Alejandro Carrillo-Carrillo v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ALEJANDRO CARRILLO-CARRILLO;
ANASTASIA CARRILLO-GREGORIO;
VITALINA ASUSENA CARRILLO-
GREGORIO,
Petitioners,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 19-71600
Agency Nos. A208-117-991
A208-117-992
A208-117-993
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted December 7, 2022**
San Francisco, California
Before: GRABER, WALLACH,*** and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Evan J. Wallach, United States Circuit Judge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.
FILED
DEC 15 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Petitioners Alejandro Carrillo-Carrillo, Anastasia Carrillo-Gregorio, and
Vitalina Asusena Carrillo-Gregorio, natives and citizens of Guatemala, entered the
United States in 2015 without immigration documents. They conceded
removability but sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”) dismissed their appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of all
forms of relief. Petitioners timely seek our review. We deny the petition.
1. We review the BIA’s decisions regarding asylum and withholding of
removal for substantial evidence. Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028
(9th Cir. 2019). “[W]e must uphold the agency[’s] determination unless the
evidence compels a contrary conclusion.” Id. (emphasis added). Here, the BIA
ruled that Petitioners did not establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of
future persecution on account of one of the protected grounds enumerated in 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). The IJ found that Petitioners showed they had
experienced harm motivated only by gang members’ pecuniary interests, and
perhaps also the desire to recruit Mr. Carrillo-Carrillo, and thus did not satisfy the
nexus requirement for eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal.
We are not compelled to conclude to the contrary. Petitioners produced no
evidence showing that their persecutors targeted them on account of their Christian
opposition to gangs, political opinion of opposing gangs, family relationship, or

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gender. The evidence therefore does not rise to “a reason,” much less “one central
reason,” for Petitioners’ alleged persecution. See Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846
F.3d 351, 358–59 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing “a reason” requirement for
withholding of removal eligibility); Aden v. Wilkinson, 989 F.3d 1073, 1084 (9th
Cir. 2021) (discussing “one central reason” requirement for asylum eligibility).
Regarding their assertion of a fear of future persecution on account of gender,
Petitioners cite in support only country reports of generalized threats of violence
against women in Guatemala. But these reports do not contain specific,
individualized threats that are required as objective evidence for eligibility. See
Kumar v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1043, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006).
2. Petitioners’ CAT claim rested on the argument that corruption is so
endemic in Guatemala that “one can hardly discern between the government and a
criminal,” and thus any likelihood Petitioners would face criminal conduct in the
future in Guatemala would be with the acquiescence of the government. The BIA
denied relief under CAT due to an absence of past torture, the generalized nature of
Petitioners’ claim, and the lack of evidence that governmental authorities would
fail to protect them. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s CAT
determination, see Lalayan v. Garland, 4 F.4th 822, 840 (9th Cir. 2021), and
substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Petitioners did not
experience torture and failed to establish the state action necessary for CAT relief.

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The evidence of attacks presented by Petitioners does not satisfy the
definition of torture under CAT—the attacks against Mr. Carrillo-Carrillo were
short and not extreme forms of cruel and inhuman treatment, 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.18(a)(2), they did not exhibit specific intent to inflict severe physical or
mental pain or suffering, 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(5), and Mr. Carrillo-Carrillo was
never in the custody or control of his attackers, 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(6). Threats,
such as extortion upon threat of violence, while deplorable and illegal, do not,
without more, rise to the level of torture. See Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d
1025, 1029–30 (9th Cir. 2019). Considering the absence of past torture, we are not
compelled to conclude that it is more likely than not that Petitioners would be
tortured if removed to Guatemala. See Santos-Ponce v. Wilkinson, 987 F.3d 886,
891 (9th Cir. 2021).
Petitioners also have not produced evidence demonstrating that government
officials at any level acquiesced in their alleged torture, other than speculation that
they did so because local police failed to investigate the attacks they reported. Mr.
Carrillo-Carrillo, however, did not know the identity of his attackers and bases his
belief that the police failed to investigate on the fact that he never saw the police in
his village. Although Petitioners assert that the Guatemalan government did not
take their complaints seriously because they are indigenous and presented country
reports indicating that Guatemala generally does not provide indigenous

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communities with adequate public services, this evidence does not compel the
conclusion that government officials were willfully blind to or unwilling to oppose
Petitioners’ particular mistreatment.
Given this record, there is substantial evidence for the BIA’s determination,
and we affirm the denial of relief under CAT.
PETITION DENIED.

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