Peo v. Meza-Franco

23CA1705 Peo v Meza-Franco 04-03-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1705
Weld County District Court No. 20CR1721
Honorable Vincente G. Vigil, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Jose De Jesus Meza-Franco,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE
Lipinsky and Johnson, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 3, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Grant R. Fevurly, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Adrienne R. Teodorovic, Alternate Defense Counsel, Windsor, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Jose De Jesus Meza-Franco, appeals the judgment

of conviction entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of multiple

counts of conspiracy to sell or distribute cocaine and one count of

money laundering. We reverse the judgment of conviction and

remand for a new trial.

I. Background

¶2 This case arises from a Weld County Drug Task Force

investigation into a drug distribution network (the network).

During the investigation, officers lawfully obtained authorization to

wiretap phone lines belonging to Jose Arellano-Arredondo, whom

officers believed to be one of two people at the top of the network.

During the investigation, law enforcement identified Meza-Franco as

an “alternate source” of narcotics for the network, who allowed the

network to store narcotics on his property, known as the “farm.” In

addition to the wiretap surveillance, officers conducted passive

surveillance at locations connected to Meza-Franco and

Arellano-Arredondo.

¶3 Based upon evidence gathered from the wiretapped phone

calls (wiretap calls) and passive surveillance, the prosecution

charged Meza-Franco with two counts of conspiracy to sell or

1
distribute cocaine (between 14 grams and 225 grams), one count of

conspiracy to possess with intent to sell or distribute cocaine

(between 14 grams and 225 grams), one count of conspiracy to sell

or distribute cocaine (more than 225 grams), and one count of

money laundering. Before trial, the prosecution dismissed the

count of conspiracy to sell or distribute (more than 225 grams). A

jury found Meza-Franco guilty on the remaining counts. The court

sentenced Meza-Franco to thirty-six years in the custody of the

Department of Corrections — eight years for each of the three

conspiracy convictions and twelve years for money laundering, all

running consecutively.

¶4 On appeal, Meza-Franco alleges two errors by the trial court in

admitting expert testimony from Investigator Valentin Oliveros, the

lead investigator on the case. Meza-Franco argues that Investigator

Oliveros’s testimony exceeded the scope of his expertise because it

(1) went beyond merely defining and explaining narcotics-related

“price[s], quantities, and terminology” and improperly relied on his

factual knowledge of the investigation (dual capacity testimony) and

(2) “usurped the jury’s role in finding the facts” by improperly

summarizing the evidence to support “[Investigator] Oliveros’s belief

2
in Meza-Franco’s guilt.” As discussed below, we disagree with

Meza-Franco’s first assertion. With respect to his second assertion,

we disagree that Investigator Oliveros improperly summarized

evidence, but we agree that certain portions of Investigator

Oliveros’s testimony usurped the jury’s role, and, as a result, we

reverse Meza-Franco’s convictions on the conspiracy counts. And

because, under the circumstances, proof of the conspiracy offenses

was necessary to prove the money laundering charge, we also

reverse that conviction.

II. Whether Investigator Oliveros’s Testimony Exceeded the Scope
of His Expert Qualification

A. Additional Facts

¶5 At trial, the court qualified Investigator Oliveros as an expert

in “narcotics and culture including prices, amounts for personal

use and distribution and terminology” and the Spanish language.

Investigator Oliveros testified that he was the lead agent assigned to

the investigation; listened to “hundreds, if not thousands” of

wiretapped calls; and pulled and reviewed recordings of calls

relevant to the case before testifying. The prosecution offered as

exhibits transcripts of certain wiretap calls, each of which was

3
related to one of the charged counts against Meza-Franco.

Meza-Franco did not object to the admission of the wiretap call

transcripts generally. He did object to Investigator Oliveros’s

interpretation of the content of the wiretap calls, however, arguing

that the transcripts should be allowed to “stand on [their] own

without explanation” from Investigator Oliveros and that the jurors

should review the transcripts to “determine on their own what they

think is going on.”

¶6 The court overruled Meza-Franco’s objection, concluding that

Investigator Oliveros could “opine on interpretations of coded

language and may discuss the context of the investigation

and . . . testify as to what he believes the conversation[s] to be

about.” The court also said it would instruct the jurors to “decide

what weight or value they give the testimony of any experts [who]

have testified at trial.” Thereafter, Investigator Oliveros testified to

the circumstances surrounding the transcribed wiretap calls, their

content, and his interpretations of the content as it related to each

charged count.

4
1. First Conspiracy Count and Money Laundering Count

¶7 The first conspiracy and money laundering counts

corresponded to wiretap calls between June 29, 2020, and July 6,

2020. Investigator Oliveros testified he believed that Meza-Franco

and Arellano-Arredondo were discussing the arrival of a shipment of

cocaine because the prices and amounts they discussed were

consistent with the prices and amounts of drugs officers had

obtained from the network in undercover buys. Investigator

Oliveros said he interpreted Meza-Franco’s statement that “he

w[ould] take three” to mean that Meza-Franco participated with

Arellano-Arredondo in distributing cocaine to others, and

Arellano-Arredondo’s statement to Meza-Franco that “we can just

buy the five” as reflecting a “partnership” to purchase five ounces of

cocaine.

¶8 Investigator Oliveros also described surveillance video from

Arellano-Arredondo’s residence on June 30, which showed

Meza-Franco’s brother and a van in which an undercover officer

investigating the network had previously seen Arellano-Arredondo

arrive to complete a controlled drug buy.

5
¶9 Investigator Oliveros opined that the events in the video, along

with phone calls leading up to them, were indicative “that a

narcotics transaction potentially had occurred.”

¶ 10 Investigator Oliveros also testified about communications

between and surveillance of Meza-Franco and Arellano-Arredondo

during this time that he believed demonstrated Meza-Franco was

coordinating with Arrellano-Arredondo to receive and distribute

cocaine.

2. Second Conspiracy Count

¶ 11 The second conspiracy count related to several wiretap calls

between Meza-Franco and Arellano-Arredondo on July 9, 2020.

Investigator Oliveros testified that Arellano-Arredondo asked

Meza-Franco about acquiring “flour,” which Investigator Oliveros

believed meant cocaine, and that “[Arellano-Arredondo] ha[d] a

customer asking for 10,” which Investigator Oliveros understood

meant a customer was asking for ten ounces of cocaine.

Investigator Oliveros also opined that Meza-Franco’s response “that

he only ha[d] five or six” but would “see if he had a different kind”

meant that Meza-Franco only had a few ounces of cocaine in his

possession, but that he would acquire a different batch of cocaine.

6
¶ 12 Investigator Oliveros also interpreted wiretap calls between

Meza-Franco and Arellano-Arredondo on July 10, 2023.

Investigator Oliveros opined that, during those wiretap calls,

Meza-Franco and Arrellano appeared to be discussing that an

individual who had “fronted” narcotics to them was requesting

payment of $1,500 per ounce, but Meza-Franco and Arrellano

intended to tell their source to “leave it at 12,” meaning that they

wanted to “relay to the source of their narcotics to try to do the

ounces of cocaine for [$1,200].”

¶ 13 Based on these conversations, Investigator Oliveros opined

that Meza-Franco and Arrellano-Arredondo “agreed for

[Meza-Franco] to reach out to an individual he knows to be able to

try and purchase two ounces of cocaine . . . [and] eventually

figure[ed] out that it was [going to] cost about [$1,500] an ounce”

because Arellano-Arredondo “had a customer [who] was looking to

purchase 10 ounces and [Arellano-Arredondo] didn’t have enough

to fill that order.” Investigator Oliveros also testified “[i]t appeared

that sometime after that . . . agreement conversation, [Meza-Franco]

did in fact go to Mr. Arrellano’s residence,” which Investigator

Oliveros said he believed could have been an “overt act” in

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furtherance of the agreement to purchase the two ounces of

cocaine.

3. Third Conspiracy Count

¶ 14 The third conspiracy count related to wiretap calls on August

8, 2020. Investigator Oliveros said Meza-Franco told

Arellano-Arredondo during one wiretap call that he “still doesn’t

have anything,” while Arellano-Arredondo said he had “paper for

[Meza-Franco] to pick up,” which Investigator Oliveros said meant

money. Investigator Oliveros said Meza-Franco reminded

Arellano-Arredondo they had “previously agreed on nine per six,”

meaning six ounces of cocaine for $9,000, based upon the

previously discussed price of $1,500 per ounce. Meza-Franco also

said that his source would soon arrive at the farm.

¶ 15 Investigator Oliveros next interpreted a wiretap call later that

day in which Meza-Franco told Arellano-Arredondo there was a

miscommunication about either the purity or type of cocaine they

would be receiving. Mezo-Franco said that it was too expensive to

purchase narcotics from an alternate source, but that he would talk

to the individual the next day.

8
¶ 16 Based upon these wiretap calls and surveillance video of

Meza-Franco’s residence, Investigator Oliveros concluded that

Meza-Franco was attempting to conduct a transaction for six

ounces of cocaine for $9,000, but that the transaction likely didn’t

occur because “whatever narcotics they were [looking] at was not

what they were expecting.” He also opined that Meza-Franco overtly

acted to further the agreement to purchase six ounces of cocaine for

$9,000 by arranging the transaction by phone.

B. Preservation and Standard of Review

¶ 17 We review a trial court’s admission of expert testimony for an

abuse of discretion. People v. Rector, 248 P.3d 1196, 1200 (Colo.

2011). An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court’s ruling is

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or based on an

erroneous understanding of the law. Yusem v. People, 210 P.3d

458, 463 (Colo. 2009).

¶ 18 The parties disagree whether Meza-Franco preserved his

argument that Investigator Oliveros’s testimony exceeded the scope

of his expert qualification. As we understand his argument,

Meza-Franco asserts that Investigator Oliveros’s dual capacity

testimony exceeded the scope of his expertise because it (1) relied

9
on facts not known to the jury and summarized all of the evidence

— not just the wiretap calls — concerning law enforcement’s

investigation of the network and (2) went beyond simply informing

the jury about narcotics prices, terminology, or quantities. He

asserts that he preserved his objection to the entirety of Investigator

Oliveros’s testimony when he “objected to the prosecution’s first

question eliciting summarization of the meaning of the [wiretap]

calls.”

¶ 19 The People assert that Meza-Franco failed to preserve the

arguments he now raises on appeal regarding how Investigator

Oliveros’s testimony exceeded the scope of his expert qualification.

We agree with the People. See People v. Ujaama, 2012 COA 36,

¶ 37 (an issue isn’t preserved if the defendant didn’t object, objected

on different grounds than those raised on appeal, or objected on

unspecific grounds that didn’t alert the court to the particular issue

for which review is sought).

¶ 20 If a claim wasn’t preserved, we reverse only for plain error.

Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 14. A “plain error” is an error so

obvious that a trial judge should be able to avoid it without an

objection. Scott v. People, 2017 CO 16, ¶ 16.

10
C. Applicable Law

¶ 21 “If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will

assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a

fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,

experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of

an opinion or otherwise.” CRE 702.

¶ 22 Expert testimony is admissible under CRE 702 if the proffered

testimony is reliable, the expert is qualified to opine on such

matters, and the expert testimony is relevant — meaning it is useful

to the jury. People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68, 77 (Colo. 2001). A trial

court’s reliability inquiry “should be broad in nature and consider

the totality of the circumstances of each specific case.” Id.; see also

Brooks v. People, 975 P.2d 1105, 1114 (Colo. 1999)

(experience-based expertise is subject to the standards of CRE 702).

¶ 23 Expert testimony is useful to the jury when it assists the jury

“to either understand other evidence or to determine a fact in

issue.” People v. Ramirez, 155 P.3d 371, 379 (Colo. 2007). A trial

court must balance its discretion to allow expert witness testimony

with its obligation to ensure that the probative value of the expert’s

11
testimony is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. See

id.

D. Discussion

1. Investigator Oliveros’s Testimony Didn’t Rely on Facts Not
Known to the Jury or Improperly Summarize Evidence About
the Investigation of the Network

¶ 24 Meza-Franco alleges that the court erroneously allowed

Investigator Oliveros to testify about facts not known to the jury

and about the overall investigation of the network. We aren’t

persuaded.

¶ 25 The prosecution called several other officers to testify about

law enforcement’s investigation of the network, and the jury

received the transcripts of the wiretap calls about which

Investigator Oliveros testified. Meza-Franco fails to identify the

investigatory facts to which Investigator Oliveros testified that were

otherwise unknown to the jury. Thus, Meza-Franco’s argument is

conclusory, and we decline to address it further. People v. Wallin,

167 P.3d 183, 187 (Colo. App. 2007) (declining to address

arguments presented in a perfunctory or conclusory manner).

12
¶ 26 We likewise reject Meza-Franco’s argument that Investigator

Oliveros’s testimony improperly summarized evidence related to the

overall investigation of the network.

¶ 27 Investigator Oliveros was one of the lead case agents assigned

to the investigation of the network. In that role, he was responsible

for delegating assignments to other officers and speaking with them

about aspects of the overall investigation. And he was the point of

contact for some of the undercover officers who made drug buys

during the investigation.

¶ 28 As he was qualified as an expert witness, Investigator Oliveros

was entitled to rely on information from other officers to talk about

the overall course of the investigation and to form opinions about it.

See CRE 703; see People v. Garrison, 2017 COA 107, ¶ 46 (when an

officer’s testimony about the course of an investigation relies on

specialized training or knowledge, the officer must first be qualified

as an expert); see also United States v. Brooks, 736 F.3d 921,

930-31 (10th Cir. 2013) (law enforcement expert testimony

explaining how an investigation began, the law enforcement

agencies involved, the investigative techniques used, or roles played

by participants to a criminal enterprise is generally admissible).

13
¶ 29 Additionally, the prosecution’s evidence, if believed by the jury,

showed the complexity of the facts concerning the network’s

operation and Meza-Franco’s alleged involvement in it. Because a

court acts within its discretion to allow a witness to provide

summary testimony if it determines that the evidence is sufficiently

complex such that doing so would assist the trier of fact, Murray v.

Just In Case Bus. Lighthouse, LLC, 2016 CO 47M, ¶ 31, we conclude

that the court didn’t plainly err by allowing Investigator Oliveros to

summarize the information related to the overall investigation of the

network. See generally United States v. Duran, 941 F.3d 435,

445-46 (10th Cir. 2019) (court did not err by allowing law

enforcement officer to describe the events that triggered the

investigation of defendant in drug conspiracy case).

2. Investigator Oliveros’s Testimony Didn’t Exceed the Scope of
His Expert Qualification by Opining on Matters Beyond
Narcotics Prices, Terminology, or Quantities

¶ 30 We also reject Meza-Franco’s contention that Investigator

Oliveros exceeded the scope of his expertise by testifying to issues

beyond narcotics prices, terminology, or quantities.

¶ 31 Investigator Oliveros testified regarding the basis of his

expertise, which included his multi-year experience as an

14
investigator for the Weld County Drug Task Force and his

specialized training related to narcotics investigations. When the

court qualified Investigator Oliveros as an expert, it authorized him

to opine about the context of the investigation into the network, his

interpretation of any coded language the participants used in the

wiretap calls, and what Investigator Oliveros believed the phone

conversations were about.

¶ 32 Despite Meza-Franco’s argument otherwise, the court

authorized Investigator Oliveros to opine more broadly than just

about narcotics prices, terminology, or quantities. The court acted

within its discretion to permit Investigator Oliveros’s expert

testimony, and such testimony — which was based on his

established expertise and provided context to the investigation and

included his interpretations of the evidence presented — was within

the parameters of the court’s authorization. See People v. Watson,

53 P.3d 707, 711 (Colo. App. 2001) (“Whether opinion testimony is

within a particular witness’s expertise generally is a matter

addressed to the sound discretion of the court.”); see also People v.

Munoz-Casteneda, 2012 COA 109, ¶ 28 (when a defendant is

charged with conspiracy, evidence of a drug trafficking organization

15
may be relevant because the prosecution must prove the

defendant’s involvement with others). Accordingly, we discern no

error, let alone plain error, in the court’s admission of Investigator

Oliveros’s testimony that, according to Meza-Franco, addressed

facts not known to the jury or addressed the overall investigation of

the network.

III. Whether Investigator Oliveros’s Testimony Usurped the Jury’s
Role

¶ 33 Meza-Franco argues that Investigator Oliveros’s dual capacity

testimony, which combined his expert testimony about narcotics

with his personal knowledge of the investigation, “crossed the line

from legitimate expert opinion” into an improper opinion on

Meza-Franco’s guilt. We disagree with Meza-Franco’s assertion that

the entirety of Investigator Oliveros’s testimony was improper

opinion testimony, but as we discuss next, we agree that portions of

Investigator Oliveros’s testimony usurped the jury’s role.

A. Additional Facts

¶ 34 After interpreting the wiretap calls related to the first and

second conspiracy counts, Investigator Oliveros testified that he

believed Meza-Franco entered into an illegal narcotics transaction.

16
¶ 35 During his testimony about the third conspiracy count, the

prosecutor asked Investigator Oliveros, “why do you believe in your

opinion that the drug that was agreed to be bought and distributed,

or possessed with the intent to distribute was in fact cocaine?”

Investigator Oliveros responded that he believed it was cocaine

based on the discussion of the purchase price for the amount of the

substance that Meza-Franco and Arrellano-Arrendondo were

attempting to obtain.

¶ 36 Specifically referencing all three conspiracy counts, the

prosecutor asked Investigator Oliveros to opine whether “the

cocaine that was conspired to either be distributed or possessed

with the intent to be distributed was . . . greater than 14 grams and

less than 225 grams.” Investigator Oliveros responded that, “based

on those three counts, those three incidences they were talking in

ounces — multiple ounces so it’d be over the 14 grams.” With

respect to the money laundering count, the following exchange

occurred between the prosecutor and Investigator Oliveros:

[PROSECUTOR] Now do you believe in your
opinion that [Meza-Franco] and Mr.
Arellano-Arredondo engaged in a financial
transaction when they exchanged five ounces

17
of cocaine for $7,000 dollars on June 30th?
Through [Meza-Franco’s] brother[?]

[INVESTIGATOR OLIVEROS] Yes sir.

[PROSECUTOR] [Is i]t also your opinion that
[Meza-Franco] completed that financial
transaction with the intent to promote his
further distribution of . . . cocaine, to another
individual?

[INVESTIGATOR OLIVEROS] Yes.

¶ 37 Meza-Franco didn’t contemporaneously object to any of this

testimony, request a curative jury instruction, or request other

limiting measures. On cross-examination, Investigator Oliveros

conceded that he had never seen Meza-Franco in possession of

drugs or money.

¶ 38 In its final instructions, the court instructed the jury that it

was free to reject or accept, in whole or in part, any expert’s

testimony.

B. Preservation and Standard of Review

¶ 39 Meza-Franco argues that Investigator Oliveros’s testimony

usurped the jury’s role. The People concede — and we agree — that

Meza-Franco preserved his argument that Investigator Oliveros’s

testimony about the content of the wiretap calls usurped the jury’s

role in determining Meza-Franco’s guilt by objecting before

18
Investigator Oliveros began testifying. We review preserved

challenges to a trial court’s admission of expert testimony for an

abuse of discretion and reverse only if the error was not harmless.

People v. Baker, 2021 CO 29, ¶¶ 29, 38. An error is not harmless if

it substantially influenced the verdict or affected the fairness of the

trial proceedings. People v. Martinez, 2020 COA 141, ¶ 28.

C. Applicable Law

¶ 40 “[T]rial courts have an obligation to serve as gatekeepers

regarding the propriety of expert testimony.” Lawrence v. People,

2021 CO 28, ¶ 43. An expert can’t usurp the jury’s factfinding role.

Rector, 248 P.3d at 1203. For instance, an expert can’t “tell the

jury what result to reach,” People v. Collins, 730 P.2d 293, 306

(Colo. 1986), can’t “testify that he believes that the defendant

committed the crime at issue,” People v. Penn, 2016 CO 32, ¶ 31,

and can’t imply that the applicable legal standard has been

satisfied, People in Interest of J.R., 2021 COA 81, ¶ 31.

¶ 41 To determine whether an expert’s testimony usurped the jury’s

function, we consider whether (1) the testimony was clarified during

cross-examination; (2) the testimony expressed an opinion on the

applicable law or legal standards; (3) the jury was properly

19
instructed on the law and that it may accept or reject the expert’s

opinion; and (4) the expert opined that the defendant committed the

crime or that there was a particular likelihood that the defendant

committed the crime. Rector, 248 P.3d at 1203. We consider this

nonexhaustive list of factors in light of the totality of Investigator

Oliveros’s testimony to determine whether the court’s admission of

his testimony was erroneous. See Lawrence, ¶ 40 (citing Rector,

248 P.3d at 1203).

D. Discussion

1. The Court Erred by Admitting Portions of Investigator
Oliveros’s Expert Testimony

¶ 42 Primarily relying on United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45,

53-54 (2d Cir. 2003), Mezo-Franco asserts the court was required to

take special care in managing Investigator Oliveros’s testimony to

mitigate the “aura of special reliability and trustworthiness”

surrounding his testimony as both an investigating officer and a

narcotics expert. And we note that another division of this court

has recognized that “[t]here are special concerns attendant to law

enforcement expert testimony.” People v. Ornelas-Licano, 2020 COA

62, ¶ 64 (citations omitted). But Colorado appellate courts have not

20
categorically prohibited law enforcement officers from providing

dual capacity testimony. See People v. Fortson, 2018 COA 46M,

¶ 99 (noting that, while dual capacity testimony may be

problematic, “in the absence of binding appellate authority

condemning such testimony, it remains for the trial court to

exercise its discretion to control and, in appropriate circumstances,

preclude such testimony on proper objection”). Therefore, we reject

Meza-Franco’s contention that the court abused its discretion by

not excluding Investigator Oliveros’s expert testimony in its entirety

because Investigator Oliveros testified in a dual capacity role.

¶ 43 Some of Investigator Oliveros’s testimony indeed touched on

the ultimate issues in the case. For example, when the prosecutor

asked him whether he had an opinion that Meza-Franco engaged in

“illegal narcotics transactions” on June 29, June 30, and July 9,

2020, Investigator Oliveros testified that he did and described each

transaction in detail. But this and similar testimony didn’t

impermissibly and directly usurp the jury’s function by concluding

that the prosecution had presented sufficient evidence to prove the

elements of the charged offenses.

21
¶ 44 However, we conclude that portions of Investigator Oliveros’s

testimony did cross the line from expert testimony appropriately

tailored to the case’s factual circumstances to improper legal

conclusions under the Rector factors.

¶ 45 The jury was properly instructed on the law with respect to

assessing Investigator Oliveros’s testimony, including that it could

reject or accept some or all of, and was not bound by, any expert’s

testimony. See Lawrence, ¶ 53. “Absent a showing to the contrary,

we presume the jury heeded the court’s instructions.” People v.

Thompson, 950 P.2d 608, 614 (Colo. App. 1997). Thus, our

assessment of the third Rector factor weighs against a conclusion

that the court reversibly erred.

¶ 46 However, in our assessment, factors one, two, and four weigh

in favor of a conclusion that the court erred.

¶ 47 Factor one weighs in favor of error because — despite eliciting

testimony from Investigator Oliveros that he had never observed

Meza-Franco with drugs or money — defense counsel’s

cross-examination of Investigator Oliveros didn’t clarify that, while

Investigator Oliveros could provide opinions about the drug types,

terminology, prices, and quantities referenced in the wiretap calls,

22
he could not affirmatively opine that his interpretation of the

wiretap calls, along with Meza-Franco’s actions, satisfied the legal

elements of the charged offenses.

¶ 48 This leads to factor two, which suggests that an error occurred

because Investigator Oliveros expressed an opinion on the

applicable legal standards. “The crime of conspiracy is the illegal

agreement to commit a crime coupled with at least one overt act in

furtherance of that agreement.” People v. Robinson, 226 P.3d 1145,

1155 (Colo. App. 2009) (quoting People v. Phong Le, 74 P.3d 431,

435-36 (Colo. App. 2003)); see also People v. Lucero, 2016 COA 105,

¶ 26 (“To prove the requisite conspiratorial agreement to distribute

drugs, the prosecution must proffer evidence of an agreement to

advance further distribution of the drugs to others beyond the

alleged conspirators.”). And the crime of money laundering is

committed when a person (1) conducts or attempts to conduct a

financial transaction; (2) knowing or believing that the property

involved in that transaction represents the proceeds of a criminal

offense; (3) with the intent to promote the commission of a criminal

offense. § 18-5-309(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2024; Butler v. People, 2019 CO

87, ¶ 14.

23
¶ 49 Indeed, by responding to the prosecutor’s questions, which the

prosecution explicitly posed in legal terms, Investigator Oliveros

provided direct opinions that Meza-Franco entered into agreements

with Arellano-Arredondo to sell and distribute cocaine and that

Meza-Franco committed overt acts in furtherance of those

agreements. For example, in response to the prosecutor’s inquiry

“what overt acts, if any, were carried out in furtherance” of the

agreements to purchase cocaine, Investigator Oliveros described

that Meza-Franco engaged in arranging the drug transactions by

phone, was present on the property where the transactions

occurred, and followed up with phone calls. Likewise, Investigator

Oliveros provided direct opinions, using legal terms prompted by

the prosecutor, that Meza-Franco and Arellano-Arredondo engaged

in a financial transaction on June 30 through Meza-Franco’s

brother, and that Mezo-Franco completed that transaction with the

intent to promote his further distribution of cocaine to another

individual.

¶ 50 Factor four is also indicative of error because, in combination

with Investigator Oliveros’s testimony regarding the meaning of the

wiretap calls, the prosecutor’s specific questions prompted

24
Investigator Oliveros to respond that Meza-Franco completed overt

acts, including placing calls in furtherance of the third conspiracy

count; agree with the prosecutor that the essential elements of all

three of the conspiracy counts had been satisfied; and further agree

it was his opinion, with respect to the money laundering count, that

Meza-Franco made an illegal agreement and completed a financial

transaction with the intent to promote further distribution of three

ounces of cocaine. Indeed, in response to the prosecutor’s

questions that used legal language, Investigator Oliveras directly

opined that Meza-Franco’s actions on June 30 satisfied the

elements of money laundering. In doing so, Investigator Oliveros

effectively testified that Meza-Franco had met each element of the

conspiracy charges, all but agreeing with the prosecutor that the

legal standards for conspiracy to distribute cocaine had been met

and telling the jury that Meza-Franco was guilty. See Baker, ¶¶ 33,

34.

¶ 51 Meza-Franco’s trial counsel eventually objected to this line of

questioning, arguing that the prosecutor was “testifying and having

the officer agree with him.” Although trial counsel’s objection was

to the prosecution leading the witness, and not to Investigator

25
Oliveros’s provision of improper legal opinion, we agree that the

manner in which the prosecutor elicited Investigator Oliveros’s

testimony was improper. The prosecutor’s manner of questioning

Investigator Oliveros — using legal language, centered on the

elements necessary prove the offenses, and asking Investigator

Oliveros to identify specific evidence that satisfied those elements —

resulted in Investigator Oliveros rendering improper legal opinions.

¶ 52 Further, this testimony was unnecessary because the jury

could have applied Investigator Oliveras’s opinions about the

wiretap calls to the law to reach its own conclusions about whether

Meza-Franco committed the charged offenses. Accordingly, we

conclude that the court abused its discretion by admitting the

portions of Investigator Oliveros’s testimony in which he

affirmatively agreed with the prosecutor’s questioning regarding the

applicable legal standard and words of the elements of the crime

and responded to questioning regarding whether the elements of the

crime had been satisfied because such testimony constituted

improper legal opinion testimony.

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2. The Error Wasn’t Harmless

¶ 53 Because the error was preserved, the People bear the burden

to show that the error was harmless. James v. People, 2018 CO 72,

¶ 18. The People assert that any error in the admission of

Investigator Oliveros’s improper legal opinion testimony was

harmless because “the jury also heard from numerous officers

conducting surveillance of [Meza-Franco] and Arellano-Arredondo

that matched up to events discussed in the calls themselves.” We

disagree.

¶ 54 The prosecution’s case primarily relied on Investigator

Oliveros’s testimony about the wiretap calls to connect Meza-Franco

to the network and its distribution of cocaine. No corroborating

physical evidence directly linked Meza-Franco to the distribution of

cocaine, and other witnesses provided either general background

information related to the network or evidence that corroborated

Investigator Oliveros’s interpretation of the wiretap calls, such as

information about surveillance video of Meza-Franco. But that

“corroborating” evidence doesn’t make sense without Investigator

Oliveros’s testimony to contextualize it. Said another way, the

factual and legal significance of Meza-Franco’s words and actions

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only makes sense when placed in context by Investigator Oliveros’s

testimony.

¶ 55 We recognize the risk that the jury possibly afforded

Investigator Oliveros’s improper testimony “particular weight and

credibility” because he testified as an expert, was employed by the

government, and testified to complex matters. Baker, ¶¶ 41-42; see

also Ornelas-Licano, ¶ 64. Under these circumstances, we conclude

there is a reasonable probability that Investigator Oliveros’s

inadmissible expert testimony substantially influenced the verdict

or impaired the trial’s fairness. See Yusem, 210 P.3d at 469.

Because the court’s error in allowing Investigator Oliveros’s

impermissible expert testimony was not harmless, we reverse

Meza-Franco’s convictions for conspiracy to sell or distribute

(between 14 grams and 225 grams) and conspiracy to possess with

intent to sell or distribute (between 14 grams and 225 grams).

¶ 56 We also reverse Meza-Franco’s conviction for money

laundering. Meza-Franco was charged under section

18-5-309(1)(a)(I), which required proof that Meza-Franco knowingly

conducted a financial transaction with proceeds from a criminal

offense, with the intent to promote the commission of another

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criminal offense. Under that section, the prosecution was required

to prove the conspiracy as the underlying unlawful offense upon

which the transfer of proceeds was based. See People v. Woodyard,

2023 COA 78, ¶ 68 (concluding that federal courts have interpreted

a substantially similar provision of the federal money laundering

statute “to require proof of a covered offense” apart from the

transfer of proceeds itself). Therefore, because we have reversed

Meza-Franco’s conviction on the conspiracy charges, his conviction

for money laundering is also necessarily reversed.

IV. Disposition

¶ 57 We reverse the judgment of conviction and remand for a new

trial.

JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.

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