Peo in Interest of NRL

24CA1418 Peo in Interest of NRL 02-20-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1418
Weld County District Court No. 22JV153
Honorable W. Troy Hause, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of N.R.L. Jr., a Child,

and Concerning N.R.L.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK
Dunn and Tow, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced February 20, 2025

Bruce T. Barker, County Attorney, David S. Anderson, Assistant County
Attorney, Greeley, Colorado, for Appellee

Sandra K. Owens, Guardian Ad Litem

Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellant
¶1 N.R.L. (father) appeals the juvenile court’s judgment

terminating his parent-child legal relationship with N.R.L., Jr. (the

child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Weld County Department of Human Services filed a

petition in dependency and neglect with regard to mother and

father after investigating reports that the child had been born

exposed to methamphetamine and the child’s mother was using

drugs and did not have a stable residence.

¶3 In March of 2023, father admitted to the allegations in the

petition, and the court adjudicated the child dependent or

neglected. The court then adopted a treatment plan for father,

requiring him to (1) cooperate with case professionals; (2) complete

a substance use evaluation, comply with any recommendations,

and submit to urinalysis testing; (3) participate in family time; (4)

comply with his ongoing criminal charges; (5) complete an anger

management evaluation and comply with any recommendations; (6)

maintain appropriate housing; and (7) provide for the child’s basic

needs.

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¶4 Father was in the Larimer County jail from November 2023

until April 2024, when he was sentenced to four years in

community corrections for assault with a deadly weapon. While

father was incarcerated, the Department filed a motion to terminate

father’s parental rights, alleging that he had not complied with his

treatment plan and remained unfit. The court later granted the

motion.

II. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review

¶5 The juvenile court may terminate a parent’s parental rights if

it finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the child was

adjudicated dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not complied

with an appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan was

unsuccessful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct or

condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time. § 19-3-

604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024; People in Interest of E.S., 2021 COA 79, ¶ 10.

¶6 As a general matter, whether a juvenile court properly

terminated parental rights presents a mixed question of fact and

law because it involves application of the termination statute to

evidentiary facts. See People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14,

¶ 15. The credibility of witnesses; the sufficiency, probative value,

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and weight of the evidence; and the inferences and conclusions to

be drawn from the evidentiary facts are for the juvenile court to

determine. People in Interest of S.K., 2019 COA 36, ¶ 41. We will

not set aside a juvenile court’s factual findings if they are supported

by the record. Id. But we review the juvenile court’s legal

conclusions de novo. M.A.W. v. People in Interest of A.L.W., 2020

CO 11, ¶ 31.

III. Reasonable Efforts

¶7 Father first asserts that the Department failed to make

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate him and reunify his family.

Specifically, he claims that the Department did not provide him

with (1) transportation assistance; (2) the referrals necessary for

anger management therapy; (3) releases of information for him to

execute; and (4) family time sessions while he was incarcerated. We

perceive no basis for reversal.

A. Applicable Law

¶8 Before the juvenile court may terminate parental rights under

section 19-3-604(1)(c), the department must make reasonable

efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family. §§ 19-1-

103(114), 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2024.

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“Reasonable efforts” means the “exercise of diligence and care” for a

child who is in out-of-home placement. § 19-1-103(114). This

standard is satisfied by the provision of services in accordance with

section 19-3-208. § 19-1-103(114); see also People in Interest of

C.T.S., 140 P.3d 332, 335 (Colo. App. 2006).

¶9 The services must be “appropriate to support the parent’s

treatment plan.” People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915

(Colo. App. 2011). Accordingly, the juvenile court should “consider[]

the totality of the circumstances and account[] for all services and

resources provided to a parent to ensure the completion of the

entire treatment plan,” People in Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022

CO 35, ¶ 33.

¶ 10 The parent is ultimately responsible for using the services to

comply with the plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279,

1285 (Colo. App. 2011). And the court may consider a parent’s

unwillingness to participate in treatment in determining whether

the department made reasonable efforts. See People in Interest of

A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12.

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B. Efforts

¶ 11 The juvenile court found that the Department made

reasonable efforts to support father’s treatment plan, but that he

did not engage in many of the offered services. The record supports

this finding.

¶ 12 The caseworker tried to contact father often, using different

phone numbers, addresses, and emails when necessary. For his

part, father “let [her] [k]now when he got new phone numbers.” The

caseworker lost contact with father for approximately four months

before he was arrested. Nonetheless, after he was incarcerated, the

caseworker visited him and was able to communicate with him

regularly. After father entered community corrections, the

caseworker repeatedly attempted to contact father and eventually

received his cell phone number, allowing for better communication.

She also communicated with father’s community corrections case

manager.

¶ 13 Father never completed a substance use evaluation. The

caseworker had “several conversations” with father about treating

his active substance use, but father refused to engage. Similarly,

while in community corrections, father’s case manager reported

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that father “missed evaluations and other things that were

necessary to move forward in the [substance abuse] treatment.”

¶ 14 Before father’s incarceration, the Department arranged

supervised family time in Weld County and then moved it to

Larimer County in order to be closer to father. Despite these

efforts, father participated inconsistently in family time.

¶ 15 Father was not able to comply with the requirements of his

ongoing criminal case and was arrested during this case. And

because father was in community corrections at the time of the

termination hearing, he had not yet provided a stable living

situation for the child.

¶ 16 Father claims the Department did not work to overcome his

transportation barriers, but the record does not support his

assertions. The caseworker testified that, when she became aware

of father’s lack of transportation, she offered to change the location

of his services or provide him with bus passes. Father refused the

accommodations. Similarly, father asserts that the Department did

not provide anger management services, but the caseworker

testified that father reported already participating in anger

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management services. However, father did not provide a signed

release of information allowing the Department’s confirmation.

¶ 17 We are also unpersuaded by father’s claim that he was not

provided with reasonable efforts while incarcerated. Despite the

caseworker’s several requests, father did not provide her with

signed releases of information necessary for the caseworker to

confirm that father was participating in services through the jail.

¶ 18 We acknowledge gaps in the provision of family time services

for father after his incarceration. For instance, in the first four

months father was jailed, family time was not provided. The

caseworker testified that providing family time in jail necessitated

communication between Weld County and Larimer County, which

was “difficult.” It was also challenging to get reimbursement

approved for supervision of those visits. Nevertheless, in the last

month of father’s incarceration, “two or three” virtual supervised

visits occurred. Similarly, father had been released from jail into

community corrections for over a month by the termination hearing,

and visits had not yet started there. The caseworker testified that

the referral process “take[s] a significant amount of time” and that

she had trouble scheduling times for professionals, such as family

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time supervisors, to visit father in community corrections.

However, looking to the totality of circumstances, see My.K.M., ¶

33, the record shows that the caseworker persevered in overcoming

interjurisdictional challenges to establish family time for father in

visits at community corrections, which were scheduled to occur

“very soon.”

¶ 19 Overall, the record supports, and we conclude, that the

Department made reasonable — even if imperfect — efforts to

support father’s treatment plan objectives.

IV. Less Drastic Alternative

¶ 20 Father also asserts that the juvenile court erred when it found

no available less drastic alternative to termination. We disagree.

¶ 21 The juvenile court must consider and eliminate less drastic

alternatives before it terminates the parent-child legal relationship.

People in Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 24. When considering

less drastic alternatives, the court bases its decision on the best

interests of the child, giving primary consideration to the child’s

physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs. § 19-3-

604(3). The court may also consider whether the child is bonded to

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the parent. People in Interest of D.P., 181 P.3d 403, 408-09 (Colo.

App. 2008).

¶ 22 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must do more than

“adequately” meet a child’s needs; rather, the less drastic

alternative must be the “best” option for the child. A.M., ¶ 27.

Therefore, if the court considers a less drastic alternative but finds

instead that termination is in the child’s best interests, it must

reject the less drastic alternative and order termination. Id. at ¶ 32.

Under those circumstances, we must affirm the court’s decision if

its findings are supported by the record. People in Interest of B.H.,

2021 CO 39, ¶ 80.

¶ 23 Father argues that the caseworker did not investigate several

named relatives. The Department is not obligated to investigate all

relatives, only a “reasonable number.” People in Interest of M.T.,

121 P.3d 309, 314 (Colo. App. 2004). The Department did this.

The caseworker attempted to seek out other relative placements as

part of her diligent search. These relatives included “several family

members that . . . [she found] through different databases and

networks.” None of them was willing to be a placement for the

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child. The caregivers “would only accept termination and adoption”

for the child.

¶ 24 The caseworker also opined that the child had no bond with

father. By contrast, the child was attached and bonded to his

caregivers and “looks to them for safety.” The caseworker opined

that adoption by the caregivers was in the child’s best interest.

¶ 25 The court concluded that there were no less drastic

alternatives to termination. In doing so, it explicitly gave primary

consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotions and

conditions and needs. It also based its determination on the

evidence showing that the child had no bond with father but shared

a strong bond with his adoptive placement. Because the record

supports the court’s finding, we will not disturb it. B.H., ¶ 80.

V. Disposition

¶ 26 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE TOW concur.

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