Marriage of Scavarda

25CA1131 Marriage of Scavarda 10-15-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1131
Arapahoe County District Court No. 24DR30664
Honorable Michelle Jones, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Kylan Scavarda,
Appellee,
and
Andrea Eskanos,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS
Gomez and Taubman*, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 15, 2026
Aitken Law, LLC, Sharlene J. Aitken, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee
Law Office of Joel M. Pratt, Joel M. Pratt, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for
Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2026.

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¶ 1 In this dissolution of marriage proceeding involving Andrea
Eskanos (wife) and Kylan Scavarda (husband), wife appeals those
portions of the permanent orders concerning parentage, allocation
of parental responsibilities, and spousal maintenance.
¶ 2 In connection with the dissolution proceeding, the court
allocated parental responsibilities for two children. The older child,
H.L., was born to wife prior to the marriage. H.L.’s biological father
died when H.L. was young. The younger child was born during the
marriage, and wife and husband are his biological parents. The
district court adjudicated husband the legal father of both children.
¶ 3 Because the trial court lacked authority to adjudicate husband
H.L.’s legal father, we reverse the district court’s permanent orders
concerning parentage and allocation of parental responsibilities as
to H.L., as well as the intertwined child support order, and remand
for further proceedings concerning those issues. But because we
reject wife’s contentions concerning parental responsibilities for the
younger child and spousal maintenance, we otherwise affirm the
judgment.

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I. Legal Parentage Adjudication
¶ 4 Wife argues that the district court failed to comply with
statutory requirements when it adjudicated husband H.L.’s legal
father, necessitating reversal. We agree.
A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
¶ 5 A “legal parent” has a “due process right to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of h[is] children.” In re
Parental Responsibilities Concerning E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 548
(Colo. App. 2004). Legal parenthood comes with various rights and
responsibilities. N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354, 359 (Colo. 2000).
Legal parents have rights to parenting time; to direct the child’s
activities; and to make decisions regarding the control, education,
and health of the child. Id. They also have obligations to support
the child and to teach moral standards and good citizenship. Id.
¶ 6 The Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), §§ 19-4-101 to -130, C.R.S.
2026, governs determinations of legal parentage. The UPA
“mandates specific procedures that must be followed” in a paternity
proceeding. In re Support of E.K., 2013 COA 99, ¶ 9.
¶ 7 Before the district court can determine paternity, it must
provide notice to the “natural mother”; “each man presumed to be

3
the father under section 19-4-105[, C.R.S. 2026]”; and “each man
alleged to be the natural father.”1 § 19-4-110, C.R.S. 2026; see
People in Interest of J.G.C., 2013 COA 171, ¶ 12. If a man alleged to
be the natural father is deceased, his representative must be named
as a party to the proceeding or otherwise provided with notice of the
paternity action. § 19-4-110 (explaining that if the natural father is
deceased, the court must name as a party to the proceeding the
personal representative of his estate or, if one has not been
appointed, his spouse or immediate blood relative or, if no such
person exists, some other representative).
¶ 8 A person may be a presumptive parent if, as relevant here, the
child was born while the mother and the person were married;
genetic testing establishes that the person is the biological father;
or “the child is under the age of majority [when] the person receives
the child into [his] home and openly holds out the child as [his]
natural child.” § 19-4-105(1)(a), (d), (f). When more than one
presumption of paternity arises under the UPA and none is rebutted
1 Under the UPA, a “natural” parent means a “nonadoptive parent
established pursuant to” article 4 of title 19 of the Colorado Revised
Statutes — in other words, a legal parent. § 19-4-102.5(3), C.R.S.
2026.

4
by clear and convincing evidence, the district court must conduct a
fact-intensive inquiry to determine which presumption controls
based on the “weightier considerations of policy and logic.” § 19-4-
105(2)(a).
¶ 9 Legal parentage may be adjudicated during dissolution of
marriage proceedings. See § 19-4-109(1), C.R.S. 2026 (providing
that a paternity “action may be joined with an action in another
court of competent jurisdiction for dissolution of marriage”); In re
Marriage of Burkey, 689 P.2d 726 (Colo. App. 1984). But “[w]hen a
paternity issue arises in a nonpaternity proceeding, the court must
follow the procedures outlined in the UPA.” J.G.C., ¶ 11; see People
in Interest of O.S-H., 2021 COA 130, ¶ 40.
¶ 10 In contrast to a “legal parent,” a “psychological parent” is
“someone other than a [legal] parent who develops a parent-child
relationship with a child through day-to-day interaction,
companionship, and caring for the child.” E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d at
559 (quoting In re Marriage of Martin, 42 P.3d 75, 77-78 (Colo. App.
2002)). A psychological parent is a “nonparent” with respect to the
child. See In re Parental Responsibilities of Reese, 227 P.3d 900,
904 (Colo. App. 2010). Still, a nonparent has standing under the

5
Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act, §§ 14-10-101 to -133, C.R.S.
2026, to request an allocation of parental responsibilities for a child
when, as relevant here, the nonparent had physical care of the child
for a period of at least 182 days and the nonparent pursues the
allocation within 182 days of the termination of that physical care.
§ 14-10-123(1)(c), C.R.S. 2026. “The statutory grant of standing to
a non-parent to seek legal custody of a child constitutes legislative
recognition of the importance of ‘psychological parenting’ to the best
interests of a child.” In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning
V.R.P.F., 939 P.2d 512, 514 (Colo. App. 1997).
¶ 11 Although Colorado law permits a nonparent to request an
allocation of parental responsibilities for a child, “[a] parental
responsibilities dispute between a [legal] parent and a nonparent is
not a contest between equals.” In re Parental Responsibilities
Concerning M.W., 2012 COA 162, ¶ 13; see In re Parental
Responsibilities Concerning A.C.H., 2019 COA 43, ¶ 12 n.1 (“[A]
psychological parent does not generally share equal footing with a
biological parent.”). Before a district court may allocate parental
responsibilities to a nonparent over the legal parent’s objection, the
court must (1) apply a presumption that the legal parent’s decision

6
is in the best interests of the child; (2) require the nonparent to
overcome the presumption by showing by clear and convincing
evidence that the legal parent’s decision is not in the child’s best
interests and that the nonparent’s requested allocation of
responsibilities is in the child’s best interests; and (3) identify the
“special factors” that justify the court’s interference with the legal
parent’s fundamental rights. M.W., ¶¶ 13-15.
¶ 12 We review de novo whether the district court followed the
required statutory procedures, including whether it applied the
correct legal standard in determining parentage. See People in
Interest of K.L.W., 2021 COA 56, ¶ 42.
B. Analysis
1. Standing
¶ 13 To the extent husband argues that wife lacks standing to
challenge the district court’s parentage ruling, because some of the
UPA procedures create rights that only H.L. or the representative of
his deceased biological father may assert, we reject that argument.
¶ 14 “To have standing, a [party] must have (1) suffered an injury in
fact (2) to a legally protected interest.” C.W.B. v. A.S., 2018 CO 8,
¶ 18. Under this “relatively broad definition,” the standing test has

7
“traditionally been relatively easy to satisfy.” Ainscough v. Owens,
90 P.3d 851, 855-56 (Colo. 2004).
¶ 15 Wife contends that she has a legally protected interest in the
care and custody of H.L. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,
66 (2000) (parents have a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in the care, custody, and management of their children); People in
Interest of J.C.S., 169 P.3d 240, 245 (Colo. App. 2007) (“Parental
rights constitute a legally protected interest.”). And she argues that
when the court adjudicated legal parentage without authority and
then allocated parental responsibilities in accordance with that
adjudication, it infringed on her right to parent her child. See
K.L.W., ¶ 21. We agree on both fronts.
¶ 16 Because wife seeks to protect her own legally protected
parental rights, which were arguably injured by the court’s
adjudication of legal parentage, and not the rights of H.L. or his
biological father, we conclude that she has standing to challenge
the court’s paternity ruling. See, e.g., People in Interest of J.A.S.,
160 P.3d 257, 261 (Colo. App. 2007) (a mother has standing to
challenge a court ruling concerning the father to the extent the
ruling affects her own relationship with her children).

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2. Failure to Comply with the UPA
¶ 17 First, there is no serious dispute that the court adjudicated
legal parentage without a request from or notice to the parties and
without adding the deceased biological father’s representative as a
party.
¶ 18 Beginning with the petition for dissolution, husband described
his relationship to H.L. as his stepfather, and although he
“assert[ed] parenting rights and responsibilities over [H.L.],” he did
not ask to be declared H.L.’s legal father. A couple of months later,
the parties stipulated to the appointment of a child and family
investigator (CFI) tasked with determining, among other things,
“whether or not [husband] is a psychological parent of [H.L.]” The
CFI concluded that husband was H.L.’s psychological parent and
that he had standing as a “non-parent” to request an allocation of
parental responsibilities, which the CFI recommended the court
grant. Husband reiterated this position in the parties’ joint trial
management certificate (JTMC), asserting that he was H.L.’s
psychological parent and should be granted parenting time under
the nonparent legal standard. Wife opposed husband’s status as a
psychological parent and his request for parenting time. The JTMC

9
did not raise legal parentage as an issue to be determined at the
permanent orders hearing. And at the hearing, husband testified
that he was “seeking [to have] the [c]ourt determine[] that [he] [is]
[H.L.’s] psychological parent.” On appeal, husband concedes that
“Title 19 grounds” for adjudicating husband H.L.’s legal father were
“not raised in prior pleadings, at permanent orders, or [in] the
JTMC.”
¶ 19 Nonetheless, in the permanent orders, the district court
“adjudicated [husband] the legal father of [H.L.], after consideration
of [section] 19-4-105” because he “married the biological Mother of
[H.L.], asserted parentage of [H.L.], and ha[d] been a psychological
parent to [H.L.] for 10 years. [And H.L.]’s biological father is
deceased.” The district court then awarded husband joint decision-
making authority and equal parenting time for both children.
¶ 20 Contrary to husband’s argument on appeal, the district court
did not comply with the UPA’s notice provision merely by noting in
the permanent orders that “[H.L.’s] biological father is deceased so
[he] was not added as a party to this case.” Section 19-4-110
specifically requires that a deceased natural parent’s representative
be named as a party or, at a minimum, receive notice of the

10
proceeding. And without such notice, the parentage adjudication
cannot stand. See E.K., ¶¶ 10-12.
¶ 21 Nor did the court follow the procedure set forth in section
19-4-105 to determine H.L.’s legal father. The biological father,
though deceased, was nonetheless an alleged natural parent. See
People in Interest of M.E.W.F., 600 P.2d 108, 108 (Colo. App. 1979)
(paternity proceedings survive the death of the alleged father); cf.
Lewis v. Schneider, 890 P.2d 148, 149-50 (Colo. App. 1994) (under
the Colorado Probate Code, paternity can be established after the
putative father’s death).
¶ 22 Thus, before the court could name husband H.L.’s legal father,
it had to weigh the competing presumptions of paternity — the
deceased biological father’s presumption under section 19-4-105(a)
and, potentially, section 19-4-105(f) versus husband’s presumption
under section 19-4-105(d). Unless one of the presumptions was
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, the court then had to
consider multiple factors to determine which of the conflicting
presumptions controlled. See § 19-4-105(2)(a). But instead, the
court simply ruled that husband “is adjudicated the legal father of
[H.L.] after consideration of [section] 19-4-105,” because biological

11
father is deceased and husband married wife, asserted
psychological parentage, and is H.L.’s psychological parent. Those
findings do not comport with section 19-4-105.
¶ 23 The court’s errors require reversal of the paternity ruling.
Prior divisions of this court have framed noncompliance with the
statute as a jurisdictional problem. See J.G.C., ¶ 7 (if the district
court fails to comply with the UPA, it “lack[s] subject matter
jurisdiction to make a paternity determination”); In re Marriage of
De La Cruz, 791 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Colo. App. 1990) (if the district
court fails “to follow the requirement[s] of the U.P.A., . . . its order is
void”). But it may be more precise to say that noncompliance
implicates the court’s authority to render a decision. See People in
Interest of J.W. v. C.O., 2017 CO 105, ¶ 24 (when the court
otherwise has subject matter jurisdiction, its later failure to follow
statutory requirements does not divest it of jurisdiction but instead
deprives it of authority to act); People in Interest of T.W., 2022 COA
88M, ¶ 34 (“[A] court’s authority to take action within a particular
case in which it enjoys subject matter jurisdiction may be
constrained by statute, rule, or case law.”). However framed, the
upshot is the same: Because a district court’s authority to

12
adjudicate paternity in a dissolution proceeding is constrained by
the UPA, absent compliance with the statute’s procedural and
substantive requirements, the district court lacks authority to
determine legal parentage.
¶ 24 Husband argues that we should nonetheless affirm the
allocation of parental responsibilities for H.L. because the district
court, despite having concluded that husband was H.L.’s legal
parent, applied the legal standard for allocating parental
responsibilities between a parent and a nonparent. But the record
belies that argument.
¶ 25 As explained, a natural parent and a nonparent (even a
nonparent who qualifies as a psychological parent) are not on
“equal footing” for purposes of an allocation of parental
responsibilities. A.C.H., ¶ 12 n.1; see also Reese, 227 P.3d at 904
(nonparent’s status as psychological parent is insufficient to
overcome presumption in favor of natural parent). But having
adjudicated husband the legal father, that is how the district court
appeared to treat wife and husband.
¶ 26 True, as husband points out, the district court made detailed
findings regarding the best interests factors in section

13
14-10-124(1.5), C.R.S. 2024.2 But there is no indication in the
permanent orders that the court presumed wife was acting in H.L.’s
best interests when she objected to husband’s parenting time,
required husband to rebut the presumption by clear and convincing
evidence, or identified any special factors that justified overriding
wife’s objection. See M.W., ¶ 15; see also Reese, 227 P.3d at 905-06
(district court’s failure to make specific findings regarding burden of
proof required reversal of allocation of parental responsibilities
between parent and nonparent). We reject husband’s argument
that the district court’s reference to the CFI report establishes that
the court adopted the CFI’s application of the three-part test for
allocating parental responsibilities to a nonparent. The district
court expressly adopted only the CFI’s finding that husband was
H.L.’s psychological parent. In paragraph 7(d) and section I(B)(2) of
the permanent orders, the court made factual findings concerning
husband’s relationship with H.L., then concluded that “[t]he CFI
report in this regard is persuasive. It is clear that [husband] is
2 Section 14-10-124, C.R.S. 2024, was substantially amended in
2026. See Ch. 163, sec. 3, § 14-10-124(1.3), (1.5)(a)-(b), (4), 2026
Colo. Sess. Laws 975-81. We refer to the version in effect at the
time the district court issued the permanent orders.

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[H.L.’s] psychological parent.” The court neither purported to adopt
the CFI report in full nor referenced the CFI’s recitation of the three-
part allocation of parental responsibilities test.
¶ 27 Accordingly, we must reverse the portion of the permanent
orders allocating parental responsibilities for H.L. And because we
are reversing the allocation of parental responsibilities for H.L., we
must also reverse the child support order, which is based on an
equal parenting time plan.3 See In re Parental Responsibilities
Concerning W.P.A.S., 2026 COA 4, ¶ 18 (A child support order is
“intertwined with and dependent upon the court’s determination of
parenting time.”).
¶ 28 On remand, if any party seeks an adjudication of legal
parentage, the district court must determine legal parentage of H.L.
in compliance with the UPA. If neither party seeks an adjudication
of legal parentage, but husband seeks an allocation of parental
responsibilities for H.L. as a nonparent, the district court shall
3 However, the existing child support order shall remain in effect
unless and until the district court enters a new order. See In re
Marriage of Stedman, 632 P.2d 1048, 1052 (Colo. App. 1981); see
also In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning M.W., 2012 COA 162,
¶ 27 (directing that the existing parenting time order must remain
in effect pending new orders).

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proceed under title 14 of the Colorado Revised Statutes.4 The court
should consider H.L.’s best interests at the time of the remand
proceedings and give the parties an opportunity to present new
evidence on their current circumstances. See O.S-H., ¶ 54. After
determining whether to enter a new allocation of parental
responsibilities for H.L., the district court shall enter a new child
support order.
II. Equal Allocation of Parental Responsibilities
¶ 29 Wife argues that the district court abused its discretion by
awarding husband equal parenting time and joint decision-making
4 Wife notes that one factor in determining the best interests of a
child is “[t]he interaction and interrelationship of the child with his
. . . siblings.” § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(III). She says that any change to
the allocation of parental responsibilities for H.L. may prompt a
reweighing of the factors informing the allocation of parental
responsibilities for the younger child. But nothing in the
permanent orders suggests that the court’s decision to award the
parties equal parenting time with respect to the younger child was
contingent on H.L.’s parenting time schedule. To the contrary, we
note that H.L. is nearly eighteen, and the district court will soon
lose jurisdiction to allocate parenting time as to him. See In re
Marriage of Tibbetts, 2018 COA 117, ¶ 12 (once a child turns
eighteen, he is no longer subject to an allocation of parental
responsibilities order, as, at that age, he “attain[s] the right to make
h[is] own decisions, including whether to visit h[is] parents”).
Accordingly, we decline to disturb the portion of the permanent
orders allocating parental responsibilities for the younger child.

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because the case involved domestic violence and coercive control.5
We disagree.
A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
¶ 30 The district court must allocate parenting time and
decision-making responsibility according to the child’s best
interests. § 14-10-123.4(1)(a), C.R.S. 2026. In making this
determination, the court must consider all relevant factors,
including the best interests factors identified in section
14-10-124(1.5)(a) and (b). See In re Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA
116M, ¶ 7.
¶ 31 As relevant here, that includes any allegations of domestic
violence. § 14-10-124(1.5)(a). Domestic violence means an act of
violence or threatened act of violence and can include any act
against a person or property “when used as a method of coercion,
control, punishment, intimidation, or revenge.” § 14-10-124(1.3)(b).
If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that one
parent has committed domestic violence, then the primary concern
the court must consider in determining parenting time is the safety
5 Given our disposition with respect to H.L., this issue pertains only
to the younger child.

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and well-being of the abused person and the child.
§ 14-10-124(4)(d). To that end, before the court allocates joint
decision-making responsibility over the objection of the abused
party, the court must find “that there is credible evidence of the
ability of the parties to make decisions cooperatively in the best
interest of the child in a manner that is safe for the abused party
and the child.” § 14-10-124(4)(a)(II)(A).
¶ 32 A district court has broad discretion to allocate parental
responsibilities in the child’s best interests, and we may not disturb
its orders absent an abuse of that discretion. In re Marriage of
Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 330 (Colo. App. 2007). The court abuses its
discretion if its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or
unfair, or if it misapplies the law. In re Marriage of Badawiyeh,
2023 COA 4, ¶ 9. We review the district court’s factual findings for
clear error, meaning that we will defer to its findings unless they
lack record support. Van Gundy v. Van Gundy, 2012 COA 194,
¶ 12.
B. Analysis
¶ 33 After considering allegations of domestic violence and coercive
control, the court concluded that although there was evidence that

18
the parties’ relationship “became toxic with significant arguments
where both parties would drink and become aggressive with one
[an]other[,] it “c[ould] not find, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that domestic violence was committed during the relationship.” The
court found, however, that both parties “used coercive control and
manipulation during the emotional and volatile last few years of the
relationship.”
¶ 34 Wife argues that the court erred by declining to find that
husband’s act of punching a hole in a closet wall constituted an act
of domestic violence. Wife testified that after an argument that
occurred about a year before the hearing, she retreated to a guest
bedroom. She heard a sound, and the next day saw a hole in the
closet wall and photographed it.
¶ 35 We cannot say that the court’s factual finding is clearly
erroneous. Wife was not present when husband punched the wall;
indeed, she did not know about it until the next day. Therefore, the
court could reasonably have concluded that husband’s conduct was
not “directed against” wife for the purpose of intimidating, coercing,
or punishing her. § 14-10-124(1.3)(b).

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¶ 36 Wife also argues that because the court found that husband
engaged in coercive control, it had to explain why unsupervised
parenting time was in the child’s best interests. See § 14-10-124(9)
(If “there is any information . . . that the parent has committed
domestic violence . . . or if the parent is accused by the child of
domestic violence . . . or coercive control, the court shall make a
statement” regarding why unsupervised parenting time is in the
child’s best interests.).
¶ 37 Assuming the provision applies, notwithstanding the lack of
any accusation by the children,6 we think the court’s detailed
findings concerning the best interests factors provide a sufficient
basis for its decision. The court found, “[d]espite the volatility in
the last few years of the [parties’] relationship and the exposure of
the children to the parties’ actions,” that (1) the children were “well-
adjusted and comfortable with and in each party’s home and care”;
(2) both parties “interact[ed] appropriately with the children and
support[ed] the children”; (3) neither party had any mental health
6 In her reply brief, wife makes a different argument about why
section 14-10-124(9) applies, but we do not address arguments
raised for the first time in a reply brief. See In re Marriage of
Drexler, 2013 COA 43, ¶ 24.

20
conditions that affected parenting; (4) neither party had “a current
drug addiction or alcohol addiction”; (5) each party had the ability
to alert the court if either believed that the children were
endangered; and (6) both parties had historically “committed
significant time and support to both children” and generally put the
children’s needs above their own.
¶ 38 Finally, we reject wife’s argument that the court abused its
discretion by awarding joint decision-making and equal parenting
time to husband. Her argument amounts to a rehashing of the
hearing evidence — according to wife, the evidence showed,
contrary to the court’s findings, that the parties could not make
joint decisions and that husband exhibited violent and coercive
behavior that put the children at risk. But it was up to the district
court to weigh the relevant factors and resolve conflicts in the
evidence. See In re Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 49; In re
Marriage of Rahn, 914 P.2d 463, 465 (Colo. App. 1995) (when the
district court resolves conflicting evidence in one party’s favor, the
appellate court may not reweigh that evidence or substitute its
judgment for that of the district court). And because the court’s

21
findings have record support, we may not disturb them. See Van
Gundy, ¶ 12.
III. Spousal Maintenance
¶ 39 Wife contends that the parties agreed to an award of
maintenance, and, therefore, the court erred by denying
maintenance without finding that the agreement was
unconscionable. Again, we disagree.
¶ 40 The parties to a dissolution proceeding may enter into “a
written separation agreement” concerning maintenance that is
“binding upon the court unless it finds . . . that the separation
agreement is unconscionable.” § 14-10-112(1)-(2), C.R.S. 2026.
¶ 41 Maintenance was addressed in the JTMC in a section entitled
“Disputed Issues and Specific Points of Law.” Husband “d[id] not
dispute the [statutory] guideline term or amount of maintenance,”
but he did not expressly stipulate to an award of maintenance to
wife. Wife argued that the statutory factors “favor an award of
spousal maintenance” and “ask[ed] for an award of maintenance
pursuant to” the statutory guidelines. Wife did not assert that
husband agreed to pay maintenance. If that portion of the JTMC
constituted a binding agreement that husband would pay wife

22
maintenance of $752 per month for two years, there would have
been no reason for wife to apply twelve factors “affecting the amount
and term of maintenance” to justify her request for that amount of
maintenance.
¶ 42 At the outset of the permanent orders hearing, when the court
and parties were discussing the issues to be resolved, husband’s
counsel confirmed that, while the parties agreed on the statutory
duration and amount of maintenance, husband intended to argue
against a maintenance award if wife “succeed[ed] on her argument
regarding separate property.” Wife did not challenge husband’s
entitlement to object to maintenance. Later, husband testified
consistently with his counsel’s notice: He said that depending on
the amount of separate property wife received, maintenance “would
not be necessary.” Again, wife’s counsel did not challenge
husband’s position on the ground that the parties had entered into
a binding separation agreement.
¶ 43 The district court denied wife’s request for maintenance, in
part, because wife was awarded more of the marital property,
“which alleviate[d] the need for spousal maintenance.”

23
¶ 44 On de novo review of the JTMC, which wife says contains the
parties’ agreement concerning maintenance, see Fed. Deposit Ins.
Corp. v. Fisher, 2013 CO 5, ¶ 9 (contract interpretation is a question
of law reviewed de novo), we conclude that the parties did not enter
into a separation agreement obligating husband to pay maintenance
to wife. Even if the JTMC were ambiguous, the parties’ conduct at
the hearing “is a reliable test of their interpretation” of the JTMC,
and it indicates the lack of an agreement for an award of
maintenance. T.W. Anderson Mortg. Co. v. Robert Land Co., 480
P.2d 109, 110-11 (Colo. App. 1970).
¶ 45 Accordingly, we affirm the permanent orders as to the denial of
spousal maintenance.
IV. Appellate Attorney Fees and Costs
¶ 46 Wife requests her appellate attorney fees under section
14-10-119, C.R.S. 2026, alleging a disparity in the parties’
economic circumstances. Husband argues that wife failed to state a
sufficient legal and factual basis for the request. We disagree.
¶ 47 As to the legal basis, wife cited the statute providing a basis
for an award of attorney fees — section 14-10-119. And as to the
factual basis, wife explained that “[h]usband earns nearly twice

24
what [she] earns” and that he “w[ould] have a far greater ability to
replenish his resources after the divorce, particularly because he is
not paying” maintenance. Husband says that in awarding attorney
fees under section 14-10-119, the district court must consider the
totality of the parties’ financial circumstances, not just their
incomes, and, considering the whole financial picture, “there is not
a disparity in financial resources that justifies an award of appellate
attorney fees to [w]ife.” But that is an argument more appropriately
presented to the district court on remand.
¶ 48 Because the district court is better equipped to assess the
parties’ current financial resources, we direct the district court to
address wife’s request on remand. See C.A.R. 39.1; W.P.A.S., ¶ 38.
¶ 49 Husband requests his appellate costs pursuant to C.A.R.
39(a). In light of our disposition, we also direct the district court to
address husband’s request on remand. See C.A.R. 39(a)(4) (“[I]f a
judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, modified, or vacated,
costs are taxed only as ordered by the [district] court.”).
V. Disposition
¶ 50 We reverse those portions of the district court’s permanent
orders concerning (1) legal parentage; (2) the allocation of parental

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responsibilities for H.L.; and (3) child support. In all other respects,
the judgment is affirmed. The case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion and for determinations of
wife’s request for appellate attorney fees and husband’s request for
appellate costs.
JUDGE GOMEZ and JUDGE TAUBMAN concur.