Peo v. Halbrooks

23CA0966 Peo v Halbrooks 04-03-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA0966
Mesa County District Court No. 22CR84
Honorable Matthew D. Barrett, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

James Rodney Halbrooks,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART,
ORDER AFFIRMED, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY
Johnson and Moultrie, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 3, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jaycey DeHoyos, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Daniel J. Sequeira, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 James Rodney Halbrooks appeals (1) the judgment of

conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of felony

menacing; (2) certain conditions of his probation sentence; and

(3) the order of restitution imposed against him. We affirm the

judgment of conviction, reverse the portion of his sentence

assigning him additional conditions of probation, affirm the

restitution order, and remand for correction of the mittimus to

remove the additional conditions of probation.

I. Background

¶2 The jury could reasonably have found the following facts from

the evidence introduced at trial.

¶3 While walking down her street, the victim heard a man’s voice

behind her calling out, “Hey, where are you going?” and “Hey, come

back here.” When she realized that the man was talking to her, she

turned around and saw a man following her and pointing a long

gun in her direction. The man told the victim that he was going to

shoot her.

¶4 The victim ran to a neighbor’s house and knocked on the door.

When the neighbor answered the door, the man turned and walked

away. The victim called 911 and described the incident to the

1
responding officers. She then suffered a stress-induced cardiac

emergency and was taken to a hospital by ambulance.

¶5 When the officers arrived, Halbrooks emerged from his

home — which was located on the same street as the victim’s

home — because he said he was curious about the heavy police

presence in the neighborhood. He admitted to the officers that he

used a rifle to chase someone off his property earlier that afternoon.

Halbrooks explained that, because his property had been

vandalized several times before, when he believed a woman had

entered his property, he walked out and confronted her “with his

.22 rifle” as a “show of force.” Halbrooks told the officers that he

followed the woman for “a short ways,” but when she knocked on

the door of another house, he “turned around and went back to his

house.” Officers searched Halbrooks’s home and collected three

rifles.

¶6 Halbrooks was charged with felony menacing, use of a weapon

while intoxicated, and possession of a weapon by a previous

offender. The prosecution later dismissed the latter two charges.

The only charge before the jury was that for felony menacing.

2
¶7 At trial, Halbrooks’s theory of defense was that he did not

interact with or threaten the victim. Instead, he asserted that he

used a rifle to chase a different woman off his property. Halbrooks

testified that he had never seen the victim before trial and that,

although he followed a different woman on the day of the incident,

he never pointed the rifle at or threatened to shoot her.

¶8 A jury found Halbrooks guilty of felony menacing. The court

sentenced him to thirty months of supervised probation. Based on

a prior conviction in California involving unlawful sexual behavior,

the court imposed additional conditions of probation for adult sex

offenders. The court also ordered Halbrooks to pay $2,600 in

restitution.

II. Sufficiency of Evidence of Identity

¶9 Halbrooks contends that his conviction must be reversed

because the prosecution failed to introduce sufficient evidence that

he was the man who followed the victim. We are unpersuaded.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 10 “The Due Process Clauses of the United States and Colorado

Constitutions require proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on

each of the essential elements of a crime.” People v. Duncan, 109

3
P.3d 1044, 1045 (Colo. App. 2004). In deciding whether the

prosecution presented sufficient evidence to support the

defendant’s conviction, we examine “whether the relevant evidence,

both direct and circumstantial, when viewed as a whole and in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, is substantial and sufficient

to support a conclusion by a reasonable mind that the defendant is

guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Donald,

2020 CO 24, ¶ 18, 461 P.3d 4, 7 (quoting Clark v. People, 232 P.3d

1287, 1291 (Colo. 2010)).

¶ 11 To prove that Halbrooks committed the crime of menacing, the

prosecution bore the burden of proving that Halbrooks knowingly,

by any threat or physical action, placed or attempted to place

another person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. See

§ 18-3-206, C.R.S. 2024. Menacing is a felony if committed, as

relevant here, “by the use of a firearm.” Id.

¶ 12 A jury must generally find that the prosecution proved all

elements of a charged offense — including identity — beyond a

reasonable doubt. See Gorostieta v. People, 2022 CO 41, ¶ 18, 516

P.3d 902, 905; see also People v. Watkins, 553 P.2d 819, 821 (Colo.

1976) (“[T]he identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the

4
crime charged is an element of the crime which must be proven

beyond a reasonable doubt.”). But “[f]or the evidence to be

sufficient[,] it is not essential that an identifying witness make a

positive identification or that he be free from doubt as to the

correctness of his opinion.” People v. Jenkins, 768 P.2d 727, 729

(Colo. App. 1988). “Rather, uncertainty in identification is a matter

of weight and witness credibility to be considered by the jury in

reaching its determination.” Id.; see also People v. Harland, 251

P.3d 515, 519 (Colo. App. 2010).

¶ 13 A defendant may present a sufficiency of the evidence

argument for the first time on appeal. McCoy v. People, 2019 CO

44, ¶ 2, 442 P.3d 379, 382. “When a defendant challenges the

sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[w]e review the record de novo to

determine whether the evidence before the jury was sufficient both

in quantity and quality to sustain the defendant’s conviction.’”

Johnson v. People, 2023 CO 7, ¶ 13, 524 P.3d 36, 40 (quoting Clark,

232 P.3d at 1291).

5
B. The Evidence Was Sufficient to Support Halbrooks’s
Conviction for Felony Menacing

¶ 14 Halbrooks contends that the prosecution failed to introduce

sufficient evidence that he was the man who followed the victim

because the testimony of the prosecution’s witnesses either involved

impermissibly suggestive identification procedures or had minimal

evidentiary value.

¶ 15 The jury heard the following evidence of identity.

¶ 16 The prosecution introduced into evidence the victim’s 911 call,

in which she described the person who followed her as a white man

with a gray beard, gray hair, and “maybe a tattoo.” At trial, the

victim testified that the man was “thinner,” with “long-ish, messy

hair.” Although the victim testified that she is legally blind, she

said, “[I]f I blink, I have a second of clarity. But otherwise, it just

gets staticky again. I have to keep blinking it away.”

¶ 17 The neighbor testified that the man might have been bald or

had light hair but that she “couldn’t swear to that.” A witness who

happened to drive by the incident said that she was able to observe

the man for “about two to three minutes” and described the gun he

6
was holding. The record shows that all three witnesses observed

the man during daylight hours.

¶ 18 The witnesses agreed that the man was not wearing a shirt.

The police officers who spoke with Halbrooks on the day of the

incident asked him if he had been shirtless that afternoon. He

responded that he was “possibly bare chested, as it was warmer

earlier in the day.” Halbrooks testified at trial that he was “bare

chested” in his house that day but that he would not have walked

outside without a shirt.

¶ 19 Two of the witnesses described Halbrooks’s pants as blue

jeans. The officers said he was wearing “blue pants.” Although the

victim told the 911 operator that the man “maybe [had] a tattoo,”

none of the three witnesses testified at trial that they specifically

remembered seeing tattoos on the man.

¶ 20 At trial, the victim visually identified Halbrooks as the man

who had followed her. After Halbrooks testified in his defense, the

prosecution recalled the victim, who said that Halbrooks’s voice

matched the voice of the man who had followed her.

¶ 21 The neighbor testified that she does not “see all that well” and

that she did not get a good enough look at the man to identify his

7
face. The driver, who had visually identified Halbrooks at the crime

scene, identified him again at trial. But on cross-examination, she

conceded that, during her first identification, it was getting dark,

and he was already in handcuffs.

¶ 22 The three witnesses each described the man’s gun differently.

The victim told the 911 operator that Halbrooks had held “a weird

gun . . . like a dart gun or an arrow gun.” She said it was “long,”

but it was not “like a rifle.” The neighbor testified that, although

she knew “nothing about guns,” the gun “looked like some kind of

rifle.” The driver described it as a “machine gun.” No witness could

identify any of three guns that the officers recovered from

Halbrooks’s house. Halbrooks testified that he used a .22 caliber

rifle to scare the woman off his property.

¶ 23 We conclude that the evidence was sufficient in both quantity

and quality to prove that Halbrooks was the man who followed the

victim. The descriptions of the witnesses who saw the man on the

day of the incident were largely consistent. The officers’ testimony

regarding Halbrooks’s attire on the day of the incident matched the

witnesses’ descriptions of the man’s clothing. Further, the jury was

able to compare the witnesses’ contemporaneous descriptions of the

8
man with Halbrooks’s physical appearance at trial and photographs

of him that the defense introduced into evidence.

¶ 24 The prosecution presented visual identifications of Halbrooks

from the two witnesses who had the best view of him: the victim

and the driver. And because the victim was visually impaired, the

prosecution recalled her to testify that she recognized Halbrooks’s

voice as that of the man who had followed her. To the extent

Halbrooks argues in his opening brief that some of the

identifications were unduly suggestive, in his reply brief, he

expressly abandoned the argument that any of the identifications

were inadmissible.

¶ 25 Significantly, Halbrooks’s contemporaneous statement to the

officers closely matched the victim’s report: that he followed a

woman while holding a gun until she knocked on the front door of

another house, at which time he returned home. It was the jury’s

role to consider the likelihood that two substantially similar

incidents occurred on the same street on the same afternoon. See

People v. Poe, 2012 COA 166, ¶ 14, 316 P.3d 13, 16 (“It is the fact

finder’s role to weigh the credibility of witnesses, to determine the

9
weight to give all parts of the evidence, and to resolve conflicts,

inconsistencies, and disputes in the evidence.”).

¶ 26 While Halbrooks supports his sufficiency argument by

pointing to discrepancies between the witnesses’ initial statements

to the officers and the witnesses’ trial testimony, we conclude that

the differences went to the weight of the evidence. The court did

not limit Halbrooks’s cross-examination of the witnesses on the

portions of their testimony where the witnesses expressed

uncertainty or contradicted one another. “We may not ‘substitute

[our] judgment for that of the jury and reweigh the evidence or the

credibility of witnesses.’” Id. (quoting People v. Sharp, 104 P.3d

252, 256 (Colo. App. 2004)).

¶ 27 Indeed, because Halbrooks does not contend that the court

erred by admitting the witnesses’ testimony, our role is limited to

determining whether the evidence was substantial and sufficient to

support a conclusion by a reasonable mind that Halbrooks was

guilty of menacing. See Donald, ¶ 18, 461 P.3d at 7. We conclude

that the evidence introduced at trial, described above, satisfies this

standard. Thus, we reject Halbrooks’s contention that the

10
prosecution presented insufficient evidence that he was the man

who followed the victim.

III. Conditions of Probation

¶ 28 According to a report from the National and Colorado Crime

Information Center databases, Halbrooks had a prior conviction for

statutory rape under section 261.5 of the California penal code (the

California statutory rape statute). Based on Halbrooks’s California

conviction, the trial court determined he was a “sex offender” for

purposes of section 16-11.7-102(2)(a)(IV), C.R.S. 2024, and,

therefore, imposed additional probation conditions for sex offenders

(the additional conditions), including restrictions on his internet

access. Halbrooks contends that his prior California conviction was

insufficient, without further analysis, to allow the court to impose

the additional conditions.

¶ 29 After comparing the elements of the California statutory rape

statute with the elements of unlawful sexual contact found in

section 18-3-404(1.5), C.R.S. 2024 (the Colorado unlawful sexual

contact statute), which the People argue are equivalent statutes, we

conclude that Halbrooks could not be deemed a “sex offender” in

Colorado because of the material differences between the statutes.

11
(Halbrooks alternatively contends that the court abused its

discretion by imposing the additional conditions, but in light of our

analysis of the Colorado sex offender probation statute, we need not

reach that issue.)

A. Standard of Review

¶ 30 To impose the additional conditions, the court was required to

determine whether, in light of his prior conviction, Halbrooks was a

“sex offender” for purposes of the Colorado sex offender probation

statute. We review that question de novo. See People v. Boling, 261

P.3d 503, 505 (Colo. App. 2011).

¶ 31 Halbrooks did not specifically preserve his legal argument that

he is not a sex offender based on the differences between the

California statutory rape statute under which he was convicted and

the crimes that trigger sex offender probation in Colorado. Thus,

we review this argument for plain error. An error is plain if it is

obvious and substantial. Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 14, 288

P.3d 116, 120. An error is obvious if it is “so clear-cut” that the

court “should be able to avoid it without benefit of objection.”

People v. Crabtree, 2024 CO 40M, ¶ 42, 550 P.3d 656, 667 (quoting

Romero v. People, 2017 CO 37, ¶ 6, 393 P.3d 973, 976).

12
“Consequently . . . [the] error must contravene a clear statutory

command, a well-settled legal principle, or established Colorado

case law.” Id. An error is substantial if it “so undermined the

fundamental fairness of the trial itself as to cast serious doubt on

the reliability of the judgment of conviction.” Id. at ¶ 43, 550 P.3d

at 667 (quoting Wilson v. People, 743 P.2d 415, 420 (Colo. 1987)).

B. The Law Governing Conditions of Probation

¶ 32 “Generally, a sentencing court has discretion in determining

the appropriate conditions of probation.” People v. Silvanic, 2023

COA 16, ¶ 24, 529 P.3d 1240, 1246. “But a sentencing court’s

imposition of probation conditions is not without limitation.” Id. at

¶ 25, 529 P.3d at 1246. “[P]robation conditions [must] be

reasonably related to a defendant’s rehabilitation and the purposes

of probation,” which include “enhancing the reintegration of the

offender into a responsible lifestyle and affording society a measure

of protection against recidivism.” Id. at ¶ 27, 529 P.3d at 1246

(quoting People v. Brockelman, 933 P.2d 1315, 1318-19 (Colo.

1997)).

¶ 33 The General Assembly has specified when a defendant is an

appropriate candidate for additional conditions of probation for

13
adult sex offenders based on a prior out-of-state conviction. See

§ 16-11.7-102(2)(a)(IV). As relevant here, a “sex offender” is any

person who (1) was “evaluated because of a discretionary request”

by a court; (2) a court “determines should undergo sex offender

treatment based upon the recommendations of the evaluation”;

(3) is “convicted in the state of Colorado on or after January 1,

1994, of any criminal offense”; and (4) “has previously been

convicted in any other jurisdiction of any offense that would

constitute a sex offense” as defined in the statute. Id. The statute

provides for heightened evaluation, treatment, and monitoring of

“sex offenders.” §§ 16-11.7-104 to -105, C.R.S. 2024.

C. Additional Background

¶ 34 Halbrooks’s criminal history showed that he was convicted of a

sexual offense in California more than twenty-six years before his

trial in this case. The history showed he was originally charged

under the California statute criminalizing “oral copulation with a

person under sixteen.” Cal. Penal Code § 288a(b)(2) (West 1997)

(current version at Cal. Penal Code § 287(b)(2)). But the history

also showed that the charge was later dismissed and that

Halbrooks was convicted of an added count under the California

14
statutory rape statute, Cal. Penal Code § 261.5(a) (West 1997). The

prosecutor told the court that he had requested documentation of

Halbrooks’s conviction from California officials, but they had

responded, “the records don’t exist.”

¶ 35 At the conclusion of trial, the court found that Halbrooks had

a prior “sex offense” conviction on his record and ordered a sex

offense specific evaluation (SOSE). Defense counsel did not object

to the SOSE.

¶ 36 The SOSE said the following about Halbrooks’s prior

conviction:

Halbrooks acknowledged that he had a case
from 1996 in California, but claimed he does
not remember much. He explained he has had
multiple traumatic brain injuries (TBI) and
struggles with memory. He believes the case
was sexual in nature, but he believes the
charges were dropped because of a lack of
evidence. He stated, “When I was 21 this 17
year old girl was dating a friend of mine and
we were all hanging out. Nothing ever
happened, but the DA tried to put some
charges on me.”

The drafter of the SOSE recommended that Halbrooks participate in

sex offense specific therapy based on “the existence of [his] sexual

offense and the unknown factors surrounding this offense as a

15
result of [his] denial and/or memory problems and lack of collateral

information.” The subsequent presentence investigation (PSI) report

recommended that the court order Halbrooks to comply with the

additional conditions, including conditions restricting his internet

usage.

¶ 37 The court sentenced Halbrooks to thirty months of supervised

probation with the “standard conditions of supervision.” Based on

Halbrooks’s prior conviction, the court also imposed the additional

conditions, as recommended in the PSI report. The court reasoned

that “the recommendations in the [PSI report] suggest that

[Halbrooks is] a moderate risk to recidivate” and that “there is a

need for treatment.” The additional conditions included, for

example, that Halbrooks would not — without first seeking approval

from his probation officer — have contact with children, go to

locations where children are usually present, enter a new sexual or

romantic relationship, or change residences. Further, the court

imposed “Special Additional Condition 23,” which substantially

limited Halbrooks’s ability to use the internet:

I will not subscribe to or use any Internet
service provider, by modem, LAN, DSL, or any
other avenue (to include but not be limited to

16
satellite dishes, PDAs, electronic games, web
televisions, Internet appliances and
cellular/digital telephones) and will not use
another person’s Internet or use the Internet
through any avenue until approved in advance
by the probation officer in consultation with
the community supervision team. This
includes but is not limited to the following
activities: web browsing/surfing; email;
Internet-related interpersonal communication
(e.g. chatting, texting, instant messaging,
participating in interactive games); producing
web content; Internet-related telephone
communication (e.g. Skype, Voice Over
Internet Protocol); and file sharing through any
means.

D. Halbrooks Is Not a Sex Offender Under Colorado Law

¶ 38 The court has discretion to order a SOSE for a person who

“may be determined to be a sex offender based upon a prior

offense.” § 16-11-102(1)(b)(I), C.R.S. 2024. For purposes of this

case, the General Assembly defined a “sex offender” as any person

who

(A) Was evaluated because of a discretionary
request by a prosecuting attorney or court
pursuant to section 16-11-102; and

(B) A court determines should undergo sex
offender treatment based upon the
recommendations of the evaluation and
identification pursuant to section 16-11.7-104;
and

17
(C) Is convicted in the state of Colorado on or
after January 1, 1994, of any criminal offense
and, if the person has previously been
convicted of a sex offense as defined in
subsection (3) of this section, in the state of
Colorado; or if the person has previously been
convicted in any other jurisdiction of any
offense that would constitute a sex offense as
defined in subsection (3) of this section; or if
the person has a history of any sex offenses as
defined in subsection (3) of this section.

§ 16-11.7-102(2)(a)(IV). As relevant here, section 16-11.7-102(3)

states that unlawful sexual contact is a “sex offense.”

¶ 39 This case turns on whether the second part of section 16-11.7-

102(2)(a)(IV)(C) was satisfied: whether Halbrooks “ha[d] previously

been convicted in any other jurisdiction of any offense that would

constitute a sex offense as defined” in section 16-11.7-102(3).

Specifically, we consider whether a conviction under the California

statutory rape statute “would constitute [the] sex offense” of

unlawful sexual contact under section 16-11.7-102(3).

¶ 40 Halbrooks initially argues that the prosecution did not provide

the court with sufficient documentation to establish the specific

offense of which he was convicted in California. Because we

conclude that a conviction under the California statutory rape

statute is not necessarily the equivalent of a conviction under the

18
Colorado unlawful sexual contact statute, we need not opine on this

issue. Thus, we assume, without deciding, that the documentation

of Halbrooks’s prior criminal history was sufficient and turn to the

analysis of the key statutes.

¶ 41 Section 18-3-404(1.5) provides that

[a]ny person who knowingly, with or without
sexual contact, induces or coerces a child by
any of the means set forth in section
18-3-402[, C.R.S. 2024,] to expose intimate
parts or to engage in any sexual contact,
intrusion, or penetration with another person,
for the purpose of the actor’s own sexual
gratification, commits unlawful sexual contact.

For purposes of the Colorado unlawful sexual contact statute, a

“child” is any person under eighteen years old. Id.

¶ 42 In contrast, the California statutory rape statute criminalizes

“an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person who is not

the spouse of the perpetrator, if the person is a minor.” Cal. Penal

Code § 261.5(a) (West 1997). For purposes of the California

statutory rape statute, a “minor” is a person under eighteen years

old. Id.

¶ 43 The relevant elements of each offense are:

19
The California The Colorado
Statutory Rape Statute Unlawful Sexual Contact
Statute

Unlawful sexual intercourse: Unlawful sexual contact:
• An act of sexual • Knowingly
intercourse • With or without sexual
• Accomplished with a contact
person • Inducing or coercing a child
• Who is not the spouse of • By means set forth in
the perpetrator section 18-3-402
• And who is a minor • To expose intimate parts or
to engage in any sexual
contact, intrusion, or
penetration with another
person
• For the purpose of the
actor’s own sexual
gratification

¶ 44 Because the statutes are materially different, as explained

further below, we conclude that Halbrooks’s conviction for violating

the California statutory rape statute was not equivalent to a

conviction for violating the Colorado unlawful sexual contact

statute.

¶ 45 Section 18-3-402 — Colorado’s sexual assault statute —

provides that a sexual assault occurs if “[a]ny actor . . . knowingly

inflicts sexual intrusion or sexual penetration on a victim,” and

(a) the actor causes “sexual intrusion or sexual penetration

knowing the victim does not consent”;

20
(b) the actor “knows that the victim is incapable of

appraising the nature of the victim’s conduct”;

(c) the actor “knows that the victim submits erroneously,

believing the actor to be the victim’s spouse”;

(d) “the victim is less than fifteen years of age and the actor

is at least four years older than the victim and is not the

spouse of the victim”;

(e) “the victim is at least fifteen years of age but less than

seventeen years of age and the actor is at least ten years

older than the victim and is not the spouse of the victim”;

(f) the victim “is in custody of law or detained in a hospital

or other institution” and the actor uses a “position of

authority to coerce the victim to submit”;

(g) “while purporting to offer a medical service,” the actor

“engages in treatment or examination of a victim for other

than a bona fide medical purpose or in a manner

substantially inconsistent with reasonable medical

practices”; or

(h) the actor knows that “the victim is physically helpless

and the victim has not consented.”

21
§ 18-3-402(1). All eight of these ways of committing sexual assault

are “means” for purposes of the Colorado unlawful sexual contact

statute. See People v. Mena, 2025 COA 14, ¶ 43, ___ P.3d ___, ___.

Thus, in addition to its burden to prove the elements of knowledge

and inducement or coercion, to obtain a conviction under the

Colorado unlawful sexual contact statute, the prosecution must

also prove that the defendant employed one of the eight means.

Further, the prosecution must establish that the actor acted for the

specific purpose of his own sexual gratification. § 18-3-404(1.5).

¶ 46 In contrast, to obtain a conviction under the California

statutory rape statute, the prosecution need not prove one of the

eight means found in section 18-3-402(1), that the defendant acted

knowingly, that the child’s sexual contact was induced or coerced,

or the defendant acted for the specific purpose of his own sexual

gratification. See Cal. Penal Code § 261.5(a) (West 1997). Rather,

an adult could be convicted under the California statutory rape

statute merely by engaging in sexual intercourse with a person, not

the adult’s spouse, under the age of eighteen. See id.

¶ 47 Thus, the two offenses are not sufficiently comparable such

that conduct resulting in a conviction under the California statutory

22
rape statute would automatically result in a conviction under the

Colorado unlawful sexual contact statute if the conduct occurred in

this state. Unlawful sexual intercourse under the California

statutory rape statute does not necessarily “constitute a sex

offense” as defined in section 16-11.7-102(3). Under some

circumstances, proof of a defendant’s conduct that would be

sufficient for a conviction under the California statutory rape

statute may also be sufficient to establish the elements of unlawful

sexual contact in Colorado. However, based on the limited evidence

in the record regarding Halbrooks’s twenty-six-year-old conviction,

that is not the case here. Thus, the evidence did not establish that

Halbrooks had a prior conviction for a “sex offense” under section

16-11.7-102(2)(a)(IV)(C). For the same reasons, the court erred by

concluding that Halbrooks was a “sex offender” for purposes of

section 16-11.7-102(2)(a)(IV) and therefore by ordering him to

comply with the additional conditions.

E. The Error Was Obvious and Substantial

¶ 48 Having concluded that the court erred, we now consider

whether the error was plain. We conclude that it was.

23
¶ 49 First, the error was obvious. The court’s erroneous

classification of Halbrooks as a sex offender resulted from its

misapplication of a clear statutory command — section

16-11.7-102(2)(a)(IV) — which provides that a prior conviction can

serve as the basis for sex offender status only if it “would constitute

a sex offense as defined in subsection (3) of this section.” If the

court had compared the California and Colorado statutes, as we do

above, the court would have realized that the two statutes require

different elements of proof.

¶ 50 Second, the court’s error was substantial. While the error did

not necessarily cast doubt on the reliability of the judgment of

conviction, it “affected ‘the substantial rights of the accused.’”

Crabtree, ¶ 43, 550 P.3d at 667 (quoting People v. Stewart, 55 P.3d

107, 120 (Colo. 2002)). Those rights included Halbrooks’s ability to

engage in conduct as basic as visiting a public park, entering into a

new romantic relationship, or moving residences without first

seeking approval from his probation officer. Most importantly, the

court’s erroneous classification of Halbrooks as a sex offender

curtailed his ability to use the internet, a significant part of

everyday life.

24
¶ 51 For these reasons, the court’s classification of Halbrooks as a

sex offender and its imposition of the additional conditions cannot

stand. Because Halbrooks did not appeal the court’s imposition of

the standard conditions of supervision, we express no opinion on

that portion of Halbrooks’s sentence.

IV. Restitution

¶ 52 Halbrooks contends that the court erred by ordering

restitution because the prosecution presented insufficient evidence

to prove a causal link between his criminal conduct and the victim’s

mental health condition for which she received treatment. We

disagree.

A. Additional Background

¶ 53 At Halbrooks’s sentencing hearing, the prosecutor requested

restitution in the amount of $2,600, which the county crime victim

compensation board (CVCB) had already paid on the victim’s behalf,

but said he needed additional time to determine whether to include

other expenses in the restitution request. The court granted the

prosecution’s request and set a hearing on restitution.

¶ 54 Before the restitution hearing, the prosecution filed a victim

impact statement, in which the victim detailed how Halbrooks’s

25
actions affected her mental health, as well as the financial support

she received from the CVCB to cover the cost of mental health

counseling.

¶ 55 At the restitution hearing, the prosecution presented a written

summary reflecting the dates and expenses of the victim’s

counseling sessions for which the CVCB had paid. The prosecution

also presented testimony from a CVCB administrator, who

connected the financial assistance provided on behalf of the victim

with the harm resulting from Halbrooks’s actions. The

administrator explained that, because the financial assistance was

for “mental health” expenses, the summary was the only document

she was “permitted to generate and file with the Court by [CVCB]

policy.” Halbrooks did not call any witnesses. The court ordered

Halbrooks to pay restitution to the CVCB in the amount of $2,600.

B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 56 The restitution statute provides, “Every order of conviction . . .

shall include consideration of restitution.” § 18-1.3-603(1), C.R.S.

2024. We generally review a restitution award for an abuse of

discretion. People v. Fregosi, 2024 COA 6, ¶ 39, 547 P.3d 402, 410.

But when, as here, a party challenges the sufficiency of the

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evidence supporting a restitution award, we review de novo whether

the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, when viewed as a

whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, supports

the restitution award. People v. Stone, 2020 COA 24, ¶ 7, 471 P.3d

1159, 1162-63; People v. Barbre, 2018 COA 123, ¶ 25, 429 P.3d 95,

99.

¶ 57 “After a [CVCB] makes a payment to a victim, it might ask a

court to order the defendant in the victim’s case to pay restitution”

to the CVCB. People v. Henry, 2018 COA 48M, ¶ 1, 439 P.3d 33,

34. A CVCB may establish the payments it made on behalf of a

victim through (1) “a list of the amount of money paid to each

provider” or (2) “summary data reflecting what total payments were

made,” if “the identity or location of a provider would pose a threat

to the safety or welfare of the victim.” § 18-1.3-603(10)(b). A CVCB

may provide summary data to document the amount it paid for the

victim’s mental health counseling, among other expenses.

§ 18-1.3-603(10)(b)(II).

¶ 58 The prosecution has the burden of proving, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant’s criminal

conduct proximately caused the victim’s loss. Fregosi, ¶ 44, 547

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P.3d at 410. “Proximate cause in the context of restitution is

defined as a cause which in natural and probable sequence

produced the claimed injury and without which the claimed injury

would not have been sustained.” People v. Rice, 2020 COA 143,

¶ 24, 478 P.3d 1276, 1282, overruled on other grounds by People v.

Weeks, 2021 CO 75, ¶ 39, 498 P.3d 142, 154-55.

¶ 59 The General Assembly established a rebuttable presumption

that the prosecution meets its burden to prove proximate cause

when a CVCB pays a provider on a victim’s behalf. “If, as a result of

the defendant’s conduct, a [CVCB] has provided assistance to or on

behalf of a victim . . . , the amount of assistance provided and

requested by the [CVCB] is presumed to be a direct result of the

defendant’s criminal conduct.” § 18-1.3-603(10)(a).

¶ 60 After a CVCB establishes the amount it paid on behalf of a

victim, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that the

payment was not for services directly resulting from his criminal

conduct. See Stone, ¶ 24, 471 P.3d at 1164. The two-step process

for making such a showing is set forth in section 24-4.1-107.5(3),

C.R.S. 2024. See Fregosi, ¶¶ 53-55, 547 P.3d at 411. First, the

defendant may request “an in camera review” of the CVCB’s

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records, so long as the request “is not speculative and is based on

an evidentiary hypothesis that warrants” such review.

§ 24-4.1-107.5(3). Second, following the in camera review, the

court may provide the defendant with information from the records

that it finds is “necessary for the defendant to dispute the amount

claimed for restitution” and would not “pose any threat to the safety

or welfare of the victim” or “violate any other privilege or

confidentiality right.” Id.

C. Halbrooks Did Not Overcome
the Statutory Rebuttable Presumption

¶ 61 We reject Halbrooks’s sufficiency challenge for three reasons.

First, the record supports the court’s determination that the CVCB

was only required to provide summary data to support the

prosecution’s restitution request. Second, the record demonstrates

that the prosecution relied on additional evidence at the restitution

hearing, besides the summary data, to establish that Halbrooks

proximately caused the victim’s injuries for which she sought the

mental health counseling and for which the CVCB paid. Third,

Halbrooks offered no evidence to rebut the statutory presumption of

causation.

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¶ 62 First, the record supports the court’s determination that

disclosing the identity or location of the victim’s mental health

provider posed a risk to the victim. In the victim impact statement,

the victim raised concerns about her mental health and recovery

and said she no longer feels safe in her home or community. She

also expressed concern that Halbrooks knew where she lived from a

restraining order entered against him.

¶ 63 In addition, as the CVCB noted in its summary of the victim’s

mental health counseling expenses that it had paid, the Colorado

Supreme Court has recognized that the relationship between a

mental health provider and a patient must be confidential and that

the mere threat of disclosure destroys the sanctity of the provider-

patient relationship. See People v. Sisneros, 55 P.3d 797, 802 (Colo.

2002). Given the concerns for the victim’s safety, welfare, and

treatment efficacy, the prosecution’s summary complied with

section 18-1.3-603(10)(b)(II), which limits disclosure of a victim’s

mental health counseling expenses to “summary data reflecting

what total payments were made.”

¶ 64 Second, the record demonstrates that the prosecution relied

on more than the summary data to support its restitution request.

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Halbrooks does not address the additional evidence that the

prosecution presented to support its restitution request — the

testimony from the CVCB administrator. See Fregosi, ¶ 47, 547

P.3d at 411. During the hearing, the administrator testified that,

before the CVCB can authorize a payment for mental health

services, the provider must submit a treatment plan that includes a

sworn declaration that the treatment is “related to the crime” and

that “all treatment that [the provider] render[s] and bill[s] to the

[CVCB] will be related to the crime.” If, after reviewing the

treatment plan, the CVCB determines that it is directly related to

the crime, the CVCB can authorize a specified “number of sessions”

or a “dollar amount worth of therapy treatments.” The

administrator testified that the CVCB followed this procedure in

Halbrooks’s case.

¶ 65 Lastly, Halbrooks offered no evidence to rebut the statutory

presumption of causation. The prosecution satisfied its burden of

production by establishing that the CVCB paid $2,600 for the

victim’s mental health counseling expenses. The burden then

shifted to Halbrooks to negate the causal link between his criminal

action and the mental health counseling expenses that the CVCB

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had paid. See Stone, ¶ 24, 471 P.3d at 1164. Rather than

presenting evidence through the two-step process outlined in

section 24-4.1-107.5(3), Halbrooks merely alleged that the CVCB’s

summary was insufficient to support the prosecution’s restitution

request.

¶ 66 For these reasons, the court did not err by ordering Halbrooks

to pay $2,600 in restitution.

V. Disposition

¶ 67 We affirm Halbrooks’s judgment of conviction, reverse the

imposition of the additional terms and conditions of probation for

adult sex offenders, and affirm the restitution order. We remand for

correction of the mittimus to remove the references to “Non-SOISP

with all standard terms and cond[.] of non-SOISP” and “addit[i]onal

cond[.] #23, 26, and 27 and follow through with any treatment.”

JUDGE JOHNSON and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.

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