Adriana Ruiz-Matias v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ADRIANA RUIZ-MATIAS,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 20-73028
Agency No. A028-956-291
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted July 10, 2023**
Seattle, Washington
Before: GRABER, GOULD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Adriana Ruiz Matias (“Ruiz”), a citizen and native of Guatemala, petitions
for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) denial of her
applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JUL 27 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We dismiss in part for lack of jurisdiction
and deny in part.
1. Ruiz challenges the BIA’s finding that she is barred from seeking asylum
and withholding of removal because she committed a particularly serious crime.
We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s assessment of the facts in making the
particularly serious crime determination but retain jurisdiction to “determine
whether the BIA applied the correct legal standard.” Flores-Vega v. Barr, 932
F.3d 878, 884 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Anaya-Ortiz v. Holder, 594 F.3d 673, 676
(9th Cir. 2010)).
Ruiz was convicted of criminal mistreatment of a child and resisting arrest
for not reporting her former partner’s sexual abuse of her daughter to the police.
The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found, and the BIA affirmed, that this conviction
constituted a particularly serious crime. Ruiz challenges the determination on the
merits but does not argue that the IJ misapplied the legal standard. We lack
jurisdiction to review the IJ and BIA’s interpretation of the facts. Hernandez v.
Garland, 52 F.4th 757, 765 (9th Cir. 2022).
2. Ruiz also challenges the BIA’s finding that she is not eligible for CAT
relief because she is not likely to suffer torture at the hands of the Guatemalan
government. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s determination.
Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2020).

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Ruiz bears the burden of proving that it is more likely than not that she
would be tortured if removed to Guatemala. Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d
351, 361 (9th Cir. 2017); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). Country conditions evidence
alone is sufficient to meet this burden if the evidence “compel[s] the conclusion
that [she] is more likely than not to be tortured.” Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d
1034, 1048–49 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Ruiz contends that she would be tortured because she is a lesbian woman in
a same-sex relationship. But because she does not challenge the IJ’s adverse
credibility finding, only the country conditions reports support her argument. The
BIA considered the reports and found that they were not specific enough to
demonstrate that it is more likely than not that Ruiz would be tortured if she
returned to Guatemala.
Although the 2017 country conditions report describes some incidents of
harm to LGBTQ+ individuals at the hands of governmental actors, neither that
report, nor any other country conditions document in the record, contains sufficient
specific details about state violence against lesbian women in Guatemala. Thus,
the country conditions evidence does not compel us to find that Ruiz would be
tortured in Guatemala by, or with the acquiesce of, governmental officials.
DISMISSED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART

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