Jonathan Eric Rivera v. Centurion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JONATHAN ERIC RIVERA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CENTURION; UNKNOWN PARTY, named
as P.C.S.D. Medical Intake Jane Doe #1;
PIMA COUNTY ADULT DETENTION
COMPLEX; UNKNOWN PARTY, named
as Centurion Nurse Jane Doe #2;
UNKNOWN PARTY, named as Nurse Jane
Doe #3 Centurion; UNKNOWN PARTY,
named as Centurion Nurse Jane Doe #4;
UNKNOWN ROBINSON, named as Nurse
Robinson Centurion; NAPHCARE;
UNKNOWN PARTY, named as Pima Count
Sergeant Classification Officer John/Jane
Doe #5; PIMA, COUNTY OF,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 22-16818
D.C. No. 4:22-cv-00031-JAS-PSOT
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
James Alan Soto, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 14, 2023**
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
NOV 21 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Before: SILVERMAN, WARDLAW, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
Arizona state prisoner Jonathan Eric Rivera appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional
violations related COVID-19 policies at the jail where Rivera was housed as a
pretrial detainee. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo a district court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Resnick v. Hayes, 213
F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Rivera’s action because Rivera failed
to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Gordon v. County of
Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2018) (setting forth objective deliberate
indifference standard for Fourteenth Amendment inadequate medical care
and conditions-of-confinement claims brought by pretrial detainees); Tsao v.
Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating standard for
bringing § 1983 suits against private entities acting under color of state law);
Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth elements for
establishing liability based on failure to train under § 1983); Arnold v. Int’l Bus.
Machs. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981) (“[L]iability under section
1983 can be established by showing that the defendant personally participated in a
deprivation of the plaintiff's rights [] or caused such a deprivation to occur.”); see
also Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se

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pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a
plausible claim).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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