Ion Media Networks, Inc. v. West

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
July 10, 2025

2025COA66

No. 24CA1416, Ion Media Networks, Inc. v. West —
Government — Law Enforcement Integrity — Body Worn
Camera Footage — Substantial Privacy Concerns — Blurring

For the first time in a published case, a division of the court of

appeals addresses section 24-31-902, C.R.S. 2024, which is part of

the Enhance Law Enforcement Integrity Act. The statute requires a

law enforcement agency to release body-worn camera (BWC) audio

and video recordings that depict the death of a person caused by

law enforcement within twenty-one days of a request for such

footage. The division concludes that the district court did not err by

ordering the BWC video and audio footage to be released to the

public after blurring the juvenile decedent’s head, despite the

decedent’s kin’s objections. The division also concludes that the
district court did not err by declining to mute any portion of the

audio recordings.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2025COA66

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1416
Jefferson County District Court No. 24CV30008
Honorable Chantel E. Contiguglia, Judge

Ion Media Networks, Inc. d/b/a Scripps News,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Kirsten West, in her official capacity as the Records Manager of the Police
Department, for the City of Lakewood, Colorado, a political subdivision of the
State of Colorado,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ
Fox and Harris, JJ., concur

Announced July 10, 2025

Zansberg Beylkin, LLC, Steven D. Zansberg, Denver, Colorado; Rachael
Johnson, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Alison McKenney Brown, City Attorney, Robert C. Huss, Senior Assistant City
Attorney, Patrick T. Freeman, Senior Assistant City Attorney, Lakewood,
Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

Azizpour Donnelly LLC, Katayoun A. Donnelly, Denver, Colorado, for Amici
Curiae Colorado Trust for Local News d/b/a Colorado Community Media, The
Coloradan, Gray Local Media, Inc., Colorado Freedom of Information Coalition,
National Freedom of Information Coalition, The Associated Press, and The
Denver Post
¶1 Defendant, the City of Lakewood (the City),1 appeals the

district court’s order releasing police officers’ body-worn camera

(BWC) audio-video footage depicting the shooting of seventeen-year-

old M.M. to plaintiff, Ion Media Networks, Inc., d/b/a Scripps News

(Ion). Because section 24-31-902, C.R.S. 2024, which is part of the

Enhance Law Enforcement Integrity Act (ELEIA), required the City

to release the audio-video recordings when the privacy interest at

stake could be addressed by blurring the video, we affirm the

district court’s order.

I. Background and Procedural History

A. The Shooting

¶2 In March 2023, Lakewood Police Department officers

responded to a report that M.M. had robbed a mail carrier at

gunpoint. When officers approached M.M., she fled on foot.

¶3 Three officers pursued M.M. and eventually surrounded her in

front of a closed garage at an auto repair shop. According to the

district attorney’s report, at least one officer observed what looked

1 Ion sued the City of Lakewood and Kirsten West in her official

capacity as the Lakewood Police Department’s records manager.
We collectively refer to the defendants as the City.

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like a cell phone in M.M.’s left hand and a black object in her right

hand, carried near her leg, which the officer believed may have been

a gun. The officers ordered M.M. to get on the ground. At that

point, M.M. removed a handgun from her jacket pocket and pointed

the gun in a sweeping motion at the three officers. Each officer

fired multiple rounds at M.M., striking her a total of ten times.

M.M. was eventually transported to the hospital but died from her

injuries.

¶4 Subsequent investigation confirmed that, during the incident,

M.M. possessed a semi-automatic handgun that had a round in the

chamber and four rounds in the magazine. The shooting was

recorded by each officer’s BWC and a security camera located on

the auto shop’s exterior. The Critical Incident Response Team

(CIRT)2 investigated the shooting and found no casings from M.M.’s

gun, indicating that she did not fire the gun during the incident.

¶5 CIRT reported its findings to the district attorney’s office.

Based on the information provided, the district attorney concluded

2 CIRT is a multi-agency team tasked with investigating and

reviewing incidents “involving the discharge of a firearm by a peace
officer that resulted in injury or death, or other use of force by a
peace officer that resulted in death.” § 16-2.5-301(1), C.R.S. 2024.

2
that the officers had objectively reasonable grounds to use deadly

physical force against M.M. and declined to criminally charge the

three officers.

B. The Aftermath of the Shooting

¶6 In August 2023, M.M.’s family members filed a notice under

the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act and ELEIA stating their

intention to file a civil claim against the City. The City later

permitted M.M.’s family members and their attorney to view the

BWC footage. M.M.’s family informed the City that they did not

want the BWC footage released to the public.

¶7 Ion subsequently requested the release of the BWC footage

under section 24-31-902(2). After receiving Ion’s request, the City

again contacted M.M.’s family members, who confirmed that they

did not want the recordings released to the public.

¶8 The city attorney denied Ion’s request, citing section 19-1-304,

C.R.S. 2024, which governs the release of juvenile delinquency

records, and section 24-31-902. Over the next two months, counsel

for both parties corresponded in an effort to resolve the dispute.

When those efforts proved unsuccessful, Ion filed a civil lawsuit

alleging that the City violated section 24-31-902 by failing to

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produce the BWC footage within twenty-one days of Ion’s request.

Ion sought declaratory and injunctive relief ordering the City to

produce copies of the BWC footage. The parties suggested that the

district court needed to review the footage. The court agreed and

set a hearing to address the parties’ claims.

¶9 After reviewing the BWC footage and hearing the parties’ legal

arguments, the district court made the following findings of fact and

conclusions of law:

(1) Section 24-31-902’s plain language requires the release

of BWC footage, subject to blurring portions of the video

necessary to protect a victim’s or minor’s substantial

privacy interest.

(2) Section 19-1-304 does not apply to this dispute because

no delinquency action was initiated against M.M. and,

even if the court found that the footage was a juvenile

record, it could release the footage under section 19-1-

304(2)(a)(VII) (authorizing the release of law enforcement

records concerning juveniles “[b]y order of the court”).

(3) M.M. had a substantial privacy interest, which her next

of kin could assert, in protecting the disclosure of her

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identity as captured on the video; however, the

substantial privacy interest could be addressed by

blurring her entire head.

(4) The court lacked the authority to mute any portion of the

BWC footage.

¶ 10 Based on these findings and conclusions, the district court

ordered the City to blur M.M.’s entire head as shown in the BWC

footage and then release the footage to Ion. The City sought post-

trial relief under C.R.C.P. 59. The court denied the motion but

stayed its order requiring the release of the BWC footage pending

the outcome of this appeal.

II. Issues Presented

¶ 11 The City contends the district court erred by finding and

concluding that (1) ELEIA requires the release of the BWC footage if

M.M.’s substantial privacy interest can be protected by blurring

portions of the footage; (2) the juvenile code does not prohibit

release of the BWC footage; and (3) blurring M.M.’s head sufficiently

protects her privacy interest. We address and reject each of these

contentions.

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A. Release of BWC Footage Under Section 24-31-902

¶ 12 We begin by addressing the City’s contention that the district

court erred by concluding that release of the BWC footage was

required under section 24-31-902.

1. Standard of Review

¶ 13 We review a district court’s legal conclusions de novo. Forest

View Co. v. Town of Monument, 2020 CO 52, ¶ 13. We interpret a

statute de novo. Edwards v. New Century Hospice, Inc., 2023 CO

49, ¶ 14. In doing so, our primary task is to “give effect to the

intent of the General Assembly.” Id. at ¶ 15 (quoting People v. Dist.

Ct., 713 P.2d 918, 921 (Colo. 1986)).

¶ 14 “When interpreting a statute, we look first to its plain

language,” and if that language is clear, we apply it as written.

People v. Garcia, 2021 COA 65, ¶ 19 (citing Smith v. Exec. Custom

Homes, Inc., 230 P.3d 1186, 1189 (Colo. 2010)), aff’d, 2023 CO 41.

In doing so, we may not add or subtract words from the statute.

See People v. Benavidez, 222 P.3d 391, 393-94 (Colo. App. 2009)

(“[I]n interpreting a statute, we must accept the General Assembly’s

choice of language and not add or imply words that simply are not

there.”).

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2. Applicable Law

¶ 15 In the wake of the police-involved deaths of George Floyd, Eric

Garner, Elijah McClain, and others, and the resulting widespread

protests, the Colorado General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 20-

217, which eventually became ELEIA. See 2020 Colo. Sess. Laws

445. In pertinent part, ELEIA requires peace officers who interact

with members of the public to wear BWCs. § 24-31-902(1)(a)(I). To

promote greater transparency concerning law enforcement

interactions with the public, the statute requires the release of BWC

footage under certain circumstances.

¶ 16 As relevant here, if

there is a complaint of peace officer
misconduct by . . . a civilian . . . through
notice to the law enforcement agency involved
in the alleged misconduct, the local law
enforcement agency . . . shall release, upon
request, all unedited video and audio
recordings of the incident, including those
from body-worn cameras, . . . to the public
within twenty-one days.

§ 24-31-902(2)(a). If the recordings depict a death, the decedent’s

next of kin shall be notified of their right to receive and review the

recording at least seventy-two hours before the recordings are

publicly released. § 24-31-902(2)(b)(I), (II)(A).

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¶ 17 The broad release language of section 24-31-902(2)(a) is

tempered by section 24-31-902(2)(b)(II)(A), which states,

Notwithstanding any other provision of this
section, any video that raises substantial
privacy concerns for . . . victims . . . [or]
juveniles, . . . including video depicting . . . a
medical emergency . . . a mental health
crisis[,] . . . a minor, including any images or
information that might undermine the
requirement to keep certain juvenile records
confidential[,] . . . [or] significantly explicit and
gruesome bodily injury, unless the injury was
caused by a peace officer[,] . . . shall be blurred
to protect the substantial privacy interest
while still allowing public release. Unblurred
footage shall not be released without the
written authorization of the victim or, if the
victim is deceased or incapacitated, the written
authorization of the victim’s next of kin . . . .
This subsection (2)(b)(II)(A) does not permit the
removal of any portion of the video.

¶ 18 If blurring is insufficient to protect the substantial privacy

interest at issue, “the local law enforcement agency shall notify the

person whose privacy interest is implicated, if contact information

is known, within twenty days after receipt of the complaint of

misconduct, and inform the person of [their] right to waive the

privacy interest.” § 24-31-902(2)(b)(II)(B).

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3. Analysis

¶ 19 The district court’s analysis was consistent with this statutory

framework. Nevertheless, the City argues that the district court’s

findings and conclusions were flawed. We disagree, concluding that

section 24-31-902(2) unambiguously required the court to release

the BWC footage.3

a. The Juvenile Code Does Not Control

¶ 20 The City contends that the district court misapplied both

section 19-1-304, which governs the disclosure of and access to

juvenile records, and section 24-31-902 by not acknowledging how

the statutes interact with each other. Because section 24-31-

902(2)(b)(II)(A) expressly references the “requirement to keep certain

juvenile records confidential,” the City argues that section 19-1-

304’s prohibition on disclosing certain records involving juveniles

trumps section 24-31-902’s broad requirements that BWC footage

be released. Because Ion does not qualify as a person typically

3 Because we discern no ambiguity in the statutory language, we

decline the parties’ invitation to examine the statute’s legislative
history. See Smith v. Exec. Custom Homes, Inc., 230 P.3d 1186,
1189 (Colo. 2010) (“Where the statutory language is clear and
unambiguous, we do not resort to legislative history or further rules
of statutory construction.”).

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allowed to access juvenile delinquency records or law enforcement

records pertaining to juveniles, the City reasons that section 19-1-

304 prohibits releasing the BWC footage to Ion.

¶ 21 The City’s argument rests on a misinterpretation of section 24-

31-902(2)(b)(II)(A). That provision says that if BWC footage contains

images or information that would reveal data contained in

confidential juvenile records, the court must blur those parts of the

video before releasing it. The City does not identify any information

contained in a confidential juvenile record that the BWC footage

would reveal, nor could they; no confidential juvenile record is

implicated in this case.

¶ 22 Instead, the City’s argument is that the BWC footage is itself a

“juvenile record” that may not be disclosed under section 19-1-304

and therefore may not be released under ELEIA. But that theory

cannot be squared with the statutory language. Under section 24-

31-902(2)(b)(II)(A), the BWC footage is not a “juvenile record”;

rather, it is a conduit through which information from a juvenile

record might be disclosed absent blurring of the video. And even in

that circumstance — where the BWC footage might reveal a juvenile

record — the statute does not bar release of the footage. The court

10
must still release the footage, but it must blur the video to account

for the juvenile’s privacy interest.

¶ 23 But even if we were to adopt the City’s flawed interpretation,

the statute would not prevent the release of the BWC footage.

Assuming the BWC video qualifies as a “record[] of law enforcement

officers concerning juveniles” under section 19-1-304(2)(a), as the

City contends, the court could nonetheless disclose the record

under section 19-1-304(2)(a)(VII) (Records of law enforcement

officers concerning juveniles “must not be inspected by or disclosed

to the public, except . . . [b]y order of the court.”).

¶ 24 Finally, even if there was a conflict between section 19-1-304

and section 24-31-902, we conclude that the more specific and

recent provisions of section 24-31-902 control. See Delta Sales

Yard v. Patten, 892 P.2d 297, 298 (Colo. 1995) (“It is a well-accepted

principle of statutory construction that in the case of conflict, a

more specific statute controls over a more general one.”); Jenkins v.

Pan. Canal Ry. Co., 208 P.3d 238, 242 (Colo. 2009) (“[W]hen

specificity cannot resolve the conflict, the more recent statute

prevails even if the General Assembly did not clearly intend it to

supplant an existing statute.”).

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¶ 25 Therefore, the district court did not err by rejecting the City’s

argument that releasing the BWC footage was barred by section 19-

1-304.

b. The District Court’s Oral Findings

¶ 26 In its oral ruling, the district court made statements that the

City argues were legal error. First, the court remarked that it could

not determine whether M.M. was a juvenile based on the content of

the BWC footage. But in its subsequent written order denying the

City’s motion for post-trial relief, the court clarified that this

observation was not material to its ruling, and instead, the order

was based on section 24-31-902’s broad language contemplating

the release of BWC footage coupled with the fact that M.M.’s privacy

interest could be adequately protected by blurring her entire head.

¶ 27 Next, the City argues that the district court improperly relied

on section 24-31-902(2)(a) to conclude that the BWC footage must

be released upon request and that it didn’t have “a choice.” But the

court’s oral ruling and its subsequent written order, when

considered in context, reflect the district court’s understanding that

the BWC footage may be released only if blurring was sufficient to

protect the substantial privacy interest at stake.

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¶ 28 Relatedly, the City argues that the district court improperly

focused only on the portion of section 24-31-902(2)(b)(II)(A) that

identifies a privacy interest in “significantly explicit and gruesome

bodily injury, unless the injury was caused by a peace officer.” The

district court interpreted this provision to mean that “blurring is not

required when the gruesome bodily injury was caused by a peace

officer.” The City argues this interpretation was erroneous and

improperly led the district court to believe that the video could be

released without blurring. But we need not decide whether the

district court’s interpretation was correct because, in the end, the

court authorized the release of the BWC footage only after blurring

M.M.’s head.

c. Next of Kin’s Rights

¶ 29 Next, the City points to the language of subsection (2)(b)(II)(B),

which addresses the rights of a victim — or the victim’s survivors —

to obtain access to BWC footage when “the recording is not released

to the public pursuant to this subsection.” § 24-31-902(2)(b)(II)(B).

¶ 30 The City relies on this language to argue that a victim or their

next of kin, in the event the victim dies or is incapacitated, may veto

the release of BWC footage whenever a substantial privacy interest

13
is implicated. But this argument wholly ignores the prefatory

language of the subsection: “If blurring is insufficient to protect the

substantial privacy interest . . . .” § 24-31-902(2)(b)(II)(B). In light

of this language, it is clear that the provisions of subsection

(2)(b)(II)(B) only apply if the subject privacy interest cannot be

protected through adequate blurring. Id.; see also § 24-31-

902(2)(b)(II)(A) (“Unblurred footage shall not be released without the

written authorization of the victim or, if the victim is deceased or

incapacitated, the written authorization of the victim’s next of kin.”).

Because the district court found that M.M.’s privacy interest could

be adequately protected through blurring, it appropriately did not

apply the provisions of subsection (2)(b)(II)(B) to block the release of

the BWC footage.

d. Summary

¶ 31 In sum, the district court properly concluded that section 24-

31-902, rather than section 19-1-304, controlled the release of the

BWC footage. The district court also correctly concluded that

section 24-31-902 required the release of the BWC footage to Ion if

the privacy interest at stake could be adequately protected by

blurring.

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B. Sufficiency of Blurring

¶ 32 We turn now to the City’s contention that the district court

erred by concluding that M.M.’s privacy interest could be

sufficiently protected by blurring her head.

1. The Parties’ Contentions

¶ 33 The City argues that the district court’s finding regarding a

substantial privacy interest was inadequate because the court did

not articulate all of the privacy interests implicated by the footage,

and without articulating all cognizable privacy interests, the court

could not properly determine whether blurring sufficiently protected

those interests.

¶ 34 Ion responds by noting that the district court did not limit its

analysis of the privacy interests at issue to the “gruesome bodily

injury” factor. Ion notes that the court viewed the video and

corresponding audio recordings and that its findings and order

acknowledged that M.M. had multiple privacy interests, including

that she was a minor, she suffered gruesome bodily injuries, and

the footage depicted her last “moments” and “breaths.” Moreover,

Ion notes that the City did not address any other material privacy

15
interests at stake and did not explain why blurring was insufficient

to protect M.M.’s privacy interests.

2. Analysis

¶ 35 As a starting point, we agree with Ion that the City misstates

the scope of the district court’s findings regarding the substantial

privacy interests at stake. The court acknowledged not only that

the BWC footage depicted a gruesome bodily injury but also that

the video and audio from the BWC footage depicted M.M.’s struggle

against death, including her “last breaths of life.” The court also

found that M.M. had a substantial privacy interest associated with

the recording of these images and sounds.

¶ 36 Aside from M.M.’s status as a juvenile, the depiction of

gruesome bodily injury and resulting death, and the inherent

privacy interests associated with dying, the only other privacy

interest the City points to on appeal is that the footage depicts “a

mental health crisis” under section 24-31-902(2)(b)(II)(A). But the

City does not point to evidence — aside from the events depicted in

the BWC footage — supporting a conclusion that M.M. was in the

midst of a mental health crisis, or how any privacy interests

associated with such a crisis could be addressed. If there were

16
additional privacy interests at play, the burden was on the City to

identify them. The district court did not err by failing to address

unarticulated privacy interests, and we do not address issues that

were not raised in the district court. Liberty Bankers Life Ins. Co. v.

First Citizens Bank & Tr. Co., 2014 COA 151, ¶ 25.

¶ 37 Finally, the City argues that blurring M.M.’s head was

insufficient to protect the privacy interests at issue. The primary

thrust of the City’s argument is that blurring is insufficient because

the audio recording of M.M.’s final breaths could still be heard. But

the City cites no authority suggesting that the district court is

authorized to mute or otherwise limit the public’s access to the

sound of an audio recording.

¶ 38 As the district court noted, section 24-31-902(2)(a) starts from

the premise that the law enforcement agency will release “all

unedited video and audio recordings of the incident.” And when

substantial privacy concerns are implicated by a video’s release,

section 24-31-902(2)(b)(II)(A) only specifically authorizes blurring to

protect those interests.

¶ 39 We need not resolve whether, under certain circumstances,

the court may mute some portion of BWC audio to protect a

17
person’s privacy interest. Despite our independent review of the

BWC footage, we could not hear any words spoken by M.M. Rather

her sounds were limited to gasps for breath and expressions of

pain. The audio portion reveals the physical act of dying. But the

statute clearly contemplates the release of BWC video and audio

recordings that depict the death of an individual. Thus, we discern

no substantial privacy interest that could be compromised by the

release of the audio from the BWC footage.

¶ 40 We also reject the City’s contention that blurring M.M.’s head

was insufficient to protect the privacy interests at issue. The

district court considered both parties’ arguments on the adequacy

of blurring. It rejected Ion’s argument that blurring only M.M.’s

face was sufficient, noting she had a distinctive hair color that

could be used to identify her. But the court also concluded that the

complete blurring of M.M.’s body was neither necessary nor

appropriate. Instead, the court found that her privacy interests

could be protected by blurring her head (including her hair).

¶ 41 ELEIA does not enumerate specific considerations that courts

should apply when assessing whether blurring is sufficient to

protect the substantial privacy interests at stake. Thus, district

18
courts must make these determinations based on their assessment

of the relevant privacy interests and the degree of blurring

necessary to protect them. Because there is evidence in the record

supporting the district court’s findings that the privacy interests at

stake could be protected by blurring M.M.’s head, we discern no

error or abuse of discretion. See Woodbridge Condo. Ass’n v. Lo

Viento Blanco, LLC, 2020 COA 34, ¶ 24 (“We review findings of fact

for clear error, meaning that we won’t disturb such findings if there

is any evidence in the record supporting them.”), aff’d, 2021 CO 56;

see also Gazette v. Bourgerie, 2023 COA 37, ¶ 37 (reviewing

decision whether to disclose documents under the Colorado

Criminal Justice Records Act for an abuse of discretion), aff’d on

other grounds, 2024 CO 78.

¶ 42 Finally, we — like the district court — acknowledge that the

provisions of section 24-31-902 effectuate a delicate balance. On

the one hand, as noted in the amicus brief filed by the Associated

Press and various Colorado media entities, the recordings depicting

deaths in high-profile cases have profoundly impacted the public’s

perceptions and spurred legislative action surrounding law

enforcement’s use of force. On the other hand, the cost of releasing

19
graphic and disturbing recordings includes the intrusion into the

privacy interest of those depicted. See Ashlee Marie Preston, Sorry,

Consuming Trauma Porn is Not Allyship, Marie Claire (June 9,

2020), https://perma.cc/5VFB-EY55 (“As human beings, death

places us at our peak of vulnerability; the deceased, no matter their

skin color, deserve privacy, dignity, and respect in those final

moments.”). But it is the General Assembly’s purview to draw those

lines, and it did so by enacting section 24-31-902. It is the courts’

role to apply those provisions to the specific facts of a given case.

The district court did just that, and we discern no error in its

findings and conclusions.

C. Unaddressed Issues

¶ 43 Given our resolution of the City’s appellate contentions, we

need not address Ion’s alternative arguments that (1) M.M. was not

a victim as that term is used under 24-31-902; (2) M.M.’s asserted

privacy interest did not continue after her death; and (3) no privacy

interest may be considered if the BWC footage depicts a gruesome

bodily injury or death committed by law enforcement.

III. Disposition

¶ 44 The district court’s order is affirmed.

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JUDGE FOX and JUDGE HARRIS concur.

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