Peo in Interest of GH

25CA0619 Peo in Interest of GH 06-05-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0619
City and County of Denver Probate Court No. 25MH2011
Honorable Beth A. Tomerlin, Magistrate

The People of the State of Colorado,

Petitioner-Appellee,

In the Interest of G.H.,

Respondent-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE KUHN
Moultrie and Berger*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced June 5, 2025

Katie McLoughlin, Acting City Attorney, Daniel B. Horwitz, Assistant City
Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee

Richard Slosman, Boulder, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant

* Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const.
art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024.
¶1 Respondent, G.H., appeals a magistrate’s order committing

him to the custody of the Colorado Department of Human Services,

Behavioral Health Administration (BHA), under section 27-81-112,

C.R.S. 2024. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 On February 20, 2025, Officer Alexa Jekich, a co-responder

officer1 with the Thornton Police Department, filed an application

for emergency commitment under section 27-81-111, C.R.S. 2024,

after responding to G.H.’s house on numerous occasions to provide

resources for mental health and substance use treatment. In the

application, Officer Jekich alleged that for the past three months

G.H. had presented with erratic and dangerous behavior, including

wandering the streets and being hit by cars, setting fires to objects

multiple times, and engaging in physical altercations due to

agitation. Officer Jekich further alleged that G.H. had recently

tested positive for fentanyl, cannabis, and methamphetamine, was

1 Officer Jekich explained at a hearing that she was assigned to a

co-response unit in which an officer and a master’s level clinician
respond to mental health and substance abuse calls in an attempt
to get people mental health or substance use treatment where
appropriate.

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not eating or sleeping well, and had refused voluntary substance

use treatment. Based on the application for emergency

commitment, G.H. was placed at Denver Community Addiction

Rehabilitation and Evaluation Services (CARES) under the care and

treatment of Dr. Daniel Severn, among others.

¶3 On March 3, 2025, the People petitioned a magistrate under

section 27-81-112 to authorize involuntary commitment of G.H. to

the custody of the BHA to receive substance use treatment. The

People included with their petition a physician’s certificate for

involuntary commitment, completed by Dr. Severn, as well as an

application for involuntary commitment, completed by Officer

Jekich. The magistrate appointed counsel for G.H. and set the

matter for an evidentiary hearing. Before the hearing, Kristina

Coker, Licensed Clinical Social Worker and Involuntary

Commitment Program Manager with the BHA, submitted a

Recommendation for Placement, outlining various placement

options for G.H.

¶4 At the evidentiary hearing Dr. Severn, Officer Jekich, Coker,

and G.H. each testified. Dr. Severn was admitted as an expert in

the field of psychiatry and addiction medication without objection.

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He summarized G.H.’s “long history” of substance use and

explained how G.H. met the diagnostic criteria for substance use

disorder. Officer Jekich described her various contacts with G.H.

spanning from January through February and how she and her

clinician co-responder initially suspected mental health-related

concerns but subsequently became concerned with possible

substance use. Coker explained that G.H. had been administered

the American Society of Addiction Medicine (ASAM) Criteria

assessment. She then explained his results and the placement

recommendations based on that assessment. G.H., for the most

part, denied having any substance use problems and did not believe

he needed inpatient treatment. He testified that he had “struggled

with stuff in the past” but “besides alcohol and marijuana” had

been “pretty sober” for the past three years.

¶5 The magistrate granted the petition, finding that the testimony

provided by Dr. Severn, Officer Jekich, and Coker was “essentially

uncontroverted” and “credible” and G.H.’s testimony, to the extent it

disagreed with or was contradicted by these witnesses, was not

credible. The magistrate found by clear and convincing evidence

that G.H. is a person with a substance use disorder who is

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incapacitated by substances, is a threat to himself and others, and

has refused voluntary treatment. Accordingly, the magistrate

ordered G.H. involuntarily committed to the custody of the BHA for

ninety days of substance use treatment.

II. Analysis

¶6 G.H. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the

order. In particular, he contends the evidence was insufficient to

support the magistrate’s findings that he (1) has a substance use

disorder; (2) has inflicted or is likely, unless committed, to inflict

physical harm on himself or others; and (3) is incapacitated by

substances. We address each contention in turn.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶7 When a party challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we

review the record de novo as a whole and, viewing it in the light

most favorable to the People, determine whether the evidence is

sufficient to support the court’s decision. People in Interest of

Ramsey, 2023 COA 95, ¶ 23. Likewise, we review de novo the

court’s conclusions of law, and we defer to its findings of fact,

including the weight and credibility afforded to the witnesses, if

supported by the record. People in Interest of Strodtman, 293 P.3d

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123, 131 (Colo. App. 2011); People in Interest of C.A.K., 652 P.2d

603, 613 (Colo. 1982). “The district court, as fact finder, ‘has

discretion to determine the credibility of the witnesses; the

sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence; and the

inferences and conclusions to be drawn from it.’” People in Interest

of R.C., 2019 COA 99M, ¶ 7 (quoting People in Interest of

S.M.A.M.A., 172 P.3d 958, 962 (Colo. App. 2007)).

¶8 Section 27-81-112(1) provides, in pertinent part, that a court

may commit a person to the custody of the BHA if

the person has a substance use disorder and
that the person has threatened or attempted to
inflict or inflicted physical harm on the
person’s self or on another and that unless
committed, the person is likely to inflict
physical harm on the person’s self or on
another or that the person is incapacitated by
substances.

¶9 Before entering a commitment order, the court must find that

grounds for involuntary commitment have been established by clear

and convincing evidence. § 27-81-112(5). Evidence is clear and

convincing when it “persuades the trier of fact that the truth of the

contention is ‘highly probable.’” People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127,

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1136 (Colo. 1980) (quoting Page v. Clark, 592 P.2d 792, 800 (Colo.

1979)).

B. Substance Use Disorder

¶ 10 G.H. challenges the magistrate’s finding that he has a

substance use disorder. As relevant here, a “substance use

disorder” means

a chronic relapsing brain disease,
characterized by recurrent use of alcohol,
drugs, or both, causing clinically significant
impairment, including health problems,
disability, and failure to meet major
responsibilities at work, school, or home.

§ 27-81-102(13.8), C.R.S. 2024.

¶ 11 The magistrate found that G.H. has a substance use disorder

based on Dr. Severn’s testimony that he has a “long history of

alcohol use disorder, methamphetamine and cannabis and fentanyl

use, as well as other prescription medications that goes back

approximately [ten] years” and such use “has resulted in an

inability to care for himself.” Additionally, the magistrate noted that

due to G.H.’s “erratic behavior” there had been “repeated calls to

law enforcement” and an inability to manage his financial

resources. The record supports these findings.

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¶ 12 At the hearing Dr. Severn testified that in his opinion G.H. met

the criteria for a substance use disorder as defined by the

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders Version 5

Revised (DSM-5-TR) and as defined under Colorado Law.

Specifically, he testified that G.H. has a chronic, relapsing brain

disease that causes clinically significant impairment. Regarding

evidence of G.H.’s clinically significant impairment, Dr. Severn

testified that G.H. repeatedly uses substances and there had been

thirty-five police calls for erratic behavior — including medical

complaints, complaints from neighbors, an altercation in a bank,

and threats toward police — as well as a failure to pay his bills.

¶ 13 Dr. Severn explained that based on his review of G.H.’s

records combined with other information from law enforcement, as

well as firsthand observations, G.H. has a history spanning “at least

ten years” of “alcohol use disorder, methamphetamine use,

cannabis use, and fentanyl use, in addition to other prescription

medications.” Dr. Severn testified that when G.H. arrived at Denver

CARES, he tested positive for “cannabis and amphetamines.”

During Dr. Severn’s clinical evaluation, G.H. presented “as a little

disorganized . . . agitated, [and] upset,” and had “some difficulty

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with making some logical sense in terms of what had happened.”

He testified that G.H. was also unable to make plans for his future

— namely, what he “planned to do once he got out of Denver

CARES.”

¶ 14 Despite this testimony, G.H. asserts that the record “does not

support [a finding] that he meets the criteria for a substance use

disorder” and instead his “mental health disorders . . . are sufficient

to explain [his] behaviors.” But Dr. Severn was asked whether there

were any other explanations for the behavior he described or that

he had seen in G.H.’s records and he testified that there was not.

Dr. Severn explained that the change he observed in G.H.’s

behavior after “a week or two” was “indicative of a washout period

where his body [was] now starting to return . . . to more of a normal

state.” Dr. Severn further opined that while G.H. was being treated

for some mental health issues, “such as depression and anxiety,”

the behavior that occurred while at the facility and just before his

admission would not have been explained by those disorders and

was “more indicative of a substance use issue.”

¶ 15 Crediting Dr. Severn’s testimony and explicitly adopting his

opinions, the magistrate found that “there is nothing else that

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would explain the before and after behavior that [Dr. Severn]

witnessed” beyond “a washout period,” which is “medically . . . more

indicative of a substance use disorder.” Because the record

supports the magistrate’s determination, we will not disturb it and,

to the extent G.H. asks us to second-guess witness credibility or

draw different inferences from the testimony, we decline to do so.

See R.C., ¶ 7.

C. Physical Harm to Self or Others

¶ 16 Next, G.H. asserts that there is not sufficient evidence in the

record to establish that he has inflicted and is likely, unless

committed, to inflict physical harm on himself or others. In

particular, G.H. asserts that “[t]here was not much in the way of

establishing that he has ever done harm to himself or to others, or

that any of the incidents involving purported harm are attributable

to substance abuse.” We disagree.

¶ 17 As an initial matter, the People assert that the magistrate only

had to find either that the person is at risk of physical harm to self

or others or that they are incapacitated by substances. See

§ 27-81-112(1). We agree that one of these findings is sufficient. In

this case, however, the magistrate addressed both of these prongs.

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¶ 18 As relevant to this contention, the magistrate found, with

record support, that G.H., “due to his substance use disorder, has

threatened or attempted to inflict or inflicted harm onto himself or

another” and “[u]nless committed, [he] is likely to inflict physical

harm on himself or others.” In support of its finding, the magistrate

noted that G.H. had engaged in “disruptive behaviors and

threatening type behaviors that were concerning enough to require

a response from police and law enforcement.”

¶ 19 Beyond the thirty-five calls for service to his residence for

various well-being checks, medical concerns, and complaints from

neighbors, Officer Jekich testified that she responded to G.H.’s

house at least four separate times based on concerns regarding

G.H.’s safety “to himself or others.” While the first two times were

based primarily on noise complaints from the neighbors, the third

time Officer Jekich learned that G.H. “was lighting a chair on fire”

and had made comments about “lighting his house on fire for

insurance purposes.” Based on this, Officer Jekich and her

co-response team clinician partner decided to put G.H. on a mental

health hold. But G.H. was discharged from the mental health hold

after testing positive for amphetamines and marijuana. When he

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was again hospitalized and tested positive for those substances,

Officer Jekich decided an emergency commitment was the next

appropriate step.

¶ 20 In addition to lighting fires, G.H. told Officer Jekich that he

had been “hit by a television while walking around” and had been

“hit by multiple vehicles.” G.H. himself confirmed that he was

lighting fires in his driveway, was struck by a car and broke “several

of [his] ribs,” was hit by a television when it “bounced out of the

back” of a truck, and “got in[to] several fights with [police] officers.”

Officer Jekich testified that they “were concerned for [G.H.’s] safety

in regards to being left to his own devices” and she “suspected drug

use” on “pretty much . . . every encounter that [they] had.”

¶ 21 Accordingly, because the record supports the magistrate’s

findings, we discern no error in the finding that G.H., due to his

substance use disorder, has inflicted and is likely, unless

committed, to inflict physical harm on himself or others.

D. Incapacitated by Substances

¶ 22 Finally, we address G.H.’s contention that the evidence

presented at the hearing was insufficient to establish that he is

incapacitated by substances. As relevant here, “incapacitated by

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substances” means that a person, because of their use of drugs or

alcohol:

is unconscious or has judgment otherwise so
impaired that the person is incapable of
realizing and making a rational decision with
respect to the person’s need for treatment, is
unable to take care of basic personal needs or
safety, or lacks sufficient understanding or
capacity to make or communicate rational
decisions concerning himself or herself.

§ 27-81-102(9), (9.2), (9.4).

¶ 23 True, as G.H. points out, there is no evidence in the record

that he has ever been rendered unconscious by substances. But

the magistrate found that G.H.’s “judgment [is] otherwise so

impaired that he is incapable of realizing and making rational

decisions with respect to his need for treatment” and he is “unable

to care for his basic personal needs and safety.” These findings are

adequately supported by the record.

¶ 24 Dr. Severn opined that G.H. is incapacitated by substances

because “even though he’s gone through a detox period,” Dr. Severn

expects that “psychologically he would revert back to his behavior

and substance use after he is released, unless he goes into a

treatment program.” Dr. Severn also opined that G.H.’s judgment is

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impaired and his “rational ability . . . is greatly influenced by his

substance use.”

¶ 25 Regarding his ability to make a rational decision with respect

to his need for treatment, G.H. testified that he did not believe he

needed inpatient treatment, and instead, he would, if necessary,

continue outpatient treatment at Red Rocks Recovery. But Dr.

Severn testified that he was concerned that even if G.H. was willing

to “accept voluntary treatment” he was unlikely to follow through

with it. And Coker testified that G.H. has “demonstrated an

inability to follow through with voluntary treatment” and that his

chosen outpatient facility, Red Rocks Recovery, would not be an

appropriate placement for him given his ASAM assessment results.

¶ 26 Concerning G.H.’s ability to take care of his own basic

personal needs or safety, it was Dr. Severn’s opinion that G.H.

“lack[s the] ability to care for himself and to meet his personal

obligations.” Officer Jekich described G.H.’s home as being in a

state of “extreme disarray” and “very cluttered with new items.” She

described how there was red spray paint all over the sidewalk,

above his garage, and around his windows, as well as “a lot of

trash” in the front yard and driveway. Indeed, G.H. himself testified

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that, despite receiving a $34,000 monthly inheritance stipend, his

water was shut off at his house based on a failure to pay his water

bill and he had to rely on his neighbors for meals, drinking water,

and showers. He also described at times staying in hotels,

homeless shelters, and sleeping on the streets.

¶ 27 This evidence, when viewed as a whole and in the light most

favorable to the People, is more than sufficient to support the

magistrate’s finding that G.H. is incapacitated by substances.

III. Disposition

¶ 28 The order authorizing involuntary commitment pursuant to

section 27-81-112 is affirmed.

JUDGE MOULTRIE and JUDGE BERGER concur.

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