Peo in Interest of Johansson

25CA2266Coloctapp5 de fev. de 2026

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25CA2266 Peo in Interest of Johansson 02-05-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA2266
Mesa County District Court No. 25MH30189
Honorable Gretchen B. Larson, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Petitioner-Appellee,
In the Interest of Korey Johansson,
Respondent-Appellant.
APPEAL DISMISSED
Division V
Opinion by JUDGE TAUBMAN*
Tow and Lipinsky, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced February 5, 2026
Todd M. Starr, County Attorney, Richard B. Tuttle, Assistant County Attorney,
Grand Junction, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee
Tezak Law, P.C., Mary Tezak, Florence, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
1
¶ 1 Respondent, Korey Johansson, appeals the district court’s
order authorizing (1) his certification for short-term mental health
treatment at Centennial Peaks Hospital (the hospital) and (2) the
involuntarily administration of medication. Because the appeal is
moot, we dismiss it.
I. Background
¶ 2 Johansson was transported to an emergency room after he
attempted suicide. At the emergency room, staff placed Johansson
on a seventy-two-hour emergency mental health hold. He was then
transferred to the hospital, where he was diagnosed with
schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type.
¶ 3 Johansson’s treating psychiatrist at the hospital sought an
order authorizing Johansson’s certification for short-term mental
health treatment. The hospital also asked for an order to
involuntarily medicate him. In November 2025, the district court
held an evidentiary hearing, after which the court granted the
hospital’s requests.
¶ 4 Less than two weeks later, Johansson’s treating physician filed
a notice of termination of involuntary treatment, stating that
Johansson no longer met the criteria for treatment and was
2
discharged from the hospital. This court then issued an order
directing Johansson to show cause why the appeal should not be
dismissed as moot.
II. Mootness
¶ 5 Johansson acknowledges that he has been released from the
hospital and is no longer subject to the involuntary treatment
challenged on appeal. However, he contends that the appeal should
not be dismissed because it falls within the exception to the
mootness doctrine for issues “capable of repetition but evading
review.” People in Interest of Vivekanathan, 2013 COA 143M, ¶ 9,
338 P.3d 1017, 1019. We disagree.
¶ 6 Colorado courts have applied the exception for issues capable
of repetition but evading review in mental health appeals involving
short-term certifications and involuntary medication
administration. See, e.g., Gilford v. People, 2 P.3d 120, 124 (Colo.
2000); People in Interest of Ofengand, 183 P.3d 688, 691 (Colo. App.
2008). In those cases, however, the appeals involved specific
procedural issues that were likely to arise in other cases. See
Gilford, 2 P.3d at 122 (addressing whether the petition must be
personally delivered to vest the trial court with jurisdiction);
3
Ofengand, 183 P.3d at 691 (addressing an argument that the
patient waived her right to counsel).
¶ 7 Johansson does not raise any such procedural issues in this
appeal. Rather, he asserts only that the district court erred by
finding that sufficient evidence supported the requirements for both
short-term certification and the involuntary administration of
medication. These determinations are fact-specific and turn on
Johansson’s condition when the district court ruled. See
Vivekanathan, ¶ 14, 338 P.3d at 1019. As a result, the issue of
whether the court erred has become moot, and our ruling would
have no practical effect. See id.
¶ 8 Still, Johansson asserts that this matter is capable of
repetition yet evading review “by its very nature” because “it
pertains to short-term certification and involuntary treatment.” In
support, he directs our attention to People in Interest of Hoylman,
865 P.2d 918, 920 (Colo. App. 1993), where a division of this court
observed that, “[b]y its nature, an order for short-term
hospitalization, entered in a proceeding in which a respondent has
been denied a hearing before a jury, will expire before the review of
such an order may be had before an appellate court.” (Emphasis
4
added.) We do not read Hoylman to hold, as Johansson suggests,
that any case involving short-term certification and involuntary
medication is categorically exempt from the mootness doctrine.
Rather, like the cases cited above, Hoylman involved a procedural
issue — the denial of a hearing before a jury — that was capable of
repetition yet evading review. See Vivekanathan, ¶ 10 (including
Holyman in a list of cases involving procedural issues that were
capable of repetition yet evading review).
¶ 9 At any rate, even if Hoylman could be read to suggest that all
mental health orders are reviewable simply because they expire
before an appellate court can review them, such a proposition is no
longer true today. We consistently review orders for short-term
certification and involuntary administration of medication before
they expire. And the only reason we have not done so in this case
is because Johansson was released eight days after he filed the
appeal.
5
¶ 10 We therefore reject Johansson’s contention and conclude that
the appeal is moot. As a result, we do not address the merits of his
appeal.1
III. Disposition
¶ 11 The appeal is dismissed.
JUDGE TOW and JUDGE LIPINSKY concur.
1 Johansson filed his notice of appeal on November 24, 2025. The
record indicates that the treating physician, through the People,
filed a notice of termination of treatment in the district court on
December 2, 2025, eight days after the notice of appeal was filed
and seventeen days before the opening brief was filed. Thus,
Johansson’s counsel should have known about the notice of
termination of treatment before filing the opening brief, yet omitted
any reference to that notice in the brief. We remind counsel of her
professional duty of candor to this court under Colo. RPC 3.3 and
the obligation to include all relevant facts in her brief under C.A.R.
28(a)(5). If this conduct recurs, counsel may be referred to the
Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel.

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