Cristina Velasquez-Ramos v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CRISTINA VELASQUEZ-RAMOS,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 22-718
Agency No.
A209-873-771
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted July 20, 2023**
Pasadena, California
Before: NGUYEN and FORREST, Circuit Judges, and BENNETT,*** District
Judge.
Cristina Velasquez-Ramos, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions
for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming the
immigration judge’s order denying asylum, withholding of removal, and
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Richard D. Bennett, United States District Judge
for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.
FILED
JUL 24 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 3 --

2 22-718
protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Reviewing the agency’s factual findings for
substantial evidence, Flores Molina v. Garland, 37 F.4th 626, 632 (9th Cir.
2022), we deny the petition for review.
1. Velasquez-Ramos challenges the agency’s determination that she
failed to meet the nexus requirement for asylum and withholding of removal.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that gang members
targeted Velasquez-Ramos and her family because they perceived that they had
access to money. Velasquez-Ramos adduced no evidence that the gang
members’ economic motive for persecution relates to her proposed particular
social group of indigenous rural women with limited education.1 See
Rodriguez-Zuniga v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1012, 1019–20 (9th Cir. 2023) (“Where
the record indicates that the persecutor’s actual motivation for threatening a
person is to extort money . . . [it] does not compel finding that the persecutor
threatened the target because of a protected characteristic . . . .”).
2. Velasquez-Ramos next contends that the agency erred in denying
her claim for CAT protection. But substantial evidence supports the agency’s
determination that Velasquez-Ramos is not entitled to CAT relief because she
has failed to show that she is more likely than not to suffer torture in Guatemala.
See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). She adduced no record evidence supporting her
1 We do not reach the question of whether Velasquez-Ramos’s proposed
particular social group is cognizable.

-- 2 of 3 --

3 22-718
claim that police would not protect her upon return to Guatemala. The distance
from her hometown to the nearest police station is not dispositive because
Velasquez-Ramos could relocate closer to a police station upon her return. See
id. § 208.16(c)(3) (providing non-exclusive list of considerations for granting
CAT relief, including the possibility of relocation to an area where petitioner is
not likely to be tortured).
3. Velasquez-Ramos raises a due process claim in her reply brief.
Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are waived. Autotel v. Nev.
Bell Tel. Co., 697 F.3d 846, 852 n.3 (9th Cir. 2012).
PETITION DENIED.

-- 3 of 3 --