Peo in Interest of AM

25CA0261 Peo in Interest of AM 07-24-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0261
Weld County District Court No. 23JV5
Honorable W. Troy Hause, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of A.M., K.M., and M.M., Children,

and Concerning B.M.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY
Pawar and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced July 24, 2025

Bruce T. Barker, County Attorney, David S. Anderson, Assistant County
Attorney, Greeley, Colorado, for Appellee

Debra W. Dodd, Counsel for Youth, Berthoud, Colorado, for A.M.

Debra W. Dodd, Guardian Ad Litem, for K.M. and M.M.

Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant
¶1 A.M. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating her parent-

child legal relationships with A.M., K.M., and M.M. (the children).

We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Weld County Department of Human Services (the

Department) became involved with the family and filed a petition in

dependency or neglect for the children due to concerns about

substance abuse and appropriate housing. The juvenile court

adjudicated the children dependent or neglected and adopted a

treatment plan for mother.

¶3 Fifteen months after the Department filed the petition, it

moved to terminate mother’s parental rights. The court granted the

motion following a two-day evidentiary hearing.

¶4 On appeal, mother asserts that (1) the court erroneously found

that she was unfit and unable to become fit within a reasonable

time; (2) the Department did not make reasonable efforts to

rehabilitate her; and (3) the court admitted and relied on hearsay

evidence.

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II. Criteria for Termination of Parental Rights

¶5 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds by

clear and convincing evidence that (1) the child has been

adjudicated dependent or neglected; (2) the parent did not comply

with, or was not successfully rehabilitated by, an appropriate,

court-approved treatment plan; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the

parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a

reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024; People in Interest of

E.S., 2021 COA 79, ¶ 10, 494 P.3d 1142, 1144.

¶6 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights is

a mixed question of fact and law. People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M.,

2021 CO 14, ¶ 15, 480 P.3d 682, 686. We review the juvenile

court’s findings of evidentiary fact — the raw, historical data

underlying the controversy — for clear error and accept them if they

have record support. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12,

¶ 10, 486 P.3d 1201, 1204.

¶7 When a child is under six years old at the time a petition in

dependency or neglect is filed, the juvenile court must consider the

statutory expedited permanency planning (EPP) provisions, which

require that the child be placed in a permanent home as

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expeditiously as possible. §§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123, 19-3-

702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2024; see also People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022

COA 133, ¶ 25, 524 P.3d 1209, 1216.

¶8 The credibility of the witnesses; the sufficiency, probative

effect, and weight of the evidence; and the inferences and

conclusions to be drawn therefrom are all matters within the

province of the juvenile court. For this reason, we will not disturb

the juvenile court’s findings on these issues unless they are so

clearly erroneous as to find no record support. People in Interest of

S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 912 (Colo. App. 2011). But determining the

proper legal standard to apply in a case and applying that standard

to the facts of the case are questions of law that we review de novo.

M.A.W. v. People in Interest of A.L.W., 2020 CO 11, ¶ 31, 456 P.3d

1284, 1289.

III. Fitness

¶9 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding that

she was unfit and unable to become fit within a reasonable period

of time. She further argues the court erred by applying an

erroneously stringent standard of parental fitness to justify

terminating her parental rights. We disagree.

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A. Applicable Law

¶ 10 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders the

parent unable or unwilling to give a child reasonable parental care.

People in Interest of S.K., 2019 COA 36, ¶ 74, 440 P.3d 1240, 1254.

Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum, that the parent

provide nurturing and safe parenting adequate to meet the child’s

physical, emotional, and mental needs and conditions. Id.

¶ 11 In determining whether a parent’s conduct or condition is

likely to change in a reasonable time, the court may consider

whether any change occurred during the proceeding, the parent’s

social history, and the chronic or long-term nature of the parent’s

conduct or condition. Id. at ¶ 75, 440 P.3d at 1254.

¶ 12 A “reasonable time” is not an indefinite time, and a court must

determine it by considering the child’s conditions and needs. Id.

What constitutes a reasonable time is fact specific and varies from

case to case. S.Z.S., ¶ 25, 524 P.3d at 1216. Where a parent has

made little to no progress on a treatment plan, the juvenile court

need not give the parent additional time to comply. Id. at ¶ 24, 524

P.3d at 1216.

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B. Analysis

¶ 13 In finding mother unfit, the court considered evidence of

mother’s increased compliance with her treatment plan, but it

determined that she could not become fit in a reasonable time

based on her delayed engagement in services, her history of drug

abuse, and the family’s previous dependency or neglect cases. The

court also noted that the case was subject to the EPP provisions

and found that it would not be in the children’s best interests to

allow mother additional time to comply with her treatment plan.

¶ 14 The record supports these findings, even though, as mother

points out, during the last nine months of the case, she achieved

sobriety and substantially increased her compliance with the

treatment plan. But “increased compliance” over the course of a

case does not necessarily justify additional time. See People in

Interest of V.W., 958 P.2d 1132, 1134-35 (Colo. App. 1998).

¶ 15 The record shows that treatment and services were available to

mother throughout the case, but that she failed to engage in nearly

any aspect of her treatment plan for the first thirteen or so months

of the case. Even though mother achieved sobriety and completed

inpatient treatment, the Department remained concerned about her

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consistency and ability to maintain sobriety. See People in Interest

of D.L.C., 70 P.3d 584, 588 (Colo. App. 2003) (stating that, although

absolute compliance is not required, “partial compliance, or even

substantial compliance, may not result in a successful plan that

renders the parent fit”). Mother admitted to substance abuse as

recently as nine months before the termination hearing and testified

at the hearing that she had been abusing substances off and on for

the preceding eighteen years. See E.S.V. v. People, 2016 CO 40,

¶ 22, 370 P.3d 1144, 1148 (“In determining whether a parent’s

conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time,

the court may consider whether any change has occurred during

the pendency of the dependency and neglect proceeding, to include

. . . the chronic or long-term nature of the parent’s conduct or

condition.”).

¶ 16 In addition, the caseworker testified that the Department had

concerns that the older children were “parentified,” mother was not

receptive to professionals’ feedback, and family time with the

children remained supervised throughout the case because of safety

concerns. The caseworker also opined that mother lacked financial

and housing stability that would enable the children to return to

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her and allow her to provide for the children’s needs. Nonetheless,

mother asserts that the “court unreasonably and erroneously

concluded that the presence of the [c]hildren’s as-yet unresolved

trauma meant that [m]other was unable to meet the [c]hildren’s

emotional needs.”

¶ 17 As required by statute, the court considered the children’s

emotional needs before terminating mother’s parental rights. See

§ 19-3-604(1)(c)(B). Specifically, the court found that the children

lacked trust in mother and it was “speculative at best” that, “if given

more time, the relationship between mother and the children could

be repaired” to such an extent to allow them to return home. But

as described above, that was not the only factor the court

considered.

¶ 18 In short, the court’s findings and conclusions comport with

applicable law and are supported by the record. See People in

Interest of C.T.S., 140 P.3d 332, 334-35 (Colo. App. 2006). We

cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment to reach a

different result. See S.Z.S., ¶ 29, 524 P.3d at 1217. Therefore, we

reject mother’s arguments concerning fitness.

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IV. Reasonable Efforts

¶ 19 Mother next contends that the Department did not make

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her and reunify her with the

children. We disagree.

A. Preservation

¶ 20 The guardian ad litem (GAL) notes the divisional split

regarding whether raising a lack of reasonable efforts claim for the

first time at a termination hearing preserves the issue for appeal.

Compare People in Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 354-55 (Colo. App.

2007) (holding that a parent waives any perceived deficiency in

reasonable efforts not raised before the termination hearing), with

S.N-V., 300 P.3d at 913-18 (holding that an appellate court may

consider a perceived deficiency in reasonable efforts not raised until

the termination hearing). We need not take sides regarding this

split, however, because even if we assume that a parent can

properly raise reasonable efforts for the first time at a termination

hearing, we discern no basis for reversal.

B. Applicable Law

¶ 21 A department of human services must make reasonable efforts

to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the parent with the child.

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§§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2024. The

reasonable efforts standard is satisfied if the department provides

services in accordance with section 19-3-208. § 19-1-103(114).

Section 19-3-208 requires that a department provide screenings,

assessments, and individual case plans for the provision of services;

home-based family and crisis counseling; information and referral

services to available public and private assistance resources; family

time; and placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b).

¶ 22 In assessing a department’s reasonable efforts, the juvenile

court should consider whether the services provided were

appropriate to support the parent’s treatment plan, S.N-V., 300 P.3d

at 915, by “considering the totality of the circumstances and

accounting for all services and resources provided to a parent to

ensure the completion of the entire treatment plan,” People in

Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 33, 512 P.3d 132, 143.

The parent is ultimately responsible for using the services to comply

with the plan, People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285

(Colo. App. 2011), and the court may consider a parent’s

unwillingness to participate in treatment in determining whether

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the department made reasonable efforts, see People in Interest of

A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12, 297 P.3d 1019, 1022.

¶ 23 Whether a department satisfied its obligation to make

reasonable efforts presents a mixed question of fact and law. People

in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8, 527 P.3d 404, 407.

C. Analysis

¶ 24 Mother contends that the Department did not make

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her and reunify her with the

children because it failed to (1) timely make available family

therapeutic services and (2) give priority to reunification after

mother made progress on her treatment plan.

¶ 25 The court found that the Department made reasonable efforts

and that mother’s delay in engaging with the treatment plan

prevented her reunification with the children. See A.V., ¶ 12, 297

P.3d at 1022. The record supports these findings.

¶ 26 The record shows the delay in family therapy was attributable

to mother’s lack of engagement early in the case and a professional

recommendation that sessions be held with the children separately

before bringing mother into the sessions.

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¶ 27 As described above, mother did not fully engage in the case

until the case had been open approximately thirteen months.

Contrary to mother’s assertions, the record shows that the

caseworker first suggested family therapy in May 2024 after one of

the children allegedly reported he did not trust that mother would

stay sober. Mother never requested family therapy before the

caseworker’s suggestion. The caseworker additionally testified that,

once mother agreed to family therapy, the caseworker submitted a

referral in July 2024, and intake for family therapy began the next

month.

¶ 28 We acknowledge that, as mother describes, she lacked an

opportunity to begin family therapy until shortly before the

termination hearing. However, the caseworker testified that this

delay was attributable to the family therapist’s recommendation

that the sessions start with only the children, and that mother be

brought in later when the children “felt it was most appropriate.”

¶ 29 For these reasons, we discern no error in the court’s

determination that the Department made reasonable efforts to

reunite mother with the children.

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V. Hearsay

¶ 30 Lastly, mother asserts that the court improperly admitted and

relied on “voluminous hearsay evidence” through the caseworker’s

testimony and report, as well as through the children’s therapist’s

testimony. We discern no reversible error.

A. Applicable Law

¶ 31 Hearsay is a statement other than one “made by the declarant

while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove

the truth of the matter asserted.” CRE 801(c). Hearsay statements

are generally inadmissible at trial unless an exception applies. CRE

802; Vista Resorts, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 117 P.3d 60,

66 (Colo. App. 2004). A statement is not hearsay, however, if it is

not offered for the truth of the matter asserted but, rather, to show

its effect on the listener. See, e.g., People v. Robinson, 226 P.3d

1145, 1151-52 (Colo. App. 2009) (noting that informants’

statements offered to show their effect on the listening police

officers are not hearsay).

¶ 32 The hearsay rule does not bar the admission of “written

reports and other material relating to [a] child’s mental, physical,

and social history” offered to “determin[e] proper disposition of a

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child,” so long as the report’s author is available, at the request of

“the child, his parent or guardian, or other interested party,” to

“appear as a witness” and is “subject to both direct and cross-

examination.” § 19-1-107(2), C.R.S. 2024. Accordingly, a

caseworker’s report is admissible at a termination hearing to

determine the proper disposition of a child even if the report

contains hearsay. Id.; see also People in Interest of A.M.D., 648 P.2d

625, 641 (Colo. 1982).

B. Analysis

1. Caseworker Report and Testimony

¶ 33 Mother asserts that the court improperly admitted child

hearsay statements through the caseworker’s report and testimony.

¶ 34 A department is required to make a social study and report in

writing in all dependency or neglect cases unless waived by the

court. § 19-1-107(1). As noted above, such reports are admissible

at termination hearings pursuant to section 19-10-107(2), even if

they contain hearsay. See People in Interest of A.R.S., 502 P.2d 92,

94 (Colo. App. 1972) (“Because of the statutory authorization, the

common-law hearsay objections as to the admissibility of such

reports are not applicable.”). “Where the statute authorizes

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consideration of [such] reports, the fact that they may contain

hearsay . . . becomes a matter concerning their weight and

probative value and not their admissibility.” Id. at 95.

¶ 35 At the termination hearing, the Department moved to admit

the caseworker’s termination report into evidence during the

caseworker’s testimony. Mother objected to the report “insofar as it

contains hearsay statements” and argued that she had no way of

“test[ing] the credibility of the statements that were given.” The

alleged hearsay consisted of the children’s statements concerning

mother’s alleged previous neglect, substance abuse, and criminal

activity, as well as the children’s purported desire to be adopted.

Mother further asserted that she did not receive proper notice that

the report “contains child-hearsay statements.”

¶ 36 The court overruled mother’s objection and admitted the

termination report, finding that it was admissible by statute and

any objection would go to its weight and not its admissibility.

Further, the court observed that the hearsay statements in the

report were not being admitted “for the truth of the matter asserted”

but for the basis of the caseworker’s opinion. See People in Interest

of J.E.B., 854 P.2d 1372, 1375-76 (Colo. App. 1993) (holding that

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“CRE 703 permits an expert to rely on facts and data reasonably

relied upon by experts in that field,” including reports and

information “which otherwise might have been objectionable

hearsay”). Moreover, the Department never claimed that the

children’s statements were true and did not ask the court to find

the truth of the matter asserted in the statements. CRE 801.

Finally, even if the report contained hearsay, the report was

nonetheless admissible under sections 19-1-107 and 19-3-604(3),

C.R.S. 2024 — the criteria for termination statute — as the

caseworker who wrote the report testified and was subject to direct

and cross examination. See A.R.S., 502 P.2d at 94.

¶ 37 Thus, contrary to mother’s assertion, the court did not rely on

improper child hearsay statements when it terminated mother’s

parental rights. See People v. Phillips, 2012 COA 176, ¶ 87, 315

P.3d 136, 157-58 (“If the out-of-court statements are admissible

either as relevant nonhearsay or under another evidentiary

exception to the hearsay rule,” section 13-25-129, C.R.S. 2024 (the

child hearsay statute), “does not apply.”).

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2. Therapist Testimony

¶ 38 Mother next asserts that the court improperly admitted

hearsay statements through the children’s therapist’s testimony.

The Department and GAL contend that mother did not preserve her

hearsay argument regarding the therapist’s testimony. Mother

responds that she preserved the argument and that, even if she did

not preserve it, this court should review it anyway to avoid a

miscarriage of justice. We reject mother’s argument because she

(1) did not preserve it for appeal and (2) is not entitled to relief

under the miscarriage of justice exception to the preservation

requirement.

a. Preservation

¶ 39 In dependency or neglect proceedings, appellate courts do not

consider issues that were not preserved in the trial court, such as

challenges to the admission of evidence that were not timely made

at trial. See People in Interest of M.B., 2020 COA 13, ¶ 14, 459 P.3d

766, 769. To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must present the

court with “an adequate opportunity to make findings of fact and

conclusions of law on [the] issue.” Forgette v. People, 2023 CO 4,

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¶ 21, 524 P.3d 1, 5 (quoting People v. Melendez, 102 P.3d 315, 322

(Colo. 2004)).

¶ 40 Mother contends that the children’s therapist offered several

improper child hearsay statements regarding (1) the children’s lack

of trust in mother; (2) incidents of concern that allegedly occurred

while the children were in mother’s care; and (3) secondhand

observations of the children’s alleged behavior that was purportedly

triggered by contact with mother or the prospect of them returning

home. Mother did not object to the admission of any of this

evidence.

¶ 41 Consequently, mother did not preserve her hearsay argument.

See Martinez v. People, 2015 CO 16, ¶ 14, 344 P.3d 862, 868

(holding that an objection must be “specific enough to draw the trial

court’s attention to the asserted error”).

b. Miscarriage of Justice Exception

¶ 42 Nevertheless, mother argues that we should address her

unpreserved assertion under the miscarriage of justice exception to

the preservation rule. In those rare cases involving unusual or

special circumstances, we may review unpreserved errors in a

dependency or neglect case to prevent a miscarriage of justice.

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M.B., ¶¶ 19-25, 459 P.3d at 770-71; see, e.g., People in Interest of

T.W., 2022 COA 88M, ¶ 24, 519 P.3d 1071, 1077; E.S., ¶ 14, 494

P.3d at 1145; People in Interest of A.E., 914 P.2d 534, 539 (Colo.

App. 1996). But see S.Z.S., ¶ 21 n.1, 524 P.3d at 1216 n.1

(declining to apply the miscarriage of justice exception).

¶ 43 Mother appears to assert that the miscarriage of justice

exception should apply to her unpreserved hearsay argument

because the termination hearing implicated her fundamental right

to parent. But all dependency or neglect cases impact parents’

fundamental liberty interest in parenting their children. Therefore,

under mother’s reasoning, every putative error in a dependency or

neglect case would be subject to appellate review regardless of

whether it was preserved. This approach would render the

preservation requirement and the miscarriage of justice exception

meaningless.

¶ 44 Thus, we decline to review mother’s unpreserved hearsay

argument under the miscarriage of justice exception.

VI. Disposition

¶ 45 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE LUM concur.

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