Willian Matias Rauda v. David Jennings

FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
W ILLIAN MATIAS RAUDA ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DAVID J ENNINGS , in his official
capacity, Field Office Director of
San Francisco Field Office, U.S.
Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; TAE D. J OHNSON,
Acting Director of U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement; M ERRICK
B. GARLAND, Attorney General;
ALEJANDRO N. M AYORKAS , Acting
Secretary of Department of
Homeland Security,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 21-16062
D.C. No.
3:21-cv-03897-
CRB
OPINION
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Charles R. Breyer, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted to Motions Panel July 13, 2021*
* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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Filed August 13, 2021
Before: Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Consuelo M. Callahan, and
Lawrence VanDyke, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge VanDyke
SUMMARY**
Immigration / Habeas Corpus
Affirming the district court’s denial of Willian Matias
Rauda’s request for a temporary restraining order (TRO) to
prevent the government from removing him, the panel:
(1) concluded that the district court correctly determined that
it lacked jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g);
(2) concluded that Matias’s Suspension Clause argument
failed because his requested relief fell outside of the scope
of habeas; and (3) directed the district court to dismiss
Matias’s petition.
In 2018, Matias, a native of El Salvador, was detained by
immigration authorities. An immigration judge (IJ) denied
bond, and an IJ later denied him relief under the Convention
Against Torture and ordered his removal. The Board of
Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal, and this court
denied his petition for review. In April 2021, Matias moved
the BIA to reopen, and the BIA denied a stay of removal. In
May 2021, Matias filed a habeas petition with the district
** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It
has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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court, which denied his motion to enjoin his removal until
his motion to reopen and habeas petition were decided. On
June 14, 2021, the district court denied Matias’s
subsequently-filed motion for a TRO, and the government
voluntarily agreed to stay removal up to and including
August 13, 2021.
The panel observed that the motion before it was
Matias’s motion for stay pending appeal, but given the
decisive jurisdictional issue, the panel reached the merits.
The panel concluded that the district court correctly
determined that jurisdiction was barred by 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(g), which provides that “no court shall have
jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any
alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney
General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or
execute removal orders against any alien.” The panel
explained that the execution of his removal order was
precisely what Matias challenged here, and that Congress
could have chosen to provide petitioners like Matias with
access to judicial review of non-final immigration orders,
but did not do so.
The panel explained that the conclusion that it lacked
jurisdiction was reinforced by the consideration that, as
explained in Shaboyan v. Holder, 652 F.3d 988 (9th Cir.
2011), this court may only review final orders, and the BIA’s
interim order denying a stay of removal pending resolution
of a motion to reopen is not such an order. Noting that
Shaboyan involved a petition for review, while this case
involved a habeas petition, the panel explained that
Shaboyan foreclosed review (direct or indirect) of the BIA’s
denial of his stay request.

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The panel rejected Matias’s claim that the Constitution’s
Suspension Clause preserves judicial review here. The panel
relied on DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020), in
which the Supreme Court determined that habeas relief
applies to petitioners seeking release from executive
detention, not to those seeking to remain in the United States.
Because Matias was not seeking a remedy for unlawful
detention, the panel concluded that only an extreme and
unwarranted expansion of the habeas writ would encompass
his requested relief.
Matias attempted to distinguish his case from
Thuraissigiam on the ground that he made it farther than
25 yards into the United States before being apprehended.
The panel explained that the Supreme Court rejected
essentially the same argument in Thuraissigiam, where the
petitioner argued he was entitled to more process than an
applicant for admission because he succeeded in making it
25 yards into the country. The Supreme Court rejected that
argument, determining that it would undermine the
sovereign prerogative of governing admission to the country
and create a perverse incentive to enter at an unlawful
location. Thus, the panel concluded that Matias was entitled
to the process afforded by statute, but no more. The panel
also observed that the process provided here was ample.
Addressing Matias’s request that the court grant him a
stay because he would be severely harmed or killed if
removed to El Salvador, the panel explained that, if a court
could inject itself into the agency’s process and force
(another) stay because a removable alien newly represented
that he would be severely injured or die when removed, all
similarly situated petitioners would be incentivized to
demand a stay. The panel explained that, if that were case,
it seems foreseeable that this would become the new norm

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M ATIAS RAUDA V. J ENNINGS 5
and courts would essentially grant automatic stays of
removal pending the BIA’s consideration of motions to
reopen.
Finally, the panel noted that Matias is not required to be
in the United States for the adjudication of his motion to take
place. Rather, he would continue to receive the statutorily
required process even when he is removed, just as Congress
designed.
COUNSEL
Manohar Raju, Public Defender; Matt Gonzalez, Chief
Attorney; Francisco Ugarte and Genna Ellis Beier,
Attorneys; Public Defender’s Office, San Francisco,
California; Sean Lai McMahon and Jehan Laner Romero,
Pangea Legal Services, San Francisco, California; for
Plaintiff-Appellant.
Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney General;
William C. Peachey, Director; Elianis Perez, Assistant
Director; Mary L. Larakers, Trial Attorney; Office of
Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States
Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Defendants-
Appellees.

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OPINION
VANDYKE, Circuit Judge:
Petitioner Willian Matias Rauda appeals the district
court’s order denying his request for a temporary restraining
order to prevent the government from removing him from
the United States. In the district court, Matias argued that
deportation prior to a ruling on his motion to reopen would
violate his due process rights, the Convention Against
Torture, and the Immigration & Nationality Act. In denying
his motion, the district court concluded that it lacked
jurisdiction to reach Matias’s claim. We agree with the
district court and affirm.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Matias is a native of El Salvador and unlawfully entered
the United States in February 2014. El Salvadoran
authorities considered him a member of MS-13, a violent
gang.
Leaving his partner and child, he moved to Maryland
from the San Francisco Bay Area in October 2015. While
residing in Maryland, Matias pleaded guilty to assault in the
first degree after being involved in a gang shooting where
two victims were shot. Authorities determined that the
shooting was in retaliation for MS-13 gang activity, and
identified Matias as an “affiliate” of MS-13. The
government claims Matias admitted his status as an MS-13
gang member while he was imprisoned at Prince George’s
County Detention Center in Maryland. He was sentenced to
twenty years in prison but was released from custody on a
deferred sentence, after which he moved back to the Bay
Area.

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U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
detained Matias in November 2018, seeking to remove him.
While in ICE custody, Matias requested to be housed with a
gang aligned with MS-13. An immigration judge (IJ) denied
him bond in January 2019, finding he was a danger to the
community. In June 2019, an IJ denied Matias relief under
the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and ordered him
removed to El Salvador. Matias unsuccessfully appealed to
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed
his appeal in November 2019. On January 28, 2021, this
court likewise denied his petition for review, determining
that the evidence supported the IJ’s findings. See Matias
Rauda v. Wilkinson, 844 F. App’x 945 (9th Cir. 2021).
On April 22, 2021, Matias moved the BIA to reopen his
case so that it could consider “new developments” regarding
his request for CAT relief. The new developments that
Matias contends undermine the BIA’s previous decision are:
(1) claimed political changes in El Salvador, and (2) an
alleged text from an MS-13 gang member labeling him a
“snitch” and saying he will be killed if he returns to El
Salvador.1 On May 14, 2021, after the Ninth Circuit’s stay
of removal terminated, Matias moved the BIA for an
emergency stay while his motion to reopen was being
considered. One week later, on May 21, 2021, the BIA
denied his request for a stay.
Because he could not file a direct petition for review with
this court (which, as discussed below, is foreclosed by
precedent), Matias filed a habeas petition with the district
court on May 24, 2021, asking the court to enjoin the
1 The text is alleged to have come from a sender within the United
States, but Matias has never authenticated the text, nor did he provide
copies to the district court.

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government from removing him until the BIA ruled on his
motion to reopen and the court ruled on his habeas petition.
The district court denied his motion.
ICE initially scheduled Matias’s removal for the first
week of June 2021, but that deadline has repeatedly slipped.
On June 14, 2021, the district court denied Matias’s
subsequently-filed motion for a temporary restraining order
(TRO), determining that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)’s jurisdictional
limits barred his claims. But the district court granted a five-
day administrative stay so that this court could hear Matias’s
appeal. Subsequently, the government voluntarily agreed to
stay removal up to and including August 13, 2021.
Matias appeals the district court’s order denying his TRO
and argues that this court has jurisdiction to consider his
claim. Meanwhile, Matias’s motion to reopen remains
pending before the BIA. Notably, the motion brought before
this panel was Matias’s motion for stay pending appeal. But
given the decisive jurisdictional issue at play, we reach the
overall merits of Matias’s claim.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We have jurisdiction to determine whether jurisdiction
exists.” Shaboyan v. Holder, 652 F.3d 988, 989 (9th Cir.
2011) (per curiam). In the immigration context, “[w]e may
review only final orders of removal.” Id.

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DISCUSSION
I. We Lack Jurisdiction to Review Matias’s Claims.
A. Section 1252(g) Deprives Us of Jurisdiction.
Matias argues that the district court erred in determining
that § 1252(g) bars judicial review of his claims challenging
the government’s execution of his removal order. The
statute’s plain language, however, bars review of his claims.
Per § 1252(g), “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any
cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the
decision or action by the Attorney General to commence
proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders
against any alien.” § 1252(g) (emphasis added).
The execution of his removal order is precisely what
Matias challenges here. Matias seeks to enjoin the
government from removing him—or in other words, enjoin
“action by the Attorney General to . . . execute removal
orders against [Matias].” § 1252(g). Congress has explicitly
precluded our review of this claim.
Beyond its plain text, legislative action (or inaction)
corroborates that § 1252(g) was meant to preclude judicial
review over claims like Matias’s. While Congress could
have chosen to provide Matias and other petitioners like him
with access to judicial review of non-final immigration
orders, it did not do so. Cf. DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S.
Ct. 1959, 1983 (2020); Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 424
(2009) (explaining Congress’s amendments to immigration
procedures). Limiting federal jurisdiction in this way is
understandable since Congress wanted to streamline
immigration proceedings by limiting judicial review to final
orders, litigated in the context of petitions for review. See
Nken, 556 U.S. at 424 (“Congress . . . ‘repealed the old

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judicial-review scheme . . . and instituted a new and
(significantly more restrictive) one in 8 U.S.C. § 1252.’ The
new review system substantially limited the availability of
judicial review and streamlined all challenges to a removal
order into a single proceeding: the petition for review.”
(citation omitted)).
Matias asserts that applying the plain text of § 1252(g)
and refusing to enter a stay of removal pending the resolution
of his motion to reopen “would deprive a noncitizen [of] his
statutory right to file a motion to reopen.” But that’s not true.
Matias’s motion to reopen has already been filed, and is
currently pending before the BIA. Once the BIA decides
that motion, Matias will be able to file a petition for our court
to review that final agency action—including review of the
BIA’s denial of his request for a stay of removal pending its
decision. See Shaboyan, 652 F.3d at 991. Matias has taken
full advantage of his statutory rights and will continue to
have access to the process guaranteed to him under the
statute even if he is removed. See Nken, 556 U.S. at 424.
Matias also attempts to avoid § 1252(g)’s jurisdictional
bar by arguing that his challenge pertains not to the Attorney
General’s discretionary authority, but rather to the Attorney
General’s allegedly unlawful decision to “remov[e] him
now.” But § 1252(g)’s jurisdictional bar on “claim[s] . . .
arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General
to . . . execute removal orders” does not include any
temporal caveats. As the Third Circuit has observed, “the
discretion to decide whether to execute a removal order
includes the discretion to decide when to do it . . . . [and]
[b]oth are covered by the statute.” Tazu v. Att’y Gen. United
States, 975 F.3d 292, 297 (3d Cir. 2020).
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has also determined that
§ 1252(g) strips courts of jurisdiction in this instance. In

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Hamama v. Adducci, petitioners sought a stay while they
argued that changed country conditions required
reconsideration of their removal orders. 912 F.3d 869, 873
(6th Cir. 2018). The court held that, “[u]nder a plain reading
of the text of the statute, the Attorney General’s enforcement
of long-standing removal orders falls squarely under the
Attorney General’s decision to execute removal orders and
is not subject to judicial review.” Id. at 874.
We agree with our sister circuits. No matter how Matias
frames it, his challenge is to the Attorney General’s exercise
of his discretion to execute Matias’s removal order, which
we have no jurisdiction to review. See Camarena v. Dir.,
ICE, 988 F.3d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 2021) (“[W]e do not
have jurisdiction to consider ‘any’ cause or claim brought by
an alien arising from the government’s decision to execute a
removal order. If we held otherwise, any petitioner could
frame his or her claim as an attack on the government’s
authority to execute a removal order rather than its execution
of a removal order.”). The district court correctly concluded
that § 1252(g) deprived it of jurisdiction to hear Matias’s
claims.
B. We May Only Review Final Orders.
That we lack jurisdiction over Matias’s claims is
reinforced by another consideration. As explained in
Shaboyan, 652 F.3d at 989, we may only review final orders.
While Matias is asking us to review the denial of a TRO that
he filed alongside a habeas petition in district court, what he
fundamentally seeks is a stay of removal pending the BIA’s
resolution of his motion to reopen. Because Matias asks us
to review an interim order and not a ‘“final order of removal’
that may . . . give rise to a petition for review,” we lack
jurisdiction to consider his claim. Id. at 989–90.

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In Shaboyan, just as in this case, the petitioner was
ordered removed. Shaboyan filed a motion to reopen with
the BIA and the BIA denied her request for a stay of removal
pending its consideration of that motion. Instead of filing a
habeas petition in the district court seeking review of the
BIA’s denial of a stay like Matias did here, Shaboyan filed a
petition for review with this court asking us to directly
review the BIA’s stay decision. Id. at 989. Applying § 1252,
we determined that “[w]e may review only final orders of
removal,” and that “the BIA’s interim order denying a stay
of removal pending resolution of [petitioner’s] motion to
reopen cannot qualify as a final order of removal.” Id.
at 989, 990 (internal quotation marks omitted)). In reaching
that conclusion, we recognized that the petitioner was not
without recourse because the BIA’s order denying the stay
could be reviewed as part of its final order denying her
motion to reopen. Id. at 991. But where a petitioner “seeks
review of the denial of a stay as an independent matter. . . .
we lack jurisdiction.” Id.
When one door is locked, it’s natural to try another.
Presumably recognizing that he was foreclosed by Shaboyan
from seeking our direct review of the BIA’s denial of a stay,
Matias is attempting to obtain the same relief sought by
Shaboyan, just by a different route: through the district court
via a habeas petition. But Shaboyan’s rationale applies
equally to this attempt. Congress has intentionally (and
unequivocally) stripped us of jurisdiction to review non-final
orders. The IJ ordered Matias removed, like the petitioner
in Shaboyan. While he cannot contend that he is entitled to
direct review of that removal order—because such review is
squarely foreclosed by § 1252(g) and Shaboyan—Matias
also cannot argue that he is seeking review of any other final
order properly the subject of a petition for review. Shaboyan
forecloses our review (direct or indirect) of the only thing

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M ATIAS RAUDA V. J ENNINGS 13
Matias is ultimately challenging—the BIA’s denial of his
stay request.
II. The Suspension Clause Does Not Preserve Judicial
Review.
Recognizing the problem that § 1252 poses to his
attempt to secure immediate review of the BIA’s stay denial,
Matias attacks that statute. He argues that the Constitution’s
Suspension Clause gives what § 1252 purports to take away,
and thus Congress cannot have properly removed our
jurisdiction over his habeas claim.2 But the Suspension
Clause does not preserve judicial review in this case because
only an extreme and unwarranted expansion of the habeas
writ would encompass Matias’s requested relief.
Applying Thuraissigiam, the district court determined
that “the scope of the writ protected by the Suspension
Clause . . . does not extend to the type of claim at issue here.”
After noting that the “historic role of habeas is to secure
release from custody,” Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1970, the
district court pointed out that “Matias . . . is not challenging
his deportation order or any ruling that he is ineligible for
relief from removal. Instead, he is challenging the
government’s imminent execution of his removal order.” As
a result, the district court concluded “Matias’s claims do not
‘call for traditional habeas relief’ even under an evolving
understanding of the writ, [and] applying § 1252(g) to bar
his claims does not implicate the Suspension Clause.”
(quoting Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1970).
2 The Suspension Clause states that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” U.S. Const., Art.
I, § 9, cl. 2.

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On appeal, Matias argues that the writ applies to
“individuals who are challenging the process employed by
the government that results in their detention and
deportation.” He asserts that the Suspension Clause would
be violated if he is denied an avenue to challenge the BIA’s
stay denial. But these arguments misconstrue the scope of
the habeas writ, as set forth by the Supreme Court at length
in Thuraissigiam.
In Thuraissigiam, the Supreme Court determined that
habeas relief applies to petitioners seeking release from
executive detention but not to petitioners seeking to remain
in the United States. Id. at 1969–71. There, the petitioner
argued that Congress unconstitutionally “placed restrictions
on the ability of asylum seekers to obtain review under the
federal habeas statute.” Id. at 1963. The Court determined
that, as an alien who was not lawfully admitted, the
petitioner had “no entitlement to procedural rights other than
those afforded by statute.” Id. at 1964; see also id. at 1983
(“[A]n alien in respondent’s position has only those rights
regarding admission that Congress has provided by
statute.”). “[A]s to ‘foreigners who have never been
naturalized, nor acquired any domicil[e] or residence within
the United States, nor even been admitted into the country
pursuant to law,’ ‘the decisions of executive or
administrative officers, acting within powers expressly
conferred by Congress, are due process of law.’” Id. at 1982
(citation omitted). The Court also pointed out that
“[r]espondent and amici . . . have not unearthed evidence
that habeas was . . . used [before and around the time of the
adoption of the Constitution] to obtain anything like what is
sought here, namely, authorization for an alien to remain in
a country other than his own or to obtain administrative or
judicial review leading to that result.” Id. at 1971.

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The Court explained that the “core” of habeas relief is
release from unlawful executive detention, not the right to
remain in a country. Id. at 1975. Where “respondent did not
ask to be released,” but rather sought relief from removal,
respondent was seeking relief that fell “outside the scope of
the common-law habeas writ.” Id. at 1969–70. The
Supreme Court determined that respondent had received his
due process and that the Suspension Clause was not
triggered by § 1252(g)’s limit on habeas relief. Id. at 1983.
Like the petitioner in Thuraissigiam, Matias is not
seeking “a remedy for unlawful executive detention,” and
his claims are thus outside of the scope of habeas relief. Id.
at 1970–71, 1975 (citation omitted). Rather than seeking the
traditional use of habeas, Matias specifically wants to avoid
being released (into El Salvador). As the Court noted, the
common law reserves habeas relief for remedies from
unlawful custody. Id. at 1969. But Matias seeks to remain
in the United States, even if that requires staying in custody.
Matias is not using habeas in anything like the traditional
sense, and therefore, as the Supreme Court held in
Thuraissigiam, the relevant statute limiting habeas review
does not violate the Suspension Clause. Id. at 1983; see also
Hamama, 912 F.3d at 880 (“There is no Suspension Clause
violation because the Suspension Clause can only be
triggered when a petitioner is requesting relief from
custody.” (emphasis added)).
Matias attempts to distinguish his case from
Thuraissigiam because he made it farther than “25 yards”
into the United States before being apprehended. But this
argument is unpersuasive. The petitioner in Thuraissigiam
made essentially the same argument, just tailored to the facts
of his case. He claimed that he was entitled to more process
because he “was not taken into custody the instant he

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attempted to enter the country. . . . [but] succeeded in
making it 25 yards” across the border into the U.S.
Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1982. The Supreme Court
rejected this argument, determining that it would
“undermine the ‘sovereign prerogative’ of governing
admission to this country and create a perverse incentive to
enter at an unlawful rather than a lawful location.” Id.
at 1983 (citation omitted). Therefore, the Court treated the
respondent as “an applicant for admission,” and determined
he only had “those rights regarding admission that Congress
has provided by statute.” Id. at 1982–83.
The Supreme Court’s answer in Thuraissigiam applies
equally here. If we were to grant Matias more process
because he had successfully eluded immigration authorities
for longer than the petitioner in Thuraissigiam, we would
likewise be creating the same “perverse incentive” the Court
warned against. See id. at 1983. Matias differs from
Thuraissigiam only in that he managed to “reside”
unlawfully in the U.S. for a longer period, which is irrelevant
because both petitioners were present in the U.S. illegally.
Cf. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S.
471, 491 (1999) (“[I]n all cases, deportation is necessary in
order to bring an end to an ongoing violation of United
States law.”). As the government points out, it would be
strange to afford Matias, who committed crimes and evaded
authorities, more process than an alien who lawfully
presented himself at the border. Matias, like Thuraissigiam,
is entitled to the process afforded by statute, but no more.
See Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1983; Zadvydas v. Davis,
533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).
And to be clear, the process provided by our immigration
laws is ample, which Matias knows by experience. He
sought CAT relief before an IJ. He appealed the decision to

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the BIA. He petitioned this court for review. During the
more than two years it took for all of these layers of process
to play out, his removal was stayed. After this court denied
his petition, he was allowed to ask the BIA to reopen his case
(which he did) and ask for a stay of removal while the BIA
considered his motion (which he did). What Matias is not
allowed is to have a court evaluate the BIA’s denial of his
stay request before the BIA has completed its review of his
motion to reopen. All process has its limits. This hardly
seems to be an unreasonable one.
III. Matias’s Assertions of Alleged Harm Cannot
Warrant a Stay.
Matias asks us to grant him a stay because he contends
that he will be severely harmed or killed if removed to El
Salvador. He urges us to balance the equity of entering a
stay against the potential future harm upon removal. With
respect to the latter, Matias essentially asks us to take his
word for it and assume “the allegations contained in his
declaration are true.”
If a court could inject itself into the agency’s process and
force (another) stay because a removable alien—whose
petition for review had already been denied by our court—
newly represented to us that he would be severely injured or
die when removed, all similarly situated petitioners would
be incentivized to demand a stay and make similar claims to
keep themselves in the country while the BIA considers their
motions to reopen. And without records from the agency to
review, we would be presented with just the petitioners’
untested claims of possible future harm. That this would
become the new norm, and that courts would essentially be
granting automatic stays of removal pending the BIA’s
consideration of motions to reopen, seems foreseeable
enough.

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Congress, at least, seems to have anticipated this
problem in its decision to limit judicial review in a way that
does not permit this court to review interim, non-final orders
like motions to stay pending the resolution of motions to
reopen—even if petitioners present their requests dressed as
petitions for habeas relief. Congress has already balanced
the amount of due process available to petitioners with the
executive’s prerogative to remove individuals, and we
decline to expand judicial review beyond the parameters set
by Congress. See, e.g., Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1983;
see also Nken, 556 U.S. at 424–25. This balance struck by
Congress and recognized by this court in Shaboyan is not
unreasonable.
Matias points to INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001), as
supporting his argument that judicial intervention is
constitutionally necessary. But St. Cyr did not expand the
scope of judicial review in immigration proceedings. Cf.
Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1966 (noting that “a major
objective of IIRIRA” was to prevent “undue interference by
the courts”). While the Court in St. Cyr acknowledged that
“some judicial intervention in deportation cases” is required,
533 U.S. at 300 (emphasis added, citation and internal
quotation marks omitted), that is a far cry from saying that
judicial intervention is required at every step of the process.
Ultimately, Matias has had (and will have) access to judicial
review where Congress provided for it, such as this court’s
previous consideration of his petition for review, and its
likely future consideration of the BIA’s final decision on his
motion to reopen.3
3 Citing St. Cyr and Thuraissigiam, Matias also asserts that we must
construe § 1252(g) narrowly to avoid a constitutional concern, and that
limits on review “must overcome . . . [a] strong presumption in favor of

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M ATIAS RAUDA V. J ENNINGS 19
Finally, we note that while Matias may be entitled to
adjudication on his motion to reopen, he is not required to be
present in the United States for that adjudication to take
place. Nken, 556 U.S. at 424 (citing § 1252). As the
Supreme Court explained, it was precisely “to allow for
more prompt removal” that Congress amended the
immigration adjudication system, creating a means for aliens
to continue having their cases heard even after they were
removed. Id. “Congress repealed the presumption of an
automatic stay . . . [and] restricted the availability of
injunctive relief.” Id. at 425. Once his removal order is
executed, Matias will be the beneficiary of Congress’s
“streamlined” system. Id. at 424. He presently has a motion
to reopen pending before the BIA. Even if Matias is
removed, his motion will remain pending until its
adjudication. Matias is not stripped of any process due him
by being removed. Rather, the system created by Congress
will function precisely how it was intended. We have no
authority to interfere with that system by granting Matias’s
request for a stay.4
judicial review.” (citation omitted). But where Congress has provided
a clear statement in favor of limiting judicial review, as it did in
§ 1252(g), we must follow the language of the statute. See St. Cyr,
533 U.S. at 298. Further, there is no “constitutional concern” here
because aliens are not “entitle[d] to procedural rights other than those
afforded by statute,” which Matias has received. Thuraissigiam, 140 S.
Ct. at 1964.
4 Matias’s alternative arguments in support of jurisdiction under
Article III of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause, and 18 U.S.C.
§ 1331 are without merit because he is only entitled to the process
provided by statute. See Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1964.

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20 M ATIAS RAUDA V . J ENNINGS
CONCLUSION
The district court correctly determined that it lacked
jurisdiction to hear Matias’s claims under § 1252(g).
Matias’s requested relief falls outside of the scope of habeas.
His Suspension Clause argument therefore fails and should
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Matias has been
afforded due process, and he will continue to receive the
statutorily required process even when he is removed, just as
Congress designed. The district court’s denial of the TRO is
affirmed and the district court is directed to dismiss Matias’s
petition.
AFFIRMED.
All pending motions are denied as moot.

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