United States of America v. Krysta Denise Voorhies

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
KRYSTA DENISE VOORHIES,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 21-30239
D.C. No.
2:21-cr-00006-DLC-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Dana L. Christensen, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 8, 2022
Seattle, Washington
Before: IKUTA and COLLINS, Circuit Judges, and FITZWATER,** District Judge.
Krysta Denise Voorhies (“Voorhies”) appeals the district court’s order denying
her motion to suppress. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
FILED
JAN 12 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.

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We review de novo the district court’s order denying Voorhies’ motion to
suppress. United States v. Adjani, 452 F.3d 1140, 1143 (9th Cir. 2006); In re McLinn,
739 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1984). We “may affirm the district court’s holding on
any ground raised below and fairly supported by the record.” Columbia Pictures
Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Proctor v. Vishay
Intertechnology Inc., 584 F.3d 1208, 1226 (9th Cir. 2009)).
1. When Voorhies was released from the Montana Department of Corrections
(“DOC”), she was subject to a search condition as a term of her conditional release.1
This condition permitted probation and parole officers to search her person, vehicle,
and residence based on reasonable suspicion. Prior to the search that Voorhies seeks
to suppress, she had been sentenced to DOC custody for a three-year term under
Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(3)(a)(iv)(A) (West 2017). Under Montana law, DOC
had the discretion to place Voorhies in an “appropriate community-based program[],”
such as release subject to conditions. Mont. Code Ann. § 53-1-202(2)(b), -
203(1)(a)(iv) (West 2017); Mont. Admin. R. 20.7.601(2) (2011); Mont. Admin. R.
1 The district court’s conclusion that Voorhies was not subject to supervisory
conditions at the time of the search is erroneous. But the government was not required
to file a cross-appeal to raise this error on appeal because the government prevailed
below and “seeks to preserve, and not to change, the judgment.” Lee v. Burlington N.
Santa Fe Ry. Co., 245 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
2

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20.7.1102 (2008); VanSkyock v. Twentieth Jud. Dist. Ct., 393 P.3d 1068, 1071 (Mont.
2017) (citation omitted) (“When a district court commits a criminal defendant to DOC
for placement pursuant to § 46-18-201(3)(a)(iv)(A), [Mont. Code Ann.], the
sentencing court has no authority to direct or control where or in what program DOC
ultimately places the defendant for the term of sentence.”); State v. Strong, 203 P.3d
848, 851 (Mont. 2009) (“The DOC commitment . . . could consist of a prison
sentence, appropriate community-based programs in prerelease centers, intensive
supervision programs, or the Treasure State Correctional Training Center . . . .”).
Under Montana law, Voorhies was on release subject to lawful conditions when the
search at issue occurred.2
2. The search was supported by reasonable suspicion. Voorhies was serving
a sentence for possession of dangerous drugs. When she observed probation and
parole officers arriving at her house, she ran inside and locked her front door. See
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000).
AFFIRMED.
2 Because the district court properly denied Voorhies’s motion to suppress on
other grounds, its conclusion that Voorhies was not subject to a valid search condition
is harmless error.
3

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