United States of America v. Jesse Rodriguez

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JESSE RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 21-10064
D.C. No. 1:01-cr-05146-WBS-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
William B. Shubb, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 15, 2022**
Before: CANBY, CALLAHAN, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
Jesse Rodriguez appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion
for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, see United
States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 799 (9th Cir. 2021), we affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
NOV 21 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 21-10064
Rodriguez contends that the district court erred by requiring him to show
that his release would not pose a danger to the public, and by treating U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13 as an applicable policy statement. We agree that the district court erred,
see Aruda, 993 F.3d at 799, 802, but conclude that the errors were harmless, see
United States v. Wright, 46 F.4th 938, 946 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding that an Aruda
error can be harmless). The court did not assess Rodriguez’s dangerousness or rely
upon it to deny relief. Moreover, the court considered the merits of all of
Rodriguez’s arguments, including those that were not “even remotely similar to
any of the bases listed [in § 1B1.13].”
Rodriguez also argues that the district court abused its discretion by
concluding that the First Step Act’s change to the “stacking” provision of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c) was not an extraordinary and compelling reason for relief. We
disagree. Rodriguez did not receive a stacked sentence and, as the district court
explained, any impact the stacking provision might have had on Rodriguez’s
decision to accept the plea agreement was entirely speculative, especially given his
substantial sentencing exposure even without stacking. Nor did the district court
abuse its discretion by concluding that Rodriguez’s medical conditions, when
considered along with his “relatively young” age and the medical treatment
provided to him in prison, were not an extraordinary and compelling reason
justifying compassionate release.

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Finally, contrary to Rodriguez’s argument, the record shows that the court
fully considered his arguments and explained why it was not persuaded by them. It
was not required to say more, nor was it required—once it determined that
Rodriguez had not shown extraordinary and compelling reasons for relief—to
address the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. See Wright, 46 F.4th at 947-53
(explaining what constitutes adequate explanation of a decision to deny
compassionate release and holding that, because the compassionate release
statute’s requirements are conjunctive, “a court may deny compassionate release at
any stage of the § 3582(c)(1)(A) pipeline”).
AFFIRMED.

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