In re: MARK ABBEY SLOTKIN v. ELISSA D. MILLER, Trustee

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: MARK ABBEY SLOTKIN,
Debtor.
______________________________
SLOTKIN DEFECTIVE TRUST OF
DECEMBER 14, 2012; et al.,
Appellants,
v.
ELISSA D. MILLER, Trustee,
Appellee.
No. 23-55098
D.C. No. 2:22-cv-00021-FWS
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Fred W. Slaughter, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 13, 2024
Pasadena, California
Before: W. FLETCHER, NGUYEN, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
FILED
MAR 13 2024
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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The Trustee in this Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding sought partial summary
judgment and injunctive relief in the form of an order directing the trusts and
limited liability companies (“LLCs”) to turn their assets over to debtor Mark
Slotkin’s bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court granted the relief sought by the
Trustee, and the district court affirmed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 158(d). We affirm.
We review de novo the district court’s judgment in the appeal of the
bankruptcy court’s grant of summary judgment. In re Raintree Healthcare Corp.,
431 F.3d 685, 687 (9th Cir. 2005). As the parties are familiar with the factual and
procedural history of this case, we need not recount it here.
Slotkin argues that the bankruptcy court erred by finding that he had
equitable ownership in the assets at issue and was the alter ego of the trusts and
LLCs that held the assets. None of Slotkin’s arguments create a genuine dispute of
material fact. It is undisputed that Slotkin maintained personal control over the
assets, commingled funds, used the assets to pay personal expenses, and failed to
maintain legally significant separation between himself and the trusts and LLCs
that held the disputed assets. These facts are more than sufficient to support the
bankruptcy court’s order. See In re Schwarzkopf, 626 F.3d 1032, 1038–39 (9th
Cir. 2010).
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Slotkin also argues that the bankruptcy court was collaterally estopped from
finding alter ego by a prior court finding in Slotkin’s divorce proceedings. Slotkin
argues the divorce court affirmatively found no alter ego. His argument misreads
the plain language of the relevant document, in which the court clearly stated that it
was not reaching the issue of alter ego. Slotkin also misunderstands the law of
collateral estoppel. Even if the divorce court had reached the issue and even if the
issue had been the same in the two proceedings, the Trustee was neither a party to
the divorce proceeding nor in privity with the parties to that proceeding. The
Trustee therefore cannot be collaterally estopped in the bankruptcy proceeding by a
decision by the divorce court. See In re Harmon, 250 F.3d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir.
2001).
Finally, we note that the Trustee argued, both in the briefing and at oral
argument, that this appeal was equitably moot. Because we affirm the district
court’s judgment on the merits, we need not address this argument. See In re Point
Ctr. Fin., Inc., 957 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2020).
AFFIRMED.
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