United States of America v. Dustin Wayne Randall

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DUSTIN WAYNE RANDALL,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 20-10339
D.C. Nos.
2:18-cr-00303-JCM-EJY-1
2:18-cr-00303-JCM-EJY
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 10, 2021
San Francisco, California
Before: WARDLAW, BRESS, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
Dustin Randall pleaded guilty to one count each of receipt and distribution of
child pornography, both in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2), (b). At sentencing,
the district court imposed a total sentence of 96 months’ imprisonment and lifetime
supervision. Randall now challenges his sentence of lifetime supervision, the district
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
FILED
MAY 20 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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court’s imposition of several conditions of supervised release, and the length of his
prison sentence. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.1
1. We reject Randall’s claim that the district court procedurally erred
when it sentenced Randall to lifetime supervision. To properly impose a term of
supervised release, the district court must: “(1) correctly calculate the Sentencing
Guidelines range; (2) treat the Guidelines as advisory; (3) consider the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors; (4) choose a sentence that is not based on clearly erroneous facts;
(5) adequately explain the sentence; and (6) not presume that the Guidelines range
is reasonable.” United States v. Collins, 684 F.3d 873, 888 (9th Cir. 2012).
“[T]hough a within-Guidelines sentence ordinarily needs little explanation,
. . . courts are required to provide some explanation for their decision when a party
has requested a specific departure.” United States v. Apodaca, 641 F.3d 1077, 1081
(9th Cir. 2011) (simplified). Such an explanation, however, need only “set forth
enough to satisfy the appellate court that the trial court judge considered the parties’
arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking
authority.” Id. (simplified).
According to Randall, the court imposed lifetime supervision “as a matter of
course” and erred by failing to give adequate reasons for the sentence and
1 In a concurrently filed opinion, we address Randall’s remaining arguments
regarding sentencing errors. In that opinion, we also affirm the district court.

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acknowledge Randall’s request for a lower term or that a lower term was
permissible.
The record shows, however, that the district court provided an adequate
explanation for the sentence it imposed. After explaining that the Guidelines
recommend a supervision range of five years to life, the district court considered
Randall’s circumstances, including a psychologist’s risk assessment report. The
district court decided that lifetime supervision was important to balance Randall’s
ability to “make something of [him]self” while also “assur[ing] the victims that this
won’t happen anymore with [Randall].” That was enough. See id. (explaining that
“no lengthy explanation is necessary if the record makes it clear that the sentencing
judge considered the evidence and arguments”).
Randall’s contention that his lifetime supervision sentence is substantively
unreasonable also fails. “We have previously held that sentencing individuals
convicted of possessing child pornography to lifetime terms of supervised release is
not substantively unreasonable.” Id. at 1082. Indeed, in Apodaca we upheld the
lifetime supervision sentence of a defendant who knowingly possessed child
pornography, including material that depicted sadistic or masochistic acts. Id. at
1080. Substantially the same facts are present here.
2. We also reject Randall’s challenge to the conditions of his supervised
release. Randall challenges the conditions prohibiting his contact with minors and

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preventing him from being present in places primarily used by children. Both
conditions, he argues, are overly burdensome and unnecessary to prevent him from
reoffending. Randall also objects to the polygraph testing condition on the ground
that polygraphy can be unreliable.
It is within a district court’s discretion to impose conditions that “are
reasonably related to the goal of deterrence, protection of the public, or rehabilitation
of the offender.” United States v. T.M., 330 F.3d 1235, 1240 (9th Cir. 2003). The
district court explained that “I’d rather be safe than sorry . . . . [O]ut of an abundance
of caution, I’m going to impose th[e] condition.” The court also noted that
“[polygraphy is] a tool the probation officer can use.” The record shows that the
district court imposed the conditions in the interest of public safety.
Indeed, we’ve upheld the same conditions challenged by Randall in other
cases involving child pornography. See, e.g., United States v. Autery, 555 F.3d 864,
875 (9th Cir. 2009) (upholding conditions that bar the defendant from having “direct
or indirect contact with anyone under the age of eighteen” or being “within 100 feet
of places where minors congregate”); United States v. Daniels, 541 F.3d 915, 925–
26 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding polygraph testing as a condition of supervised release);
United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 620 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding a condition
that prevents the defendant from “frequenting or loitering within one hundred feet
of . . . places primarily used by children under the age of eighteen” despite the

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defendant’s assertion that there is no evidence of him “ever having engaged in
improper contact with a minor.”).
3. Lastly, the district court acted within its discretion when it sentenced
Randall to a below-Guidelines prison term. The district court explained that both
the 210-month minimum sentence recommended by the Guidelines and the 136-
month sentence argued for by the government were too long. Yet, the court reasoned
that the 60-month sentence Randall sought was too short, given the severity of his
crimes. The district court ruled that a 96-month sentence was “adequate but not
greater than necessary punishment to deter the defendant’s conduct.” “Because a
Guidelines sentence will usually be reasonable, [the defendant’s] below-Guidelines
sentence, supported by the district court’s specific reasoning, is reasonable.” United
States v. Bendtzen, 542 F.3d 722, 729 (9th Cir. 2008) (simplified). The district
court’s reasoning here was so supported.
AFFIRMED.

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