United States of America v. JOSEPH WOLOSZYN, AKA BJ the General, AKA Joe Bread, AKA JB, AKA Jay Squeeza, AKA Squeeze

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JOSEPH WOLOSZYN, AKA BJ the
General, AKA Joe Bread, AKA JB, AKA Jay
Squeeza, AKA Squeeze,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 21-10286
D.C. Nos.
2:18-cr-00007-JAM-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 18, 2022**
San Francisco, California
Before: TASHIMA and PAEZ, Circuit Judges, and SESSIONS,*** District Judge.
Joseph Woloszyn appeals the district court’s judgment revoking his
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable William K. Sessions III, United States District Judge
for the District of Vermont, sitting by designation.
FILED
DEC 7 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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supervised release and the sentence imposed upon revocation. On appeal,
Woloszyn challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to each violation. He also
raises procedural and substantive challenges to his sentence. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. Revocation of Supervised Release. We review the district court’s
decision to revoke a term of supervised release for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Verduzco, 330 F.3d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 2003). “On a sufficiency-of-the-
evidence challenge to a supervised release revocation, we ask whether, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of a violation by a preponderance of the
evidence.” United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation
omitted).
Charge 1: Illegal Drug Use. There was sufficient evidence for the district
court to find that Woloszyn used illegal drugs. Woloszyn’s probation officer
testified that on November 16, 2020, Woloszyn admitted he would test positive for
marijuana and methamphetamine if a drug test were administered. The probation
officer did not administer a drug test because he believed Woloszyn’s statement
constituted sufficient evidence of his drug use. On appeal, Woloszyn argues the
government failed to provide “independent corroboration” of his statement, in
violation of the corpus delicti rule, which generally requires that a person’s

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confession be corroborated by independent evidence in order to serve as the basis
for a conviction. United States v. Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d 583, 589 (9th Cir.
1992). This argument is foreclosed by United States v. Hilger, where we held that
the corpus delicti rule does not apply to supervised release revocation proceedings.
728 F.3d 947, 949 (9th Cir. 2013). Like the defendant in Hilger, Woloszyn had the
opportunity to cross-examine his probation officer about the veracity of his
statement. Id. at 951. On cross-examination, counsel confirmed that Woloszyn
admitted to using marijuana and methamphetamine. Thus “the district court’s
decision to credit [Woloszyn’s admission] was amply supported by the record.”
Id. at 953.
Charge 3: Failure to Report for Drug Testing. There was sufficient
evidence to support the court’s finding that Woloszyn failed to report for drug
testing on March 10, 2021, in violation of the terms of his supervised release. As a
threshold matter, the government was required to prove only that Woloszyn
knowingly failed to report for drug testing, not that he willfully failed to do so.
Although the supervised release condition in question does not specify a mens rea
element, we generally presume that knowledge is the default standard. See, e.g.,
United States v. Phillips, 704 F.3d 754, 768 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that we
“imported a mens rea element . . . that the defendant was prohibited from
knowingly associating with members of a criminal street gang”); United States v.

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Napulou, 593 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2010) (construing a condition as
prohibiting “only knowing contact with persons with misdemeanor convictions”);
see also United States v. Vega, 545 F.3d 743, 750 (9th Cir. 2008).
Here, the government presented ample evidence that Woloszyn knowingly
failed to report for a drug test. Woloszyn’s probation officer testified that he called
Woloszyn on March 8, 2021, and directed him to report to the probation office at
10:00 a.m. on March 10, 2021. Woloszyn failed to appear, reportedly because he
was unable to obtain transportation to the probation office. Woloszyn does not
dispute that he was aware he had to report for drug testing as a condition of his
supervised release, he received and understood the probation officer’s instruction
to report, and yet he did not appear. There was sufficient evidence for the district
court to find that Woloszyn knowingly violated this term of his supervised release.
Charge 5: New State Law Violation (Criminal Threats). Finally, there was
sufficient evidence for the district court to find that Woloszyn committed criminal
threats in violation of California Penal Code section 422(a). The government
presented the testimony of Alberto De La Torre, the landlord and owner of the Bell
Terrace Apartments in Sacramento. De La Torre testified that Woloszyn went to
Bell Terrace on April 10, 2021 to retrieve an identification card that he had left at
the property. De La Torre refused to allow Woloszyn onto the property because,
over the previous three to four weeks, Woloszyn had continuously visited the

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property, “shown violence,” and “attacked” people “physically.” When Woloszyn
became angry that he could not retrieve his identification card, he threatened to
crash his car into the building and return with a gun and shoot everyone present.
Woloszyn then used a knife to slash all four tires on De La Torre’s truck. Another
witness, Ernesto De La Torre, corroborated De La Torre’s testimony.
Woloszyn argues that his threats failed to convey “a gravity of purpose and
an immediate prospect of execution.” Cal. Penal Code § 422(a). This argument
lacks merit. Woloszyn’s statements were “sufficiently unequivocal, unconditional,
immediate, and specific” to violate section 422(a), “based on all the surrounding
circumstances.” People v. Mendoza, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 728, 732 (Ct. App. 1997).
Although De La Torre may not have known whether Woloszyn had the means to
crash a car into the building or shoot anyone at that exact moment, “Section 422
does not require an immediate ability to carry out the threat.” People v. Smith, 100
Cal. Rptr. 3d 471, 474 (Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted). It is sufficient that
Woloszyn made specific, credible threats to harm De La Torre while in his
immediate presence.
2. Sentence. We review a sentence imposed in the context of revocation of
supervised release for reasonableness. United States v. Cate, 971 F.3d 1054, 1057
(9th Cir. 2020). The reasonableness standard requires us to ask whether the trial
court abused its discretion. United States v. Apodaca, 641 F.3d 1077, 1079 (9th

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Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). We employ a two-step analysis in applying this
standard: “we first consider whether the district court committed significant
procedural error, then we consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.”
Id. at 1081-81 (citation omitted).
The district court did not commit procedural error in sentencing Woloszyn to
24 months of imprisonment and 12 months of supervised release. In doing so, the
district court adequately considered the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a), including the nature of the violations and Woloszyn’s history and
characteristics. Woloszyn argues that the court improperly overlooked his
acceptance of responsibility, the difficult circumstances he faced leading up to the
violations, and the potentially harsh sentence he might receive in state court for
vandalism and criminal threats. The district court, however, was well within its
discretion to decide that the seriousness of Woloszyn’s violations, including
evidence that he committed two new crimes, outweighed any potentially mitigating
factors. The court was also not required specifically to address on the record every
sentencing factor it considered. See Cate, 971 F.3d at 1059. Rather, “the
sentencing judge's statement of reasons was brief but legally sufficient.” Rita v.
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 358 (2007).
The sentence imposed was also not substantively unreasonable. “We afford
significant deference to a district court's sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553 and

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reverse only if the court applied an incorrect legal rule or if the sentence was
‘illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn from the
facts in the record.’” United States v. Martinez-Lopez, 864 F.3d 1034, 1043-44
(9th Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1263 (9th Cir.
2009) (en banc)). A sentence of 24 months was within the guidelines range
calculated by the district court. The district court’s rationale for sentencing
Woloszyn to a high-end sentence because of his criminal history and the
seriousness of the violations is supported by the record. See, e.g., id. at 1044
(upholding a within-guidelines range sentence for a recidivist defendant).
AFFIRMED.

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