SELVIN LOPEZ-LOPEZ, AKA Neli Arilu Lopez Gramajo v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SELVIN LOPEZ-LOPEZ, AKA Neli Arilu
Lopez Gramajo,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 19-73255
Agency No. A070-146-215
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted January 9, 2024**
Pasadena, California
Before: CALLAHAN, CHRISTEN, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Neli Arilu Lopez Gramajo,1 a native and citizen of Guatemala,
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
1 Petitioner asserts that Neli Arilu Lopez Gramajo is his true name and
that Selvin Lopez-Lopez is the false name he gave to authorities during his 1990
immigration proceedings.
FILED
JAN 11 2024
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) order dismissing
his appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) order denying his motion for sua sponte
reopening of his removal proceedings. Where, as here, the BIA adopts the IJ’s
reasoning, we review both decisions. Garcia-Martinez v. Sessions, 886 F.3d 1291,
1293 (9th Cir. 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and recite
them only as necessary. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), but
our review of the agency’s exercise of its sua sponte authority is narrow. We have
“jurisdiction to review Board decisions denying sua sponte reopening for the
limited purpose of reviewing the reasoning behind the decisions for legal or
constitutional error.” Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 575, 588 (9th Cir. 2016) (italics
omitted).
We dismiss the petition because Petitioner has not identified any legal or
constitutional error in the agency’s decision. The agency correctly articulated that
the exercise of its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings is appropriate when
an applicant has demonstrated “truly exceptional situations.” Lona v. Barr, 958
F.3d 1225, 1233 (9th Cir. 2020). The agency concluded that Petitioner had not
shown that his circumstances were exceptional because he was not diligent in
seeking relief under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act
(NACARA) and his fraudulent conduct weighed against reopening. Petitioner
presents no argument that the agency, in considering these factors, “misconstrue[d]

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the parameters of its sua sponte authority based on legal or constitutional error.”
Id. at 1237.
Petitioner’s argument that the deadline for him to file a motion to reopen
under § 203(c) of NACARA, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.43(e), should be equitably tolled
due to fraud is outside the scope of our review. Petitioner’s motion sought
reopening pursuant to the agency’s sua sponte authority only, and the agency
considered only that ground in denying relief. See Andia v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d
1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 2004) (“In reviewing the decision of the BIA, we consider
only the grounds relied upon by that agency.”).
PETITION DISMISSED.

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