Peo v. Ramsey

23CA1086 Peo v Ramsey 03-27-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1086
Adams County District Court No. 19CR4058
Honorable Courtney Dinnel, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Brandon Ramsey,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE BROWN
Moultrie and Hawthorne*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced March 27, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brittany Limes Zehner, Senior Assistant
Attorney General & Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-
Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, John P. Finnegan, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024.
¶1 Defendant, Brandon Ramsey, appeals the judgment of

conviction entered after the district court revoked his deferred

judgment and sentence for his felony robbery conviction. We

affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Ramsey was charged with two counts of attempted aggravated

robbery based on his involvement in an attempted convenience

store robbery where he threatened one of the store’s employees with

large rocks.

¶3 In November 2019, Ramsey pleaded guilty to one count of

misdemeanor third degree assault and entered into a two-year

deferred judgment agreement for one count of robbery, a class 4

felony; in exchange, the prosecution dismissed the original two

attempted aggravated robbery counts. After accepting the plea, the

court entered a judgment of conviction for the assault count,

deferred the judgment of conviction for the robbery count for two

years, and sentenced Ramsey to two years of probation.

¶4 The deferred judgment agreement required Ramsey to comply

with all terms and conditions of probation, complete a substance

abuse evaluation, and comply with the substance abuse

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evaluation’s recommendations for treatment. The deferred

judgment also provided as follows:

If within the term of the deferred
sentence . . . the District Attorney or the
Probation Department has probable cause to
believe that there has been a violation of any of
the conditions upon which the entry of a
judgment of conviction and imposition of
sentence have been deferred, the District
Attorney may file a written motion with the
Court requesting the entry of a judgment of
conviction on the defendant’s guilty plea.

¶5 In November 2021, the probation department filed a motion

with the court to extend Ramsey’s probation for an additional six

months. The motion indicated that Ramsey had been granted a

deferred judgment, had been sentenced to two years of supervised

probation, and had not yet complied with the terms of his probation

requiring him to complete twenty hours of community service and

complete a substance abuse evaluation and comply with any

recommended treatment. With Ramsey’s consent, the court granted

the probation extension.

¶6 In May 2022, before the additional six months had expired,

the probation department filed a second motion to extend Ramsey’s

probation for another nine months so that Ramsey could complete

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substance abuse treatment. Like the first motion, this motion

referenced Ramsey’s deferred judgment and that he had been

sentenced to two years of probation. Again, with Ramsey’s consent,

the court extended his probation. The new probation end date was

set for February 19, 2023.

¶7 On December 6, 2022, Ramsey’s probation officer submitted a

special report and a complaint to revoke Ramsey’s deferred

judgment and probation with the court, alleging that Ramsey had

violated five terms of his probation. At the first hearing following

the filing of the revocation complaint, Ramsey moved to dismiss the

complaint to revoke the deferred judgment, alleging that the court

lacked jurisdiction because the motions to extend only referenced

the probation and Ramsey’s two-year deferred judgment had been

completed before the revocation complaint was filed. The

magistrate presiding over the hearing denied the motion in a written

order finding that both extensions referenced the deferred judgment

and were sufficient to extend the term of the deferred judgment.

¶8 Before the revocation hearing, Ramsey filed a written motion

to dismiss, this time alleging that the court lacked jurisdiction to

revoke his deferred judgment because the revocation complaint only

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sought to revoke his probation, not the deferred judgment. In a

written order, the court denied that motion, finding that Ramsey

had sufficient notice that the revocation complaint sought to revoke

his deferred judgment. Specifically, the court relied on the special

report that accompanied the revocation complaint, which asked the

court to revoke the deferred judgment, and the discussions at the

preceding hearing addressing the revocation of the deferred

judgment.

¶9 Following the revocation hearing, the court found that Ramsey

had committed four of the five violations, revoked his deferred

judgment, and entered a judgment of conviction for the robbery

count. The court then revoked Ramsey’s probation, reinstated it for

ninety days with the only condition being jail time, and gave him

133 days of confinement credit so that his probation was

terminated that day.

II. Revocation Complaint Filed by Probation Officer

¶ 10 Because the complaint to revoke Ramsey’s deferred judgment

was filed by his probation officer, Ramsey contends that the district

court (1) lacked jurisdiction to revoke his deferred judgment and

(2) breached the deferred judgment agreement. We disagree.

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A. The District Court Had Jurisdiction and Authority to Revoke
Ramsey’s Deferred Judgment

¶ 11 Ramsey first contends that the district court lacked

jurisdiction to revoke his deferred judgment and sentence because

the revocation complaint was filed by his probation officer, not the

district attorney, as required by his deferred judgment agreement.

We reject this contention.

¶ 12 We review de novo whether a trial court lacked jurisdiction.

See People v. Maser, 2012 CO 41, ¶ 10. Subject matter jurisdiction

concerns a court’s authority to deal with a “class of cases in which

it renders judgment,” Wood v. People, 255 P.3d 1136, 1140 (Colo.

2011), not its authority to enter a “particular judgment within that

class,” People in Interest of J.W. v. C.O., 2017 CO 105, ¶ 24.

¶ 13 A district court has subject matter jurisdiction in all criminal

cases. Colo. Const. art. VI, § 9(1); see also People v. Loveall, 231

P.3d 408, 412 (Colo. 2010) (“[A] district court has jurisdiction if ‘the

case is one of the type of cases that the court has been empowered

to entertain by the sovereign from which the court derives its

authority.’” (quoting Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Adams,

718 P.2d 508, 513 (Colo. 1986))). The district court’s jurisdiction is

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invoked by the filing of a legally sufficient complaint, information, or

indictment. People v. Sims, 2019 COA 66, ¶ 15.

¶ 14 Here, the district court had jurisdiction over Ramsey’s criminal

case by virtue of the prosecution’s filing of the complaint and

information. See id. At most, Ramsey’s argument challenges the

court’s authority to take a particular action or enter a particular

judgment within the case. See J.W., ¶ 24.

¶ 15 A deferred judgment is an alternative to a traditional guilty

plea allowing a defendant to plead guilty but deferring entry of the

judgment and sentence for a specified period of time. Williams v.

People, 2019 CO 101, ¶ 20. Deferred judgments are “created and

authorized by statute.” Pineda-Liberato v. People, 2017 CO 95,

¶ 21. The statute “strictly controls a trial court’s authority to

impose a deferred judgment, and a trial court lacks authority to

impose a deferred judgment outside the statute’s limits.” Carrera v.

People, 2019 CO 83, ¶ 13 (quoting People v. Carbajal, 198 P.3d 102,

104 (Colo. 2008)).

¶ 16 Under Colorado’s deferred judgment statute, once a defendant

pleads guilty to a felony, the trial court can continue the

defendant’s case without entering judgment for up to four years

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from the date of the plea and implement probation-like supervision

conditions in return for the continuance. See § 18-1.3-102(1),

C.R.S. 2024. If the defendant violates any supervision conditions

during the period of the deferral, the statute requires the court to

enter judgment and impose sentence on the guilty plea.

§ 18-1.3-102(2); see also People v. Simonds, 113 P.3d 762, 764

(Colo. 2005). The court is required to determine whether the

defendant breached the conditions of the deferred judgment “upon

application of the district attorney or a probation officer and upon

notice of hearing thereon.” § 18-1.3-102(2).

¶ 17 Under the deferred judgment statute, the district court had

the authority to accept Ramsey’s guilty plea to felony robbery and

defer entry of his conviction and sentence for the deferral period.

See Carrera, ¶ 13. The statute expressly provides that if the

defendant fails to comply with any of the conditions of the deferred

agreement, a revocation application may be made “by the district

attorney or a probation officer.” § 18-1.3-102(2) (emphasis added).

Thus, the district court had the authority to accept the probation

officer’s application to revoke Ramsey’s deferred judgment and

proceed with the revocation proceeding. See Loveall, 231 P.3d at

7
413 (appellate courts will avoid interpreting statutory language as a

limit on a district court’s power “unless the limitation is explicit”).

¶ 18 We are not persuaded otherwise by Ramsey’s argument that

his deferred judgment agreement authorized only the district

attorney to file a revocation complaint, as detailed in the next

section. The district court’s authority to accept and revoke a

deferred judgment is governed by the statute, not the deferred

judgment agreement. See Carrera, ¶ 14 n.4 (parties cannot confer

or take away a court’s jurisdiction); cf. Craig v. People, 986 P.2d

951, 959 (Colo. 1999) (statutorily required component of a sentence

cannot be altered by a plea agreement).

B. The District Court Did Not Breach the Deferred Judgment
Agreement by Accepting the Probation Officer’s Complaint

¶ 19 Ramsey nevertheless contends that the district court erred by

revoking his deferred judgment because the revocation complaint

was filed by the probation officer, not the district attorney, in

breach of his deferred judgment agreement. We are not persuaded.

¶ 20 We interpret plea agreements de novo, looking at the plain

language of the agreement and resolving any ambiguity in favor of

the defendant. See People v. Roddy, 2021 CO 74, ¶ 24. Our task is

8
not to rewrite the plea agreement in question, but to interpret the

reasonable intent of the parties to the plea agreement in light of the

defendant’s right to be treated fairly by the government. Craig, 986

P.2d at 960-61; People v. Johnson, 999 P.2d 825, 829 (Colo. 2000).

¶ 21 Contrary to Ramsey’s argument, the language in the deferred

judgment agreement did not require the district attorney to file the

motion to revoke the deferred judgment, it simply stated that the

district attorney could file that motion. The language did not limit

the filing of the revocation motion to the district attorney or prohibit

the probation officer from filing such a motion. Indeed, the

agreement acknowledges that the motion could be filed if either the

district attorney or the probation department had probable cause to

believe the terms had been violated. We do not read the deferred

judgment agreement as narrowly as Ramsey does. And in any

event, we are not persuaded that the identity of the person filing the

revocation complaint was a material term of the deferred judgment

agreement, such that its breach would require specific performance.

See St. James v. People, 948 P.2d 1028, 1032 (Colo. 1997).

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III. The Motions to Extend and the Revocation Complaint
Sufficiently Referenced the Deferred Judgment

¶ 22 Ramsey next contends that the district court lacked authority

to revoke his deferred judgment and enter the conviction, arguing

that (1) the two extensions and his consent to those extensions

sought only to extend his probation and not the deferred judgment,

so the revocation proceeding was initiated after he had completed

the deferred judgment; and (2) the revocation complaint, in its

caption, only sought to revoke his probation, not the deferred

judgment, so the district court did not have authority to proceed on

the revocation. We disagree with both assertions.

¶ 23 We begin by noting that each of the extension motions and

corresponding orders indicated that (1) Ramsey had pleaded guilty

and received a deferred judgment and sentence; and (2) the

extensions were necessary so that Ramsey could complete, among

other things, a substance abuse evaluation and any recommended

treatment. The deferred judgment agreement required that Ramsey

“receive and comply with probation supervision and comply with all

terms and conditions of probation, including any offense specific

treatment,” which expressly included the substance abuse

10
evaluation and treatment compliance requirement. Thus, we

conclude that the court’s orders granting the extensions through

February 19, 2023, sufficiently referenced the deferred judgment to

extend Ramsey’s deferred judgment period. See § 18-1.3-102(1)

(allowing the agreement to defer the judgment for up to four years).

Consequently, because the revocation complaint was filed before

the deferred judgment expired, the court had authority to proceed

with the deferred judgment revocation.

¶ 24 Similarly, the introductory paragraph of the revocation

complaint (1) indicated that Ramsey had been granted a deferred

judgment for a felony robbery conviction and sentenced to

probation supervision for a period of two years for that offense;

(2) separately listed the misdemeanor conviction and its

corresponding two years of probation; and (3) noted that both the

deferred judgment and the probation had been extended twice. The

complaint then alleged five separate violations of the terms and

conditions of both the felony and misdemeanor probations.

Further, in the report that accompanied the revocation complaint,

the probation officer detailed each of the violations and requested

that the court (1) revoke Ramsey’s deferred judgment and enter the

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conviction for robbery to which Ramsey had pled guilty and

(2) revoke the probation for his misdemeanor offense.

¶ 25 Although the caption of the revocation complaint listed only

the probation revocation, the contents of the complaint and the

accompanying report clearly referenced the deferred judgment for

felony robbery such that Ramsey had adequate notice that the

probation officer was seeking to revoke the deferred judgment.

Consequently, we conclude that the filing of the complaint and

report was sufficient to initiate the revocation of Ramsey’s deferred

judgment. See § 18-1.3-102(2).

IV. Disposition

¶ 26 We affirm the judgement of conviction.

JUDGE MOULTRIE and JUDGE HAWTHORNE concur.

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