Teresa Harvey v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TERESA HARVEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 22-15116
D.C. No. 2:20-cv-01495-DWL
MEMORANDUM*
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
The Hon. Dominic W. Lanza, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 6, 2022**
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: WARDLAW and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and SCHREIER,*** District
Judge.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Judge for the
District of South Dakota, sitting by designation.
FILED
JAN 3 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Teresa Harvey appeals from the district court’s order reversing in part the
administrative law judge’s (ALJ) denial of her application for benefits and
remanding for further proceedings to consider improperly overlooked medical
opinion evidence. Harvey contends that the district court should have instead
remanded for payment of benefits. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Reviewing for an abuse of discretion, see Treichler v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec.
Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2014), we affirm.
1. The district court did not abuse its discretion by remanding to the ALJ
for further proceedings rather than for payment of benefits. “When the ALJ denies
benefits and the court finds error, the court ordinarily must remand to the agency for
further proceedings before directing an award of benefits.” Leon v. Berryhill, 880
F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2017). Harvey maintains that her case falls within the
ambit of the “credit-as-true” rule, under which “the reviewing court may grant a
direct award of benefits when certain conditions are met.” Id. The “credit-as-true”
rule applies when (1) the ALJ “failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for
rejecting evidence”; (2) the record is fully developed, such that the court determines
that further administrative proceedings would not be useful; and (3) the Court
determines that “the record, taken as a whole, leaves not the slightest uncertainty as
to the outcome of the proceeding.” Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1100–01 (simplified).

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The district court found the “credit-as-true” rule inapplicable because “further
proceedings would be useful” and there remained “at least some uncertainty as to
the outcome” on remand. Harvey argues that further proceedings will be “fruitless,”
because the improperly disregarded medical opinion evidence, once accounted for,
“would establish that [she] is disabled.” But because the ALJ overlooked the
medical opinion at issue in the initial proceeding, remanding for further proceedings
is appropriate to allow the ALJ to properly consider the evidence in the first instance.
Reversal of a district court’s decision to remand for further proceedings rather
than for payment of benefits is appropriate “only when the appellate court is
convinced firmly that the reviewed decision lies beyond the pale of reasonable
justification under the circumstances.” Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th
Cir. 2000). Because we conclude that the district court’s decision to remand was not
“beyond the pale” here, we affirm.
2. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings that Harvey did not
have a severe mental impairment and that her testimony conflicted with evidence in
the record. The ALJ found that Harvey suffered “no more than mild limitations”
mentally. One of the medical opinions in the record recounted Harvey’s history of
depression and noted her difficulty getting along with coworkers and the public and
responding appropriately to criticism. But the ALJ discounted this opinion because
other record evidence conveyed that Harvey worked as a part-time volunteer

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basketball coach and had completed an adoption process, undermining the medical
opinion’s conclusions about Harvey’s social limitations.
The ALJ also found that Harvey’s testimony about the severity of her
symptoms conflicted with other evidence in the record. Harvey claimed that she
cannot sit or stand for periods of time and reported that her medications make her
tired. But the ALJ relied on Harvey’s statement that she “engage[d] in a somewhat
normal level of daily activity and interaction,” including shopping, attending church,
working out, and caring for nine children.
We review these findings under the “highly deferential” substantial evidence
standard. Valentine v. Comm’r. of Soc. Sec., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009). Even
if the ALJ’s conclusion is subject to reasonable disagreement, “[w]here evidence is
susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that
must be upheld.” Shaibi v. Berryhill, 883 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2018)
(simplified). Because the ALJ’s findings are supported by “such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate,” we affirm. Biestek v. Berryhill, 139
S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019).
AFFIRMED.

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