Chad D. Begay v. Winslow, City of; Carl Calnimptewa

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHAD D. BEGAY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
WINSLOW, CITY OF; CARL
CALNIMPTEWA,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 23-15013
D.C. No. 3:22-cv-08051-DLR-MHB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Douglas L. Rayes, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 26, 2024**
Before: TASHIMA, SILVERMAN, and KOH, Circuit Judges.
Chad D. Begay appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
as untimely his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging an excessive force claim arising
out of his arrest. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2004) (dismissal as time-barred
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAR 29 2024
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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and equitable tolling analysis where relevant facts are undisputed); Resnick v.
Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A).
We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Begay’s action because his claim was
barred by the statute of limitations and Begay did not allege facts sufficient to
establish equitable tolling. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542(1) (two-year statute of
limitations for personal injury claim); Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387, 394
(2007) (federal courts in § 1983 actions apply the state statute of limitations for
personal injury actions and borrow applicable tolling provisions from state law);
Doe v. Roe, 955 P.2d 951, 964 (Ariz. 1998) (unsound mind equitable tolling may
not be established by “conclusory averments such as assertions that one was unable
to manage daily affairs or understand legal rights and liabilities” but rather requires
plaintiff to provide “specific facts”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Begay’s post-
judgment motion because Begay failed to establish any basis for relief. See Sch.
Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th
Cir. 1993) (setting forth the standard of review and grounds for reconsideration
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)).
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). We do not

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consider documents not presented to the district court. See United States v. Elias,
921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990).
AFFIRMED.

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