Ralph B. Neal v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RALPH B. NEAL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING, INC.;
U.S. BANK, N.A., Successor Trustee to
Bank of America, NA Successor in Interest
to La Salle Bank NA, as Trustee on Behalf of
the Holders of WAMU Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates Series 2007-OA6;
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 21-15588
D.C. No. 5:20-cv-07127-EJD
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Edward J. Davila, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 17, 2022**
Before: CANBY, TASHIMA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Ralph B. Neal appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JUN 1 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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his diversity action alleging various claims related to his mortgage. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th
Cir. 2002). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Neal’s claims against the moving
defendants on the basis of claim preclusion because Neal raised, or could have
raised, his claims in his prior federal actions, which involved the same parties or
their privies and resulted in final judgments on the merits. See id. (setting forth
elements of federal claim preclusion); DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber, 352 P.3d
378, 386 (Cal. 2015) (setting forth elements of claim preclusion under California
law); see also Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 891 & n.4 (2008) (explaining that
the preclusive effect of judgments in diversity cases is determined by the
preclusion rules applied by the state in which the rendering court sits, and
preclusive effect of judgments in federal-question cases is determined by federal
claim preclusion rules); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning
Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1081 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining privity for purposes of
federal claim preclusion); City of Martinez v. Texaco Trading & Transp. Inc., 353
F.3d 758, 764 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining privity for purposes of claim preclusion
under California law).
The district court properly dismissed Neal’s claims against the defendants

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who did not move to dismiss the complaint. See Silverton v. Dep’t of Treasury,
644 F.2d 1341, 1345 (9th Cir. 1981) (“A District Court may properly on its own
motion dismiss an action as to defendants who have not moved to dismiss where
such defendants are in a position similar to that of moving defendants or where
claims against such defendants are integrally related.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by declaring Neal a vexatious
litigant and imposing pre-filing restrictions because the district court gave Neal
notice and the opportunity to oppose the pre-filing order, created a record adequate
for review, made substantive findings of frivolousness, and tailored the order
narrowly to prevent the abusive conduct. See Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp.,
500 F.3d 1047, 1056-58 (9th Cir. 2007) (setting forth standard of review and
factors a district court must consider before imposing a pre-filing restriction on a
vexatious litigant).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Neal’s complaint
without leave to amend because amendment would be futile. See Cervantes v.
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth
standard of review and explaining that a district court may dismiss without leave to
amend when amendment would be futile).

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We reject as without merit Neal’s contention that the district court was
biased.
AFFIRMED.

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