Carri Williams v. JO WOFFORD, Superintendent, Washington Corrections Center for Women

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CARRI WILLIAMS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
JO WOFFORD, Superintendent, Washington
Corrections Center for Women,
Respondent-Appellee.
No. 22-35628
D.C. No. 2:20-cv-01477-RSL
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Robert S. Lasnik, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 22, 2023**
Seattle, Washington
Before: HAWKINS, GRABER, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Carri Williams appeals from the district court’s denial of her
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Reviewing de novo, Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 996 (9th Cir. 2014), we
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
AUG 24 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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affirm.
1. Petitioner argues that her conviction for homicide by abuse under
Washington Revised Code section 9A.32.055 is unconstitutional because the
statute is facially vague. To prevail on her claim, Petitioner must show that the
state court’s adjudication of the merits of her claim “was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or was “based on
an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding,” id. § 2254(d)(2). Because at least one of the grounds on
which the state court relied is a reasonable application of clearly established law,
we must affirm. See Shinn v. Kayer, 141 S. Ct. 517, 524 (2020) (per curiam)
(“Federal courts may not disturb the judgments of state courts unless ‘each ground
supporting the state court decision is examined and found to be unreasonable.’”
(quoting Wetzel v. Lambert, 565 U.S. 520, 525 (2012) (per curiam))).
The state court provided two reasons for denying Petitioner’s claim, one of
which was that she could not bring a facial vagueness challenge because her as-
applied challenge failed. That is not contrary to clearly established law: “[A]s a
general matter, a defendant who cannot sustain an as-applied vagueness challenge
to a statute cannot be the one to make a facial vagueness challenge to the statute.”
Kashem v. Barr, 941 F.3d 358, 375 (9th Cir. 2019). Contrary to Petitioner’s

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assertions, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S.
591 (2015), and Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018), did not alter that rule.
Kashem, 941 F.3d at 375–76; Bowling v. McDonough, 38 F.4th 1051, 1061–62
(Fed. Cir. 2022); United States v. Cook, 970 F.3d 866, 873, 876–77 (7th Cir. 2020).
None of the exceptions to that general rule applies here. This is not an
“exceptional circumstance” that requires us to consider an idealized crime instead
of examining the facts of the case. See Kashem, 941 F.3d at 377 (distinguishing
Johnson and Dimaya because that case required application of the categorical
approach). Nor does the statute lack a discernable core. Cf. Coates v. Cincinnati,
402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (holding that an ordinance prohibiting annoying conduct
was facially vague without considering whether it was vague as applied to the
challengers, not because the ordinance “require[d] a person to conform his conduct
to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but [because] no standard
of conduct [was] specified at all”).
2. We decline to expand the certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1)(A).
AFFIRMED.

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