Pamela Rae Bennett; James Davis Bennett v. Cielo Homeowners Association, Inc;

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PAMELA RAE BENNETT; JAMES DAVIS
BENNETT,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
CIELO HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,
INC; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 21-55550
D.C. No.
3:19-cv-02131-WQH-BLM
Southern District of California,
San Diego
ORDER
Before: WALLACE, D.W. NELSON, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.
The memorandum disposition filed April 21, 2023, is withdrawn and
replaced with the disposition filed concurrently with this order.
FILED
APR 21 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PAMELA RAE BENNETT; JAMES DAVIS
BENNETT,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
CIELO HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,
INC; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 21-55550
D.C. No. 3:19-cv-02131-WQH-
BLM
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
William Q. Hayes, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 20, 2023**
Before: WALLACE, D. NELSON, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.
Pamela Rae Bennett and James Davis Bennett appeal pro se from the district
court’s order dismissing their action alleging claims under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and state law arising from the collection of their
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
APR 21 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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homeowner’s association fees. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hebbe
v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.
The district court dismissed the Bennetts’ claims as barred by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine. However, the state judgment that formed the basis for the
district court’s application of Rooker-Feldman had been vacated, and thus, the
doctrine did not apply. See Mothershed v. Justs. Sup. Ct., 410 F.3d 602, 604 n.1
(9th Cir. 2005) (“Proceedings end for Rooker-Feldman purposes when the state
courts finally resolve the issue that the federal court plaintiff seeks to relitigate in a
federal forum . . . .”).
The Bennetts’ federal claims were properly dismissed because the claims
alleging misrepresentations in the state court complaint were time-barred and the
remaining federal claims failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants
made any material misrepresentation in connection with their collection of the
homeowner’s association fees. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) (establishing that a civil
action under the FDCPA may be brought “within one year from the date on which
the violation occurs”); Rotkiske v. Klemm, 140 S. Ct. 355, 360–61 (2019) (“The
FDCPA limitations period begins to run on the date the alleged FDCPA violation
actually happened,” not “on the date an alleged FDCPA violation is discovered.”);
Afewerki v. Anaya L. Grp., 868 F.3d 771, 775–76 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[F]alse but non-

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material representations are not likely to mislead the least sophisticated consumer
and therefore are not actionable under § 1692e . . . . Material false representations,
then, are those that could cause the least sophisticated debtor to suffer a
disadvantage in charting a course of action in response to the collection effort.”
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Because the district court previously declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction after dismissing the Bennetts’ federal claims, we hold that remand to
address Bennetts’ state law claims is unnecessary here.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Bennetts’
motion for reconsideration because the Bennetts failed to set forth any basis to alter
or amend the judgment. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS,
Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and
grounds for reconsideration under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60). Even if
the district court erred in not reconsidering the dismissal of the Bennetts’ FDCPA
claims on the basis of Rooker-Feldman, any such error was harmless because the
claims failed on the merits. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61.
The district court properly denied the Bennetts’ motion for partial summary
judgment as moot.
Finally, we do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and
argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time

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on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
All pending motions are denied.
AFFIRMED.

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