Peo v. Rizo

21CA1804 Peo v Rizo 06-05-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 21CA1804
Mesa County District Court No. 20CR199
Honorable Lance P. Timbreza, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Christopher A. Rizo,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE
Gomez and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced June 5, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Caitlin E. Grant, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Michael C. Mattis, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Christopher A. Rizo, appeals his convictions for

first degree felony murder, attempted second degree murder, four

counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of menacing, and

tampering with physical evidence. We affirm the judgment.

I. Background

¶2 On Super Bowl Sunday, in 2020, Rizo went to Roosters

Tavern, a bar near a truck stop in Grand Junction. Thomas and

Bill Huddleston,1 brothers and semitruck drivers, were sitting at the

bar when Rizo arrived. Thomas and Bill had stopped at the truck

stop to spend the night and were parked beside each other. Rizo

sat next to Thomas, and the two conversed about their general

dislike of the Kansas City Chiefs, one of the teams playing. As a

Chiefs fan, Bill remained focused on the game.

¶3 Before halftime, another semitruck driver commented that he

thought Tom Brady was a cheater. While Thomas and Bill laughed

at the comment, Rizo, a New England Patriots fan, took offense,

raised his voice, and became argumentative. Rizo told the three

men that they were not “from around here” and that they should

1 Thomas and Bill share the same last name, so we refer to them by

their first names. We mean no disrespect in doing so.

1
watch out. A bartender at Roosters, Payton Coleman, noticed

tension between Rizo, Thomas, and Bill. Although she could not

hear what the men were saying, she tried to reduce the tension by

asking if they wanted another beer. Coleman said Rizo was loud,

annoying, and “talking crap” to Thomas and Bill. She eventually

asked Rizo to leave. Rizo responded by calling her a “fucking bitch.”

Coleman then asked Rizo to pay his bill. Rizo said that he would

finish his beer and then pay his bill and leave. Coleman said she

would pay his bill and asked him to leave. When Rizo refused,

Coleman asked for help from the cook, Thomas DeForest, to remove

Rizo. DeForest asked Rizo to leave multiple times before escorting

him out of Roosters. As he left, Rizo told Thomas and Bill that he

knew where they had parked their trucks. Thomas and Bill stayed

at the bar for the remainder of the game and were the last people to

leave.

¶4 Bill testified that when they left Roosters, a four-door SUV

drove up, and Rizo got out and pointed a gun at Bill’s head. Rizo

had called Bill a tough guy and said, “[Y]ou’re not so tough now,”

before ordering Thomas and Bill to walk to their trucks. When Bill

reached his truck, Rizo ordered Bill to open the door and empty his

2
pockets. Bill placed his wallet and cell phone on the floorboard of

his truck. Rizo took Bill’s phone. In the meantime, Thomas

returned to his truck to retrieve his gun. When Rizo yelled at

Thomas to get out of his truck, Bill swung at Rizo. Rizo then shot

Bill twice in the leg, and Bill dropped to his knees. Bill heard a

series of gunshots and saw Thomas fall to the ground. Rizo then

kicked Thomas’s gun away from his body, picked it up, and fled the

scene.

¶5 Two truck drivers witnessed the shooting. One truck driver

testified that he was sitting in his truck talking to his wife when he

heard what he thought were fireworks. The other truck driver

testified that, from his truck, he saw two men running in front of

him and shooting at each other. While Coleman could not see the

men’s faces, Coleman saw two men shooting at each other and a

third man. The three men were standing in a triangle-type shape.

One of the men fell to the ground shortly before another one fell to

the ground. After one of the men fled, another man on the ground

staggered toward the trucks while the third man remained on the

ground.

3
¶6 Video surveillance from the truck stop parking lot showed

three men walking away from the camera toward the other end of

the parking lot. The men appeared to have their hands in their

pockets. They walked behind the trucks but quickly reappeared in

front of the trucks. Then two men appeared on the ground in the

center of the parking lot.

¶7 After the shooting, Rizo drove to Kayla Turney’s house.

Turney was an old friend whom Rizo had lived with on and off since

2009. Turney was hesitant to let Rizo in because he appeared

upset, but she eventually allowed him into the house. Turney

noticed blood on Rizo’s hands. While pacing in her living room,

Rizo said that he had done something he could not come back from

and that he intended to kill himself. After pressing him for

information, Rizo eventually told Turney that he shot two people.

Because Turney had kids sleeping in her house, she moved the

conversation outside and the two sat in Rizo’s car. When Turney

opened the door to the car, a .357 caliber revolver fell out. Rizo told

Turney that he took “their” gun and brought it to her house. Rizo

also said there was some “shit talking,” and one of the men pulled a

gun and that is when he pulled his gun and shot. Eventually,

4
Turney’s ex-husband, Pedro Potite, called 911. When the police

arrived, they removed Rizo from his car. During the pat down, they

found a CZ-10 handgun. The handgun’s magazine was empty.

¶8 Thomas was declared dead at the scene. He had been shot

twelve times. A tourniquet was placed on Bill’s leg, and he was sent

to the hospital. Deputy James O’Neill found Bill’s cell phone on the

ground in a carport near the truck stop parking lot. The .357

caliber revolver found in Rizo’s car belonged to Thomas.

¶9 The State charged Rizo with first degree murder (felony

murder), criminal attempt to commit second degree murder, two

counts of first degree kidnapping, four counts of aggravated

robbery, two counts of menacing, and one count of tampering with

physical evidence.

¶ 10 Although Rizo did not testify, he asserted self-defense, and

counsel argued that Rizo began shooting when he saw Thomas

holding a gun after Bill tried to punch him in the face.

¶ 11 The jury acquitted Rizo of the kidnapping charges, but it

convicted him of the remaining counts. The court sentenced him to

a controlling term of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) in

the custody of the Department of Corrections.

5
¶ 12 On appeal, Rizo contends that the trial court (1) failed to

supplement the model self-defense jury instruction with an

apparent necessity instruction or an instruction allowing the jury to

consider multiple assailants; (2) abused its discretion in admitting

evidence of his conduct at the bar before the shooting; and (3)

committed cumulative error. He also challenges the

constitutionality of his LWOP sentence for felony murder, given the

legislative changes that occurred after his conviction. We address

and reject each contention.

II. Self-Defense Jury Instruction

¶ 13 Rizo contends that the trial court violated his constitutional

rights to self-defense, due process, a fair trial, and an impartial jury

when it rejected his tendered multiple assailants and apparent

necessity jury instructions. We discern no error.

A. Additional Background

¶ 14 Rizo tendered the following multiple assailants jury

instruction:

If a person reasonably believes he is
threatened with the use or attempted use of
unlawful force against him by the alleged
victim as well as others, all present and acting
together, he has a right under the law to use

6
force against at least one of them. He may use
force against any or all of them.

Thus, whether Mr. Rizo was facing multiple
assailants is a factor to consider in evaluating
the reasonableness of his belief that the use of
force was necessary and the reasonableness of
the amount of force used.

¶ 15 He also tendered the following apparent necessity instruction:

When a person has reasonable grounds for
believing, and does in fact believe, that danger
of his being injured is imminent, he may act
on such appearances and defend himself. A
person may act on such appearances,
although it may turn out that the appearances
were false, or although he may have been
mistaken as to the extent of the actual danger.

Apparent necessity, if well-grounded and of
such a character as to appeal to a reasonable
person under similar conditions and
circumstances, as being sufficient to require
action, justifies the application of self-defense
to the same extent as actual or real danger.

¶ 16 At the jury instruction conference, Rizo argued that the

apparent necessity instruction was required given the admission of

his statements that he fired his gun only after he saw Thomas’s

gun. He asserted that the tendered instruction was an accurate

statement of the law and was necessary for the jury to understand

his self-defense theory.

7
¶ 17 Similarly, Rizo argued that the multiple assailants instruction

was necessary for the jury to understand that he used force against

two different people and that it was not only each individual’s

actions but also the individual’s acting in concert with one another

that was relevant to his decision to use deadly force to protect

himself.

¶ 18 The prosecutor objected to both instructions as too fact

specific and argued that the model self-defense instruction

adequately informed the jury that it was required to consider Rizo’s

reasonable belief and the necessity of using force.

¶ 19 The trial court rejected the tendered instruction and stated,

“[The] [d]efense is certainly welcome to argue consistent with the

law, but I think the instruction adequately instructs the jury on

self-defense.”

¶ 20 The jury received the following self-defense instruction:

The evidence presented in this case has raised
the affirmative defense of “deadly physical
force in defense of person,” as a defense to
criminal attempt to commit murder in the
second degree, aggravated robbery, and
menacing. Mr. Rizo was legally authorized to
use deadly physical force upon another
person, without first retreating if:

8
1. he used that deadly physical force in order
to defend himself from what he reasonably
believed to be the use or imminent use of
unlawful physical force by that other person,
and

2. he reasonably believed a lesser degree of
force was inadequate, and

3. he had a reasonable ground to believe, and
did believe, that he or another person was in
imminent danger of being killed or of receiving
great bodily injury, and

4. he was not the initial aggressor, or, if he
was the initial aggressor, he had withdrawn
from the encounter and effectively
communicated to the other person his intent
to do so, and the other person nevertheless
continued or threatened the use of unlawful
physical force.

The prosecution has the burden to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Rizo’s
conduct was not legally authorized by this
defense. In order to meet this burden of proof,
the prosecution must disprove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, at least one of the above
numbered conditions. After considering all the
evidence, if you decide the prosecution has
failed to meet this burden of proof, then the
prosecution has failed to prove Mr. Rizo’s
conduct was not legally authorized by this
defense, which is an essential element of
criminal attempt to commit murder in the
second degree, aggravated robbery, and
menacing. In that event, you must return a
verdict of not guilty for that offense.

9
After considering all the evidence, if you decide
the prosecution has met this burden of proof,
then the prosecution has proved that Mr.
Rizo’s conduct was not legally authorized by
this defense. In that event, your verdicts
concerning criminal attempt to commit murder
in the second degree, aggravated robbery, and
menacing must depend upon your
determination whether the prosecution has
met its burden of proof with respect to the
remaining elements of those offenses.

¶ 21 The court also gave a theory of defense instruction which

stated:

Christopher Rizo contends that on February 2,
2020, he was staying in his SUV near the TA
Truck Stop on Hwy 6 & 50 in Grand Junction,
Colorado. Mr. Rizo asserts that he went to
Roosters bar to watch the Superbowl in the
late afternoon and early evening hours of
February 2, 2020. Mr. Rizo argues that he
was removed from the bar after getting into a
verbal disagreement with some of the truckers
who were also watching the game at the bar.

Mr. Rizo contends that upon leaving the bar,
he went back to his SUV while he watched the
Superbowl scores online when he noticed the
Huddlestons again. Mr. Rizo asserts that he
did not rob or kidnap either Thomas or Bill
Huddleston; instead, he was simply resuming
the argument from Roosters bar as all three
men walked out to the Huddlestons’ trucks in
the east truck parking lot. Mr. Rizo claims
that the video evidence shows that he never
pulled a gun on the Huddlestons and that Bill
Huddleston never saw his gun as he was

10
unable to describe it accurately. In addition,
Mr. Rizo asserts he did not take anyone’s
wallet, Mr. Thomas Huddleston’s phone, nor
did he take any valuables from any of the
trucks.

Mr. Rizo contends that once they got to the
Huddlestons’ trucks in the midst of this
argument, the Huddlestons’ [sic] attacked him.
Mr. Rizo asserts that Bill Huddleston
attempted to punch him in the face and that
Mr. Rizo started to shoot his gun once he saw
Thomas Huddleston draw his gun. Mr. Rizo
argues that he acted in self-defense when he
fired his gun on February 2, 2022.

After the gunfight and in the midst of a panic
over what had just happened, Mr. Rizo asserts
that he took Thomas Huddleston’s gun so that
neither Huddleston could use it to shoot at
him. Mr. Rizo also contends that he
mistakenly picked up Bill Huddleston’s phone
in the chaos as it [was] the exact same model
of iPhone and looks similar to his own. Mr.
Rizo discarded the phone, got back to his
vehicle, and left the area where he was just
attacked.

Mr. Rizo asserts that he never attempted to
hide or keep any item of physical evidence and
afterwards told multiple people what
happened, including the fact that he shot two
people.

Mr. Rizo contends that the only crime he
committed on February 2, 2020, was
unlawfully carrying a concealed weapon.

11
B. Standard of Review and Controlling Law

¶ 22 A trial court has a duty to instruct the jury correctly on all

matters of law. Riley v. People, 266 P.3d 1089, 1092 (Colo. 2011).

We review jury instructions de novo to determine whether they

correctly informed the jury of the applicable law. Id. However, if

the jury was adequately instructed on the law, we review for an

abuse of discretion a court’s decision to give a particular

instruction, and we “will not disturb the ruling unless it is

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.” People v. Trujillo,

2018 COA 12, ¶ 11.

¶ 23 When a defendant objects to the court’s ruling, we review for

nonconstitutional harmless error and affirm if “there is not a

reasonable probability that the error contributed to the defendant’s

conviction.” People v. Garcia, 28 P.3d 340, 344 (Colo. 2011)

(quoting Salcedo v. People, 999 P.2d 833, 841 (Colo. 2000)).

¶ 24 A person is justified in using a degree of physical force he

reasonably believes necessary upon another to defend himself from

what he “reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of

unlawful physical force” against him by that other person, “and he

12
may use a degree of force which he reasonably believes to be

necessary for that purpose.” § 18-1-704(1), C.R.S. 2024.

¶ 25 When evaluating “the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief

that he needed to use self-defense in the given situation” and “the

reasonableness of the actual force used by the defendant to repel

the apparent danger,” a “jury must consider the totality of the

circumstances, including the number of persons reasonably

appearing to be threatening the defendant.” Riley, 266 P.3d at

1094; see People v. Jones, 675 P.2d 9, 14 (Colo. 1984) (A defendant

has the “right to use reasonable force necessary to repel [multiple

assailants] so long as he reasonably believed them to be acting in

concert in using unlawful physical force against him.”).

¶ 26 “The purpose of this rule is to ensure that the jury

understands that it may consider all relevant evidence when

assessing the reasonableness of the defendant’s actions.” Riley,

266 P.3d at 1094. To that end, the jury instructions must “properly

direct the jury to consider the totality of the circumstances during

its deliberations on reasonableness.” Id. However, a trial court is

not required to specifically provide either a multiple assailants

instruction or an apparent necessity instruction. People v.

13
Roberts-Bicking, 2021 COA 12, ¶ 23; see also Beckett v. People, 800

P.2d 74, 78 (Colo. 1990) (an apparent necessity instruction is never

required). Such a requirement “would inappropriately infringe on

the discretion trial courts have to tailor jury instructions to fit each

unique case.” Riley, 266 P.3d at 1094.

¶ 27 Additionally, an instruction that tracks the statutory language,

particularly language focusing on what the defendant “reasonably

believed,” sufficiently encompasses the concept of apparent

necessity, and an additional instruction is not necessary. Beckett,

800 P.2d at 77-78. All that is required is that the jury be instructed

to consider the reasonableness of the defendant’s beliefs and

actions under the totality of the circumstances. Riley, 266 P.3d at

1094.

C. Analysis

¶ 28 We discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s rejection of

the tendered instructions, for two reasons. To begin, we note that

the supreme court in Riley did not overrule its decision in Beckett

and left open the possibility that the model self-defense instruction

alone would satisfy Jones. Riley, 266 P.3d at 1095 n.6. Rizo does

not challenge the accuracy of the self-defense instruction or argue

14
that it failed to track the statutory language. Indeed, the

self-defense instruction informed the jury that it should consider

the reasonableness of Rizo’s actions “after considering all the

evidence.” And we presume, absent contrary evidence, that the jury

understood and followed this instruction. See People v. Douglas,

2012 COA 57, ¶ 48.

¶ 29 Second, we conclude, consistent with Roberts-Bicking, that the

theory of the case instruction, when read and considered with the

self-defense instruction, adequately informed the jury to consider

the reasonableness of Rizo’s actions in light of the totality of the

circumstances involving both brothers.

¶ 30 In Roberts-Bicking, the trial court rejected the defense’s

tendered apparent necessity and multiple assailants instructions.

Roberts-Bicking, ¶ 26. Noting that the stock instruction may alone

be sufficient, but without finding a deficiency in the stock

instruction, the division concluded that the court’s response to a

jury question during deliberations, instructing the jury to consider

what a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have

believed or done under the circumstances and to consider the

totality of the circumstances shown by the evidence, cured any

15
deficiency. Id. at ¶ 27. The division held that this supplemental

instruction was “in all material respects identical to the instruction

given, and approved of, in Riley.” Id.

¶ 31 Here, as in Roberts-Bicking, the trial court instructed the jury

using the model self-defense instruction and rejected the tendered

apparent necessity and multiple assailants instructions. The model

instruction twice told the jury to consider “all the evidence” and

three times told it to consider the reasonableness of Rizo’s actions.

Moreover, the theory of the case instruction told the jury to consider

that, during the argument between Rizo and the Huddlestons, the

brothers attacked Rizo and that Rizo fired his gun only after Bill

tried to punch him and Thomas threatened him with a gun. In our

view, any ambiguity left by the model instruction that Rizo acted in

response to multiple assailants was clarified by the theory of the

case instruction. See id. at ¶ 28. And when read together, we

conclude that the model instruction and the theory of the case

instruction adequately informed the jury to consider the

reasonableness of Rizo’s beliefs and actions under the totality of the

circumstances. Accordingly, the trial court did not err, under the

16
circumstances of this case, in rejecting the defense’s tendered

multiple assailants and apparent necessity instructions.

III. 404(b)

¶ 32 Rizo next contends that the trial court erroneously admitted

evidence of his behavior at Roosters before the shooting. We

disagree.

A. Additional Background

¶ 33 Before trial, Rizo moved to exclude evidence of the events that

occurred at Roosters before the shooting, including his interactions

with Coleman and other witnesses. He argued there was no

evidence that this behavior was directed at Thomas and Bill, and

thus, it was irrelevant to the shooting in the parking lot.

¶ 34 The trial court denied the motion and admitted the evidence

under the res gestae doctrine. The court found that the events in

Roosters were where the interaction between Rizo and the

Huddlestons began and that it continued when Thomas and Bill left

the bar. The court also found that the probative value of the

evidence was not substantially outweighed by undue prejudice and

that the events “give life to the circumstances leading up to the

17
events at the time of the [initial] interaction with the victims, and

throughout the course of that evening.”

¶ 35 At trial, Coleman testified that Rizo called her a “fucking

bitch.” Bill testified that at some point, Rizo and Coleman began

arguing, and Rizo called Coleman a “bitch.” In the hospital

following the shooting, Bill said that Rizo had a chip on his

shoulder and called him a “little punk.”

¶ 36 Additionally, DeForest told the police that Rizo yelled, “Fuck

you,” as he left Roosters and also called Coleman a “bitch.” Rachel

Stutz, the front desk clerk at the Red Roof Inn, which shares a

lobby with Roosters, testified that Coleman looked like she was in

distress and that Rizo yelled, “[F]uck you, too,” while leaving

Roosters. Finally, Timothy Reeves, a patron of Roosters, said Rizo

was “just being real arrogant” to the bartender and that Rizo called

Coleman a “bitch.”

B. Standard of Review and Controlling Law

¶ 37 We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

discretion. Rojas v. People, 2022 CO 8, ¶16. A trial court abuses

its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary,

18
unreasonable, or unfair or when it misconstrues or misapplies the

law. People v. Trujillo, 2025 COA 22, ¶ 24.

¶ 38 In Rojas, our supreme court abolished the res gestae doctrine.

In its place, the court adopted an intrinsic-extrinsic framework for

courts to determine whether the admission of uncharged

misconduct evidence should be analyzed under CRE 404(b).

¶ 39 Intrinsic acts are those (1) that directly prove the charged

offense or (2) that occurred contemporaneously with the charged

offense and facilitated the commission of it. Rojas, ¶ 52. Their

admissibility is governed by the standard evidentiary principles,

including whether the evidence is relevant under CRE 401 and

should be excluded under CRE 403. Rojas, ¶¶ 25, 52.

¶ 40 Extrinsic evidence, on the other hand, is not directly related to

the crime charged. Id. at ¶ 52. Extrinsic evidence involves conduct

independent and different from the charged offense. People v.

Quintana, 882 P.2d 1366, 1372 (Colo. 1994), abrogated on other

grounds by Rojas, 2022 CO 8. If extrinsic evidence is potentially

reflective of a defendant’s “bad character,” it may be admissible if it

meets the criteria of CRE 404(b). Quintana, 882 P.2d at 1372.

19
C. Analysis

¶ 41 We conclude, consistent with the trial court, that Rizo’s

conduct at Roosters before the shooting is intrinsic evidence

because it occurred contemporaneously with the shooting and

directly proves the charged offenses. Specifically, Rizo’s conduct

provided relevant evidence of his motive for reappearing at the bar

more than two hours after he was kicked out and of his mental

state as he approached Thomas and Bill. As Rizo’s theory of

defense instruction states, “[Rizo] was simply resuming the

argument from Roosters bar as all three men walked out to the

Huddleston’s trucks.” Therefore, Rizo’s conduct at Roosters was

not independent or different from the charged offense but rather

provided relevant evidence of his state of mind before and during

the shooting.

¶ 42 For the same reasons, we discern no abuse of discretion in the

court’s CRE 403 ruling. Applying CRE 401-403, see Rojas ¶ 52, we

conclude that (1) the evidence was relevant as previously discussed,

and (2) the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by

the danger of unfair prejudice.

20
¶ 43 Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the

admission of this evidence.

IV. Cumulative Error

¶ 44 When reviewing for cumulative error, we ask whether

“numerous formal irregularities, each of which in itself might be

deemed harmless, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair

trial.” Howard-Walker v. People, 2019 CO 69, ¶ 18 (quoting Oaks v.

People, 371 P.2d 443, 446 (Colo. 1962)). Because we have identified

no errors, we necessarily find no cumulative error.

V. Felony Murder Sentencing

¶ 45 Finally, Rizo contends that his LWOP sentence for felony

murder is categorically unconstitutional. We are unpersuaded.

A. Standard of Review and Controlling Law

¶ 46 We review de novo the constitutionality of statutes. Sellers v.

People, 2024 CO 64, ¶ 16.

¶ 47 Both the Eighth Amendment and its Colorado analogue

provide that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive

fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S.

Const. amend. VIII; Colo. Const. art II, § 20. “This prohibition

‘guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive

21
sanctions.’” Sellers, ¶ 17 (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460,

469 (2012)). “This right stems from the concept that punishment

for a crime should be proportionate to both the offender and the

offense. Id.

B. Analysis

¶ 48 Rizo contends that an LWOP sentence for felony murder is

categorically unconstitutional because (1) legislative changes show

that LWOP is a cruel and unusual punishment for felony murder,

and (2) a sentence to LWOP for felony murder is inconsistent with

constitutional constraints on sentencing. He also argues that even

if LWOP for felony murder is consistent with the Eighth

Amendment, we should find it unconstitutional under the Colorado

Constitution.

¶ 49 The Colorado Supreme Court recently considered and rejected

these arguments. Sellers, ¶¶ 19-37. It held that “[b]ased on

objective indicia of societal standards and evolving standards of

decency as expressed in legislative action and state practice, as well

as the exercise of our independent judgment, . . . an LWOP

sentence for felony murder for an adult offender is not categorically

unconstitutional.” Id. at ¶ 2. Further, the supreme court

22
addressed whether an LWOP sentence for felony murder fails to

service the legitimate penological goals of retribution, deterrence,

incapacitation, and rehabilitation. Id. at 35. While the supreme

court acknowledged that an LWOP sentence for felony murder

might not serve all four of these goals, specifically the goal of

rehabilitation, it concluded that this alone did not override the lack

of national consensus that an LWOP sentence for felony murder for

an adult offense is always inappropriate. Id. Finally, the supreme

court concluded that an LWOP sentence for felony murder is not

unconstitutional under the Colorado Constitution. Sellers, ¶ 36.

¶ 50 Because we are bound by the supreme court’s decision in

Sellers, see People v. Allen, 111 P.3d 518, 520 (Colo. App. 2004), we

reject Rizo’s contentions.

VI. Disposition

¶ 51 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE GOMEZ and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.

23