Peo in Interest of CFJ

25CA0184 Peo in Interest of CFJ 07-31-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0184
El Paso County District Court No. 22JV218
Honorable Larry E. Schwartz, Judge
Honorable Lara Y. Nafziger, Magistrate

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of C.F.J. and K.N.J., Children,

and Concerning A.J.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS
Fox and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced July 31, 2025

Kenneth Hodges, County Attorney, Melanie Douglas, Contract Attorney,
Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Ainsley E. Baum, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellant
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, A.J. (mother)

appeals the judgment allocating parental responsibilities for C.F.J.

and K.N.J. (the children) primarily to their maternal grandmother.

We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In October 2022, the El Paso County Department of Human

Services received a referral that the twin children tested positive at

birth for methamphetamine and amphetamine. The Department

and mother agreed to a safety plan that required mother, who was

living with the children and their maternal grandmother, to have all

of her contact supervised by maternal grandmother and to take

urinalysis tests (UAs). However, according to the Department,

mother tested positive on a UA for methamphetamine and

amphetamine and failed to provide proper medical care for the

children. The Department then filed a petition in dependency and

neglect.

¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent or

neglected and adopted a treatment plan for mother that required

her to (1) eliminate substance use; (2) have a healthy parent-child

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relationship; (3) communicate with the Department; and (4) address

mental health needs.

¶4 The children remained in their placement at maternal

grandmother’s home for the duration of the case. Mother also

remained at maternal grandmother’s home but had only supervised

family time.

¶5 The guardian ad litem (GAL) moved for an allocation of

parental responsibilities (APR) that gave maternal grandmother

physical custody of the children. After an evidentiary hearing in

October 2024, a magistrate adopted the GAL’s proposed APR and

entered a judgment giving (1) maternal grandmother physical

custody; (2) mother supervised parenting time; and (3) maternal

grandmother and mother joint decision-making responsibility.

¶6 Mother then petitioned for juvenile court review of the

magistrate’s ruling, asserting that the magistrate erred by entering

the APR because the Department failed to make reasonable efforts

to reunite her with the children. The juvenile court affirmed the

magistrate’s judgment.

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II. Discussion

¶7 Mother contends that the evidence was insufficient to

establish a compelling reason to grant physical custody of the

children to grandmother and, therefore, the magistrate erred by

entering the APR. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

¶8 The allocation of parental responsibilities is a matter within

the juvenile court’s discretion. See In re Parental Responsibilities

Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15. A court abuses its

discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or

unfair, or when it misapplies or misconstrues the law. People in

Interest of E.B., 2022 CO 55, ¶ 14.

¶9 A juvenile court’s review of a magistrate’s decision is like

appellate review, and the court must defer to the magistrate’s

factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. C.R.M. 7(a)(9);

see also People in Interest of N.G., 2012 COA 131, ¶ 37. Our review

of the juvenile court’s decision is effectively a second layer of

appellate review, so we apply the same clearly erroneous standard

to the magistrate’s factual findings, but we review legal conclusions

de novo. See In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning D.P.G., 2020

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COA 115, ¶ 15. The proper burden of proof is also a question of law

that we review de novo. LeHouillier v. Gallegos, 2019 CO 8, ¶ 18.

B. Analysis

¶ 10 In dependency and neglect proceedings, the juvenile court has

jurisdiction to allocate parental responsibilities between parents

and nonparents. § 19-3-508(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024; People in Interest of

H.K.W., 2017 COA 70, ¶ 12. An allocation of parental

responsibilities is governed by the Children’s Code. People in

Interest of J.G., 2021 COA 47, ¶ 13. The overriding purpose of the

Children’s Code is to protect children’s welfare and safety by

providing procedures through which the children’s best interests

can be served. Id. at ¶ 19. Therefore, the court must allocate

parental responsibilities in accordance with the children’s best

interests. People in Interest of L.B., 254 P.3d 1203, 1208 (Colo. App.

2011).

¶ 11 Although a finding of parental unfitness is not required, People

in Interest of M.D., 2014 COA 121, ¶ 43; L.B., 254 P.3d at 1208, the

court may only award permanent custody of children to a

nonparent if the moving party (here, the GAL with the support of

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the Department) establishes a compelling reason why it is in the

children’s best interests for the nonparent to have custody.

¶ 12 The magistrate determined that the GAL and the Department

had “met their burden” to show that an APR was in the children’s

best interests. The magistrate found that mother had not complied

with her treatment plan or otherwise addressed the issues that gave

rise to the petition and the adjudication of the children as

dependent and neglected. Accordingly, the magistrate had no basis

for knowing whether mother could safely parent the children on her

own.

¶ 13 The magistrate’s findings are supported by the record. The

caseworker, who was the sole witness at the hearing, testified as

follows:

• The Department opened the case because of concerns about

mother’s substance use and one of the children missing

medical appointments.

• Mother did not complete a substance use evaluation or

treatment or submit to UAs.

• Mother did not demonstrate that she understood the impact of

her substance use on her ability to parent the children.

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• Mother did not complete a mental health evaluation or

complete any mental health treatment during the case.

• The Department had received a referral about eight months

earlier concerning mother’s mental health. According to the

referral, mother reported that “there were agents trying to

poison [her and the children] through the cables,” and mother

wanted to put tin foil on the children’s cribs to protect them

from attacks by “rays and blocks.” The referral also said that

mother “heavily used alcohol.”

• Mother did not sign releases and her communication with the

Department was “[v]ery sporadic.”

• Mother had not addressed any of the safety concerns that

prompted the Department to file a petition, and she was not “a

safe and appropriate parent at th[at] time.”

¶ 14 Thus, while the magistrate did not explicitly state that the GAL

and Department had established a “compelling reason” for the APR,

the magistrate did find that (1) an APR giving maternal

grandmother physical custody was in the children’s best interests;

(2) mother had not addressed the issues that caused the case to be

opened; (3) despite the requirements of the treatment plan, mother

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had not demonstrated sobriety or engaged in any mental health

treatment; and (4) maternal grandmother continued to supervise

mother’s interaction with the children. Those findings are sufficient

to support the magistrate’s determination that a “compelling

reason” existed to award custody of the children to grandmother.

¶ 15 We reject mother’s argument that the magistrate’s findings

suggest that the court impermissibly shifted the burden to mother

to prove that she was sober and could safely care for the children.

The magistrate’s observation that “there’s simply no proof of

sobriety” was not an attempt to shift the burden of proof to mother;

it was a finding that mother had failed to comply with her treatment

plan, which required her to “demonstrate a lifestyle free of drugs

and alcohol, through consistently clean urinalyses . . . and positive

reports from providers.” “It is the parent’s responsibility to secure

compliance with and success of a treatment plan.” People in

Interest of S.M.A.M.A., 172 P.3d 958, 962 (Colo. App. 2007).

Therefore, the magistrate could properly consider that mother had

failed to demonstrate her sobriety at any point during the case. See

People in Interest of L.K., 2016 COA 112, ¶¶ 35-39 (finding of

treatment plan noncompliance based on the evidence presented did

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not amount to the juvenile court improperly shifting the burden of

proof), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. C.K. v. People, 2017 CO 111.

¶ 16 Finally, to the extent mother asserts that the magistrate was

required to explain which factors under section 14-10-124(1.5)(a),

C.R.S. 2024, she considered in issuing the APR ruling, we disagree.

A court deciding an APR motion within a dependency and neglect

proceeding is “not required to apply the best interests factors

specifically listed under section 14-10-124(1.5)(a).” L.B., 254 P.3d

at 1208. Nonetheless, the magistrate here noted that she

considered the factors under section 14-10-124(1.5)(a) as well as

the best interests of the children under the Children’s Code. But

under the circumstances, she had no obligation to delineate the

specific statutory factors on which she relied in reaching her

conclusions. See L.B., 254 P.3d at 1208.

¶ 17 Accordingly, because the record supports the magistrate’s

findings, and the magistrate applied the correct legal standard and

burden of proof, we discern no abuse of discretion in the entry of

the APR order.

III. Disposition

¶ 18 The judgment is affirmed.

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JUDGE FOX and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.

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