Estate of Rex Vance Wilson; v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ESTATE OF REX VANCE WILSON; et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE
DEPARTMENT; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 21-16760
D.C. No.
2:18-cv-01702-APG-VCF
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Andrew P. Gordon, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 16, 2022
San Jose, California
Before: SCHROEDER, GRABER, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Rex Vance Wilson was a suspect in a series of robberies and was driving a
stolen SUV. After two officers from the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police
Department (LVMPD) spotted the stolen vehicle, Wilson fled. During the lengthy
high-speed pursuit that ensued, he repeatedly evaded spike strips and other efforts
to disable the SUV. The chase ended when several police cars boxed in Wilson,
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
FILED
NOV 28 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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and Officer John Squeo intentionally drove his police car into the stolen SUV that
Wilson was driving. Officers then saw what they perceived to be a firearm and
fired thirty-five shots, killing Wilson. Plaintiffs—Wilson’s estate, wife, and
children—brought this action against the LVMPD, Squeo, and several other police
officers. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all Defendants
on all claims. Plaintiffs timely appeal. We review de novo the entry of summary
judgment, Oswalt v. Resolute Indus., Inc., 642 F.3d 856, 859 (9th Cir. 2011), and
may affirm on any ground supported by the record, Simo v. Union of Needletrades,
Indus. & Textile Emps., 322 F.3d 602, 610 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.
1. The arguments made in the opening brief pertain only to Plaintiffs’ state-
law negligence claims against Squeo and to his actions in driving his police car
into the stolen SUV that Wilson was driving. Accordingly, we do not consider the
district court’s rulings on any other claims, including claims related to the shooting
that, according to the autopsy report, killed Wilson. See Arpin v. Santa Clara
Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 2001) (issues not specifically
and distinctly raised in a party’s opening brief are forfeited).
2. Defendants argued in support of summary judgment on the negligence
claims that there was no evidence that the collision with Squeo’s police car caused
Wilson any damages. Plaintiffs’ opposition to summary judgment identified no
such evidence, thereby leaving this argument unrebutted. As Defendants correctly

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point out, Plaintiffs cannot claim damages to the SUV because it was stolen. See
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (requiring invasion of a
legally protected interest to establish standing); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S.
223, 230 n.4 (1973) (describing petitioners’ interest in stolen property as “totally
illegitimate”).
In their reply brief on appeal, Plaintiffs now suggest that some of the injuries
described in the autopsy report were caused specifically by the contact between the
police car and the SUV, but this argument was forfeited because it was not raised
in the district court. See Tibble v. Edison Int'l, 843 F.3d 1187, 1193 (9th Cir.
2016) (en banc) (citing Visendi v. Bank of Am., N.A., 733 F.3d 863, 869 (9th Cir.
2013)). In any event, it is not obvious from the face of the autopsy report that the
injuries in question would have been caused by the contact between the cars as
opposed to impact from broken glass after the bullets hit the car during the later
shooting, and Plaintiffs presented no evidence that they were.
AFFIRMED.

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