Terrance Teran v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TERRANCE TERAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 19-35784
D.C. No. 3:18-cv-00042-TMB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Alaska
Timothy M. Burgess, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 13, 2022**
Pasadena, California
Before: IKUTA, NGUYEN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Terrance Teran appeals the district court’s decision affirming the Social
Security Administration (SSA) Commissioner’s denial of Teran’s disability claim.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district court’s order
FILED
MAY 17 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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de novo, and “will disturb the denial of benefits only if the decision contains legal
error or is not supported by substantial evidence.” Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141,
1154 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
We reject Teran’s argument that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) failed
to recognize that the period from January 2008 to December 2008 (during which
time Teran was engaged in substantial gainful activity) constituted a trial work
period. A trial work period cannot begin before the month in which the claimant
files an application for benefits, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1592(e), and Teran applied for
benefits in 2014.
Nor did the ALJ err in rejecting Teran’s claim that his condition was getting
worse. The ALJ identified specific evidence in the record supporting his
conclusion that Teran’s medical record reflected an upward trend in his condition,
including evidence that Teran: could work and attend school almost immediately
after the alleged disability onset date; had a positive response to medication; could
manage his post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms in public; and had “no
restriction” with respect to activities of daily living, as his mother confirmed. The
ALJ therefore met his burden of “specify[ing] which testimony [he] finds not
credible, and then provid[ing] clear and convincing reasons, supported by evidence
2

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in the record, to support that credibility determination.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin,
806 F.3d 487, 489 (9th Cir. 2015).
The ALJ’s determination of Teran’s residual functional capacity (RFC) was
supported by substantial evidence. The record indicated that Teran could perform
“simple, routine work” that did not involve extensive public interaction or
teamwork, and the ALJ incorporated this limitation into the RFC. To the extent
Teran alleges that the RFC does not take into account his memory problems and
neurological issues, there is no evidence in the medical record to support his claim
that he has such conditions. Therefore, we reject Teran’s challenge to the ALJ’s
conclusion that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that Teran has the RFC to perform.1
AFFIRMED.
1 To the extent Teran raises or attempts to raise additional challenges other
than those addressed in this disposition, including his claim that the ALJ failed to
review medical records regarding his 2003 assault, they have been waived or
inadequately briefed.
3

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