Miranda Wallingford; Richard Wallingford v. ROBERT ANDRES BONTA, Esquire

FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MIRANDA WALLINGFORD;
RICHARD WALLINGFORD,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
ROBERT ANDRES BONTA,
Esquire, in his official capacity as
Attorney General of the State of
California,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
DOES, 1-10,
Defendant.
No. 21-56292
D.C. No.
8:21-cv-01412-
DOC-KES
OPINION
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted July 15, 2022
Pasadena, California
Filed September 21, 2023

-- 1 of 56 --

2 WALLINGFORD V. BONTA
Before: Mark J. Bennett and Daniel P. Collins, Circuit
Judges, and Elizabeth E. Foote,* District Judge.
Opinion by Judge Bennett;
Dissent by Judge Collins
SUMMARY**
Mootness
The panel dismissed as moot an action asserting an as-
applied challenge to California laws that make it unlawful
for any person subject to a civil restraining order issued by a
California state court (including temporary restraining
orders) to possess firearms or ammunition.
This case arises from a dispute between plaintiffs and
their neighbor, which resulted in restraining orders issued
against plaintiffs by the California Superior Court. Though
plaintiffs were subject to a three-year restraining order when
they filed suit, the order expired during the pendency of this
appeal, and in January 2023, a California court denied the
neighbor’s request for an extension. Plaintiffs are once again
entitled to possess firearms and ammunition.
The panel rejected plaintiffs’ argument that, although they
were no longer subject to any firearm restrictions, the case fell
* The Honorable Elizabeth E. Foote, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.
** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

-- 2 of 56 --

WALLINGFORD V. BONTA 3
within the “capable of repetition, yet evading review”
exception to mootness. The panel noted that this doctrine is
to be used sparingly, in exceptional situations, and generally
only where (1) the challenged action is in its duration too short
to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and
(2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same
complaining party will be subject to the same action again.
The panel held that this case was moot because the
relevant restraining orders have expired, a three-year-long
restraining order is not too brief to be litigated on the merits,
and there was no reasonable expectation that plaintiffs will
be subject to the same action again. The mere possibility
that a state court would grant another restraining order, after
already denying a request for an extension, was speculative
and insufficient to constitute a renewed threat of the “same
action.” Finally, plaintiffs’ two-year delay in bringing a
lawsuit after surrendering their firearms cut materially
against them.
Judge Collins dissented from the majority’s dismissal of
this case as moot. Given that plaintiffs’ neighbor
successfully obtained no less than three temporary
restraining orders, there was more than a theoretical
possibility that plaintiffs will be subjected to a materially
similar order in the future. Additionally, it was not clear that
complex claims such as this one could be fully resolved
within three years.
Proceeding to the merits of the appeal, Judge Collins
would hold that the district court erred in concluding that the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred plaintiffs’ suit, and would
also reject the State’s contention that Younger requires
abstention. He would reverse the district court’s dismissal
of this action and remand for further proceedings.

-- 3 of 56 --

4 WALLINGFORD V. BONTA
COUNSEL
Alexander A. Frank (argued), Carl D. Michel, Sean A.
Brady, Anna M. Barvir, and Matthew D. Cubeiro, Michel &
Associates PC, Long Beach, California, for Plaintiffs-
Appellants.
Rita B. Bosworth (argued), Deputy Attorney General; P.
Patty Li, Supervising Deputy Attorney General; Thomas S.
Patterson, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Office of the
California Attorney General, San Francisco, California;
Benjamin M. Glickman, Supervising Deputy Attorney
General; Anthony P. O’Brien, Deputy Attorney General;
Rob A. Bonta, California Attorney General; Office of the
California Attorney General, Sacramento, California; for
Defendant-Appellee.
OPINION
BENNETT, Circuit Judge:
Certain California laws make it unlawful for any person
subject to a “civil restraining order” issued by a California
state court (including temporary restraining orders) to
possess firearms or ammunition. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
§§ 527.6(u)(1), 527.9; Cal. Penal Code §§ 27500, 27540,
29825, 30305–06, 30370. Plaintiffs-Appellants Miranda
and Richard Wallingford (“the Wallingfords”) claim these
laws violate the Second Amendment and the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution as applied to them.
Though the Wallingfords were subject to civil restraining
orders when they filed their suit, the orders against them
have expired, and in January 2023, a California court denied

-- 4 of 56 --

WALLINGFORD V. BONTA 5
the latest request to extend them. We hold that the
Wallingfords’ as-applied challenge to the laws is moot.
I.
The Wallingfords have lived in the same home in
Huntington Beach, California for more than 50 years. In
February 2013, Jessica Nguyen moved next door. Though
the neighbors’ relationship was initially cordial, Ms. Nguyen
soon began complaining about the melaleuca tree in the
Wallingfords’ front yard. On June 22, 2018, Ms. Nguyen
confronted Richard while Richard was taking out the trash.
According to Richard, during this encounter, Ms. Nguyen
“dropped to her hands and knees, began screaming, and
proceeded to crawl along the concrete sidewalk and pull her
hair.” Ms. Nguyen then called the police and accused
Richard of assaulting her.
On June 25, 2018, Ms. Nguyen petitioned for a civil
harassment restraining order against Richard and was
granted a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) by the
Orange County Superior Court. As a result of the TRO,
Richard was ordered to surrender his firearms to a California
licensed firearms dealer by June 26, 2018. At a merits
hearing on August 17, 2018, the state court denied Ms.
Nguyen’s petition for a restraining order against Richard and
dissolved the TRO.
Immediately following the June 22, 2018 incident, the
Wallingfords installed security cameras on their property.
According to the Wallingfords, in the year that followed, the
cameras captured Ms. Nguyen yelling racial epithets,
making violent threats, and entering the Wallingfords’
property to pour bleach on the melaleuca tree. On June 17,
2019, Miranda filed her own petition for a civil harassment
restraining order against Ms. Nguyen. The petition was

-- 5 of 56 --

6 WALLINGFORD V. BONTA
granted, and the state court issued a TRO against Ms.
Nguyen on June 18, 2019.
Ms. Nguyen then filed new petitions for restraining
orders against both Miranda and Richard on September 5,
2019, claiming the cameras on the Wallingfords’ property
were invading her privacy. The court granted the TROs Ms.
Nguyen sought, and the Wallingfords surrendered their
firearms to a California licensed firearms dealer on
September 6, 2019.
On November 1, 2019, the state court granted Miranda a
three-year restraining order against Ms. Nguyen, while also
granting Ms. Nguyen three-year restraining orders against
both Wallingfords. Because of the restraining orders issued
against them, the Wallingfords were prohibited from
possessing firearms and ammunition. The Wallingfords did
not seek to modify, terminate, or appeal the restraining
orders, nor did they raise any constitutional claims in state
court.
On August 30, 2021, almost two years after the first of
the 2019 restraining orders was issued against the
Wallingfords, they filed suit against the California Attorney
General, claiming that “California’s complete restriction on
firearm or ammunition possession and acquisition by any
person subject to a civil restraining order, regardless of the
basis for the order, is unconstitutional as applied to
Plaintiffs.” The district court dismissed the suit on October
28, 2021, and the Wallingfords appealed. On appeal, we
submitted this case after oral argument on July 15, 2022.

-- 6 of 56 --

WALLINGFORD V. BONTA 7
Months passed. While the appeal was pending, the
restraining orders expired.1 Ms. Nguyen sought to renew her
restraining orders, but on January 17, 2023, the state court
denied her attempt, and the restraining orders were not
renewed. There are presently no civil restraining orders
against the Wallingfords; they are once again entitled to
possess firearms and ammunition and have been since at
least January 2023.
II.
The constitutional requirement that federal courts
resolve “only actual, ongoing cases or controversies” applies
“through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and
appellate.” Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477
(1990). “[I]t is not enough that a dispute was very much
alive when suit was filed.” Id. For federal courts to retain
jurisdiction, the parties in a dispute “must continue to have a
personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit.” Id. at 478
(cleaned up). “A case that becomes moot at any point during
the proceedings is no longer a ‘Case’ or ‘Controversy’ for
purposes of Article III, and is outside the jurisdiction of the
federal courts.” United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct.
1 There is some dispute as to whether the restraining orders expired in
November 2022 or January 2023. As the dissent notes, on November 1,
2022, Ms. Nguyen filed a motion to renew and extend her restraining
orders, and while her requests were pending, “the state court appears to
have temporarily extended the restraining orders, keeping them in place
until the [January 2023] merits hearing.” Dissent at 29. In their
supplemental brief on mootness filed November 18, 2022, the
Wallingfords represented that “the initial restraining order expired by its
terms on November 1, 2022.” But regardless of whether Ms. Nguyen’s
restraining orders expired in November 2022 or January 2023, there is
no dispute that they are no longer in force and haven’t been for more than
seven months.

-- 7 of 56 --

8 WALLINGFORD V. BONTA
1532, 1537 (2018) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). “Mootness is a question of law,” ASW v. Oregon,
424 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2005), and federal courts must
consider mootness sua sponte, NASD Dispute Resolution,
Inc. v. Judicial Council, 488 F.3d 1065, 1068 (9th Cir.
2007).
While the Wallingfords admit that they are no longer
subject to any firearm restrictions, they argue that this case
falls into the “capable of repetition, yet evading review”
exception to mootness.2 We first note that this doctrine is to
be used sparingly, only in “exceptional situations,” “and
generally only where the named plaintiff can make a
reasonable showing that he will again be subjected to the
alleged illegality,” Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109
(1983). It “applies where (1) the challenged action is in its
duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or
expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the
same complaining party will be subject to the same action
again.” See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right To
Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 462 (2007) (cleaned up). The
plaintiff carries the burden of demonstrating the exception
applies, Dep’t of Fish & Game v. Fed. Subsistence Bd., 62
F.4th 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2023), including showing that
there is a reasonable expectation that he will once again face
the challenged activity, Native Vill. of Nuiqsut v. Bureau of
Land Mgmt., 9 F.4th 1201, 1209 (9th Cir. 2021).
We find the exception inapplicable here. This case is
moot because the relevant restraining orders have expired, a
2 The Wallingfords also argue that the “voluntary cessation” exception
to mootness also applies. But as the State argues, “[t]he ‘voluntary
cessation’ doctrine does not apply here because no party voluntarily
ceased conduct that is challenged in this matter.”

-- 8 of 56 --

WALLINGFORD V. BONTA 9
three-year-long restraining order is not too brief to be
litigated on the merits, and there is no reasonable expectation
that the Wallingfords will be subject to the “same action”
again. And even were this case capable of repetition, yet
evading review, the Wallingfords’ two-year delay in suing
cuts materially against them.
A. A Three-Year-Long Restraining Order Does Not
Evade Review
At the time they filed suit, the Wallingfords were subject
to three-year restraining orders and had been subject to brief
TROs3, all carrying firearm restrictions. They challenged
these restrictions as unconstitutional as applied to them. In
assessing whether an action is of “inherently limited
duration” in order to be considered “too short to be fully
litigated prior to cessation or expiration,” courts tend to look
at cases by type rather than individual circumstances.
Protectmarriage.com-Yes on 8 v. Bowen, 752 F.3d 827, 836
(9th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). This is “because the ‘capable
of repetition, yet evading review’ exception is concerned not
with particular lawsuits, but with classes of cases that, absent
an exception, would always evade judicial review.” Id.
Under our precedent, restraining orders lasting three years
do not qualify as too brief to be sufficiently litigated on the
merits.
Though there is no bright-line rule, when assessing the
classes of cases inherently limited in duration, actions lasting
more than two years are frequently considered long enough
to be fully litigated prior to cessation, while actions lasting
less than two years are considered too short. Compare
3 We do not discount that even a “brief” deprivation of constitutional
rights is still a significant deprivation.

-- 9 of 56 --

10 WALLINGFORD V. BONTA
Karuk Tribe of California v. U.S. Forest Serv., 681 F.3d
1006, 1018 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (actions lasting “only
one or two years” evade review), with Hamamoto v. Ige, 881
F.3d 719, 722–23 (9th Cir. 2018) (action lasting two years
and five months sufficiently long).4
The restraining orders at issue in this case lasted for three
years—beyond the line we drew in Hamamoto.
Accordingly, our precedent suggests that three-year
restraining orders do not “evade review,” even if the
restraining orders at issue here have evaded the review of our
court. Indeed, as the dissent identifies, it appears that Ms.
Nguyen may have received a temporary extension of her
restraining orders between November 1, 2022 and January
17, 2023. Dissent at 29. If this is the case, the Wallingfords
had three years and two months to fully litigate the
constitutionality of the firearms ban they were subject to
during the pendency of Ms. Nguyen’s restraining orders. If
Ms. Nguyen were to receive a similar restraining order in the
4 In Johnson v. Rancho Santiago Community. College District, 623 F.3d
1011 (9th Cir. 2010), we noted that “this litigation demonstrates that
three years is too short for us or the Supreme Court to give [a] case full
consideration;” but that was because the case had “already been pending
for nearly six and a half years.” Id. at 1019. Indeed, in Johnson,
litigation took “over three years to reach us, and the Supreme Court has
not yet had a chance to consider it.” Id. In the instant case, the district
court issued its order dismissing the Wallingfords’ Complaint 59 days
after the Complaint was filed. Oral argument before our Court occurred
less than eight months later. This circumstance is closer to the expedited
timeline of Hamamoto than the sluggish progression of Johnson.

-- 10 of 56 --

WALLINGFORD V. BONTA 11
future and the Wallingfords were to promptly sue, such a
proceeding would not evade our review.5
B. The Wallingfords Failed to Seek Prompt Relief
Of course, though the restraining orders at issue arguably
lasted for more than three years, the Wallingfords filed their
lawsuit only a little over one year before the orders were set
to expire—a substantial delay considering their three-year
duration. “A party may not profit from the ‘capable of
repetition, yet evading review’ exception where through his
own failure to seek and obtain prompt relief he has prevented
an appellate court from reviewing the trial court’s decision.”
Protectmarriage.com, 752 F.3d at 837 (cleaned up). The
exception is “designed to apply to situations where the type
of injury involved inherently precludes judicial review, not
to situations where the failure of parties to take certain
actions has precluded review as a practical matter.” Bunker
Ltd. P’ship v. United States, 820 F.2d 308, 311 (9th Cir.
1987).6
Had the Wallingfords filed suit shortly after becoming
the subjects of the restraining orders issued, under our
precedent, they would have had sufficient time to litigate this
appeal before it became moot. Instead, they waited almost
5 We do not discount that there would be insufficient time to litigate the
constitutionality of a firearm ban in a new TRO. But the Wallingfords
were not subject to TROs when they filed their as-applied challenge.
6 Additionally, our court has previously recognized prudential, in
addition to jurisdictional, concerns underlying mootness. See Wildwest
Inst. v. Kurth, 855 F.3d 995, 1002 n.11 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting “the
practical concern that the federal courts’ limited resources should not be
wasted on issues that do not need decision”). Even were the “capable of
repetition, yet evading review” exception possibly viable, the
Wallingfords’ delay in filing counsels against our applying it here.

-- 11 of 56 --

12 WALLINGFORD V. BONTA
two years after surrendering their firearms on September 6,
2019 before filing suit on August 30, 2021. All else being
the same, had the Wallingfords sued much more promptly,
we could have reached the merits of their appeal before the
restraining orders expired.7 In other words, the
Wallingfords’ yearslong failure to take action “precluded
review as a practical matter,” not as a matter of course.
Bunker Ltd. P’ship, 820 F.2d at 311.
C. The Restraining Orders Have Expired and The
State Court Has Already Rejected Ms. Nguyen’s
Request to Extend Them
Moving from “evading review” to “capable of
repetition,” there is no “reasonable expectation” or
“demonstrated probability” that the Wallingfords will be
subject to the “same action again.” Wisconsin Right to Life,
551 U.S. at 462–63 (internal quotations omitted). The
Wallingfords argue that “nothing bars Nguyen from filing
any number of additional restraining order applications—
again triggering the automatic firearms prohibition.” Both
the Wallingfords and the dissent argue that Ms. Nguyen’s
history of filing for restraining orders against the
Wallingfords creates a reasonable expectation that more
restraining orders will be entered, and that such restraining
orders will implicate the same legal issue presented here.
Dissent at 33–39.
The Supreme Court has held that “reasonable
expectation” in this context is somewhere short of
“demonstrably probable” or “more probable than not.”
7 As it was, we could have reached the merits before the restraining
orders expired. We held oral argument on July 15, 2022. The restraining
orders expired in either November 2022 or January 2023.

-- 12 of 56 --

WALLINGFORD V. BONTA 13
Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 318 n.6 (1988). The fact that
“nothing bars Nguyen” from filing a new petition for a
restraining order does not constitute a reasonable
expectation that the Wallingfords will be subject to the same
action.
Even if there existed a reasonable expectation that Ms.
Nguyen, who has not (to our knowledge) sought a restraining
order in the more than seven months following the January
17, 2023 hearing, will again file such a petition, merely filing
a request for a restraining order does not automatically
trigger the firearm prohibition under section 527.6. A court
action granting a TRO triggers the prohibition. See Cal. Civ.
Proc. Code § 527.6(u)(1) (“A person subject to a protective
order issued pursuant to this section shall not own, possess,
purchase, receive, or attempt to purchase or receive a firearm
or ammunition while the protective order is in effect.”). Any
assumption that the state court will grant Ms. Nguyen a new
TRO after rejecting her extension request is speculative, and
therefore “not a sufficient basis on which a court can
conclude that a reasonable expectation of recurrence exists.”
Brach v. Newsom, 38 F.4th 6, 14 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc).8
The dissent argues that it is not merely possible, but
probable enough to meet the standard that Ms. Nguyen will
file for and subsequently receive another restraining order
against the Wallingfords because she has already managed
to receive a temporary restraining order by “re-asserting
8 It is additionally speculative to assume, as the dissent does, that such a
petition will be meritless and granted nonetheless. Dissent at 36–38.
Just as the Supreme Court has “consistently refused to conclude that the
case-or-controversy requirement is satisfied by the possibility that a
party will be prosecuted for violating valid criminal laws,” we refuse to
assume that state courts will grant meritless petitions. See United States
v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1541 (2018) (cleaned up).

-- 13 of 56 --

14 WALLINGFORD V. BONTA
claims that had already been rejected on the merits.” Dissent
at 37. However, we take a different view of the facts.
Though “past wrongs are evidence bearing on whether there
is a real and immediate threat of repeated injury,” the “the
prospect of future injury” requires a different lens. O’Shea
v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496 (1974). Indeed, if past
conduct alone were sufficient to create likely future injury,
“virtually any matter of short duration would be
reviewable.” Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982) (per
curiam).
In Brach v. Newsom, we held that plaintiffs’ challenge to
the state’s prohibition on in-person instruction during the
early part of the COVID-19 pandemic was mooted by the
expiration of those policies, and neither the voluntary
cessation doctrine nor the capable of repetition, yet evading
review doctrine applied. 38 F.4th at 9, 12–15. In addressing
whether the COVID-19 shutdowns were capable of
repetition, we found “no ‘reasonable expectation’ that
California will once again” restrict in-person instruction
because “[t]he challenged orders have long since been
rescinded, the State is committed to keeping schools open,
and the trajectory of the pandemic has been altered by the
introduction of vaccines . . . and expanded treatment
options.” Id. at 15. In short, circumstances change, and
when circumstances change, it is not reasonable to expect
simple repetition of past actions.
Likewise here. There is no doubt that 2018 and 2019
were difficult years for the Wallingfords. But the only post-
restraining order contacts between the Wallingfords and Ms.
Nguyen contained in our record are as follows: on November
1, 2022, Ms. Nguyen sought to extend her restraining orders;
on January 17, 2023, the state court denied her attempt; and
at the January 2023 hearing, Ms. Nguyen allegedly said,

-- 14 of 56 --

WALLINGFORD V. BONTA 15
“You are not going to get away with this.” This does not
remotely equal the likelihood of a new restraining order
filing, followed by a grant.
Finally, the Wallingfords have not shown that any new
restraining order issued against them would constitute the
“same action” in a way that implicates the constitutional
challenges outlined in their Complaint. Though plaintiffs
need not allege “repetition of every ‘legally relevant’
characteristic of an as-applied challenge–down to the last
detail,” in order to show they will be subject to the “same
action again,” subsequent violations must be “materially
similar” to relevant past violations in order to constitute the
same action. Wisconsin Right To Life, 551 U.S. at 462–63.
The same action requires “the deprivation of . . . rights that
gave rise to” plaintiffs’ suit. Honig, 484 U.S. at 318.
We agree that although the Complaint is specific to the
positioning of the Wallingfords’ security cameras, “the
gravamen of the Wallingfords’ Second Amendment
challenge is that they were subjected to a statutorily
automatic prohibition on firearms possession without any
predicate finding that they had ‘posed a danger to any person
or the public.’” Dissent at 38. However, while the dissent
argues that the same injury would occur in a circumstance in
which the Wallingfords were subject to an automatic
prohibition on firearms “without any predicate finding” of
dangerousness, Dissent at 38, the dissent reads the
Complaint broadly. We disagree that a hypothetical future
case in which the state court found that the Wallingfords
were dangerous or in violation of the law (but was not
required by law to make such a finding) would constitute the
“same injury” as alleged in the Complaint.

-- 15 of 56 --

16 WALLINGFORD V. BONTA
The Wallingfords do not allege that the California
statutory scheme restricting firearms is facially
unconstitutional. Almost the opposite: the Complaint
concedes that “[p]rohibiting access to arms for individuals
subject to a restraining order may very well pass
constitutional muster in a variety of instances.” However, it
continues to allege that a firearm prohibition is
unconstitutionally excessive in this case because the
California court “made no finding that Plaintiffs had broken
any law with the positioning of their cameras. Nor did it
make any finding that Plaintiffs posed a danger to
themselves, any other person, or the public.” The Complaint
alleges that the California laws:
cannot be constitutionally enforced to deny
Plaintiffs access to firearms and ammunition
merely as a result of a complaint by a
neighbor about the positioning of security
cameras that Plaintiffs had a third party
install on their property in response to
documented hostile actions by that
neighbor—which actions a California
superior court confirmed constituted
“harassment” under California law—and that
Plaintiffs voluntarily removed once they
learned of the neighbor’s objection.
Again, while it would be too restrictive to limit our
understanding of the Complaint to issues related only to the
Wallingfords’ security cameras, the deprivation of rights
alleged is based on restrictions on firearm possession
without a predicate finding that the Wallingfords pose a
danger to any person or the public. A hypothetical future
restraining order based on a finding that the Wallingfords

-- 16 of 56 --

WALLINGFORD V. BONTA 17
were, indeed, dangerous would not fit within the confines of
the Complaint. Accordingly, for there to exist a live
controversy constituting the “same action,” as alleged in the
Complaint, Ms. Nguyen would need to file for a TRO and/or
restraining order and be granted one, with the state court
granting the restraining order without finding the
Wallingfords were dangerous. The dissent suggests that the
mere absence of a requirement that such a predicate finding
be made is sufficient for a hypothetical future restraining
order to constitute the “same action.” Dissent at 37–38. But
the injury specified in the Complaint is that the state court
made no finding as to the Wallingfords’ dangerousness or
lawbreaking, not that the state court was not required to
make any findings as to dangerousness or lawbreaking.
Because a new restraining order could be based on a finding
that the Wallingfords posed a danger, thus obviating the
Complaint’s concern, the mere possibility of a new
restraining order is not sufficient to constitute a renewed
threat of the “same action.”
III.
Let us be clear. We do not discount the harm the
Wallingfords appear to have suffered. But “[t]he basic
question in determining mootness is whether there is a
present controversy as to which effective relief can be
granted.” NW. Env’t. Def. Ctr. v. Gordon, 849 F.2d 1241,
1244 (9th Cir. 1988). It has been more than seven months
since the Orange County Superior Court denied Ms.
Nguyen’s most recent request to extend her restraining
orders, and to our knowledge, there have been no further
requests. The Wallingfords have simply not shown that this
case is one of the “exceptional situations” warranting the
application of the “capable of repetition, yet evading review”
doctrine. Lewis, 494 U.S. at 481.

-- 17 of 56 --

18 WALLINGFORD V. BONTA
* * *
For these reasons, the appeal is DISMISSED.9 10
9 The default rule when an appeal becomes moot is not vacatur, it is
dismissal. See U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S.
18, 23–27 (1994). Though there are exceptions to that rule when an
appeal becomes moot through “circumstances not attributable to the
parties,” or “unilateral action of the party who prevailed in the lower
court,” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 71 (1997)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted), this case does not
present such a circumstance. Indeed, it is the Wallingfords’ “burden, as
the party seeking relief from the status quo of the appellate judgment, to
demonstrate not merely equivalent responsibility for the mootness, but
equitable entitlement to the extraordinary remedy of vacatur.” Bancorp,
513 U.S. at 26. They have not done so. Accordingly, as the
Wallingfords’ delay contributed to our finding of mootness, and as the
district court order below dismissed the case, we simply dismiss the
appeal. The parties shall bear their own costs.
10 The Wallingfords’ unopposed motions to take judicial notice (Dkt.
Nos. 32, 46) are GRANTED.

-- 18 of 56 --

WALLINGFORD V. BONTA 19
COLLINS, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
After becoming involved in a rancorous dispute with
their next-door neighbor, Jessica Nguyen, about a tree on
their property, Miranda and Richard Wallingford installed
security cameras to record any alleged misbehavior by
Nguyen near their property line. The cameras did manage to
document harassing behavior by Nguyen, and the
Wallingfords secured a restraining order against Nguyen
from a California state court based in part on that evidence.
But the state court also concluded that the cameras had
recorded too much of Nguyen’s property and therefore
invaded Nguyen’s privacy rights. On that limited basis, the
court also granted Nguyen’s petition for restraining orders
against the Wallingfords. Under a series of inter-related
California statutory provisions, the issuance of such a
restraining order, on any grounds, automatically triggers a
prohibition on the possession of firearms by the person
restrained. By statute, this prohibition is recited on the
mandatory standard form that courts must use in issuing such
restraining orders, and any violation of the prohibition is a
criminal offense. Accordingly, upon the issuance of the
restraining order against them, the Wallingfords became
automatically subject to this prohibition on firearms
possession.
The Wallingfords thereupon filed this suit in federal
court, alleging that, as applied to them, California’s statutory
regime for automatically prohibiting firearms possession by
any person subject to a restraining order—including
someone who merely had obnoxiously-positioned security
cameras—violates their rights under the Second and
Fourteenth Amendments. Without addressing the merits of
these claims, the district court dismissed this federal action
on the ground that it amounted to a forbidden de facto appeal

-- 19 of 56 --

20 WALLINGFORD V. BONTA
of the state court’s restraining order, in violation of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
The majority today dismisses the appeal the ground that
“[t]his case is moot because the relevant restraining orders
have expired,” and “there is no reasonable expectation that
the Wallingfords will be subject to the ‘same action’ again.”
Opin. at 8. I disagree and respectfully dissent. Because this
case presents a live controversy and the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine does not bar the Wallingfords’ claims, I would
reverse the district court’s judgment and remand for
consideration of the merits of the Wallingfords’ suit.
I
The backdrop for this case is California’s statutory
regime for obtaining restraining orders against harassment,
and so I begin with an overview of the relevant statutory
provisions before turning to the specific facts of this dispute.
A
To protect each “individual’s right to pursue safety,
happiness and privacy as guaranteed by the California
Constitution,” the California Legislature enacted Code of
Civil Procedure § 527.6, which provides for “expedited
injunctive relief to victims of harassment.” Brekke v. Wills,
23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 609, 619 (Ct. App. 2005) (simplified).
Specifically, § 527.6 provides that “[a] person who has
suffered harassment . . . may seek a temporary restraining
order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment.”
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 527.6(a)(1). “Harassment” is
defined as “unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence,
or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a
specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the
person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.” Id.

-- 20 of 56 --

WALLINGFORD V. BONTA 21
§ 527.6(b)(3). “The course of conduct must be that which
would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial
emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial
emotional distress to the petitioner” seeking such injunctive
relief. Id.
A temporary restraining order under § 527.6 “may be
issued with or without notice, based on a declaration that, to
the satisfaction of the court, shows reasonable proof of
harassment of the petitioner by the respondent, and that great
or irreparable harm would result to the petitioner.” CAL.
CODE CIV. PROC. § 527.6(d). A hearing must subsequently
“be held on the petition,” generally within 21–25 days after
the court rules on the request for a temporary restraining
order. Id. § 527.6(g). In connection with such a hearing, the
“respondent” who is sought to be restrained “may file a
response that explains, excuses, justifies, or denies the
alleged harassment, or may file a cross-petition.” Id.
§ 527.6(b)(5), (h). “At the hearing, the judge shall receive
any testimony that is relevant, and may make an independent
inquiry.” Id. § 527.6(i). “If the judge finds by clear and
convincing evidence that unlawful harassment exists, an
order shall issue prohibiting the harassment.” Id. Once such
an “order after hearing” has been issued, it “may have a
duration of no more than five years, subject to termination
or modification by further order of the court either on written
stipulation filed with the court or on the motion of a party.”
Id. § 527.6(j)(1). “The order may be renewed, upon the
request of a party, for a duration of no more than five
additional years, without a showing of any further
harassment since the issuance of the original order,” but any
such renewal remains subject to the same power of the court
to modify or terminate the order upon stipulation or motion.
Id.

-- 21 of 56 --

22 WALLINGFORD V. BONTA
Section 527.6 contains the following subdivision (u),
which generally prohibits firearm ownership by a person
who is the subject of either a temporary restraining order or
an order issued after a hearing under that section:
(u) (1) A person subject to a protective order
issued pursuant to this section shall not own,
possess, purchase, receive, or attempt to
purchase or receive a firearm or ammunition
while the protective order is in effect.
(2) The court shall order a person subject to a
protective order issued pursuant to this
section to relinquish any firearms the person
owns or possesses pursuant to Section 527.9.
(3) A person who owns, possesses,
purchases, or receives, or attempts to
purchase or receive, a firearm or ammunition
while the protective order is in effect is
punishable pursuant to Section 29825 of the
Penal Code.
See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 527.6(u).
As stated in § 527.6(u)(2), the relinquishment procedure
and related details concerning firearm ownership and
possession are set forth in § 527.9. That section provides
that, upon issuing a protective order under § 527.6, the court
“shall order” the restrained person to “relinquish any
firearm” that is in or subject to “that person’s immediate
possession or control, within 24 hours of being served with
the order, either by surrendering the firearm to the control of
local law enforcement officials, or by selling the firearm to
a licensed gun dealer.” CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 527.9(b);

-- 22 of 56 --

WALLINGFORD V. BONTA 23
see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 29830(a) (allowing prohibited
person to transfer firearms to a licensed dealer). Section
527.9 further provides that “[t]he restraining order requiring
a person to relinquish a firearm . . . shall state on its face that
the respondent is prohibited from owning, possessing,
purchasing, or receiving a firearm while the protective order
is in effect” and that any firearm the person owns or
possesses shall be relinquished. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC.
§ 527.9(d).
Section 527.6 further instructs the California Judicial
Council to develop mandatory forms for the issuance of
protective orders under § 527.6. See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC.
§ 527.6(x)(1). A related provision of the Penal Code states
that the “Judicial Council shall provide notice on all
protective orders issued within the state that the respondent
is prohibited from owning, possessing, purchasing,
receiving, or attempting to purchase or receive a firearm
while the protective order is in effect” and that such orders
“shall also state” that the respondent must relinquish any
“firearm owned or possessed by [that] person.” See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 29825(d). Accordingly, the pertinent
standard forms issued by the Judicial Council for such
temporary restraining orders (Form CH-110) and orders
after a hearing (Form CH-130) both contain language
expressly reciting the prohibitions on firearm ownership and
the accompanying relinquishment obligations that are set
forth in § 527.6 and § 527.9.
As noted in § 527.6(u)(3), California law makes it a
crime for a person to own, possess, purchase, or receive a
firearm “knowing that the person is prohibited from doing
so in any jurisdiction by a temporary restraining order or
injunction issued pursuant to Section 527.6.” See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 29825(a), (b). The penalty for a violation of

-- 23 of 56 --

24 WALLINGFORD V. BONTA
these provisions is “imprisonment in a county jail not
exceeding one year, by a fine not exceeding one thousand
dollars ($1,000), or by both that imprisonment and fine,”
except that, for a violation involving purchase or receipt,
imprisonment “in the state prison” is also authorized. Id.
§ 29825(a). An additional provision of the Penal Code
generally prohibits any person subject to these firearm
prohibitions from owning or possessing “any ammunition or
reloaded ammunition.” Id. § 30305(a)(1). The Penal Code
also contained corresponding provisions forbidding sales or
delivery of firearms or ammunition to persons subject to
these prohibitions. See id. §§ 27500, 27540, 30306, 30370.
B
Because the district court dismissed this case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction based on the State’s facial
challenge to the jurisdictional adequacy of the complaint, I
take the well-pleaded allegations of that complaint as true
and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs.
Hyatt v. Yee, 871 F.3d 1067, 1071 n.15 (9th Cir. 2017). Like
the district court, this court may also consider matters subject
to judicial notice, including the files of the state court
proceedings that led to the restraining orders against
Plaintiffs. See id.; see also Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250
F.3d 668, 690 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that records of court
proceedings may be judicially noticed, but not necessarily
“for the truth of the facts recited therein”). Applying those
standards, I take the following facts as true.
1
The Wallingfords have been married and have lived
together in their Huntington Beach home for more than 50
years. In 2013, they began encountering issues with a new
next-door neighbor, Jessica Nguyen. At first, the

-- 24 of 56 --

WALLINGFORD V. BONTA 25
Wallingfords and Nguyen had a disagreement over a tree on
the Wallingfords’ front lawn that was near the property line
and that Nguyen complained littered her front yard with
leaves. Nguyen asked the Wallingfords to remove the tree,
but they refused. The Wallingfords contend that, over the
ensuing years, Nguyen would sometimes collect the leaves
that fell on her property and dump them onto the
Wallingfords’ property.
On June 22, 2018, Richard Wallingford (“Richard”) and
Nguyen had an in-person confrontation over the tree outside
their homes, which led to Nguyen calling 911 and alleging
that Richard had pulled her hair and pushed her. Richard
denied that he had done so. Although Richard was arrested
for battery, the City Attorney’s Office declined to file
charges.
Three days later, Nguyen filed a petition for a temporary
restraining order against Richard under § 527.6, and that
petition was granted. On June 26, 2018, Richard complied
with the order’s requirement to relinquish any firearms by
transferring his firearms to a licensed gun dealer. In
anticipation of the subsequent hearing on Nguyen’s petition
for a protective order, Miranda Wallingford (“Miranda”)
arranged to have three security cameras installed on the
Wallingfords’ property “for the purpose of recording
evidence of [Nguyen’s] conduct that they could use to
defend themselves in court.” In connection with their
response to Nguyen’s petition, the Wallingfords submitted
photographs from one of the security cameras that showed
Nguyen directing actions towards the camera, including
spraying her garden hose at the camera, making angry
gestures with her hand and with tools, and making a clothed
“mooning” gesture at the camera. At a hearing on August
17, 2018, the state court judge determined that “[t]he only

-- 25 of 56 --

26 WALLINGFORD V. BONTA
clear and convincing evidence I have heard here is . . . that
there’s a lot of animosity by Ms. Nguyen towards her
neighbor,” and that there was not “clear and convincing
evidence that there has been harassment by Mr. Wallingford
toward Ms. Nguyen.” Accordingly, the court denied
Nguyen’s petition and dissolved the temporary restraining
order against Richard.
The Wallingfords’ cameras continued to record
Nguyen’s conduct, and on May 7, 2019, they captured
Nguyen pouring bleach on their tree, dumping items on their
property, and making angry gestures toward the camera.
The cameras also recorded at least three incidents in which
Nguyen made “throat-slitting gestures,” in one instance
using a “cutting instrument” in doing so. In response to
Nguyen’s continuing behavior, Miranda Wallingford on
June 17, 2019 filed a petition on her own and Richard’s
behalf seeking a restraining order under § 527.6 against
Nguyen. A temporary restraining order was issued the next
day, pending a hearing on the petition.
On September 5, 2019, prior to the hearing on Miranda’s
petition, Nguyen filed two more petitions for restraining
orders under § 527.6, one against each of the Wallingfords.
In her petition against Richard, Nguyen reasserted her claim
that she had been attacked by him in June 2018, but she did
not mention that this claim had been the subject of a prior
unsuccessful petition. Both of Nguyen’s petitions also
alleged that the video surveillance conducted by the
Wallingfords captured areas of Nguyen’s property that were
“not in public view,” which Nguyen contended amounted to
an invasion of privacy. The request for a temporary
restraining order against Miranda was denied on the grounds
that the alleged video surveillance did not constitute a
“course of conduct that seriously alarmed, annoyed, or

-- 26 of 56 --

WALLINGFORD V. BONTA 27
harassed” Nguyen and that “caused substantial emotional
distress.” However, a temporary restraining order was
issued on September 5, 2019 against Richard. That order
stated that service of the order by the sheriff was authorized
because the order was “based on unlawful violence, a
credible threat of violence, or stalking,” and that suggests
that the order was issued based on the 2018 incident.
Nonetheless, the order also stated that the temporary
restraining order was issued “as requested” in Nguyen’s
petition, which arguably extended to Nguyen’s explicit
request in her petition that the cameras be repositioned. In
light of the restraining order, Richard relinquished his
firearms to a licensed dealer the next day.
At some point after receiving Nguyen’s petition,
Miranda contacted the security company about repositioning
the cameras, but she was told that they “were incapable of
further adjustment.” She consequently asked the company
to “black out the portions of [the] camera’s view that
captured any of Jessica Nguyen’s property.” In her written
response to Nguyen’s petition, Miranda stated that the
cameras had “been adjusted to the extent possible to view
[her own] property and the entire length” of the wall dividing
the two properties. At the hearing on the petitions, Miranda
testified that the cameras were not physically moved, and
that “tech support” with the camera company instead
“externally limited” the visible range of what was captured
by the cameras. She testified that the company made this
adjustment fairly quickly and that she could just as readily
“call up tech support again” and have this adjustment “taken
off.” Nguyen testified, however, that she thought that the
direction in which one of the cameras pointed had been
changed. At the hearing, counsel for Nguyen clarified that
“the way that [Miranda] testified about how the cameras are

-- 27 of 56 --

28 WALLINGFORD V. BONTA
currently situated and the way that they are currently
viewing the property is acceptable” to Nguyen. Nguyen’s
counsel nonetheless requested a restraining order to prevent
the video company’s tech support from changing the
cameras back to the way they were before.
On November 1, 2019, the superior court issued minute
orders granting all three petitions. In the written explanation
contained in these rulings, the court explained that, as to
Nguyen’s conduct, there was “no legitimate purpose to
making a throat-slashing gesture towards Miranda’s security
cameras, or to mooning the cameras, spraying the cameras
with water, or other similar conduct directed towards the
cameras.” The court also found that there was “no legitimate
purpose to throwing leaves, bleach, or other items onto
Miranda’s property.” As to the Wallingfords’ conduct, the
court found that there was “no legitimate purpose” for
“pointing security cameras into private areas [of Nguyen’s
property] and recording 24 hours per day the actions
captured by those cameras.” The court noted, however, that
“the cameras have since been repositioned such that they
point only at areas of the Nguyen’s residence in public view,
which the court finds acceptable.” Based on these findings,
the court found that Miranda, Richard, and Nguyen had each
established harassment “by clear and convincing evidence,”
as well as “a reasonable probability future . . . harassment
would occur absent a protective order.” The minute orders
themselves did not mention any firearm-related
consequences. However, the minute orders stated that the
court “concurrently enters appropriate orders on forms CH-
130.” As noted earlier, those standard forms, in accordance
with statutory directives, explicitly reference the applicable

-- 28 of 56 --

WALLINGFORD V. BONTA 29
firearms prohibitions.1 The Wallingfords did not appeal the
issuance of the restraining orders against them.
The restraining orders against the Wallingfords were
originally set to expire on November 1, 2022. However,
restraining orders “may be renewed, upon the request of a
party, for a duration of no more than five additional years,
without a showing of any further harassment since the
issuance of the original order.” CAL. CODE CIV. PROC.
§ 527.6(j)(1). On November 1, 2022—the same day
Nguyen’s restraining orders against the Wallingfords were
set to expire—Nguyen filed a motion to modify and extend
the restraining orders. The hearing on Nguyen’s motion was
originally scheduled for November 23. But the hearing was
continued twice, and while Nguyen’s requests for renewal
were pending, the state court temporarily extended the
restraining orders, keeping them in place until the delayed
merits hearing. See infra at 35–36. The merits hearing
eventually took place about two months later, on January 17,
2023. At that January 17 hearing, the state court rejected
Nguyen’s request to renew the restraining orders.
2
In August 2021, the Wallingfords filed this civil action
in the district court against Robert Bonta in his official
capacity as the Attorney General of California. The
Wallingfords sought declaratory and injunctive relief against
continued enforcement of the firearms ownership
prohibition set forth in § 527.6(u) and other related
provisions of the California Code of Civil Procedure and
1 Neither side included in the district court record of this case the actual
forms CH-130 that were entered by the superior court against Miranda,
Richard, and Nguyen.

-- 29 of 56 --

30 WALLINGFORD V. BONTA
Penal Code.2 In their first cause of action, the Wallingfords
alleged that, as applied to them, the challenged statutory
provisions violated their Second Amendment rights, as made
applicable against the States under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The complaint’s second cause of action
alleged that no “legitimate governmental objective”
supported the statutes’ prohibition on firearms ownership by
the Wallingfords and that the resulting deprivation amounted
to a violation of “substantive due process” under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The State filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, arguing that (1) the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine barred the district court from asserting jurisdiction;
and (2) alternatively, the district court should abstain under
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The district court
granted the State’s motion to dismiss, relying solely on
Rooker-Feldman. The district court accordingly did not
reach the issue of Younger abstention. The Wallingfords
timely appealed, and this court has jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291.
II
The majority concludes that “[t]his case is moot because
the relevant restraining orders have expired, a three-year-
long restraining order is not too brief to be litigated on the
merits, and there is no reasonable expectation that the
2 Specifically, the complaint asks the district court to declare that
“California Penal Code sections 29825, 27500, 27540, 30305–30306,
and 30370, and California Code of Civil Procedure sections 527.6(u) and
527.9, are unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiffs” under the Second and
Fourteenth Amendments, and to enjoin the Attorney General and his
agents from enforcing those statutes against the Wallingfords.

-- 30 of 56 --

WALLINGFORD V. BONTA 31
Wallingfords will be subject to the ‘same action’ again.”
Opin. at 8. I disagree.
A
As a general matter, “[c]laims for injunctive relief
become moot when the challenged activity ceases and the
alleged violations could not reasonably be expected to
recur.” Belgau v. Inslee, 975 F.3d 940, 949 (9th Cir. 2020)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The
“challenged activity” in this case—viz., the criminally-
enforced prohibition on the Wallingfords’ possession of
firearms—ceased, for the time being, when the underlying
restraining orders terminated on January 17, 2023. The
question is whether such an allegedly unconstitutional
prohibition could “reasonably be expected to recur.” Id. If
so, “the established exception to mootness for disputes
capable of repetition, yet evading review,” may apply, and
the case would not be moot. Fed. Election Comm’n v.
Wisconsin Right To Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 462 (2007).
That established exception “applies where ‘(1) the
challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully
litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a
reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will
be subject to the same action again.’” Id. (citation omitted).
With respect to the latter requirement, a “reasonable
expectation” of recurrence means “more than a ‘mere
physical or theoretical possibility’” that the same action
challenged in the suit will recur. Dep’t of Fish & Game v.
Fed. Subsistence Bd., 62 F.4th 1177, 1182 (9th Cir. 2023)
(quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982)). The
“complaining party . . . need not show that there is a
demonstrated probability that the dispute will recur.” Hooks
ex rel. NLRB v. Nexstar Broadcasting, Inc., 54 F.4th 1101,

-- 31 of 56 --

32 WALLINGFORD V. BONTA
1113 (9th Cir. 2022) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). A
future action is the “same action” for purposes of this
exception if it is “materially similar” to the past wrong; it
need not be identical in every respect. Wisconsin Right To
Life, 551 U.S. at 463. “Requiring repetition of every ‘legally
relevant’ characteristic of an as-applied challenge—down to
the last detail—would . . . mak[e] this exception unavailable
for virtually all as-applied challenges.” Id. (citation
omitted).
For the “evading review” prong of the exception to
apply, “the duration of the challenged action [must be] too
short to allow full litigation before it ceases or expires.”
Native Vill. of Nuiqsut v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 9 F.4th
1201, 1209 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). For purposes of this exception, “complete
judicial review . . . includes Supreme Court review.” Alaska
Ctr. for Env’t v. U.S. Forest Serv., 189 F.3d 851, 856 (9th
Cir. 1999). While the precise time window required for
“complete judicial review,” id., varies by the type of case at
issue, more than two years is generally sufficient time to
fully litigate a matter, while less than two years is generally
not. Compare Karuk Tribe of California v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 681 F.3d 1006, 1018 (9th Cir. 2012) (“We have
repeatedly held that similar actions lasting only one or two
years evade review.”), with Hamamoto v. Ige, 881 F.3d 719,
723 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Because we are not convinced that two
years and five months is ‘almost certain[ly]’ inadequate time
for a case of this type to receive plenary review by the federal
courts, we hold that the ‘capable of repetition, yet evading
review’ exception to mootness does not apply.” (citation
omitted)).

-- 32 of 56 --

WALLINGFORD V. BONTA 33
B
In my view, both of the required elements for this
mootness exception are satisfied here.
1
On this record, there is “more than a ‘mere physical or
theoretical possibility,’” Dep’t of Fish & Game, 62 F.4th at
1182 (citation omitted), that the Wallingfords will again be
subject to a materially similar order under § 527.6.
As I have explained, the Wallingfords’ complaint in this
case sought an order enjoining the as-applied enforcement of
a set of interlocking provisions that, upon issuance of a
restraining order under California Code of Civil Procedure
§ 527.6, made it a criminal offense for the person restrained
to possess firearms or ammunition. The key provision is
§ 527.6(u), which states, inter alia, that “[a] person subject
to a protective order issued pursuant to this section shall not
own, possess, purchase, receive, or attempt to purchase or
receive a firearm or ammunition while the protective order
is in effect.” CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6(u)(1). Notably,
a “protective order issued pursuant to this section” includes
both “a temporary restraining order” and “an order after
hearing.” CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6(a)(1) (emphasis
added). The question, then, is whether there is a reasonable
expectation that the Wallingfords will be subject to either a
temporary order under § 527.6 or an order issued under that
section “after hearing,” thereby triggering the statutory
criminal prohibition on owning or possessing firearms or
ammunition.
As a threshold matter, I agree with the majority that the
Wallingfords’ conflict with their neighbor Nguyen provides
the only possible factual basis for reasonably expecting that

-- 33 of 56 --

34 WALLINGFORD V. BONTA
the Wallingfords will be subject to a relevant restraining
order in the future. Moreover, the majority does not
seriously dispute that it may reasonably be expected that
Nguyen will again file another petition for a restraining order
against the Wallingfords under § 527.6.3 That point seems
amply supported by the Wallingfords: Nguyen has already
filed three requests for restraining orders against them, and
the Wallingfords have presented evidence that, at the most
recent hearing in January 2023, Nguyen turned to them at
one point and said, “You are not going to get away with
this.” But I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that
there is no reasonable expectation that the California courts
will again grant Nguyen a materially similar restraining
order. The majority’s analysis overlooks the fact that
Nguyen has successfully sought and obtained no less than
three temporary state-court restraining orders against the
Wallingfords under § 527.6, which automatically subjected
them to a criminal prohibition on firearms possession during
the relatively short period between the issuance of those
temporary orders and the merits hearing a few weeks or
months later.
Nguyen filed her first request for a restraining order
against Richard Wallingford on June 25, 2018, alleging—
falsely, as the state court later concluded—that Richard had
physically assaulted her three days earlier, on June 22. The
very same day this request was filed, the state court granted
a temporary restraining order, thereby requiring Richard to
give up his firearms (which he did the next day, June 26). At
3 The majority notes in passing that Nguyen has not filed such a petition
since the January 2023 expiration of the restraining order, see Opin. at
13, but little, if any, weight can be given to that fact, particularly given
that we explicitly raised the mootness issue in a November 2022 order
calling for supplemental briefing.

-- 34 of 56 --

WALLINGFORD V. BONTA 35
a merits hearing a little less than two months later—on
August 17, 2018—the state-court judge denied Nguyen’s
request for an order after hearing, and the court dissolved the
temporary restraining order against Richard.
On September 5, 2019, Nguyen again filed petitions for
restraining orders against the Wallingfords. Nguyen based
her petition against Richard in part on the very same June
22, 2018 allegation of assault that had already been
adjudicated against her in August 2018. The second set of
petitions also referenced “a camera pointed at my front
yard,” raising an invasion-of-privacy claim. Nguyen’s
second petition against Richard again resulted in a
temporary restraining order against Richard, again issued the
same day Nguyen filed her petition. That temporary order
was scheduled to expire less than a month later, after a merits
hearing on September 30, 2019. Richard again complied
with the temporary order’s requirement to give up his
firearms. Unlike Nguyen’s first request, which resulted in a
merits judgment in the Wallingfords’ favor, Nguyen’s
second request was ultimately successful: as described
above, the state court at the second hearing in November
2019 issued long-term restraining orders against the
Wallingfords on the basis that the placement of their security
cameras violated Nguyen’s privacy. The court, however,
disavowed any reliance on the alleged June 2018 assault,
which had previously been the subject of the August 2018
hearing on Nguyen’s first application.
Although the long-term restraining orders against the
Wallingfords were set to expire on November 1, 2022,
Nguyen again requested an extension of the restraining
orders at the last minute, and the state court again granted
temporary extensions of those orders for another two-and-a-
half months—until the most recent state-court merits hearing

-- 35 of 56 --

36 WALLINGFORD V. BONTA
on January 17, 2023. The majority claims that the November
2019 order, which was set to expire on November 1, 2022,
may not have been extended, see Opin. at 6 n.1, but the
record before us disproves that contention. The materials
submitted to this court by the State in connection with the
mootness issue specifically note that the state court’s order
scheduling a hearing on Nguyen’s extension request
included the statement that “[t]he current restraining order
stays in effect until the hearing.” Moreover, the January 17,
2023 order states that the “Request to Renew Restraining
Order” is “DENIED” and that therefore the “order is to
expire on 01/17/2023.” The record is thus clear that the
November 2019 order was temporarily extended and that it
“expire[d] on 01/17/2023,” not on November 1, 2022.4
In short, Nguyen has successfully caused the California
state courts to issue temporary restraining orders—or
temporary extensions of long-term restraining orders—
against the Wallingfords no less than three times. The
majority nonetheless says that there is now no reasonable
expectation of a recurrence, because the state court rejected
Nguyen’s most recent request for a long-term extension. See
Opin. at 13–14. It would be “speculative,” according to the
majority, to think that the state court would grant even a
temporary restraining order to Nguyen after having ruled
4 Indeed, the standard form used for providing notice of a hearing on a
request to renew a restraining order comes pre-printed with the above-
quoted language keeping the restraining order in effect, and it further
states that the restrained person “must continue to obey the current
restraining order until the hearing.” See Notice of Hearing to Renew
Restraining Order (CH-710), CAL. COURTS SELF-HELD GUIDE (Jan. 1,
2016), https://selfhelp.courts.ca.gov/jcc-form/CH-710. It thus appears
that the California courts automatically grant such further temporary
extensions without any further showing, and that the court did so here.

-- 36 of 56 --

WALLINGFORD V. BONTA 37
against her on the last one. Id. at 13. But this assertion is
refuted by the fact that Nguyen has already once before
obtained an immediate temporary order by re-asserting
claims that had already been rejected on the merits. As
noted earlier, the temporary restraining order entered against
Richard on September 5, 2019 was based on the same
alleged June 2018 assault that had been found to be meritless
when the prior request for a long-term order was denied in
August 2018. There is no support in this record for the
majority’s confidence that the California courts would never
issue a temporary restraining order based on a petition filed
by a claimant whose previous petition was rejected on the
merits. Not only have the California courts done just that to
Richard Wallingford—they did so basis on that claimant’s
re-assertion of the very same, previously rejected,
allegations. Indeed, from what this record reveals, it is
reasonably to be expected that the California courts
perfunctorily issue temporary orders on the same day that
they are requested with only minimal scrutiny and without
findings that would be sufficient to support an automatic
deprivation of Second Amendment rights.5
The majority is also wrong in suggesting that there is no
basis to reasonably expect that the Wallingfords would be
subject to a further restraining order that is “materially
similar.” Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 463. Material
similarity must be judged from the perspective of the “legal
issue” that is the gravamen of the challenge. Hooks, 54 F.4th
at 1114. Although the specific facts that gave rise to the
5 The record thus refutes the majority’s suggestion that we should
presume that the California courts will only grant temporary restraining
orders under § 527.6 after first making findings that would support what
the Wallingfords contend the Second Amendment requires. See Opin. at
13 n.8.

-- 37 of 56 --

38 WALLINGFORD V. BONTA
long-term restraining order here involved the positioning of
security cameras, the gravamen of the Wallingfords’ Second
Amendment challenge is that they were subjected to a
statutorily automatic prohibition on firearms possession
without any predicate finding that they had “posed a danger
to any person or the public.” Given the reasonable
expectation that Nguyen will file another petition and that
the California courts will grant a temporary order with little
scrutiny and without making predicate findings sufficient to
support an automatic deprivation of Second Amendment
rights, the same legal issue would be presented, even if “a
different constellation of facts” might be involved. Id.; see
also Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 463 (holding that,
to invoke the capable-of-repetition exception, a plaintiff is
not required to show “repetition of every ‘legally relevant’
characteristic of an as-applied challenge—down to the last
detail”). On this record, there is “more than a ‘mere physical
or theoretical possibility’” that the Wallingfords will be
subjected to a materially similar temporary order. Dep’t of
Fish & Game, 62 F.4th at 1182 (citation omitted).
2
I also conclude that the Wallingfords have adequately
established that “the challenged action is in its duration too
short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration.”
Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 462 (citation omitted).
There is no question, and the majority does not dispute,
that the duration of a temporary restraining order under
§ 527.6 is “too short to allow full litigation” before the order
“cease[] or expire[].” Nuiqsut, 9 F.4th at 1209. The three
temporary restraining orders issued in this matter have lasted
just weeks or months—far too short a time to allow for
“complete judicial review,” including “Supreme Court

-- 38 of 56 --

WALLINGFORD V. BONTA 39
review,” of the orders. Alaska Ctr. for Env’t, 189 F.3d at
856. Temporary orders issued under § 527.6 thus evade
federal court review, ensuring that the alleged constitutional
violations cannot be adjudicated on the merits.
Although the majority concedes that “there would be
insufficient time to litigate the constitutionality of a firearm
ban in a new” temporary restraining order issued under
§ 527.6, see Opin. at 10 n.5, the majority claims that this fact
is irrelevant because “the Wallingfords were not subject to
[temporary restraining orders] when they filed their as-
applied challenge.” Id. The majority’s analysis is flawed.
As I have explained, the application of this mootness
exception is not defeated simply by showing, as the majority
has done, that the reasonably expected recurrence of a
violation would arise under “a different constellation of
facts.” Hooks, 54 F.4th at 1114. What matters is whether
there is a reasonable expectation that the plaintiff will again
be subject to the challenged restrictions. Because the
challenged set of statutes that criminally prohibit firearms
possession is equally triggered by a temporary order under
§ 527.6 as by a long-term order, the Wallingfords have
adequately shown that there is a reasonable expectation that
they will be again subject to the challenged statutory
prohibition on firearms possession.
Moreover, the majority is wrong in asserting that three
years is sufficient to fully litigate a case of this sort. Noting
that the Wallingfords “waited almost two years after
surrendering their firearms on September 6, 2019 before
filing suit on August 30, 2021,” the majority concludes that,
“[h]ad the Wallingfords sued much more promptly, we could
have reached the merits of their appeal before the restraining
order expired.” Opin. at 11–12. But the majority overlooks
the fact that the “appeal” that we would have decided more

-- 39 of 56 --

40 WALLINGFORD V. BONTA
quickly is a preliminary appeal about the applicability of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine—not an appeal addressed to the
merits of the underlying Second Amendment issue. Even if
the Wallingfords had filed suit earlier and obtained the
district court’s adverse decision below more quickly, it
would likely have taken more than three years to complete:
(1) the full resolution of the complex issues raised in this
Rooker-Feldman appeal, including review by the Supreme
Court;6 (2) the district court proceedings on remand on the
merits of the Second Amendment issue; and (3) the full
resolution of the Second Amendment appeal, including
Supreme Court review.7 For similar reasons, the result is the
same even if we focus on the general category of such
challenges, as opposed to the specific course that this
particular litigation took. See Opin. at 9. Given their
complexity, the type of claims at issue here are not ones that,
as a general matter, we can confidently conclude are likely
to be fully resolved, including appeals and Supreme Court
review, within three years.
These same considerations negate the majority’s
suggestion that dismissal of this appeal is independently
warranted under the principle that “a party may not profit
6 It is therefore irrelevant whether this court could have resolved the
merits of this appeal by January 2023. See Opin. at 12 n.7. “[C]omplete
judicial review . . . includes Supreme Court review,’ Alaska Ctr. for
Env’t, 189 F.3d at 856, and there is no chance that that could have been
completed by January 2023.
7 For the same reason, the majority errs in emphasizing that the district
court dismissed the case in 59 days. See Opin. at 10 n.4. That fact, if
anything, cuts the other way—the district court was able to act so quickly
only because it decided only one of the three issues, and that issue-by-
issue approach raises the specter of multiple appeals and associated
delays.

-- 40 of 56 --

WALLINGFORD V. BONTA 41
from the ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’
exception . . . where through his own failure to seek and
obtain [prompt relief] he has prevented [an] appellate court
from reviewing the trial court’s decision.”
Protectmarriage.com-Yes on 8 v. Bowen, 752 F.3d 827, 837
(9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted); see Opin. at 11–12 & n.6.
While the Wallingfords’ delay in filing suit is not explained
in the record, the facts of this case make clear, as I have
explained, that that delay did not contribute to the mootness
that occurred here. Moreover, it seems inappropriate to
apply the Protectmarriage.com exception in a situation, such
as this one, in which, at least going forward, the factual
predicate for invoking the capable-of-repetition doctrine is
one “where the type of injury involved inherently precludes
judicial review.” Bunker Ltd. P’ship v. United States (In re
Bunker Ltd. P’ship), 820 F.2d 308, 311 (9th Cir. 1987); see
also Protectmarriage.com, 752 F.3d at 837. The principal
basis for applying the doctrine here—which is that the
Wallingfords face a reasonable likelihood of being subjected
to another temporary restraining order raising similar
constitutional concerns—is inherently incapable of
surviving over the full course of judicial review.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent from the majority’s
dismissal of the case as moot, and I therefore proceed to the
merits of the appeal.
III
“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars lower federal courts
from exercising jurisdiction ‘to review the final
determinations of a state court in judicial proceedings.’”
Benavidez v. County of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1142 (9th
Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). In addition to proscribing
review of “an action explicitly styled as a direct appeal,” the

-- 41 of 56 --

42 WALLINGFORD V. BONTA
Rooker-Feldman doctrine also prohibits the lower federal
courts from entertaining the “‘de facto equivalent’ of such
an appeal.” Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 777 (9th Cir.
2012) (citation omitted). A plaintiff “cannot come to federal
court to seek ‘what in substance would be appellate review
of the state judgment.’” Benavidez, 993 F.3d at 1142
(quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005–06
(1994)). This court reviews de novo the district court’s
determination that this federal suit is, in substance, a de facto
appeal of the state court’s judgments against the
Wallingfords in the protective-order actions brought by
Nguyen. Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th
Cir. 2004).
A
In assessing whether this federal action falls within the
scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, I begin by tracing the
Supreme Court’s development of the doctrine and the ways
in which our court has defined its scope.
“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine derives its name from
two Supreme Court cases: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust
Company, 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and D.C. Court of Appeals
v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).” Benavidez, 993 F.3d at
1142. The Supreme Court has held that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine “is confined to cases of the kind from which the
doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court
losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection
of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic
Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Because “the
Supreme Court has been very sparing in its invocation of the
[Rooker-Feldman] doctrine,” our court has been “careful not

-- 42 of 56 --

WALLINGFORD V. BONTA 43
to sweep too broadly” in applying it. Cooper, 704 F.3d at
778.
A proper understanding of Rooker-Feldman should
begin with Rooker and Feldman themselves. Rooker
involved a federal action seeking “to have a judgment of a
[state court] . . . declared null and void” on the ground that it
violated the federal Constitution. 263 U.S. at 414–15; see
also Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 261 U.S. 114, 115–16
(1923) (dismissing writ of error on direct review of the
Indiana Supreme Court’s decision and detailing the facts of
the state court litigation). The Court held that the federal
district court’s entertaining of such an action would amount
to “an exercise of appellate jurisdiction” over the state
courts. 263 U.S. at 416. However, only the Supreme Court
had been granted such appellate jurisdiction, and “[t]he
jurisdiction possessed by the District Courts is strictly
original.” Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (current provision
granting the Supreme Court jurisdiction to review final state
court judgments raising certain federal issues).
In Feldman, two applicants to the D.C. Bar
unsuccessfully petitioned the D.C. Court of Appeals to grant
them waivers from the D.C. bar rule requiring that applicants
have graduated from a law school approved by the American
Bar Association (“ABA”). See 460 U.S. at 464–72. The two
applicants thereafter filed separate suits in federal district
court, alleging that the refusal to waive the requirement to
attend an ABA-approved school violated the federal
Constitution. Id. at 468–73. The district court dismissed
their actions on the ground that the suits amounted to a
request to review the D.C. Court of Appeals’ judgments, but
the D.C. Circuit reversed in an opinion addressing both
applicants’ cases. Id. at 470–75. The Supreme Court
vacated and remanded. Id. at 488. The Court agreed that,

-- 43 of 56 --

44 WALLINGFORD V. BONTA
“to the extent that [the plaintiffs] sought review in District
Court of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ denial
of their petitions for waiver[,] the District Court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over their complaints” under
Rooker. Id. at 482; see also id. at 476. But the Court further
held that, “[t]o the extent that [the plaintiffs] mounted a
general challenge to the constitutionality” of the D.C. bar
rule on the grounds that “it creates an irrebuttable
presumption that only graduates of accredited law schools
are fit to practice law, discriminates against those who have
obtained equivalent legal training by other means, and
impermissibly delegates the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals’ power to regulate the bar to the American Bar
Association,” those claims “do not require review of a
judicial decision in a particular case” but simply ask the
district court “to assess the validity of a rule promulgated in
a non-judicial proceeding.” Id. at 483–84, 486–87.
Accordingly, the district court did have jurisdiction over
such claims. Id. at 487.
The distinction drawn in Feldman was further clarified
by the Court’s decision in Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521
(2011). There, Skinner, a convicted state prisoner, filed two
unsuccessful motions under a Texas statute to obtain post-
conviction DNA testing of evidence associated with the
underlying crime for which he was convicted. Id. at 529.
After the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (“CCA”)
affirmed the denial of the second motion, Skinner filed a
federal action “alleg[ing] that Texas violated his Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process by refusing to provide for
the DNA testing he requested.” Id. “Emphasizing ‘the
narrow ground’ occupied” by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
id. at 532 (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284), the Court
explained that the distinction drawn in Feldman was that “a

-- 44 of 56 --

WALLINGFORD V. BONTA 45
state-court decision is not reviewable by lower federal
courts, but a statute or rule governing the decision may be
challenged in a federal action.” Id. (emphasis added).
Because Skinner did “not challenge the adverse CCA
decisions themselves” and instead “target[ed] as
unconstitutional the Texas statute they authoritatively
construed,” the Court held that his case fell on the permitted
side of the line drawn by Feldman. Id.
In addition to the Supreme Court’s distinction between
challenging a state court decision and challenging the state
statute governing the decision, our court’s Rooker-Feldman
caselaw has drawn a distinction between challenging an
error committed by the state court and challenging a wrong
committed by a litigant. For example, in Kougasian, we
held that the doctrine did not prohibit federal court
jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ suit alleging that the
defendants had committed extrinsic fraud in securing the
dismissal of two state court tort actions against one or more
of those same defendants. 359 F.3d at 1137–43. We noted
that, as a general matter, Rooker-Feldman barred federal
district courts from asserting jurisdiction over an action in
which the “plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly
erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a
state court judgment based on that decision.” Id. at 1140
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Although
the plaintiffs’ federal suit in Kougasian unquestionably did
seek relief from the prior adverse state court judgments, we
held that the doctrine nonetheless did not apply because the
plaintiffs were not “alleg[ing] a legal error by the state court
as the basis for that relief.” Id. at 1140. As we explained:
Extrinsic fraud on a court is, by definition,
not an error by that court. It is, rather, a

-- 45 of 56 --

46 WALLINGFORD V. BONTA
wrongful act committed by the party or
parties who engaged in the fraud. Rooker-
Feldman therefore does not bar subject
matter jurisdiction when a federal plaintiff
alleges a cause of action for extrinsic fraud on
a state court and seeks to set aside a state
court judgment obtained by that fraud.
Id. at 1141.
We applied similar reasoning in rejecting a Rooker-
Feldman argument in Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945
(9th Cir. 2004). Maldonado involved a provision of
California law that, as applied to commercial buildings such
as Maldonado’s, generally forbade billboard advertisements
“unless the advertisement is for products or services offered
on the premises.” Id. at 948. Maldonado sought a permit
that would allow him to place “off-premises advertising” on
his billboard, but the California Department of
Transportation (“Caltrans”) denied the application based on
that provision of the statute. Id. After Maldonado posted
such advertisements anyway, he was cited by Caltrans for
doing so, and he lost his administrative challenges to those
citations. Id. After Maldonado again persisted in violating
the statute, Caltrans brought a nuisance action against him
and succeeded in obtaining a “judgment against Maldonado”
that “includ[ed] a permanent injunction generally restricting
his ability to post further advertisements on his billboard.”
Id. Maldonado’s appeals of that judgment in state court were
unsuccessful, and subsequently he was twice found to be in
contempt of the injunction. Id. Maldonado then filed a
complaint in federal court alleging that the California statute
“violated the First Amendment on its face and as it had been
applied to him and his various advertisements.” Id. at 949.

-- 46 of 56 --

WALLINGFORD V. BONTA 47
His requested relief included “a permanent injunction
restraining enforcement of the Act, including any attempts
by Caltrans to ‘enforce any injunction based upon’ the Act.”
Id. The district court found his claims were barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, but we reversed. Id. at 949–51.
Even though Maldonado’s complaint explicitly sought
“relief from the injunction entered by the state court,” we
held that Rooker-Feldman did not apply because Maldonado
was “not alleging as a legal wrong an erroneous decision
from the state court.” Id. at 950. We stated:
The legal wrong that Maldonado asserts in
this action is not an erroneous decision by the
state court in the nuisance suit brought
against Maldonado by Caltrans, but the
continued enforcement by Caltrans of a
statute Maldonado asserts is unconstitutional.
In other words, Maldonado asserts as a legal
wrong an allegedly illegal act by an adverse
party.
Id. (simplified) (emphasis added).
B
In light of these precedents, I conclude that Rooker-
Feldman does not bar the district court from asserting
jurisdiction over the Wallingfords’ federal suit.
Here, the “legal wrong” that the Wallingfords assert in
their federal suit “is not an erroneous decision by the state
court” in deciding the issues raised by Nguyen’s petitions
and the Wallingfords’ responses. Maldonado, 370 F.3d at
950. In resolving those issues, the state court’s minute
orders found only that the Wallingfords’ use of the security

-- 47 of 56 --

48 WALLINGFORD V. BONTA
cameras constituted harassment of Nguyen and that, absent
a protective order restraining a recurrence, there was a
“reasonable probability” that future harassment might occur.
The court specifically reaffirmed that, in deciding Nguyen’s
petitions, it was excluding all reference to the alleged assault
by Richard that had been the subject of the prior restraining
order proceedings that were resolved in his favor. The court
therefore relied solely on the positioning of the camera and
not on any allegation of violence or threats of violence. The
Wallingfords do not seek federal court review or rejection of
any of these findings. And, unlike the plaintiffs in Feldman
and Rooker, the Wallingfords do not contend that the state
court’s resolution of any of the issues actually litigated in the
state actions is tainted by a federal-law error. Cf. Feldman,
460 U.S. at 482 n.16 (noting that one aspect of the plaintiffs’
suit challenged the substantive resolution of their waiver
applications as being tainted by federal-law error, but also
noting that this challenge may not have been properly raised
and preserved); Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416 (holding that federal
suit was “merely an attempt to get rid of the judgment for
alleged errors of law committed” by the state courts).
Indeed, the trial court’s minute orders say nothing about
firearms, because neither side raised any issue for the court
to decide concerning that subject. Cf. Maldonado, 370 F.3d
at 948 (noting that no federal issues had been resolved in the
state court nuisance litigation that led to an injunction
against Maldonado’s advertising).
Instead, the Wallingfords’ complaint challenges “the
validity of [statutes] promulgated in a non-judicial
proceeding,” see Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486–87, and it seeks
to block wrongful enforcement of those statutes by strangers
to the state proceeding—namely, the Attorney General and
those acting in concert with him, see Maldonado, 370 F.3d

-- 48 of 56 --

WALLINGFORD V. BONTA 49
at 950. Far from challenging the state court’s findings, the
Wallingfords have made them the basis for their federal
challenge to the relevant California statutes, which they
contend wrongly trigger an automatic deprivation of the
right to own firearms without any regard whatsoever to
individual circumstances. The Wallingfords’ contention is
that, after the state court resolved the parties’ private dispute
by granting in part and denying in part the relief sought, the
State of California then interposed itself by mandating an
automatic ban on firearms possession, requiring the use of a
standardized form of order that includes the prohibition
decreed by the California Legislature, and making such
possession a criminal offense. See Maldonado, 370 F.3d 945
(“The legal wrong that Maldonado asserts in this action is
not an erroneous decision by the state court in the nuisance
suit brought against Maldonado by Caltrans, but the
continued enforcement by Caltrans of a statute Maldonado
asserts is unconstitutional.”). The Wallingfords’ effort to
restrain this alleged wrongful conduct by the Legislature and
by the Attorney General (and those acting in concert with
him) does not call into question the state court’s resolution
of any issue litigated by the parties in that action.
To be sure, the Wallingfords’ challenge to the California
statutes, if successful, would have the collateral effect of
voiding the portions of the state court’s final judgments that
contain the legislatively-dictated mandatory language
barring firearms ownership. But as our decisions in
Kougasian and Maldanado make clear, the mere fact that a
challenge to a party’s extrinsic misconduct (as in Kougasian)
or to a state statute being wrongfully enforced by state
officials (as in Maldonado) would have the effect of voiding
a portion of a state court judgment is not sufficient, without
more, to trigger the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Maldonado’s

-- 49 of 56 --

50 WALLINGFORD V. BONTA
complaint explicitly sought “relief from the injunction
entered by the state court,” but we nonetheless held that
Rooker-Feldman did not apply to any portion of his suit
because he was “not alleging as a legal wrong an erroneous
decision from the state court,” but rather “the continued
enforcement by Caltrans of a statute Maldonado asserts is
unconstitutional.” Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 950.8 And, as
we acknowledged in Kougasian, the federal suit there
explicitly sought to have the state court judgment voided
based on extrinsic fraud and then to have the issues resolved
by that judgment be relitigated in federal court. See
Kougasian, 359 F.3d at 1139. Yet we held that Rooker-
Feldman did not apply because the “legal wrong” that was
the gravamen of the suit was not “an allegedly erroneous
decision by a state court” but instead the “allegedly illegal
8 This point is confirmed by Maldonado’s rejection of Caltrans’s reliance
on Feldman’s comment that the bar of Rooker-Feldman extends to those
additional federal issues that are raised in the federal suit and that are
“inextricably intertwined” with the portion of the suit that is a forbidden
de facto appeal. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486–87. In rejecting
Caltrans’s argument, we stated:
Only when there is already a de facto appeal in federal
court does the “inextricably intertwined” test come
into play: Once a federal plaintiff seeks to bring a
forbidden de facto appeal, as in Feldman, the federal
plaintiff may not seek to litigate an issue that is
“inextricably intertwined” with the state judicial
decision from which the forbidden de facto appeal is
brought.
Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 950 (quoting Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1158
(9th Cir. 2003)). We concluded that, because no portion of Maldonado’s
complaint constituted a “forbidden de facto appeal,” the “‘inextricably
intertwined’ test does not come into play.” Id.

-- 50 of 56 --

WALLINGFORD V. BONTA 51
act or omission” of another party. Id. at 1140 (citation
omitted). So too here. The Wallingfords do not assert any
error in the state court’s resolution of any litigated issue;
rather, they challenge the validity of the allegedly
unconstitutional statutes that were triggered by the court’s
ruling and the Attorney General’s continued enforcement of
those statutes. Under Kougasian and Maldonado, this suit is
not barred by Rooker-Feldman even though it would have
the collateral effect of voiding a portion of the mandatory
form-orders issued by the state court.9 In my view, the
district court therefore erred in dismissing this suit under
Rooker-Feldman.
IV
The State alternatively contends that even if the district
court erred in holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
barred jurisdiction here, we should nonetheless affirm the
judgment on the grounds that Younger requires abstention
here. That contention is wrong.
A
“In the main, federal courts are obliged to decide cases
within the scope of federal jurisdiction,” and “[a]bstention is
not in order simply because a pending state-court proceeding
involves the same subject matter.” Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v.
Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72 (2013). There are, however,
“certain instances in which the prospect of undue
interference with state proceedings counsels against federal
9 For similar reasons, I cannot accept the State’s argument that Feldman
carves out only facial challenges to the constitutionality of statutes and
not as-applied challenges. Maldonado asserted both facial and “as-
applied” challenges to the statute at issue there, see 370 F.3d at 956, and
yet we squarely held that no portion of his suit was barred by Rooker-
Feldman. See supra at 46–47, 49.

-- 51 of 56 --

52 WALLINGFORD V. BONTA
relief,” and Younger “exemplified one class” of such cases.
Id. Younger established the proposition that “[w]hen there
is a parallel, pending state criminal proceeding, federal
courts must refrain from enjoining the state prosecution.” Id.
Over the years, the Supreme Court “has extended Younger
abstention” from its initial criminal context to two civil
contexts—namely, “state civil proceedings that are akin to
criminal prosecutions” and state civil proceedings “that
implicate a State’s interest in enforcing the orders and
judgments of its courts.” Id. But as we observed in Applied
Underwriters, Inc. v. Lara, 37 F.4th 579, 588 (9th Cir. 2022),
the Court has now “firmly cabined the scope of the
doctrine,” so that it “applies only” in the aforementioned
three categories—namely, pending criminal prosecutions
and the two classes of civil proceedings described above. Id.
at 588; see also Sprint Commc’ns, 571 U.S. at 591 (holding
that “these three ‘exceptional’ categories . . . define
Younger’s scope”). These are sometimes referred to as the
“NOPSI categories,” because the Supreme Court definitively
distilled those three categories of Younger abstention in New
Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of the City of New
Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (1989) (NOPSI). See Applied
Underwriters, 37 F.4th at 588; see also Sprint Commc’ns,
571 U.S. at 591.
However, “[t]o warrant Younger abstention” in a
particular federal case, it is not enough that there is a state
proceeding that falls into one of the NOPSI categories.
Herrera v. City of Palmdale, 918 F.3d 1037, 1044 (9th Cir.
2019). In addition, “the state proceeding must be
(1) ‘ongoing,’ (2) ‘implicate important state interests,’ and
(3) provide ‘an adequate opportunity . . . to raise
constitutional challenges.’” Herrera, 918 F.3d at 1044
(quoting Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar

-- 52 of 56 --

WALLINGFORD V. BONTA 53
Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). Moreover, even if a case
fits within one of the three NOPSI categories and meets all
three of the Middlesex criteria, a district court still may not
abstain under Younger unless adjudication of “the federal
action would have the practical effect of enjoining the state
proceedings.” Herrera, 918 F.3d at 1044 (citation omitted).
“Each of these requirements must be ‘strictly met.’”
Rynearson v. Ferguson, 903 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2018)
(citation omitted); see also AmerisourceBergen Corp. v.
Roden, 495 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that
“each element, on its own,” must be “satisfied” and a court
may not excuse a failure to meet one element by “balancing
the Younger elements”).
B
The State contends only that the Wallingfords’ federal
action falls within the third NOPSI category, which
encompasses “civil proceedings involving certain orders . . .
uniquely in the furtherance of the state courts’ ability to
perform their judicial functions.” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 78
(quoting NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 368). The State is incorrect.
This third NOPSI category has its origins in Juidice v.
Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977), and Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.,
481 U.S. 1 (1987). See NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 368 (citing these
two cases as the basis for the third category). In Juidice, a
judgment debtor (Vail) was held in contempt of court, fined,
and ultimately jailed, after he failed to honor a subpoena
ordering his attendance at a deposition concerning
satisfaction of the judgment against him. Id. at 329–30.
After paying the fine and being released from custody, Vail
and others filed a federal action against the relevant New
York state judges, seeking to enjoin “the use of the statutory
contempt procedures authorized by New York law” on the

-- 53 of 56 --

54 WALLINGFORD V. BONTA
ground that they violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at
330. A three-judge district court declined to abstain under
Younger, but the Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 331.
Emphasizing that “[t]he contempt power lies at the core of
the administration of a State’s judicial system,” the Court
held that the “State’s interest in the contempt process” was
sufficiently “important” to trigger Younger abstention
regardless of “[w]hether disobedience of a court-sanctioned
subpoena, and the resulting process leading to a finding of
contempt of court, is labeled civil, quasi-criminal, or
criminal in nature.” Id. at 335.
In Pennzoil, Texaco brought suit in federal court seeking
to enjoin enforcement, pending Texaco’s appeal in the Texas
state courts, of a $13 billion adverse judgment obtained by
Pennzoil. 481 U.S. at 4–6. Texaco argued, inter alia, that
Texas’s bonding requirements for staying enforcement of a
judgment pending appeal—which Texaco could not meet—
“effectively would deny Texaco a right to appeal” in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 7. The
district court declined to abstain and issued a preliminary
injunction against enforcement of the judgment. Id. at 8.
The court of appeals affirmed, but the Supreme Court
reversed. Id. at 8–9. Concluding that the “reasoning of
Juidice controls here,” the Court held that Younger
abstention applied because, as in Juidice, “this case
involve[s] challenges to the processes by which the State
compels compliance with the judgments of its courts.” Id. at
13–14.
In contrast to Juidice and Pennzoil, the Wallingfords’
suit does not challenge the constitutional validity of any
mechanism by which the state courts enforce their
judgments. Rather than asserting such a challenge to judicial
processes for enforcing judgments, the Wallingfords instead

-- 54 of 56 --

WALLINGFORD V. BONTA 55
assert a substantive challenge to California statutes that they
contend “infringe[]” their Second Amendment right to “keep
and bear Arms.” See U.S. Const., amend II. Accordingly,
this case does not fit within the third NOPSI category of
“‘civil proceedings involving certain orders . . . uniquely in
furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their
judicial functions,’” a category that is limited to suits that
strike at the mechanisms that give a state court the “ability
to perform its judicial function.” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 578–79
(quoting NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 368).
This conclusion is confirmed by our decision in
Rynearson, which rejected the application of Younger
abstention in a context that bears substantial similarities to
this case. In Rynearson, a private party (Moriwaki) obtained
a “protection order” against Rynearson on the grounds that
“Rynearson had stalked, cyberstalked, and unlawfully
harassed him.” 903 F.3d at 923. While Moriwaki’s
application for a permanent protection order was still
pending, Rynearson filed a federal action against the state
Attorney General and the county prosecuting attorney in
which he challenged the constitutionality, under the First
Amendment, of the Washington “cyberstalking statute,”
which was one of three different statutes invoked by
Moriwaki. Id. at 924; see also Moriwaki v. Rynearson, 2018
WL 733810, at *5 (Wash. Super. Ct. 2018). After the state
court issued the permanent protection order and Rynearson’s
appeal of that order was pending in state court, the federal
district court dismissed Rynearson’s federal action under
Younger. See Rynearson v. Ferguson, 2017 WL 4517790,
at *1, 5 (W.D. Wa. 2017). We reversed. Addressing the
third NOPSI category, we held that it was limited to cases
that would “interfere in the procedures by which states
administer their judicial system and ensure compliance with

-- 55 of 56 --

56 WALLINGFORD V. BONTA
their judgments.” 903 F.3d at 926 (emphasis added).
Because Rynearson’s federal action did not “‘question the
process by which [state] courts compel compliance’” with
their judgments, but instead involved a substantive challenge
to “the constitutionality of a criminal statute” whose
definition of stalking was used in the “stalking protection
order statute,” that federal action did not fall within NOPSI’s
third category. Id. at 926–27 (quoting Cook v. Harding, 879
F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2018) (emphasis added by
Rynearson)).
Here, just as in Rynearson, the Wallingfords assert a
constitutional challenge to a state statute that they contend
deprives them of a substantive constitutional right, and they
do not challenge any aspect of “the process by which
California courts compel compliance” with their judgments.
903 F.3d at 927 (citation omitted). As a result, this case does
not fall with NOPSI’s third category, and Younger abstention
does not apply. See Applied Underwriters, 37 F.4th at 590
n.4 (holding third NOPSI category is limited to cases
“implicat[ing] the regular operation of a state court’s judicial
system with respect to the processes by which the State
compels compliance with the judgements [sic] of its courts”
(simplified)).10
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, we should reverse the district
court’s dismissal of this action and remand for further
proceedings. To the extent that the majority does otherwise,
I respectfully dissent.
10 I therefore have no occasion to address whether the additional
requirements for Younger abstention are satisfied here. See supra at 51–
53.

-- 56 of 56 --