Peo v. Murphy

24CA0097 Peo v Murphy 07-31-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0097
Jefferson County District Court No. 22CR2579
Honorable Christopher B. Rhamey, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Kameron Murphy,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE WELLING
Grove and Johnson, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced July 31, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Marixa Frias, Assistant Attorney General,
Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Justin Conley, Deputy State
Public Defender, Golden, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Kameron Murphy, appeals the trial court’s order

finding that it didn’t have jurisdiction to grant the release of his

property in the custody of law enforcement due to an open homicide

investigation and finding that the search warrant that the police

used to seize his property hadn’t dissipated after his criminal case

had been resolved. Because we agree with Murphy that the court

erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to address his

motion, we reverse the court’s order and remand the case for

further proceedings on the merits of Murphy’s request.

I. Background

¶2 On September 15, 2022, police found N.C. deceased in her

bathtub during a wellness check. Her boyfriend, Murphy, had

called police to report that N.C. had been missing. Murphy told

police he hadn’t spoken to N.C. since September 2 or 3, and that he

had last seen her at her apartment around that same time. Police

couldn’t find N.C.’s purse, her wallet, or her credit, bank, or

identification cards. After police found N.C.’s body, Murphy

admitted to police during a phone interview that he had found N.C.

deceased in the bathroom of her apartment on September 13, and

that he didn’t call the police until two days later. In a subsequent

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interview with police, Murphy admitted that when he found N.C.’s

body he had turned on the shower, poured water on her body, and

stolen her purse, wallet, phone, and computer. Murphy also

admitted that he had sent N.C.’s mother’s boyfriend a video in

which Murphy and N.C. were engaged in a sex act. Murphy,

however, denied harming N.C.

¶3 On September 16, 2022, police arrested Murphy; six days later

he was charged with tampering with a deceased human body,

posting a private image for harassment, concealing a death, and

theft. Pursuant to a search warrant issued on September 19, police

seized Murphy’s car as part of the investigation into N.C.’s death.

¶4 On June 20, 2023, Murphy pleaded guilty to posting a private

image for harassment in exchange for the prosecution dismissing

the other charges against him. At that plea hearing, defense

counsel verbally requested the return of Murphy’s vehicle:

MR. CONLEY: And then additionally, Judge,
Mr. Murphy is seeking the return, at the very
least, of his vehicle.

THE COURT: And can the People arrange
that?

[THE PROSECUTOR]: The People will have no
objection to that —

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THE COURT: All right.

[THE PROSECUTOR]: — and Mr. Murphy will
just have to go to Lakewood [Police
Department (P.D.)] and make the request. And
I have no objection.

THE COURT: All right. If it requires a court
order, the Court will issue that order.

¶5 Murphy was sentenced to time served based on the time he

had spent in pretrial confinement. Due to a parole violation in

another case, however, he remained incarcerated for four more

months following the sentencing hearing.

¶6 Shortly after he was released from custody, Murphy went to

the Lakewood P.D. and requested the return of his vehicle. The

Lakewood P.D. refused to return the vehicle to Murphy. Based on

this refusal, on October 23, 2023, just over four months after his

plea hearing and sentencing, Murphy filed a written motion for the

return of his personal property.

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¶7 The City of Lakewood intervened in the case on behalf of the

Lakewood P.D. in order to oppose the return of Murphy’s property.1

The City asserted that the court should deny Murphy’s request for

an order for return of his vehicle and other property because the

Lakewood P.D. was still investigating N.C.’s death as a homicide

and Murphy’s vehicle was material to that ongoing investigation.

¶8 The trial court held two hearings on the issue of whether it

had jurisdiction to order the Lakewood P.D. to return Murphy’s

property — one in November and one in December. At the

November hearing the court asked the City to submit a brief on two

issues: (1) whether the court had jurisdiction over the return of

Murphy’s property as to the ongoing investigation; and (2) whether

the September 19, 2022, search warrant was legally sufficient to

1 Because it isn’t challenged on appeal, we offer no opinion

regarding the propriety of Lakewood’s intervention in this case (or
whether it should be permitted to continue to intervene in any
proceedings on remand). See Galvan v. People, 2020 CO 82, ¶ 45
(“Under our adversarial system of justice, we adhere to the party
presentation principle, which relies on the parties to frame the
issues to be decided and assigns to courts the role of neutral
arbiters of the matters raised.”); see also People v. Ham, 734 P.2d
623, 627 (Colo. 1987) (noting that third-party interventions in
criminal cases should only be allowed under “truly exceptional
circumstances”).

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justify continuing to hold Murphy’s property as to the ongoing

investigation.

¶9 The City argued in its brief that, though timely, Murphy’s

June 20 request hadn’t been robust enough to establish that he

owned the property and that police had seized it from him.

¶ 10 At the December hearing, the court entered a split ruling

regarding its jurisdiction over Murphy’s request. The court found

that it had ancillary jurisdiction over Murphy’s request for the

return of his property because he made a timely and sufficient

request for it at the plea hearing. Specifically, the court found that

it “has jurisdiction . . . not only because it was already raised and

ordered at the [plea] hearing, but also because we are within the

appellate time frames.” But critical to this appeal, the trial court

also found that its ancillary jurisdiction over the return of Murphy’s

property was limited to this criminal case and didn’t extend to the

ongoing homicide investigation. In that regard, the court found as

follows:

The property is ordered released as to this
case. . . . The Court subsequently finds it
doesn’t have jurisdiction for the just total
release of property as to separate
investigations. . . .

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Ultimately, this item was seized through a
lawful search warrant before the filing of this
case as to a homicide investigation. . . .

. . . I don’t think the Court has the ability to go
in and go after an unfiled investigation, or has
jurisdiction to address an unfiled investigation
with the Lakewood Police Department.

¶ 11 Because the court found it had limited ancillary jurisdiction to

rule on the return of Murphy’s property, the court didn’t hold a

hearing on the merits of Murphy’s request or otherwise require the

prosecution to oppose the return of Murphy’s vehicle based on one

of the grounds enumerated in Woo v. El Paso County Sheriff’s Office,

2022 CO 56, ¶ 46.

II. Issues on Appeal

¶ 12 Murphy argues that the trial court erred by concluding that it

didn’t have ancillary jurisdiction to consider his request for the

return of his property because such property may have also been

being held in connection with an ongoing homicide investigation.

¶ 13 The People offer two responses. First, they argue that

Murphy’s verbal request for the return of his vehicle during his

sentencing hearing wasn’t a proper motion because it didn’t include

any evidentiary support for his assertion that he owned the vehicle

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and that the police had seized it. Relatedly, the People argue that

the trial court didn’t have ancillary jurisdiction over the request

because Murphy filed his written motion for return of his property

four months after he was sentenced in the case — well after the

window for appeal had closed.

¶ 14 Because they constitute a threshold issue, we address the

People’s arguments first and then turn to Murphy’s challenge to the

court’s jurisdictional ruling.

A. Did the Trial Court Have Jurisdiction?

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 15 We review a challenge to a court’s subject matter jurisdiction

de novo. People v. Sandoval, 2016 COA 57, ¶ 14. A court has

subject matter jurisdiction “where it has been empowered to

entertain the type of case before it by the sovereign from which the

court derives its authority.” Id. at ¶ 45 (quoting Wood v. People,

255 P.3d 1136, 1140 (Colo. 2011)). Thus, any action a court takes

without proper jurisdiction is a nullity. Strepka v. People, 2021 CO

58, ¶ 13.

¶ 16 The general rule is that, once a criminal trial ends, the

defendant’s property should be returned to him. United States v.

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Rodriguez-Aguirre, 264 F.3d 1195, 1212 (10th Cir. 2001). But a

court must have subject matter jurisdiction over a case in order to

acquire ancillary jurisdiction over the issue of the return of property

to a criminal defendant. Woo, ¶ 40. In order for a court to exercise

ancillary jurisdiction over a defendant’s request for return of

lawfully seized property, the defendant must make such a motion

while the court still has subject matter jurisdiction over the case.

Id. at ¶ 42. As relevant here, a district court’s subject matter

jurisdiction over a case continues until the deadline to file a direct

appeal passes, id., which is forty-nine days after sentencing, C.A.R.

4(b)(1). Accordingly, where, as here, a defendant doesn’t file a

direct appeal, a defendant must make a motion for the return of

lawfully seized property before the window for filing a direct appeal

closes. Woo, ¶ 42.

¶ 17 Not only must the motion be timely, but it also needs to be

substantively adequate. In such a motion the defendant must

make a “prima facie showing that: (1) he owns or is otherwise

entitled to possess the requested property and (2) the requested

property was seized by law enforcement as part of his case.” Id. at

¶ 45.

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¶ 18 Once a defendant has moved for the return of his property, the

prosecution may oppose that motion on any of the following five

grounds:

(1) the requested property is the fruit of
illegal activity or is otherwise connected to
criminal activity; (2) the defendant is not
the owner of the requested property or a
person entitled to possess it; (3) it would be
unlawful for the defendant to possess the
requested property; (4) the prosecution may
need the requested property later, including
after a direct appeal, during postconviction
proceedings, or following an appeal from
those proceedings; or (5) based on any
relevant factors, including the type of case
and the nature of the requested property, it
would be inappropriate to grant the
defendant’s motion.

Id. at ¶ 46.

2. Analysis

¶ 19 Pointing to the October 2023 written motion, the People argue

that Murphy’s request was untimely since it was filed after the

forty-nine-day deadline to file a direct appeal had passed. They

further contend that Murphy’s verbal request at the plea hearing

was insufficient to make the required prima facie showing that he

owned the vehicle and that police had seized it from him in this

case. We conclude that Murphy’s verbal request was adequate to

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trigger the court’s ancillary jurisdiction, at least as it pertains to the

request for return of his vehicle.2

a. Murphy’s Request Was Timely and Sufficient to Make the
Prima Facie Showing

¶ 20 As they did below, the People contend that the trial court

didn’t acquire ancillary jurisdiction over Murphy’s request for the

return of his vehicle because Murphy didn’t file a written motion

until after the court had lost subject matter jurisdiction over the

case. Relatedly, they contend that the request made at the

sentencing hearing wasn’t adequate because it wasn’t in the form of

a verified motion, which they argue Woo requires before a court’s

ancillary jurisdiction can be invoked. We disagree for two reasons.

¶ 21 First, neither Woo nor People v. Buggs, 631 P.2d 1200 (Colo.

App. 1981) — the two cases the People rely upon — hold that a

timely and adequate request for a return of lawfully seized property

must be in the form of a verified motion. Instead, both note that a

2 Murphy’s request for the return of his property at his plea hearing

only referenced his vehicle. Because this initial request was limited
to his vehicle, and because the initial request was the only timely
request made for the return of any of Murphy’s property, to the
extent that Murphy claims more than the return of his vehicle on
appeal, that claim is untimely. Therefore, our analysis of his
motion for the return of his property will be restricted to the vehicle.

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verified motion is sufficient to meet the prima facie burden placed

on defendants, not that it’s necessary. See Woo, ¶ 45 (“A verified

motion asserting that law enforcement took the requested property

from the defendant at the time of his arrest suffices.”); Buggs, 631

P.2d at 1201 (“The issue here is whether a verified motion for return

of seized property is sufficient to meet defendant’s burden.”).

Indeed, the court in Woo emphasized the relative ease of invoking

the court’s jurisdiction, noting that “[m]aking a prima facie showing

is not a rigorous task. Woo, ¶ 45.

¶ 22 Second, the prosecution conceded the sufficiency of Murphy’s

showing during the sentencing hearing. At the hearing, defense

counsel told the court that “Mr. Murphy is seeking the return, at the

very least, of his vehicle.” (Emphasis added.) The prosecutor

responded by stating, “The People will have no objection to that.”

To be sure, the prosecution could have objected to the sufficiency of

counsel’s showing, thereby forcing Murphy to produce evidence

establishing that he owned the vehicle and that the police had

seized it from him. But the prosecutor didn’t. Having failed to

oppose Murphy’s request at the time it was made (when such

opposition would have afforded an opportunity for any deficiency to

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be cured), the People confessed at least the sufficiency of the prima

facie showing.

¶ 23 Our conclusion in this regard is bolstered by the prosecution’s

and court’s responses to Murphy’s verbal request. Not only did the

prosecutor not object to the request, but the prosecutor instructed

Murphy to go to the Lakewood P.D. and request his vehicle — an

implicit admission that the Lakewood P.D. had seized the car and a

concession that it was his property.

¶ 24 Moreover, the court granted Murphy’s request when it

promised Murphy it would provide an order for the return of

Murphy’s vehicle in the event that was necessary. Accordingly,

because Murphy’s request was timely, unopposed, and granted by

the court, we aren’t persuaded by the People’s arguments that the

court didn’t have subject matter jurisdiction at the time Murphy

requested the return of his vehicle.

b. The Trial Court’s Ancillary Jurisdiction Extended Over the
Homicide Investigation

¶ 25 Having concluded that Murphy’s verbal motion for the return

of his vehicle was timely and sufficient to invoke the court’s

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ancillary jurisdiction over Murphy’s request, we turn to the trial

court’s exercise of ancillary jurisdiction.

¶ 26 The trial court determined that its ancillary jurisdiction didn’t

extend to the homicide investigation after considering the four

elements laid out in Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728,

740 (D.C. Cir. 1969), and applied by the division in People v.

Hargrave, 179 P.3d 226, 230 (Colo. App. 2007), abrogated in part on

other grounds by Woo, 2022 CO 56.3 Calling the Marrow factors the

Woo factors, the trial court found as follows:

So first, the Court’s going to address
jurisdiction, specifically ancillary

3 Those four elements are:

(1) the ancillary matter arises from the same
transaction which was the basis of the main
proceeding, or arises during the course of the
main matter, or is an integral part of the main
matter; (2) the ancillary matter can be
determined without a substantial new fact-
finding proceeding; (3) determination of the
ancillary matter through an ancillary order
would not deprive a party of a substantial
procedural or substantive right; and (4) the
ancillary matter must be settled to protect the
integrity of the main proceeding or to insure
that the disposition in the main proceeding will
not be frustrated.

Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1969).

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jurisdiction. . . . The Court finds that, as to
[this case], the property was already ordered
released, and the Court maintains that
order. . . .

However, the Court does not have jurisdiction
as [to] the return of property for a legally
appropriate separate hold, apart from [this
case].

Specifically, the analysis fails under the
second, third, and fourth prong of jurisdiction
in Woo; that is:

(2) the ancillary matter can be determined
without substantial new factfinding
proceedings. Here, we’re talking about
essentially a different case that’s unfiled.

(3) determination of the ancillary matter
through an ancillary order would not deprive a
party of a substantial procedural or
substantive right. Here, there is an issue for
the Lakewood Police Department, as they’re
holding a piece of item [sic]. That item was to
be returned. There’s issue [sic] surrounding
the search of that item, the proper hold of that
item, and the collection of evidence.

And then: (4) that the ancillary matter must be
settled to protect the integrity of the main
proceedings or to insure that the disposition in
the main proceedings will not be frustrated.

That one’s split both ways. If we’re considering
this the main proceeding, then that falls in the
way of the Defense. If we’re considering a
separate investigation to be the main issue,
the main proceeding, as the Court has already
ruled that in this case, everything should be

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released, that certainly falls on the side of the
Lakewood City attorney or police department.

¶ 27 By applying these factors to conclude that it lacked

jurisdiction to consider the merits of Murphy’s timely and facially

adequate request for return of his lawfully seized property, the trial

court erred. See Woo, ¶¶ 32-33. This is so because in Woo, when

“endorsing” the four-part jurisdictional test from Morrow and

Hargrave, the supreme court concluded that all four factors are

deemed satisfied when a criminal defendant makes a sufficient and

timely request for the return of his lawfully seized property:

[W]e endorse Hargrave’s application of the
four-part test articulated in Morrow. As we see
it, whenever a post-sentence motion for return
of property is filed in a criminal case: (1) the
property in question will have been seized as
part of the investigation giving rise to the
charges; (2) the resolution of the motion will
usually implicate straightforward, if not
perfunctory, proceedings and will not require a
substantial factfinding process; (3) litigation of
the motion will not deprive any party of a
substantial right because the parties necessary
to the determination of the matter will be
properly notified and will be afforded an
opportunity to be heard; and (4) the matter will
need to be resolved to protect the integrity of
the main proceeding or to ensure that the
disposition of the main proceeding won’t be
frustrated.

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Woo, ¶ 33 (emphasis added).

¶ 28 In other words, the supreme court in Woo held that when a

criminal defendant makes a timely prima facie showing, the four

factors in Morrow are deemed satisfied. See id. at ¶¶ 32-33 (“[T]he

property in question will have been seized . . . . [T]he resolution of

the motion will usually implicate straightforward, if not perfunctory,

proceedings . . . . [L]itigation of the motion will not deprive any

party of a substantial right . . . . [And] the matter will need to be

resolved . . . .”) (emphasis added). To put a sharper point on it, Woo

eliminated the need for a trial court to conduct the four-prong

Morrow test. Thus, the trial court erred by hinging its jurisdictional

analysis on whether the facts of this case satisfied the four-part test

discussed in Morrow and Hargrave. Instead, the trial court should

have concluded that it had ancillary jurisdiction over Murphy’s

request for the return of his vehicle and considered the request on

the merits. To be sure, some of the facts that the court considered

in assessing its jurisdiction may be relevant when it considers the

merits of Murphy’s request on remand. See Woo, ¶ 46 (setting forth

the five grounds for denying a defendant’s motion for lawfully sized

property). But making some relevant findings in the jurisdictional

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context isn’t a substitute for resolving Murphy’s motion on the

merits. Instead, it must do so following the procedure set forth in

Woo, ¶¶ 45-48.

B. Did the Search Warrant Dissipate?

¶ 29 Because we have reversed the trial court’s order on other

grounds, we need not address whether the search warrant had

dissipated. That is an issue that the trial court must consider in

the first instance on remand.

III. Disposition

¶ 30 The order is reversed. On remand, the trial court should

exercise ancillary jurisdiction over Murphy’s request for return of

his vehicle that was lawfully seized pursuant to a warrant in this

case and resolve the request on its merits. In doing so, “[i]n its

discretion, the trial court may hold a hearing (evidentiary or non-

evidentiary) before resolving [Murphy’s] motion for return of [his]

property.” Woo, ¶ 48.

JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.

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