Peo v. Goldman

23CA0923 Peo v Goldman 04-10-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA0923
Boulder County District Court No. 21CR241
Honorable Nancy W. Salomone, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Yechezkel Meir Goldman,

Defendant-Appellee.

ORDER REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE KUHN
Harris and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 10, 2025

Michael T. Dougherty, District Attorney, Adam Kendall, Chief Trial Deputy,
Ryan Day, Senior Deputy District Attorney, Boulder, Colorado, for Plaintiff-
Appellant

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Kelly A. Corcoran, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee
¶1 The People appeal the district court’s order dismissing their

case against defendant, Yechezkel Meir Goldman, on the grounds

that there was not a substantial probability he would be restored to

competency to stand trial in the reasonably foreseeable future. We

reverse and remand the case to the district court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Background

¶2 In February 2021, the prosecution charged Goldman with a

single count of stalking, a class 5 felony. See § 18-3-602(1)(c),

(3)(a), C.R.S. 2024. According to the probable cause affidavit for his

arrest, Goldman had stalked his father’s massage therapist for

roughly three years. During that period, the prosecution alleged,

Goldman had shown up at the victim’s work and had sent her

unwanted emails about engaging in a personal relationship with

him. Goldman was released on a personal recognizance bond

shortly after his arrest.

¶3 In June, defense counsel filed a motion to determine

Goldman’s competency to stand trial. The district court made a

preliminary finding of incompetency and ordered the Colorado

1
Department of Human Services to perform an out-of-custody

competency evaluation of Goldman.1

¶4 Dr. Amanda Ferguson, a licensed psychologist, completed the

initial evaluation. Dr. Ferguson determined that Goldman met the

diagnostic criteria for “unspecified schizophrenia and other

psychotic disorder” and “unspecified personality disorder.” She also

indicated that erotomanic delusional disorder was under

consideration as a diagnosis. She opined that Goldman was

incompetent to proceed because his delusional beliefs about the

case and his perceived relationship with the victim significantly

impacted his ability to understand the nature of the criminal

proceedings and to effectively assist in his defense. But Dr.

Ferguson also opined that, while Goldman hadn’t been prescribed

psychotropic medications to treat his conditions, there was a fair

chance that he would be restored to competency with the use of

those medications.

1 The Colorado Mental Health Hospital in Pueblo (then known as

the Colorado Mental Health Institute at Pueblo) coordinated the
evaluation.

2
¶5 Based on this report, the district court found Goldman

incompetent to proceed and ordered outpatient competency

restoration therapy as a condition of his bond. The court also

ordered the Department to provide periodic reports detailing the

status of Goldman’s competency. Over the next eighteen months,

Dr. Ferguson completed six additional competency evaluations.2 In

each report, she opined that Goldman remained incompetent to

stand trial and that the likelihood of his restoration was “fair” with

the use of psychotropic medications but “poor” or “guarded” without

such treatment. Dr. Ferguson stated that a psychiatric assessment

and prescribed medications were “strongly recommended” under

these circumstances. In each of these reports, Dr. Ferguson also

stated that, in her opinion, “there is a substantial probability that

Mr. Goldman will be restored to competency within the reasonably

foreseeable future.”

¶6 Relying on Dr. Ferguson’s recommendations, the district court

granted the prosecution’s request for a psychiatric and medication

2 Dr. Ferguson also completed an eighth evaluation and filed a

report, dated two weeks after the court dismissed the case, that
contained the same conclusions as the others.

3
evaluation of Goldman and for the appointment of a court liaison to

assist him with finding a prescribing physician for any medications

recommended under the evaluation. Dr. Leah Brar, a forensic

psychiatrist, completed the evaluation and opined that

(1) psychiatric medications were “clinically indicated” because they

constituted a “first-line treatment” of delusional disorder;

(2) Goldman didn’t meet the “criteria for involuntary treatment

under Colorado statutes”; and (3) Goldman’s prognosis for

restoration to competency was “at least fair” with antipsychotic

medications and “poor” without any form of treatment “as untreated

delusions may persist for many years.”

¶7 Less than a week later, Goldman moved to dismiss the case

under section 16-8.5-116(4), C.R.S. 2022 (repealed 2024),3

asserting that dismissal was required because he was incompetent

to proceed and there was no substantial probability of restoring him

3 Throughout this opinion, we refer to the version of section

16-8.5-116, C.R.S. 2022, that was in effect when the district court
dismissed the case. The General Assembly has since amended the
relevant provisions twice, ultimately repealing subsection (4). See
Ch. 423, sec. 3, § 16-8.5-116(10), 2023 Colo. Sess. Laws 2484-85;
Ch. 372, sec. 12, § 16-8.5-116(3)-(4), 2024 Colo. Sess. Laws
2515-16.

4
to competency in the reasonably foreseeable future. In April 2023,

the district court granted Goldman’s motion to dismiss after a

hearing. It determined that Dr. Ferguson and Dr. Brar opined that

Goldman could be restored to competency only if he were to adhere

to a psychotropic medication regimen. And because Goldman,

among other things, wasn’t (1) prescribed such treatment;

(2) ordered by the court to take psychotropic medications; or

(3) inclined to medicate voluntarily, the court reasoned that there

was no substantial probability that he would be restored to

competency in the reasonably foreseeable future.

¶8 In accordance with section 16-8.5-116(10), the district court

stayed its order of dismissal for twenty-one days to allow the

prosecution to take “any of the steps authorized by that subsection”

and “assess their legal options for requesting that [Goldman] be

involuntarily medicated.” However, after denying the prosecution’s

motion for reconsideration, the court dismissed the case against

Goldman.

II. Analysis

¶9 On appeal, the People contend that the district court erred by

dismissing its case on the grounds that there was no substantial

5
probability of restoring Goldman to competency because all

evidence in the record suggested that, with the use of appropriate

medications, Goldman could be restored to competency in the

reasonably foreseeable future. We agree and, therefore, reverse.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 10 When, as here, a district court dismisses a charge based on its

application of the controlling legal standard to undisputed facts,

our review is de novo.4 See People v. Curren, 2014 COA 59M,

¶¶ 13-14 (reviewing de novo a district court’s application of the

speedy trial statute to undisputed facts); People v. Yakas, 2019 COA

117, ¶ 15 (noting that this principle applies to a court’s ruling on a

motion to dismiss asserting a violation of the Uniform Mandatory

Disposition of Detainers Act). Likewise, we review de novo

questions of statutory interpretation. People v. Alaniz, 2016 COA

101, ¶ 22.

4 The parties dispute whether de novo or clear error review applies

to the court’s finding that there is a substantial probability that a
particular defendant’s competency will be restored in the
reasonably foreseeable future. However, we need not definitively
resolve this dispute because the court’s finding here would fail
under either standard.

6
B. Applicable Law

¶ 11 The right to due process under the United States and Colorado

Constitutions prevents the trial of an incompetent defendant. See

Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354 (1996); People v. Zapotocky,

869 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Colo. 1994). In Colorado, that right is further

protected by statute. See § 16-8.5-101 to -124, C.R.S. 2024.

¶ 12 Under the statute, a defendant is incompetent to proceed if,

“as a result of a mental disability or developmental disability,” he

lacks “sufficient present ability to consult with [his] lawyer with a

reasonable degree of rational understanding in order to assist in the

defense,” or he “does not have a rational and factual understanding

of the criminal proceedings.” § 16-8.5-101(12). Thus, to be

competent to stand trial, a defendant must have “both a factual

understanding and cognitive ability and perceptions and

understandings that are rational and grounded in reality.” People v.

Mondragon, 217 P.3d 936, 941 (Colo. App. 2009).

¶ 13 Either defense counsel or the prosecution may file a motion to

determine competency when they have reason to believe that the

defendant is incompetent to proceed. § 16-8.5-102(2)(b), C.R.S.

2022. If a district court makes a preliminary finding of

7
incompetency over a party’s objection, or it determines that it lacks

sufficient information to make such a finding, then the court must

order “that the defendant be evaluated for competency by the

[D]epartment and that the [D]epartment prepare a court-ordered

report.” § 16-8.5-103(2), C.R.S. 2024.

¶ 14 After the court receives this report, it must enter a final

determination regarding the defendant’s competency to proceed.

§ 16-8.5-103(5). And if, as here, the defendant is incompetent and

on bond, and there is a substantial probability that services will

restore competency, then the court must order “that restoration to

competency take place on an outpatient basis, unless the

[D]epartment recommends inpatient restoration services.”

§ 16-8.5-111(2)(b)(I), C.R.S. 2022 (version effective until May 16,

2023).

¶ 15 Within ninety-one days after this order, the court must again

review the case to determine, among other things, whether there is

a substantial probability that the defendant will be restored to

competency in the reasonably foreseeable future.

§ 16-8.5-116(2)(a). The court must review the case every ninety-one

8
days thereafter until four reviews have been conducted.

§ 16-8.5-116(3).

¶ 16 After the fourth review, the court must continue to review the

defendant’s case every ninety-one days until the defendant is

restored to competency or it determines that there is no substantial

probability that the defendant will be restored to competency in the

reasonably foreseeable future. § 16-8.5-116(4). In the latter event,

“the court shall dismiss the case subject to the provisions of

subsection (10) of this section.” Id. In turn, subsection

(10) provides that prior to dismissing a case under subsection (4), a

district court must identify whether an incompetent defendant

“meets the requirements for certification pursuant to article 65 of

title 27, or for the provision of services pursuant to article 10.5 of

title 27, or whether the defendant will agree to a voluntary

commitment.” § 16-8.5-116(10). If the defendant meets the

requirements for certification or provision of services and is not

amenable to a voluntary commitment, then the court may stay the

dismissal for twenty-one days to allow the prosecution to pursue

certification proceedings or the provision of necessary services. Id.

9
C. The District Court Erred by Dismissing the Case Under
Section 16-8.5-116(4)

¶ 17 The People contend that the district erred when it concluded

that there was no substantial probability that Goldman would be

restored to competency in the reasonably foreseeable future

because “all evidence and evaluations indicate[d] that [he could] be

restored to competency with necessary medications.” Goldman

responds that this argument misconstrues the governing test

because the proper inquiry was whether it was likely that he would

“actually be restored to competency in the reasonably foreseeable

future,” not whether his restoration was possible in theory.

Goldman argues that the court correctly concluded that there was

no substantial probability that he would be restored to competency

in the reasonably foreseeable future after finding, among other

things, that (1) his prognosis for restoration was poor without

psychotropic medications; and (2) his condition was unlikely to

change given that he wasn’t even prescribed medications, much

10
less taking them under a court order or voluntarily.5 We agree with

the People.

¶ 18 The record shows that Goldman underwent eight psychological

competency evaluations with Dr. Ferguson and one psychiatric and

medication evaluation with Dr. Brar. All nine reports concluded

that, while Goldman was incompetent to stand trial at the time the

reports were completed, his competency could be restored in the

reasonably foreseeable future with adherence to appropriate

medications. Dr. Ferguson opined that psychotropic medications

were recommended because there was at least a “fair” chance that

Goldman would regain his competency with the use of those

medications. She noted that it was “unlikely that [Goldman’s]

mental health symptoms [would] remit spontaneously without the

use of psychotropic medications.” Dr. Ferguson concluded that

5 We note that Goldman’s answer brief addresses issues the People

didn’t raise in their opening brief. Specifically, Goldman argues
that the district court properly dismissed the case because the
People failed to (1) appeal the court’s ruling declining to include
adherence to psychotropic medications as a condition of his bond;
and (2) pursue, let alone establish the requirements for, involuntary
treatment with medication. In the reply brief, the People clarify that
these are not issues on appeal. We thus need not address them.
See People v. Zweygardt, 2012 COA 119, ¶ 47 (not addressing an
issue the appellant didn’t present for appellate review).

11
there was a substantial probability that Goldman “[would] be

restored to competency within the reasonably foreseeable future”

and “[would] be restored to competency and [would] likely remain

competent with the use of medications.”

¶ 19 Dr. Brar’s opinion was no different. Dr. Brar stated that

antipsychotic medications were “clinically indicated” because they

constituted a “first-line treatment” for delusional disorder. She

opined that, with antipsychotic medications, Goldman’s clinical

prognosis “should be at least fair.” However, “[w]ithout any form of

treatment,” Dr. Brar opined, “his prognosis [was] poor as untreated

delusions may persist for many years.” Under these circumstances,

Dr. Brar concluded that if Goldman “were to engage in treatment

with antipsychotic medications, he [could] indeed be restored in the

foreseeable future.”

¶ 20 True, both doctors noted that there were challenges to treating

Goldman with psychiatric medications. Dr. Brar pointed out that

Goldman had told her that he was disinterested in taking the

medications. Similarly, Dr. Ferguson noted that Goldman had a

“limited insight into his psychiatric disorder and it [was] unclear if

he [would] be willing to take medications in the future.” Moreover,

12
Dr. Ferguson reported that “while some symptoms of psychosis

tend to respond well to psychotropic medications, Mr. Goldman

displayed delusional beliefs, which may be somewhat resistant to

psychotropic medications.” But Dr. Brar noted that “[s]tudies have

indicated that delusions may at least partially respond to

antipsychotics.”

¶ 21 Regardless, Dr. Ferguson and Dr. Brar unequivocally

concluded that Goldman could be restored to competency in the

reasonably foreseeable future if he were to take antipsychotic

medications. Thus, while both doctors acknowledged that such a

treatment wasn’t certain to render Goldman competent to proceed,

the likelihood of Goldman’s restoration to competency with the use

of medications was more than just a “theoretical possibility.”

Despite this, the district court concluded that there was no

substantial probability that Goldman would be restored to

competency in the reasonably foreseeable future.

¶ 22 In reaching this conclusion, the court considered Dr.

Ferguson’s and Dr. Brar’s opinions and determined that “without

psychotropic medication[s], there was not a substantial probability

that [Goldman would] be restored to competency in the foreseeable

13
future.” And because Goldman wasn’t, among other

things, prescribed such medications, inclined to take them

voluntarily, or ordered by the court to medicate, the court

concluded that he was necessarily unlikely to be restored to

competency in the reasonably foreseeable future. We think the

court erroneously dismissed this case under section 16-8.5-116(4)

for three reasons.

¶ 23 First, the court relied almost exclusively on the fact that

Goldman wasn’t voluntarily medicating and was disinclined to take

medications in the future to conclude that he was unlikely to be

restored to competency. Put differently, the court dismissed

Goldman’s felony charge because it found that he wasn’t willing or

able6 to address his mental health conditions with the treatments

that the two doctors had recommended. This approach left

Goldman’s condition untreated, which contradicts the statute’s

objective of improving the health of defendants. See Ch. 389, sec.

1(2), 2008 Colo. Sess. Laws 1837.

6 As the reports indicated, individuals with Goldman’s condition

frequently have poor insight into their condition, making their
voluntary use of medication challenging.

14
¶ 24 More significantly, however, in reaching this conclusion the

court disregarded the fact that Goldman didn’t ever definitely

confirm whether he would or wouldn’t medicate. To be sure, he had

told Dr. Brar that he was disinterested in taking psychotropic

medications. Likewise, Dr. Ferguson reported that it was unclear

whether Goldman would be willing to medicate considering that he

had limited insight into his psychiatric disorder. And at the

hearing, the district court noted that “he does not voluntarily

consent to taking psychiatric medication.” But in response to the

court’s observation, Goldman’s counsel clarified that Goldman

hadn’t said that he would “never take[] medications” and that he

was only “waiting to see what the result of the motion to dismiss”

would be before taking a position on that issue. The court didn’t

follow up on these statements or ask Goldman to confirm his

position before ruling on his motion to dismiss the case. Instead,

the court granted Goldman’s motion primarily because he wasn’t

voluntarily medicating at the time of the hearing, even though he

hadn’t unequivocally said that he wouldn’t take the recommended

medications in the future.

15
¶ 25 Second, while the court found that there was no court order

requiring Goldman to medicate, the parties and the court were

unclear about whether psychotropic medications were a condition

of Goldman’s bond. The prosecution argued that medication

treatment was a condition of Goldman’s bond, which would have

allowed the prosecution to seek revocation of his bond; a return to

custody; and, potentially, an order for involuntary medication if he

refused to take the medications that would likely help restore him

to competency. In support of this argument, the prosecution

directed the court to the language in its November 2022 order that

said, “It is the Court’s intention that [Goldman’s] cooperation with

any psychotropic medications that are recommended by the

[psychiatric and medication] evaluation shall become a condition of

bond.” The court observed that the order was “poorly worded”:

[The November 2022 order] did not impose a
bond condition that required Mr. Goldman to
respond to a hypothetical future medication
recommendation by affirmatively seeking out a
prescribing psychiatrist, obtaining a
prescription, and then taking any medications
that individual might hypothetically prescribe.
At most, the [November 2022 order] stated an
intention to enter future orders upon receipt of
the [psychiatric and medication evaluation
report]. . . . [T]he Court has not entered any

16
order requiring Mr. Goldman to take
psychiatric medications as a condition of bond.

We note that despite these statements, the status of the orders

remains unclear. The plain language of the court’s November 2022

order said that Goldman’s compliance with the medication

treatment recommended under the psychiatric and medication

evaluation constituted a condition of his bond.7

¶ 26 Third, while Goldman hadn’t been prescribed medications at

the time of dismissal, such treatment wasn’t only “hypothetical.”

The record shows that the prosecution had made some progress on

the medication front. Specifically, in the November 2022 order, the

district court appointed Goldman a liaison to assist “with the

determination of an appropriate prescribing physician for any

medications or treatment recommended” under the psychiatric and

medication evaluation. But only days after Dr. Brar completed that

evaluation — recommending a specific medication treatment the

liaison could assist with obtaining a prescription for — Goldman

7 Regardless of the clarity of the record, there have been extensive

changes to the governing statutes, and this issue may not arise in
the same manner on remand. We therefore express no opinion on
how the district court should ultimately resolve this issue.

17
filed his motion to dismiss. The court then dismissed the

prosecution’s case in part because Goldman didn’t have a

prescription for psychiatric medications.

¶ 27 True, at the time Goldman moved to dismiss the case, he had

been facing charges for two years and had been participating in

outpatient restoration therapy at some level for about eighteen

months. But the record shows that, during that time, Goldman had

engaged only in education and psychotherapy but not the

medication that both doctors indicated would likely help restore

him to competency.8 The district court noted the challenges

associated with restoring Goldman to competency given that there

was no court order requiring him to take medications, he wasn’t

prescribed medications, and he wasn’t voluntarily medicating. The

court observed that these circumstances were causing a logjam,

where both parties were waiting for something to happen. While we

agree the court could appropriately manage the case by prodding

the parties to action, we don’t agree that it was the right junction to

8 In her report, Dr. Brar stated that while it was unclear whether

Goldman had reached the maximum benefit from education and
psychotherapy, her “clinical suspicion” was that he was “unlikely to
progress much further without the assistance of antipsychotics.”

18
simply dismiss the prosecution’s charge. Given the circumstances

of this case, we think that ruling was premature.

¶ 28 In sum, the district court erred when it dismissed the stalking

charge against Goldman after concluding that there was no

substantial probability that he would be restored to competency in

the reasonably foreseeable future on these facts. On remand, the

court should reinstate that charge and address anew the issue of

Goldman’s competency to proceed.

III. Disposition

¶ 29 The order of dismissal is reversed, and the case is remanded to

the district court to reinstate Goldman’s stalking charge and

conduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE YUN concur.

19