Gurpreet Singh v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GURPREET SINGH,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 22-1317
Agency No. A209-156-988
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted May 12, 2023**
San Francisco, California
Before: FRIEDLAND, BENNETT, Circuit Judges and BENNETT***, District
Judge.
Petitioner Gurpreet Singh is a native and citizen of India. He petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his
applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Richard D. Bennett, United States District Judge of
Maryland, sitting by designation.
FILED
MAY 16 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 4 --

2 22-1317
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252, and we review for substantial evidence the BIA’s factual findings.
Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 2010). We review
questions of law de novo. Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir.
2010).1 We deny the petition for review.
Assessing Petitioner’s asylum claim, the BIA permissibly concluded that
Petitioner’s past experiences “were not sufficiently extreme to rise to the level
of persecution.”2 “Persecution is an extreme concept that does not include
every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive.” Duran-Rodriguez v.
Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Petitioner, who was 16, was twice attacked and beaten by supporters
of the Akali Dal Badal and BJP parties. His injuries included bruising, a bloody
nose, and a cut from falling off his bike. His injuries appeared to have quickly
healed. While we agree with the BIA that the “harm that the [Petitioner]
experienced in India was serious and unjustifiable,” we also agree with the BIA
1 As discussed in Flores Molina v. Garland, 37 F.4th 626, 633 n.2 (9th Cir.
2022), the standard of review for past persecution is currently unsettled.
Compare Kaur v. Wilkinson, 986 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 2021) (reviewing de
novo whether particular acts constitute persecution), with Sharma v. Garland, 9
F.4th 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2021) (applying substantial evidence standard). We
need not “discuss the nuances of the two standards” because, even applying de
novo review, the harm Petitioner experienced does not amount to persecution.
See Flores Molina, 37 F.4th at 633 n.2.
2 Because Petitioner did not establish past persecution, he is ineligible for
humanitarian asylum. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(l)(ii).

-- 2 of 4 --

3 22-1317
that “considering all past harm cumulatively, . . . and taking into account that
the [Petitioner] was a teenager at the time of the two attacks . . . his past
experiences were not sufficiently extreme to rise to the level of persecution.”3
See Gu v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 1014, 1019–21 (9th Cir. 2006) (concluding that a
brief detention, beating and interrogation did not compel a finding of past
persecution); Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 2009)
(holding that two separate beatings, without more, did not compel a finding of
past persecution).
Petitioner has also not established a clear probability of future persecution
upon return to India. His father, who is also a Mann Party supporter, lives there
safely. See Sharma, 9 F.4th at 1066 (“The ongoing safety of family members in
the petitioner’s native country undermines a reasonable fear of future
persecution.”). And while Petitioner’s assailants have threatened him, and
asked about his whereabouts, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s
determination that the threats and inquiries are not so extreme or particularized
as to create a reasonable fear of future persecution.
Because Petitioner did not establish his eligibility for asylum, his
withholding of removal claim was properly denied on the same bases. See
3 Our cases establish that age “may bear heavily on the question of whether an
applicant was persecuted or whether she holds a well-founded fear of future
persecution.” See Hernandez-Ortiz v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir.
2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But that does not
automatically mean that all attacks on a teenager constitute persecution, and
none of our cases stand for such a proposition.

-- 3 of 4 --

4 22-1317
Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1146 (9th Cir. 2021). Nor did Petitioner
establish eligibility for relief under CAT. The record evidence does not compel
the conclusion that it is more likely than not that he would suffer harm rising to
the level of torture by government officials or private actors with government
acquiescence if returned to India. See Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654, 662–63
(9th Cir. 2019).
The petition is DENIED.

-- 4 of 4 --