Bogdan Radu v. Persephone Johnson Shon

FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BOGDAN RADU,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v.
PERSEPHONE J OHNSON SHON,
Respondent-Appellant.
No. 20-17022
D.C. No.
4:20-cv-00246-RM
OPINION
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona, Tucson
Rosemary Marquez, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted July 1, 2021
San Francisco, California
Filed August 31, 2021
Before: Mary H. Murguia, Ryan D. Nelson and
Danielle J. Forrest, Circuit Judges
Opinion by Judge R. Nelson

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2 RADU V . SHON
SUMMARY*
Hague Convention
The panel vacated the district court’s order granting a
petition under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction and the International Child
Abduction Remedies Act, and remanded for the district court
to reasonably ensure compliance with its remedy.
The Hague Convention provides for the prompt return of
abducted children so that the country of habitual residence
may resolve custody disputes. Respondent Persephone
Johnson Shon left her husband Bodgan Radu in Germany
and removed her two minor children to Arizona, where they
had resided for the last two years. The district court granted
Radu’s petition for the return of the children, but the court
found that the repatriation of the children to Germany posed
a grave risk of psychological harm if in Radu’s custody. To
alleviate that risk, the district court ordered that the children
be transferred back to Germany in Shon’s custody until a
German court made a custody determination.
Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention gives courts
discretion not to return children if there is a grave risk of
harm. If a court finds such a risk, it must consider whether
the risk can be minimized or eliminated through some
alternative remedy. The panel concluded that the district
court did not exceed its authority to mandate the children’s
return to Germany accompanied by Shon, but the panel
* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It
has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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RADU V . SHON 3
vacated the district court’s alternative remedy order because
the record did not adequately support whether the order of
the children’s return in Shon’s custody had a high likelihood
of performance through supportive reinforcements in
Germany.
COUNSEL
Stephen J. Cullen (argued), Kelly A. Powers, and Leah M.
Hauser, Miles & Stockbridge P.C., Washington, D.C., for
Respondent-Appellant.
Michelle E. Irwin (argued), Fenwick & West LLP, Seattle,
Washington; Todd R. Gregorian and Rina Plotkin, Fenwick
& West LLP, San Francisco, California; for Petitioner-
Appellee.
OPINION
R. NELSON, Circuit Judge:
Persephone Johnson Shon left her husband in Germany
and removed her two minor children to Arizona, where they
have resided for the last two years. The Hague Convention
of the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
provides for the prompt return of abducted children so that
the country of habitual residence may resolve custody
disputes. The district court found the repatriation of the
minor children to Germany posed a grave risk of
psychological harm if in the father’s custody. To alleviate
that risk, the district court ordered that the children be
transferred back to Germany in Shon’s custody until a
German court made a custody determination. While the

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4 RADU V . SHON
district court’s order is permissible under the Convention,
we vacate and remand for the district court to reasonably
ensure compliance with its alternative remedy in Germany.
I
Bodgan Radu, a dual citizen of Romania and the United
States, married Shon, a United States citizen, in 2011 in
California. The couple has two minor children, O.S.R. born
in 2013 in the United States and M.S.R. born in 2016 in
Germany. The couple initially lived and worked in the
United States. In December 2015, Radu traveled to
Germany for a contractor job with the U.S. State
Department. In March 2016, Shon moved to Germany along
with O.S.R. and M.S.R. Shon, Radu, O.S.R., and M.S.R.
lived together in Germany in an apartment leased from Inge
Frick-Wilden. Shon was a “full-time mom” while living
with Radu in Germany.
Shon alleges that Radu abused her and the children after
they moved to Germany. According to Shon, Radu
constantly yelled and screamed at her about the messy
apartment, put her down, and called her profanities. Shon
did not trust Radu’s parenting because “when he would rage
and get angry and mean . . . [h]e couldn’t control himself.”
Shon provided examples of Radu’s rage and anger. In June
2016, Shon unknowingly gave O.S.R. sour milk to drink. In
response, Radu allegedly slammed his hand on the table,
threatened Shon, and accused her of trying to poison their
son. Janet Johnson, Shon’s mother, witnessed the sour-milk
incident and testified that Radu “exploded all over [Shon]
about being a terrible mother.” In October 2017, Shon
tripped on a stool and spilled broccoli across the floor. Radu
allegedly screamed, yelled, and called O.S.R. “bad names,
calling him stupid for leaving the stool out” while O.S.R.
was “cowering.” In March 2018, while Shon was handling

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RADU V . SHON 5
bath time for the children, Radu allegedly flung the
bathroom door open and slapped O.S.R. across the face.
Finally, during a potty-training incident, while Shon was
teaching M.S.R., Radu allegedly was “slamming against the
door” and yelling for Shon to get M.S.R. to stop crying.
Throughout these events, Shon never contacted law
enforcement or sought a protective order or other legal
remedy while living with Radu. However, she testified that
she “was terrified of [Radu]” and “feared retaliation”—that
is, he would hurt her or the children.
In March 2019, after Radu allegedly sexually assaulted
Shon, she decided that she was not going to stay with Radu.
On June 10, 2019, Shon flew one way to Arizona with both
O.S.R. and M.S.R. Since Shon’s departure, she and the
children have resided in Arizona where she enrolled the
children in school. Shon later filed for a divorce in Arizona.
Shon has obtained counseling from Sherri Mikels-Romero,
a licensed psychotherapist, approximately forty times.
According to Mikels-Romero, Shon exhibited symptoms of
posttraumatic stress disorder.
On June 8, 2020, Radu filed a Verified Petition for
Return of Children to Germany (“Petition”) pursuant to the
Convention1 and the International Child Abduction
Remedies Act (“ICARA”), Pub. L. No. 100-300, 102 Stat.
437 (1988) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 9001 et
seq.), which implements the Convention. Before filing,
Radu contacted various local and national authorities to
obtain the return of his children. This included filing a report
with the Tucson, Arizona Police Department, contacting the
1 We use Convention to refer to the Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction (Convention), Oct. 25, 1980,
T.I.A.S. No. 11670.

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6 RADU V . SHON
children’s school in Tucson, and filing a formal Convention
application with Germany. The district court held an
evidentiary hearing over three non-consecutive days on the
merits of the Petition.
The district court granted Radu’s Petition, ordering Shon
to return O.S.R. and M.S.R. to Germany. Radu v. Shon, No.
CV-20-00246-TUC-RM, 2020 WL 5576742, at *1 (D. Ariz.
Sept. 17, 2020). The district court carefully considered what
type of remedy would safely allow the children to return to
Germany. To “mitigate th[e] risk of psychological harm” to
the children, the district court ordered an alternative remedy
that “Shon shall retain temporary custody and care of the
children until a custody determination can be made by a
German court of competent jurisdiction.” Id. at *3–4.
The district court made several findings. First, the
district court found and Shon conceded that “Shon’s removal
of the children to the United States, and retention of them
therein, was wrongful within the meaning of Article 3 of the
Convention.” Id. at *1. Second, the district court found that
Article 12—“if less than one year has elapsed from the date
of the wrongful removal or retention and the commencement
of the proceedings” the children shall be returned—applied
absent an exception. Id. at *2. However, the district court
found an Article 13(b) exception applied because “the
children would be at grave risk of psychological harm if
returned to Germany in the custody of Radu.” Id. at *3. The
district court found the “evidence presented at the
evidentiary hearing—including the testimony from Shon,
Frick, and Johnson, as well as from Radu himself—supports
a finding that Radu behaved in ways that could be
characterized as psychologically or emotionally abusive.”
Id. At the hearing, Radu testified: “Probably in the heat of
the passion, I may have called them [names] a couple of

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RADU V . SHON 7
times . . . . So I do regret it, looking in perspective right now.
Maybe I should have used a different tone [of] voice or a
different type of – better approach in managing my
children.”
The district court found the “evidence [] insufficient to
show that O.S.R. and M.S.R. would be at grave risk of
physical harm if returned to Germany” and there was “no
evidence of any sexual abuse of the children.” Id. The
district court offered to “hold a further hearing upon request
concerning the logistics of the children’s return.” Id.
Apparently, neither party requested a hearing. Shon
appealed and the district court stayed its order pending
resolution of this appeal.
II
“The Hague Convention is a multilateral international
treaty on parental kidnapping” in force between the United
States and Germany. Holder v. Holder (Holder I), 305 F.3d
854, 859 (9th Cir. 2002). “Federal district courts have
jurisdiction over actions arising under the Hague Convention
pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 9003.” Flores Castro v. Hernandez
Renteria, 971 F.3d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 2020). We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Id. We review for
abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to grant or deny
a petition for return following an Article 13(b) finding of
grave risk of harm. See Convention Art. 18 (“The provisions
of this Chapter do not limit the power of a judicial or
administrative authority to order the return of the child at any
time.”); see also Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 20
(2014) (Alito, J., concurring); Baran v. Beaty, 526 F.3d
1340, 1349 (11th Cir. 2008). “We review the district court’s
factual determinations for clear error, and the district court’s
application of the Convention to those facts de novo.”
Flores Castro, 971 F.3d at 886.

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8 RADU V . SHON
III
The main objective of the Convention and ICARA, its
implementing statute, is “to secure the prompt return of
children wrongfully removed to or retained in any
Contracting State” and “to ensure that rights of custody and
of access under the law of one Contracting State are
effectively respected in the other Contracting States.”
Convention Art. 1. The aim is to “prevent parents from
wrongfully taking children across national borders in order
to shop for a friendly forum in which to litigate custody.”
Gaudin v. Remis, 415 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2005).
“Underlying this aim is the premise that the Convention
should deprive parties of any tactical advantages gained by
absconding with a child to a more favorable forum.” Holder
v. Holder (Holder II), 392 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2004);
see also Papakosmas v. Papakosmas, 483 F.3d 617, 621 (9th
Cir. 2007). The central question is thus “whether a child
should be returned to a country for custody proceedings and
not what the outcome of those proceedings should be.”
Holder II, 392 F.3d at 1013.
A
We briefly recount the procedure for Convention
petitions. The “return remedy” is the Convention’s “central
operating feature.” Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 9 (2010).
“To that end, the Convention ordinarily requires the prompt
return of a child wrongfully removed or retained away from
the country in which she habitually resides.” Monasky v.
Taglieri, 140 S. Ct. 719, 723 (2020) (citing Convention Art.
12). However, return is not required if the “abductor can
establish one of the Convention’s narrow affirmative
defenses.” Gaudin, 415 F.3d at 1034–35; see 22 U.S.C.
§ 9003(e)(2). Article 12, Article 13, and Article 20 provide
affirmative defenses or exceptions to the return of the child

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RADU V . SHON 9
to her habitual residence. “Importantly, a finding that one or
more of the exceptions provided by Articles 13 and 20 are
applicable does not make refusal of a return order
mandatory. The courts retain the discretion to order the child
returned even if they consider that one or more of the
exceptions applies.” Hague International Child Abduction
Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494,
10,509 (1986).
Most relevant here is Article 13(b), which gives courts
discretion not to return the children if “there is a grave risk
that [the child’s] return would expose the child to physical
or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an
intolerable situation.” Convention Art. 13(b); see Gaudin,
415 F.3d at 1034–35. “By its terms, Article 13 does not
require a court to refuse return of the child upon the
demonstration of one of the article’s defenses.” Asvesta v.
Petroutsas, 580 F.3d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 2009). The
Convention and ICARA “dictate that custody must be
determined by the home jurisdiction”—in this case,
Germany—“unless the existence of a ‘grave risk’ truly
renders that impossible.” Gaudin, 415 F.3d at 1036. If a
court decides that the record supports an Article 13(b)
defense, it “must proceed to consider whether that risk can
be minimized or eliminated through some alternative
remedy.” Id. at 1037.2
2 An alternative remedy is a judicial construct not found in the text
of the Convention nor ICARA. See Danaipour v. McLarey, 286 F.3d 1,
21 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing P.R. Beaumont & P.E. McEleavy, The Hague
Convention on International Child Abduction 156–59 & n. 183 (1999)).
We note that other courts have used different terms to describe an
alternative remedy; “undertaking” appears to be the more common term
employed. See Simcox v. Simcox, 511 F.3d 594, 605 (6th Cir. 2007)

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B
Our controlling precedent on alternative remedies is set
forth in Gaudin. 415 F.3d 1028. “[B]efore denying the
return of a child because of a grave risk of harm, a court must
consider alternative remedies that would allow both the
return of the children to their home country and their
protection from harm.” Id. at 1035 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). We explained that the “question is
simply whether any reasonable remedy can be forged that
will permit the children to be returned to their home
jurisdiction for a custody determination while avoiding the
‘grave risk of psychological harm’ that would result from
living with” the petitioning parent. Id. at 1036 (citation
omitted). We noted a few guidelines for determining
whether a grave risk of harm may be mitigated through an
alternative remedy: (1) the district court must consider the
“effect of any possible remedies in light of circumstances as
they exist in the present” meaning “whether a grave risk of
harm now exists, and if so, whether that risk can be
minimized through an alternative remedy” and (2) the
district court must not be influenced by or accord weight to
any existing custody proceedings. Id. at 1036–37.
If a district court makes an Article 13(b) grave-risk-of-
harm finding—as the district court did below—the
alternative remedy must significantly reduce, if not
(defining “undertakings” as “enforceable conditions of return designed
to mitigate the risk of harm occasioned by the child’s repatriation”);
Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 219 (1st Cir. 2000) (explaining that the
“undertakings approach allows courts to conduct an evaluation of the
placement options and legal safeguards in the country of habitual
residence to preserve the child’s safety while the courts of that country
have the opportunity to determine custody of the children within the
physical boundaries of their jurisdiction”).

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RADU V . SHON 11
eliminate, the grave risk of harm to the children. See Saada
v. Golan, 930 F.3d 533, 541 (2d Cir. 2019) (“The District
Court must determine whether there exist alternative
ameliorative measures that are either enforceable by the
District Court or, if not directly enforceable, are supported
by other sufficient guarantees of performance.”). To that
end, district courts need to determine whether and how the
alternative remedy is likely to be performed. See Walsh,
221 F.3d at 219 (“A potential grave risk of harm can, at
times, be mitigated sufficiently by the acceptance of
undertakings and sufficient guarantees of performance of
those undertakings.”).
An alternative remedy evaluation in the context of an
Article 13(b) finding must consider whether the return
remedy is more likely than not to reduce the short-term risk
of harm accompanying repatriation, thus protecting the
child’s psychological safety. While we do not impose rigid
requirements, a district court’s evidence-gathering cannot
weigh matters or apply measures treading on the ultimate
custody determination—e.g., whether the children are better
off with one parent or another. Gaudin, 415 F.3d at 1036.
Nor should the alternative remedy incorporate any long-term
considerations or conditions that conflict with the
Convention and ICARA. See 22 U.S.C. § 9001(b)(4)
(providing that the Convention and ICARA “empower
courts in the United States to determine only rights under the
Convention and not the merits of any underlying child
custody claims”).
The children’s interests, not the parents’ preference or
inconvenience, are paramount to evaluating whether an

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12 RADU V . SHON
alternative remedy mitigates the grave risk of harm.3
Appropriate considerations include the enforceability of the
alternative remedy in the foreign jurisdiction based on the
availability of legal measures to mitigate the child’s risk of
harm, reliability of testimony indicating compliance with
any court orders or legal measures, as well as history of the
parent’s relationship, cooperation, and interpersonal
communications. See Saada, 930 F.3d at 541–42. Any
supportive reinforcements that may be necessary should
reflect these considerations. Accordingly, the district court
may solicit any promises, commitments, or other assurances
to facilitate repatriation, which may involve directing
parents to arrange for legal measures in the foreign
jurisdiction—the children’s habitual residence. See id.;
Danaipour, 286 F.3d at 15. Indeed, the district court may
need to review foreign law to evaluate the reach of that
foreign court’s authority in issuing legal measures or other
relief in support of the alternative remedy.
Radu discusses German Code of Civil Procedure § 328
for its standards on enforcing foreign judgments. An
analysis of Germany’s pertinent civil laws, and other aspects
of its legal apparatus (processes, procedures, and so forth)
may inform whether the district court should direct the
parties to obtain protective measures abroad or confirm
whether domestic orders suffice. But given its limited
authority abroad and potential comity concerns, the district
court should not make the order of return with an alternative
remedy contingent on the entry of an order by the children’s
3 However, a district court may factor in whether, for example,
returning to the children’s place of habitual residence would put the
safety of the abducting parent at grave risk, and therefore calibrate the
alternative remedy. See Abbott, 560 U.S. at 22.

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RADU V . SHON 13
country of habitual residence. See Danaipour, 286 F.3d at
23.
The district court may also solicit supplementary
evidence, and in particular testimony, from the parents on
these or related issues to determine the nature of supportive
reinforcements. In rare circumstances, oral commitments
from one parent to obey court orders may be enough.4
Voluntary commitments or agreements—those without
third-party intervention—are acceptable depending on the
parties’ pattern of behavior and the severity of risk of harm
to the children (which must be low).
The district court should also, if needed, contact the
United States Department of State Office of Children’s
Issues to coordinate legal safeguards or otherwise procure
assistance from the foreign jurisdiction to address or resolve
any issues animating the Article 13(b) grave risk of harm
finding. See Convention Art. 7 (listing measures available
through Central Authorities).5 Logistical arrangements such
as financing the return of the children or securing housing or
temporary placement should not undermine the alternative
remedy. The options are extensive, but this framework
4 Radu testified that he would follow the district court’s order. It is
difficult to assess whether such testimony is enough to sustain the
alternative remedy without additional facts. Notably, there is no
restraining order, criminal adjudication, or other court judgment
indicating either Shon or Radu poses a risk to the children requiring law
enforcement. This may suggest an increased likelihood of performance
and therefore reduced need for multiple supportive reinforcements.
5 Central Authorities, such as the Department of State’s Office of
Children’s Issues, are empowered to engage in several activities
including “to provide such administrative arrangements as may be
necessary and appropriate to secure the safe return of the child.”
Convention Art. 7(h).

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14 RADU V . SHON
provides the guideposts for navigating the provisions of the
Convention and ICARA and creating a reasonable remedy
for a short-term period. The district court may also consider
activity in the children’s habitual residence, including
criminal proceedings, if it could significantly interfere with
implementing the supportive reinforcements and otherwise
reduce the likelihood of performance.6 Supportive
reinforcements generally should be limited in scope and thus
not extremely burdensome to either party to avoid litigation
over the merits of custody issues. Resolving the parameters
of safe repatriation of the children is paramount.
IV
With this governing framework outlined, we turn to the
merits of the district court’s order to return the children. On
appeal, Radu does not properly challenge the district court’s
finding that his children would face a grave risk of
psychological harm if returned to Germany, even though the
facts here do seem to be a borderline case whether an Article
13(b) finding is warranted. See Gaudin, 415 F.3d at 1037
(“[B]ecause the Hague Convention provides only a
provisional, short-term remedy in order to permit long-term
custody proceedings to take place in the home jurisdiction,
the grave-risk inquiry should be concerned only with the
degree of harm that could occur in the immediate future.”).
The focus of our inquiry here, however, is the alternative
remedy based on the district court’s findings. We vacate and
remand the alternative remedy order since the record does
not adequately support whether the order of the children’s
6 Radu wrote that there are “pending police dockets” in Germany
related to the “disappearance of [his] children.” Whether further inquiry
is appropriate, particularly where it poses obstacles to advancing the
alternative remedy, is for the district court to determine.

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RADU V . SHON 15
return in Shon’s custody has a high likelihood of
performance through supportive reinforcements.
A
Shon argues that where an Article 13(b) finding is made,
the petitioning parent (here, Radu) bears the burden of
“adduc[ing] any evidence on the enforceability of American
alternative remedies in Germany.” We decline to allocate a
burden of proof on the reasonableness of an alternative
remedy.7 Congress is capable of assigning burdens of proof
and has already done so under ICARA. See 22 U.S.C.
§ 9003(e)(2). We need not add judicial constraints absent
from ICARA or the Convention. To be sure, the
reasonableness of the remedy originates with the district
court having authority to request any information from the
parties. The district court is in the best position to assess a
parent’s willingness to respect court orders and craft the
alternative remedy accordingly.
Our framework enables a district court to craft the
remedy with enough flexibility to account for the likely
idiosyncratic nature of the parties’ relationship without
mandating a new evidentiary burden. On appeal, Shon
alleged concerns about her “immigration status” impacting
her ability to live in Germany with the children or “work in
Germany to financially support herself and the children.” At
a minimum, practical considerations should be substantiated
7 But see Acosta v. Acosta, 725 F.3d 868, 877 (8th Cir. 2013) (“As
the petitioner proffering the undertaking, [petitioner] bears the burden of
proof.”) (citation omitted); Simcox, 511 F.3d at 611 (“[T]he burden for
establishing the appropriateness and efficacy of any proposed
undertakings rests with the petitioner.”).

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16 RADU V . SHON
by the party asserting them as that furthers efficient
resolution and discourages potential dilatory conduct.
Shon also argues that the alternative remedy “is
overbroad and exceeds the scope of the lower court’s
authority” because it requires her to move to Germany,
“orders the children to remain” in her custody, and
“implicitly requires [her] to file a custody case in Germany
and the German court to act on it.” The Convention,
however, presumes relocation of the children to facilitate
repatriation. See Abbott, 560 U.S. at 20 (“Ordering a return
remedy does not alter the existing allocation of custody
rights, but does allow the courts of the home country to
decide what is in the child’s best interests.”) (internal citation
omitted). If relocation of the abducting parent (or a
responsible family member) can help alleviate any grave risk
of harm from repatriation of the kids, the district court
retains that discretion.
Because Shon wrongfully removed the children, as she
conceded, the district court in no way exceeded its authority
to mandate the children’s return to Germany accompanied
by Shon. But in the context of an Article 13(b) finding, the
district court needed a fuller record to have sufficient
guarantees that the alternative remedy will be enforced in
Germany. As stated above, there are multiple resources the
district court may engage, including assistance via the U.S.
Department of State, to fulfill the Convention’s presumptive
goal of the speedy return of the children. That Germany is a
treaty partner with the United States already informs
baseline expectations. Id. (“International law serves a high
purpose when it underwrites the determination by nations to
rely upon their domestic courts to enforce just laws by
legitimate and fair proceedings.”). We must respect that
another treaty partner—a contracting State to the

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RADU V . SHON 17
Convention—is well-equipped with the proper legal
mechanisms and internal processes and procedures to
support alternative remedies and otherwise fulfill treaty
obligations.
We recognize that abuse exists on a spectrum depending
on the form, frequency, and other features. See Simcox,
511 F.3d at 605; Blondin v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153, 162 (2d
Cir. 2001). But an Article 13(b) grave risk of psychological
harm finding does not automatically terminate further
investigation into a reasonable alternative remedy. In fact,
there is longstanding practice among our foreign
counterparts, see Abbott, 560 U.S. at 16–17, to order return
of the children despite objections by the abducting parent in
situations of physical or psychological harm or alternatively
consider remedies to mitigate a grave risk of harm upon
repatriation.8 The framework detailed above accommodates
8 See Oberlandesgericht Dresden [OLG] [Higher Regional Court]
Jan. 21, 2002, 10 UF 753/01 (Ger.); see also RS v. BS [2005] NZFC 61
at [37] (N.Z.) (concluding that “it is not sufficient for a respondent to
make allegations of domestic violence and/or sexual abuse or even to
satisfy the Court that such claims can be substantiated” and that “[i]n
addition to the Court being satisfied of such matters it must also be
satisfied that the U.S. justice system would not be able to deal with the
stated allegations in a way that placed due consideration upon the best
interests of the child”); Re:‘H’ Children [2003] EWCA (Civ) 355 [37]
(Eng.) (resolving “mechanics of the return” of the mother with the
children to include “set[ting] aside” prior court order “giving sole
parental rights to the father” and establishing “[s]ome clear
understanding between the father and mother as to how and in what
circumstances the father should see the children prior to any decision by
the Belgian court” and “[i]f it can be arranged, either a hearing before
the Belgian Court . . . to take over control of the future of these children
as soon as possible after their return”); C v. B [2005] EWHC (Fam) 2988
[62] (Eng.) (concluding that the “proper solution . . . is for the court to
order return so that the Australian court can reconsider the position . . .

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18 RADU V . SHON
the fact-intensive nature that undergirds the fashioning of an
alternative remedy upon an Article 13(b) finding and affords
the district court the latitude to tailor it in light of more
troubling factual scenarios.
V
Resolving international child abduction is at the
forefront of the Convention. We are not blind to the
emotional consequences, disruptions to livelihoods, and
changes in routine that arise in physically moving children
across international borders when a grave risk of
psychological harm looms. But alternative remedies are
consistent with the Convention’s goal to accomplish
children’s repatriation while also protecting them from
harm. There are multiple routes the district court may take
to support an alternative remedy that satisfies the
reasonableness standard—a likelihood of performance
advanced through supportive reinforcements. The district
court can be assisted by the U.S. Department of State,
especially if foreign cooperation and protective measures are
needed.
Consistent with the goals of the Convention, this
litigation should conclude as quickly as possible. The
district court shall expedite consideration of the case. Any
subsequent appeal shall be assigned to this panel and either
party may move for an expedited briefing schedule on
appeal.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
of the mother” who raised concerns about her mental health and other
welfare considerations if the court ordered return).

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