Peo in Interest of ZS

24CA1916 Peo in Interest of ZS 05-15-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1916
Fremont County District Court No. 22JV30093
Honorable Kaitlin B. Turner, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of Z.S., a Child,

and Concerning Z.A.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE
Lipinsky and Johnson, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 15, 2025

Eric Bellas, County Attorney, Sean R. Biddle, Assistant County Attorney,
Canon City, Colorado, for Appellee

Jennifer A. Zamarripa, Guardian Ad Litem

Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellant
¶1 Z.A. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating her

parent-child legal relationship with Z.S. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In August 2022, the Fremont County Department of Human

Services filed a petition in dependency or neglect, alleging that the

child’s psychological kinship provider — who had court-ordered

custody — had physically abused her.1 As pertinent to this appeal,

mother made a no-fault admission to the petition, and a magistrate

adjudicated the child dependent or neglected. The magistrate then

adopted a treatment plan for mother.

¶3 In January 2024, the Department moved to terminate

mother’s parental rights. The parties waived the right to a hearing

before a judge, so the magistrate conducted a termination hearing

in June 2024. Following the hearing, the magistrate granted the

Department’s motion and terminated mother’s parental rights.

1 We take judicial notice of the petition and other relevant filings in

Fremont County Case No. 22JV30049. See Harriman v. Cabela’s
Inc., 2016 COA 43, ¶ 64 (noting that appellate courts may take
judicial notice of court records in related proceedings under CRE
201(f)).

1
¶4 Mother then filed a petition for juvenile court review of the

magistrate’s ruling, asserting that (1) the Department had failed to

make reasonable efforts to investigate kinship placements and

provide family time and (2) the magistrate had erred by finding that

there was no less drastic alternative to termination. The juvenile

court rejected mother’s arguments because the record supported

the magistrate’s findings. Consequently, the court adopted the

magistrate’s order.

II. Discussion

¶5 Mother asserts that the magistrate erred by finding that (1) the

Department made reasonable efforts and (2) there was no less

drastic alternative to termination. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

¶6 The juvenile court may delegate to a magistrate its authority to

preside over a termination proceeding. § 19-1-108(1), C.R.S. 2024;

see also People in Interest of L.B-H-P., 2021 COA 5, ¶ 9. In a case

heard by a magistrate, the parties are bound by the magistrate’s

findings and recommendations, subject to a request for juvenile

court review. L.B-H-P., ¶ 9; see also § 19-1-108(3)(a.5). A juvenile

court reviewing a magistrate’s decision must adopt, reject, or modify

2
the magistrate’s initial order or judgment. C.R.M. 7(a)(10). But the

court may not alter the magistrate’s findings unless they are clearly

erroneous. C.R.M. 7(a)(9).

¶7 Our review of the juvenile court’s decision is effectively a

second layer of appellate review, and, like the juvenile court, we

must accept the magistrate’s factual findings unless they are clearly

erroneous. People in Interest of N.G., 2012 COA 131, ¶ 37.

However, we may set aside a judgment based on errors of law or

findings that do not conform to the statutory criteria. Id.

B. Reasonable Efforts

¶8 Mother first argues that the Department failed to provide her

with reasonable accommodations as required by the Americans with

Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), and the magistrate therefore erred by

finding that the Department had satisfied its reasonable efforts

obligation. See People in Interest of S.K., 2019 COA 36, ¶ 34.

Because mother did not preserve the ADA issue, we do not reach

the merits of her contention. See People v. Tallent, 2021 CO 68,

¶ 11 (“[A]n appellate court has an independent, affirmative duty to

determine whether a claim is preserved . . . , regardless of the

positions taken by the parties.”).

3
¶9 Because a petition for juvenile court review of a magistrate’s

judgment is a prerequisite to an appeal under section

19-1-108(5.5), a party must raise an issue in the juvenile court so

that the court has an opportunity to correct any error that the

magistrate may have made. People in Interest of K.L-P., 148 P.3d

402, 403 (Colo. App. 2006). In other words, a party must present

an issue to the juvenile court in a petition for review before we may

consider it on appeal. Id.; see also People in Interest of M.B., 2020

COA 13, ¶ 14 (noting that appellate courts do not consider issues

that were not raised or ruled on in the juvenile court).

¶ 10 Although mother challenged the Department’s reasonable

efforts in her petition, she did not specifically assert that the

Department failed to provide her with reasonable accommodations

under the ADA. See Martinez v. People, 2015 CO 16, ¶ 14 (“Parties

must make objections that are specific enough to draw the trial

court’s attention to the asserted error.”). Therefore, the juvenile

court did not rule on the ADA issue, and we will not address it for

the first time on appeal. See M.B., ¶ 14; K.L-P., 148 P.3d at 403;

see also People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 21 (declining

to address an unpreserved ADA claim when the court “didn’t make

4
any specific findings about the applicability of the ADA for [the

appellate court] to review”).

C. Less Drastic Alternative

¶ 11 Mother next contends that the magistrate erred by finding that

there was no less drastic alternative to termination. Specifically,

she asserts that (1) the Department failed to adequately investigate

maternal grandparents and maternal great-aunt (collectively,

maternal relatives) and (2) the maternal relatives were willing to

accept an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR). We are not

persuaded.

1. Applicable Law

¶ 12 To terminate parental rights under section 19-3-604(1)(c),

C.R.S. 2024, the magistrate must find, by clear and convincing

evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated dependent or neglected;

(2) the parent has not complied with an appropriate, court-approved

treatment plan or the plan has not been successful; (3) the parent is

unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change

in a reasonable time. Before terminating parental rights, however,

the magistrate must also consider and eliminate less drastic

alternatives. People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 19.

5
¶ 13 When considering less drastic alternatives, the magistrate

must give primary consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and

emotional conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3). To aid the

magistrate in determining whether there is a less drastic alternative

to termination, the department must evaluate a reasonable number

of people the parent identifies as placement options. People in

Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 532 (Colo. App. 2004). An APR to a

relative is not a less drastic alternative to termination if the child

needs the permanency that only adoption can provide. See People

in Interest of Z.M., 2020 COA 3M, ¶ 30.

¶ 14 A viable less drastic alternative must do more than adequately

meet a child’s needs; rather, it must be in the child’s best interests.

A.M., ¶ 27. Therefore, if the magistrate considers a less drastic

alternative but finds instead that termination is in the child’s best

interests, it must reject the less drastic alternative and order

termination. Id. at ¶ 32. Under those circumstances, we will affirm

the magistrate’s decision if its findings are supported by the record.

People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 81.

6
2. Magistrate’s Ruling and Juvenile Court’s Review

¶ 15 The magistrate determined that mother had not complied with

her treatment plan, she was unfit, and she was unlikely to become

fit within a reasonable time. The magistrate also determined that

the Department had made “efforts to assess potential kinship

placement[s]” and that there was “no less drastic alternative that

would serve the best interests of the child.”

¶ 16 On review, the juvenile court rejected mother’s assertion that

the Department failed to adequately assess the maternal relatives.

The court noted that the Department had considered placement

with maternal great-aunt but did not support it because the child

suffered significant dysregulation after visits with her. The court

also concluded that the Department had investigated maternal

grandparents but did not support placing the child with them

because, among other reasons, a friend of maternal grandfather

had “statutorily raped” mother when she was a teenager.

¶ 17 The juvenile court also rejected mother’s contention that an

APR to one of the maternal relatives was a less drastic alternative to

termination. The court noted that the magistrate had properly

“focused on the child’s need for permanency” in rejecting less

7
drastic alternatives by relying on evidence that the child “had been

in nine placements in her short life,” she needed stability to thrive,

and an APR would not provide her with the permanency that she

needed.

3. Analysis

¶ 18 We conclude the record supports the magistrate’s finding that

the Department adequately investigated relatives for placement, and

we therefore agree with the juvenile court’s conclusion. The record

shows that the Department completed a diligent search for relatives

on more than one occasion, sent out letters to the identified family

members multiple times, and investigated the relatives who

responded, including the maternal relatives. See B.H., ¶ 82

(rejecting the parent’s assertion that the Department failed to

properly investigate relatives). The record also confirms the

Department’s reasons for declining placement with the maternal

relatives, as described above. See People in Interest of T.E.M., 124

P.3d 905, 910 (Colo. App. 2005) (concluding that a long-term

placement with the child’s grandmother was not a less drastic

alternative to termination because grandmother ran a facility for

sex offenders in her home).

8
¶ 19 What’s more, the record shows that mother did not support

placing the child with maternal great-aunt for most of the case and

mother opposed maternal great-aunt’s request for a change of

placement (which the court denied). See People in Interest of Z.P.,

167 P.3d 211, 215 (Colo. App. 2007) (ratifying the court’s rejection

of a potential less drastic alternative, in part, because the parent

opposed the placement). Given this record, we are not convinced

that the Department had an obligation to continue exploring

maternal great-aunt as a placement option.

¶ 20 We also conclude the record supports the magistrate’s finding

that there was no less drastic alternative to termination. For

example, the caseworker testified that

• the child had been in nine placements throughout her life

and needed the permanency that only an adoption could

provide, see Z.M., ¶ 30;

• because of mother’s minimal participation in the case,

she did not have any relationship with the child, see

People in Interest of A.R., 2012 COA 195M, ¶ 38 (a court

may consider the benefits of an ongoing relationship with

a parent); and

9
• moving the child to a new placement would be

“detrimental” to her well-being, see A.M., ¶¶ 27, 33.

¶ 21 Mother does not identify any legal error made by the

magistrate or the juvenile court. See N.G., ¶ 37. At most, she asks

us to reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of

the magistrate. We cannot do so. See S.Z.S., ¶ 29. Rather,

because the record supports the magistrate’s findings, we cannot

disturb them. See N.G., ¶ 37; see also B.H., ¶ 81.

III. Disposition

¶ 22 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.

10