Amy I. Reilly v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AMY I. REILLY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 21-36003
D.C. No. 3:20-cv-05971-MLP
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Michelle L. Peterson, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 9, 2022**
Seattle, Washington
Before: IKUTA and COLLINS, Circuit Judges, and FITZWATER,*** District Judge.
FILED
DEC 9 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.

-- 1 of 4 --

Amy Reilly (“Reilly”) appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of Reilly’s application for disability
insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the
Social Security Act. The district court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and
1383(c)(3). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the underlying
decision of the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) only for legal error or lack of
substantial evidence. Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 2020). We
affirm.
1. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Reilly’s impairments
did not meet a Listing. In discussing whether Reilly’s mental impairments met Listing
12.04 or 12.06, the ALJ discussed in detail the four areas of mental functioning listed
in “paragraph B.” And after considering the evidence in the record, the ALJ
determined that Reilly had only a moderate restriction in each area. The ALJ also
found that the alternative “paragraph C” criteria were not satisfied. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404,
subpt. P, app. 1, §§ 12.00(A)(2).01. These findings are “supported by inferences
reasonably drawn from the record.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir.
2012) (citation omitted).
2

-- 2 of 4 --

2. Substantial evidence also supports the ALJ’s decision to assign low weight
to Reilly’s testimony.1 The ALJ discussed in detail several inconsistencies between
Reilly’s testimony and the record before the Commissioner, including the medical
evidence presented to the Commissioner contrasted with Reilly’s reported activities.
Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997).
3. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decisions regarding the
persuasiveness of the medical opinions provided to the Commissioner. The ALJ
considered the extent to which the opinions were based on Reilly’s unreliable
subjective reports and evaluated the opinions’ consistency with the other evidence in
the record, including objective clinical findings and observations of Reilly’s reported
activities. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014) (“An ALJ can
satisfy the ‘substantial evidence’ requirement by ‘setting out a detailed and thorough
summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation
thereof, and making findings.’” (quoting Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th
Cir. 1998))); see also Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1155 (9th Cir. 2020) (explaining
that conflicts between a physician’s opinion and the claimant’s anctivity level is a
reason for rejecting the medical opinion); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th
1 Reilly forfeited her claim that the 2017 amendments to the regulations were
invalid by raising the issue for the first time in her reply brief. See Martin v. City of
Oceanside, 360 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004).
3

-- 3 of 4 --

Cir. 2002) (“The ALJ need not accept the opinion of any physician . . . if that opinion
is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings.”).
4. The ALJ did not reversibly err in failing to meaningfully consider the third-
party function report completed by Reilly’s ex-husband because the report echoed the
claims of Reilly that were found to be inconsistent and unreliable. See Valentine v.
Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009). Nor did the ALJ err in
failing to address the report of the Social Security facilitator; her observations, which
were based on one telephone call with Reilly, did not constitute significant and
probative evidence. See Vincent ex rel. Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1394–95
(9th Cir. 1984).
5. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Reilly had the
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a range of light work and therefore
was not entitled to benefits. The ALJ considered and discussed the medical opinions
that were determined to be reliable, objective medical findings, and other reliable
evidence in the record when determining Reilly’s RFC. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427
F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005).
AFFIRMED.
4

-- 4 of 4 --