Peo in Interest of SM

25CA0073 Peo in Interest of SM 08-07-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0073
Weld County District Court No. 24JV7
Honorable W. Troy Hause, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of S.M., a Child,

and Concerning J.M.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE JOHNSON
Welling and Grove, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced August 7, 2025

Bruce T. Barker, County Attorney, David S. Anderson, Assistant County
Attorney, Greeley, Colorado, for Appellee

Jenna L. Mazzucca, Guardian Ad Litem

Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for
Appellant
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, J.M. (father)

appeals the judgment adjudicating S.M. (the child) dependent or

neglected. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Weld County Department of Human Services (the

Department) received a referral with concerns that R.M. (mother)

tested positive for methamphetamine at the time she gave birth to

the child. The Department and the parents entered into an

agreement for a safety plan. The safety plan required the parents to

complete monitored sobriety, to live with the child’s great-

grandmother, and to abstain from transporting the child. But the

safety plan “disintegrated” within three weeks, largely due to the

parents’ continued substance use.

¶3 The Department then filed a petition in dependency or neglect,

and the court removed the child from great-grandmother’s home

and placed her with her great-aunt and great-uncle. Father denied

the allegations in the petition and requested an adjudicatory jury

trial.

¶4 Following the trial, the jury found that the child was

dependent or neglected under section 19-3-102(1)(b), (c), and (e),

1
C.R.S. 2024. Based on those findings, the court entered an

adjudication.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶5 Father contends the evidence was insufficient to support the

jury’s verdicts. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶6 Whether a child is dependent or neglected presents a mixed

question of fact and law because it requires application of

evidentiary facts to the statutory grounds. People in Interest of

M.M., 2017 COA 144, ¶ 17. When determining whether the

evidence is sufficient to sustain an adjudication, we review the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and draw

every inference fairly deducible from the evidence in favor of the

jury’s verdicts. People in Interest of S.G.L., 214 P.3d 580, 583 (Colo.

App. 2009). The credibility of the witnesses and the sufficiency,

probative effect, and weight of the evidence, as well as the

inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom, are within the

purview of the jury. See id. We will not disturb the jury’s verdicts if

the evidence supports them, even though reasonable people might

arrive at different conclusions based on the same evidence. See id.

2
¶7 To establish that a child is dependent or neglected, a

department must prove the allegations in the petition by a

preponderance of the evidence. See § 19-3-505(1), (7)(a), C.R.S.

2024. As relevant here, a child is dependent or neglected if (1) the

child lacks proper parental care through the actions or omissions of

a parent; (2) the child’s environment is injurious to her welfare; or

(3) through no fault of the parent, the child is homeless, without

proper care, or not domiciled with a parent. § 19-3-102(1)(b)-(c), (e).

Proper parental care means the minimum level of care or services

and necessities that are required to prevent any serious threat to

the child’s health or welfare. People in Interest of S.X.M., 271 P.3d

1124, 1131-32 (Colo. App. 2011) (approving jury instruction

containing this language); see CJI-Civ. 41:7 (2024). An injurious

environment is a situation that is “likely harmful” to the child.

People in Interest of J.G., 2016 CO 39, ¶ 26.

¶8 An adjudication must be based on existing circumstances and

relate to the child’s status at the time of adjudication. People in

Interest of A.E.L., 181 P.3d 1186, 1192 (Colo. App. 2008). But that

does not mean a juvenile court must find that the child is receiving

improper care at the time of the hearing. See S.X.M., 271 P.3d at

3
1130. Rather, an adjudication may be based on past, current, or

prospective harm. See People in Interest of G.E.S., 2016 COA

183, ¶ 15. To determine whether a child is dependent or neglected

based on prospective harm, a court may consider whether it is

likely or expected that a child will be dependent or neglected if

returned to the parent. See People in Interest of S.N., 2014 COA

116, ¶¶ 15-16.

B. Analysis

¶9 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prevailing party and drawing every fairly deducible inference in

favor of the jury’s decision, we conclude the evidence was sufficient

to support its determination that the child was dependent or

neglected with respect to father under subsections (1)(b) (lack of

proper parental care) and (1)(c) (injurious environment). The

Department’s evidence supporting this determination largely

concerned the parents’ substance use.

¶ 10 The record shows that both father and mother continued to

use methamphetamine at the time of the hearing. Father, who had

used methamphetamine for twenty years, admitted his use was

ongoing and identified himself as a “functioning meth addict.”

4
Father also testified that he wanted the child returned to his care

first and then to get sober thereafter. See S.N., ¶¶ 17-18

(concluding that a prospective harm determination may be based on

a parent’s past conduct, including drug use, and current

circumstances).

¶ 11 The permanency caseworker outlined her concerns if the child

were returned to the parents’ care — namely, the possibility that (1)

the child would be exposed to methamphetamine through smoke

residue on surfaces and (2) the parents would be unable to read the

child’s cues because of their substance use. The permanency

caseworker testified she had observed the parents not reading the

child’s cues during visits, which she believed to be related to their

substance use. Relatedly, the intake caseworker testified that

great-grandmother reported that she could not tell when the

parents were under the influence.

¶ 12 In addition, father admitted that he would have to get rid of a

few of the animals in his home before it was safe for the child to live

there.

¶ 13 Still, father contends that the evidence of injurious

environment was insufficient because the Department presented no

5
evidence that great-grandmother’s home, “the only place the couple

planned to live with the child,” was injurious to her welfare. In

support, father points to his testimony that he and mother

“originally wanted to go stay with [great-grandmother] to begin

with.” But the jury as the fact finder, see S.G.L., 214 P.3d at 583,

was not required to credit this testimony or conclude, as father

posits, that father and the child would only ever live with great-

grandmother regardless of Departmental involvement. Regardless,

the evidence the jury may have considered with respect to

prospective harm was not limited to that concerning great-

grandmother’s home. See also People in Interest of C.M., 2024 COA

90, ¶ 29 (stating that when a child has been removed from the

parents, the relevant inquiry is whether her environment would be

injurious if “returned to the parents”) (emphasis added). Among

other evidence supporting a finding of injurious environment, father

tested positive for methamphetamine four times while living with

the child at great-grandmother’s home.

¶ 14 Nor are we persuaded by father’s claim that there was

insufficient evidence to support a finding of lack of proper parental

care because he complied with the safety plan. The record appears

6
to indicate that father did not comply with the safety plan because,

among other things, he used methamphetamine during the time the

safety plan was in effect. Nonetheless, father’s compliance with the

safety plan is not dispositive of whether it is likely or expected that

the child would lack proper parental care if returned to his care.

See K.D. v. People, 139 P.3d 695, 699 (Colo. 2006) (stating that, in

an adjudicatory hearing, the court determines whether the child

lacks “the benefit of parental guidance, concern, protection or

support to which he is entitled”) (citation omitted).

¶ 15 Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to

support the jury’s verdicts pursuant to subsections (1)(b) and (1)(c).

Based on this conclusion, we need not consider whether the

evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict under

subsection (1)(e). See People in Interest of S.M-L., 2016 COA 173,

¶ 29 (“[S]ection 19-3-102 requires proof of only one condition for an

adjudication.”), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. People in Interest of

R.S. v. G.S., 2018 CO 31.

III. Conclusion

¶ 16 We affirm the judgment.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE GROVE concur.

7