Ricardo Arreguin-Cruz v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RICARDO ARREGUIN-CRUZ,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 22-378
Agency No. A206-547-677
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 19, 2023**
Portland, Oregon
Before: RAWLINSON and SUNG, Circuit Judges, and MORRIS,*** District
Judge.
FILED
APR 21 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Brian M. Morris, United States District Judge for the
District of Montana, sitting by designation.

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Ricardo Arreguin-Cruz (Arreguin-Cruz), a native and citizen of Mexico,
petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
dismissing his appeal of the denial by an Immigration Judge (IJ) of withholding of
removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), and we deny the petition.
We review the denials of withholding of removal and CAT relief for
substantial evidence. See Flores Molina v. Garland, 37 F.4th 626, 632 (9th Cir.
2022). We review questions of law de novo. See id. If the agency cites Matter of
Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (BIA 1994), and also “provides its own review of
the evidence and law, we review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions.” Ruiz-
Colmenares v. Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted).
An applicant for withholding of removal has the burden of establishing by a
“clear probability” that he will be persecuted in the proposed country of removal.
Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1146 (9th Cir. 2021). An applicant must also
demonstrate that the protected ground would be “a reason” for feared future
persecution. Id. (citation omitted)
1. Arreguin-Cruz proposed a social group of “disabled person[s] unable
to protect [themselves] from violence.” However, Arreguin-Cruz’s proposed
social group “include[s] large numbers of people with different conditions and in
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different circumstances.” Mendoza-Alvarez v. Holder, 714 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th
Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Such a group is
not cognizable under our precedent. See id.
2. Arreguin-Cruz also fears returning to Mexico because he has resided
in the United States for a lengthy period. He contends that as a result of his time in
America he will be perceived as wealthy. However, as with his other proposed
social group, our precedent forecloses the cognizability of the “proposed group of
imputed wealthy Americans.” Ramirez-Munoz v. Lynch, 816 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th
Cir. 2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
3. A petitioner is eligible for CAT relief if the petitioner establishes that
it is “more likely than not that he . . . would be tortured if removed to the proposed
country of removal.” Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1067 (9th Cir. 2021)
(citation omitted). The torture must be “inflicted by or at the instigation of or with
the consent or acquiescence of a public official.” Id. (citation and alteration
omitted). A petitioner must also establish that “[he], in particular,” is at risk of
torture. Garcia, 988 F.3d at 1147 (citation omitted). Arreguin-Cruz presented
evidence that disabled individuals are abused at facilities in Mexico housing
individuals with disabilities. He also proffered evidence that Mexico has failed to
adequately protect the rights of its disabled citizens. However, this evidence does
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not compel the conclusion that Arreguin-Cruz will be tortured if returned to
Mexico. The probability of torture is too speculative because Arreguin-Cruz
presented no evidence that he is likely to be admitted to a home for disabled
individuals or that those with his disability are likely to be tortured. See
Hernandez v. Garland, 52 F.4th 757, 772 (9th Cir. 2022); see also Acevedo
Granados v. Garland, 992 F.3d 755, 765 (9th Cir. 2021). Substantial evidence
supports the denial of CAT relief because Arreguin-Cruz failed to establish that he,
“in particular,” would be tortured, see Garcia, 988 F.3d at 1147, or that torture
would occur “with the consent or acquiescence of a public official.” Sharma, 9
F.4th at 1067.
PETITION DENIED.
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