Peo v. Rantz

23CA2117 Peo v Rantz 03-27-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA2117
El Paso County District Court No. 01CR4048
Honorable Marcus S. Henson, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Geoffrey Del Rantz,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN
Martinez* and Taubman*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced March 27, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brittany Zehner, Senior Assistant Attorney
General & Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

The Gasper Law Group, PLLC, Allen Gasper, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024.
¶1 Geoffrey Del Rantz appeals the postconviction court’s order

denying his fourth Crim. P. 35(c) motion. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In 2002, a jury convicted Rantz of multiple offenses for

sexually assaulting two minors, including sexual assault on a child

by a person in a position of trust as a pattern of abuse. The trial

court sentenced Rantz to an aggregate indeterminate sentence of

forty years to life in the custody of the Department of Corrections.

On direct appeal, a division of this court affirmed Rantz’s

convictions, although it remanded for resentencing with conflict-

free counsel. People v. Rantz, (Colo. App. No. 02CA2120, Apr. 20,

2006) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)) (Rantz I). The

division also affirmed the postconviction court’s order denying

Rantz’s first Crim. P. 35(c) motion for postconviction relief. Id. On

remand with conflict-free counsel, the trial court again sentenced

Rantz to an aggregate indeterminate sentence of forty years to life.

¶3 In 2007, Rantz filed a second Crim. P. 35(c) motion pro se,

which the postconviction court declined to rule on because Rantz

was represented by counsel at the time. After counsel withdrew,

Rantz filed a third Crim. P. 35(c) motion pro se that raised fourteen

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claims for relief, including that his trial counsel had provided

ineffective assistance of counsel. The postconviction court denied

the motion, and a division of this court affirmed. People v. Rantz,

(Colo. App. No. 10CA2276, Apr. 26, 2012) (not published pursuant

to C.A.R. 35(f)) (Rantz II).

¶4 In 2022, Rantz filed his fourth Crim. P. 35(c) motion, this time

through counsel. As relevant to this appeal, Rantz alleged that his

trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance by advising him to

reject two plea offers based on counsel’s mistaken belief that he

would receive the same sentence if he was convicted at trial.

According to Rantz, trial counsel also advised him incorrectly that

he would have to serve only fifty percent of any sentence imposed

after trial before becoming parole eligible. His trial counsel’s error

couldn’t have been discovered earlier, Rantz asserted, because the

Department of Corrections had only recently issued its official time

computation report with his parole eligibility date.

¶5 After holding an evidentiary hearing in September 2023, the

postconviction court found in a detailed oral ruling that Rantz had

established excusable neglect for bringing his claims more than

three years after his felony convictions became final, see § 16-5-

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402(1), (2)(d), C.R.S. 2024, but it nevertheless denied Rantz’s

motion on the merits.

¶6 Rantz now appeals. He contends that the postconviction court

erred by (1) finding that two alleged plea offers described in letters

that his trial counsel sent him before trial weren’t actual offers

made by the prosecution; (2) not applying current state and federal

precedent to evaluate the effectiveness of trial counsel’s

performance; and (3) not appropriately considering an active

conflict that arose between Rantz and trial counsel during plea

negotiations. We address and reject each contention in turn.

II. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶7 A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to the effective

assistance of counsel. People v. Rainey, 2023 CO 14, ¶ 1. To

prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant

must show that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) the

deficient performance prejudiced their defense. Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Prejudice in this context

means that the defendant has shown a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome of the

proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694. A reasonable

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probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in

the outcome.” People v. Houser, 2020 COA 128, ¶ 30 (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). A defendant must establish both

prongs under Strickland to succeed on their ineffective assistance of

counsel claim. People v. Garcia, 815 P.2d 937, 941 (Colo. 1991).

¶8 Ineffective assistance of counsel claims present mixed

questions of law and fact. People v. Corson, 2016 CO 33, ¶ 25. We

review the postconviction court’s legal conclusions de novo but

defer to the court’s factual findings if they are supported by the

record. Id. We also defer to the court’s determinations regarding

the weight and credibility of witness testimony at an evidentiary

hearing. Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054, 1061-62 (Colo. 2007).

III. Discussion

A. Timeliness

¶9 At the outset, we reject the People’s arguments that Rantz’s

claims in his 2022 motion were time barred and that the

postconviction court erred by reaching their merits.

¶ 10 We recognize that a defendant must ordinarily commence a

collateral attack on the validity of their felony conviction, except

class 1 felonies, within three years of the date of conviction. § 16-5-

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402(1). But an exception to this time bar exists when the

postconviction court finds “circumstances amounting to justifiable

excuse or excusable neglect.” § 16-5-402(2)(d). Whether the

defendant has demonstrated justifiable excuse or excusable neglect

is a question of fact for the postconviction court. People v.

Shepherd, 43 P.3d 693, 698 (Colo. App. 2001).

¶ 11 In its oral ruling, the postconviction court found that Rantz

had shown excusable neglect based on the difficulties he

experienced in securing his exact parole eligibility date from the

Department of Corrections’ time computation division. The record

supports this finding. Rantz testified that (1) Department personnel

repeatedly gave him inconsistent parole eligibility dates; (2) he

attempted to file a formal grievance in 2017 but was told that time

computation wasn’t a cognizable grievance; and (3) he didn’t receive

the Department’s official time computation report from its head of

case management until December 2021. Rantz’s postconviction

counsel filed his current Crim. P. 35(c) motion less than two

months later.

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¶ 12 Because the postconviction court’s finding of excusable neglect

is supported by the record, we won’t disturb its finding on review.

See Shepherd, 43 P.3d at 698.

B. Validity of Plea Offers

¶ 13 We next turn to Rantz’s contention that the postconviction

court erred by finding that the prosecution didn’t make Rantz two

plea offers that his trial counsel described in a pair of letters to

Rantz while he awaited trial.

¶ 14 In his 2022 motion for postconviction relief, Rantz relied on

his trial counsel’s letters to allege that the prosecution had

extended two alternative plea offers — that Rantz plead guilty to

either (1) one count of sexual assault on a child, a class 4 felony,

with an open sentence to the court; or (2) second degree kidnapping

and theft.

¶ 15 Rantz’s trial counsel testified, however, that she had written

her two letters to Rantz early in the case and that the prosecution

ultimately refused to make any plea offer that wasn’t a “sex

indeterminate offer.” She explained that the prosecution’s offer was

for Rantz to plead guilty to sex assault on a child (position of trust)

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as a class 3 felony with an indeterminant sentence. She testified as

follows:

Well, at some point, I believed that he had —
that they had offered a kidnapping, theft case.
But, you know, ultimately, I — I need to make
clear that these letters were written within 2 to
3 weeks of — I mean, they were very early on
in the case, the two exhibits, A and B. Things
progressed, you know, in a much more heated,
contested fashion from there. But they were
filed — written early in the case. So, you
know, at some point, it became absolutely
clear that we were not going to get anything
other than a sex — a sex indeterminate offer.

¶ 16 The trial prosecutor similarly testified that, because Rantz’s

case was high profile, his team declined to offer a “non-sex charge.”

He explained that such an offer was a “non-starter”; that Rantz’s

trial counsel had sought a “non-sex plea,” but he “quickly shut [it]

down”; and that he “would have been fired” for making such an

offer. Consistent with trial counsel’s testimony, the prosecutor

testified that the only offer the prosecution had extended was for

Rantz to plead guilty to sex assault on a child (position of trust)

with an open sentence.

¶ 17 In its oral ruling, the postconviction court found credible the

prosecutor’s testimony that his team had extended only one plea

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offer and that any request for Rantz to plead to a non-sex offense

was a non-starter. As a result, the court determined that trial

counsel couldn’t have advised Rantz to accept a plea offer that the

prosecution never actually extended. The court also found credible

trial counsel’s testimony that, in addition to her two letters, she had

multiple in-person and telephone conversations with Rantz

regarding possible penalties. Because the court’s findings enjoy

record support, they are binding on us on review. See, e.g., Downey

v. People, 25 P.3d 1200, 1206 (Colo. 2001).

¶ 18 We aren’t persuaded otherwise by Rantz’s arguments that

(1) the postconviction court should have placed more weight on trial

counsel’s “objective” letters, and (2) the prosecutor’s memory was

“unreliable.” Although Rantz presented some evidence supporting

his version of how the plea negotiations played out, we may not

revisit the postconviction court’s determinations of witness

credibility or the weight given to the evidence. See People v.

Williams, 908 P.2d 1157, 1161 (Colo. App. 1985).

¶ 19 Accordingly, we perceive no error in the postconviction court’s

finding that the prosecution didn’t extend the plea offers described

in trial counsel’s letters to Rantz.

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C. Trial Counsel’s Plea Phase Advice

¶ 20 Rantz next contends that the postconviction court erred by

failing to apply current state and federal precedent to evaluate the

effectiveness of trial counsel’s performance during plea negotiations.

We conclude that, even if we assume without deciding that trial

counsel’s performance was deficient, Rantz failed to establish

prejudice.

¶ 21 A defendant who receives ineffective assistance of counsel

during plea negotiations and then proceeds to trial in lieu of taking

a plea offer may suffer prejudice from either a conviction on more

serious counts or the imposition of a more severe sentence. Lafler

v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 166 (2012). To prove such prejudice, the

defendant must show, as relevant here, a reasonable probability

that they would have accepted the plea offer rather than going to

trial if they had been properly advised. People v. Delgado, 2019

COA 55, ¶ 21.

¶ 22 The postconviction court found that Rantz suffered no

prejudice from trial counsel’s allegedly deficient plea-phase advice

because (1) the prosecution never actually extended the plea offers

that Rantz asserted he would have accepted, and (2) Rantz’s

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“steadfast adherence” to his innocence showed that he wouldn’t

have accepted a plea offer in any event.

¶ 23 The record supports the postconviction court’s first finding, as

discussed above.

¶ 24 The record also supports the postconviction court’s second

finding. Rantz’s trial counsel testified at the 2023 hearing that

Rantz had maintained his innocence from the beginning of the case

through sentencing; that Rantz “was not interested in a plea,

period”; and that Rantz’s sole focus throughout the “entire

litigation” was being able to continue his relationship with one of

the victims. By crediting trial counsel’s testimony, the

postconviction court necessarily rejected Rantz’s conflicting

evidence suggesting that he would have accepted a plea offer had he

been properly advised. We may not reweigh the conflicting evidence

to reach a different result. See People v. Sifuentes, 2017 COA 48M,

¶ 30 (Appellate courts give “substantial deference” to the

postconviction court’s findings when its prejudice determination

“depends heavily on the court’s credibility findings or its resolution

of factual disputes.”).

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¶ 25 To the extent Rantz on appeal relies on evidence appended to

his emergency petition for rehearing that sought reconsideration of

the court’s decision denying his Crim. P. 35(c) motion, we agree

with the People that Rantz was obligated to introduce such evidence

during the 2023 evidentiary hearing. See People v. Thomas, 195

P.3d 1162, 1164 (Colo. App. 2008) (“The rules of criminal procedure

do not authorize a motion to reconsider postconviction orders.”).

Rantz doesn’t argue that the evidence appended to his petition for

rehearing couldn’t have been discovered earlier through the exercise

of due diligence, see Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VI)(a), nor does the record

reveal such evidence.1

¶ 26 Accordingly, the postconviction court didn’t err by denying

Rantz’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

1 For the first time in his reply brief, Rantz contends that, if we

determine that postconviction counsel should have introduced the
evidence at the 2023 evidentiary hearing, we should remand the
case for the postconviction court to address the effectiveness of his
postconviction counsel. But we don’t address arguments raised for
the first time in a reply brief. People v. Owens, 2024 CO 10, ¶ 90.

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D. Conflict of Interest

¶ 27 Rantz also contends that the postconviction court erred by

failing to consider an “active conflict” that arose between Rantz and

trial counsel during plea negotiations.

¶ 28 According to Rantz, one of his alleged minor victims contacted

his trial counsel to seek advice about emancipation after having run

away to California. Trial counsel failed to report her

communication with the minor, but the prosecution eventually

discovered the communication and moved to disqualify her, alleging

that she had become a fact witness on the kidnapping charge

against Rantz. Although the trial court denied the prosecution’s

motion, Rantz argues that trial counsel’s actions created a conflict

of interest that prevented her from effectively representing his

interests during plea negotiations. The postconviction court denied

Rantz’s claim as successive, explaining that the “appellate courts

have already addressed this issue sufficiently.”

¶ 29 Under Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VI), a postconviction court must deny

as successive any claim that was “raised and resolved in a prior

appeal or postconviction proceeding” on behalf of the same

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defendant. We review de novo whether a Crim. P. 35(c) claim is

properly denied as successive. People v. Taylor, 2018 COA 175, ¶ 8.

¶ 30 In Rantz I, the division determined that Rantz’s trial counsel

had a conflict of interest in representing Rantz at sentencing based

on a renewed investigation by the district attorney’s office “following

the trial.” Rantz I, slip op. at 14. But the division rejected Rantz’s

related contention that trial counsel labored under a conflict “up to

and through the time of trial.” Id. at 10. Thus, because a division

of this court has already rejected Rantz’s contention that his trial

counsel labored under a conflict of interest during pretrial plea

negotiations, we reject his claim as successive. See Crim. P.

35(c)(3)(VI).

¶ 31 We aren’t persuaded otherwise by Rantz’s argument that his

earlier conflict-related arguments focused only on the trial, not on

trial counsel’s plea-phase negotiations. On this record, we fail to

see how Rantz’s trial counsel could labor under a conflict during

plea negotiations but not the trial itself. See Thomas, 195 P.3d at

1165 (Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VI)’s bar on successive claims prevents relief

“based on the same or similar allegations.”) (emphasis added).

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¶ 32 Accordingly, we discern no error in the postconviction court’s

decision rejecting Rantz’s claim that his trial counsel labored under

a conflict of interest during plea negotiations.

IV. Disposition

¶ 33 We affirm the order.

JUSTICE MARTINEZ and JUDGE TAUBMAN concur.

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