization. Both

medications may have side effects that medical staff monitor for by

“ask[ing] the patients if they are experiencing side effects and

observ[ing] them on the unit.”

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¶7 The psychiatrist said that after taking both emergency

medications, Feyintola started showing signs of improvement, such

as eating solid foods more regularly and demonstrating more logical

thinking. He also said Feyintola’s mood-disorder-related symptoms

have historically worsened when he is not adequately medicated,

and he opined that “[w]ithout the medications Mr. Feyintola will

continue to suffer from the symptoms of his mental illness which

will place him at increased risk of danger to himself and others.

With the medications, these symptoms can improve and Mr.

Feyintola can more appropriately care of himself.”

¶8 Much of Feyintola’s testimony focused on describing the side

effects he claimed to have experienced while taking the emergency

medications. The psychiatrist acknowledged that Feyintola

reported experiencing various side effects while taking the

emergency medications. However, the psychiatrist noted that while

neither he nor other medical staff had observed some of the side

effects Feyintola reported experiencing, they would continue to

monitor Feyintola for adverse side effects and attempt to mitigate

them with appropriate medication management.

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¶9 At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court granted the

petition.

II. Discussion

¶ 10 A district court may order the involuntary administration of

medication to a patient only if the People prove, by clear and

convincing evidence, each of the four elements outlined in Medina.

Id. at 973. Feyintola doesn’t contest the first, second, or third

Medina elements. He contends only that the evidence presented at

the hearing was insufficient to prove the fourth Medina element.

We aren’t persuaded.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 11 When a patient challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting an involuntary medication order, we review the district

court’s legal conclusions de novo and defer to its factual findings if

they have record support. People v. Marquardt, 2016 CO 4, ¶ 8. We

view the evidence as a whole and in the light most favorable to the

People as the petitioning party. People in Interest of Uwayezuk,

2023 COA 69, ¶ 57; People in Interest of R.C., 2019 COA 99M, ¶ 7.

As the fact finder, the district court determines the sufficiency,

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probative effect, and weight of the evidence, along with the

inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom. R.C., ¶ 7.

B. Analysis

¶ 12 The fourth Medina element evaluates whether the patient’s

need for treatment is sufficiently compelling to override any

legitimate interest in refusing treatment. Medina, 705 P.2d at 974.

In conducting this evaluation, a court determines — to the extent

permitted by the evidence — whether the patient’s refusal is “bona

fide and legitimate” and, if so, whether the patient’s prognosis

without treatment is “so unfavorable that [his] personal preference

must yield to the legitimate interests of the [S]tate in preserving the

life and health of the patient placed in its charge and in protecting

the safety of those in the institution.” Id.

¶ 13 Feyintola agrees the district court acknowledged that his

reasons for refusing medication — avoiding adverse side effects —

“might be bona fide.” See Uwayezuk, ¶ 62 (a desire to avoid adverse

effects can constitute a bona fide and legitimate reason to refuse

medication). However, he does not present any specific argument

regarding the court’s balancing of his interests against the State’s.

Instead, he merely asserts — in conclusory fashion — that the court

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“erred in finding that his interests were outweighed by those of the

State.”

¶ 14 Reviewing the record as a whole and in the light most

favorable to the People, we conclude that sufficient evidence

supports the conclusion that Feyintola’s need for treatment

outweighs his interest in refusing it. The psychiatrist’s testimony

establishes that (1) the risk of adverse side effects from the

requested medications is treatable; (2) “objectively, [Feyintola]

tolerate[s] the medications well”; (3) without treatment, Feyintola

will continue to suffer from the symptoms of his mental illness, and

will be at increased risk of danger to himself and others; and

(4) Feyintola’s need for the requested medications outweighs his

interest in refusing them. We conclude that this evidence clearly

and convincingly supports the court’s determination that

Feyintola’s interest in refusing medication must yield to the State’s

interests in preserving his health and protecting his safety and the

safety of those in the hospital. See Medina, 705 P.2d at 974.

¶ 15 We note that the hearing transcript is incomplete, presumably

because the device recording the proceedings stopped doing so

before the hearing concluded. Feyintola does not assert that the

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missing portion of the hearing contains evidence requiring reversal.

Nor has he sought to settle the record. See C.A.R. 10(g)(1) (“If any

difference arises as to whether the record truly discloses what

occurred in the trial court or a portion of the record is not in the

possession of the trial court, the difference must be submitted to

and settled by the trial court. The party moving to settle the record

must file a motion to stay the appellate court proceedings in the

appellate court while the trial court considers the motion to settle

the record.”). “Where the record is silent the law presumes

regularity.” People in Interest of I.S., 2017 COA 155, ¶ 11 (quoting

McClain v. People, 141 P.2d 685, 686 (Colo. 1943)); LePage v.

People, 2014 CO 13, ¶ 15 (“According to the presumption of

regularity, appellate courts presume that the trial judge did not

commit error absent affirmative evidence otherwise.”). Thus, absent

evidence to the contrary, we presume that the missing portion of

the transcript would show that district court did not err.

III. Disposition

¶ 16 The order authorizing the involuntary administration of

medication is affirmed.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE KUHN concur.

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